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I am the manifestation of study, NOT the manifestation of money. Therefore, I advance 
through thought, NOT what's manufactured and bought.
-Kris Parker 1965
In 2008 I was motivated by a teacher who inspired me to do research and set up my own 
company. Like any other student, I liked teachers who inspire you, regardless of how old you 
are. This teacher captivated his classes by talking about his own personal experiences as a 
researcher and as an entrepreneur. What struck me most was the applicability of his research 
for contemporary organisations wrestling with the implementation of IT systems.
During my study we had long discussions on the necessity of doing academic research 
that actually makes a contribution to society. In my professional career as an entrepreneur 
– seeking better solutions that can contribute to delivering true value to organisations – I 
encountered managers and directors struggling with the implementation of Information 
Security. Encouraged by this teacher, I started my research journey in 2008, finding 
methods and practices that could help my company grow as well as help my customers 
improve.
In 2010 this same teacher assisted me in finishing my Master’s degree in Informatics and 
another striking thing happened: the birth of my first daughter Lolah. These two life-changing 
events inspired me to approach this teacher to discuss a PhD. After some demotivating 
remarks about the long journey, the endless debates with promotors and students, and the 
worries that keep you up at night, he noticed that I was serious. So he invited me for a high 
tea in Delft, where we met together with our wives. I soon noticed that such journeys are not 
taken alone. I had the blessing of meeting my wife Nicole when I was only 21. As she is my 
best friend, she is also my life promotor and she motivates me in everything I do. Including 
this PhD. 
So there we were, having high tea in Delft discussing not the topic, research questions and 
potential outcomes, but purely the intrinsic drives: what gives you energy and what takes it 
away. Or, as ice skating champion Johan Olaf Koss put it, “constructors”. These are the people 
who inspire and have the ability to empower others. Now, at the end of my journey, I can tell 
you that these people are the most important source of inspiration and motivation if you 
decide to do a PhD. In 2013 my second daughter Mabel was born. During the year 2014 she 
gave me the strength to keep on going even when things might have set me back. I have had 
the pleasure of surrounding myself with such inspiring people who gave me the confidence 
and motivation I needed to complete my PhD. Due to them I never had moments of doubt 
or serious distractions along the road that could endanger my personal journey. There was 
always this teacher and my Nicole. After the high tea we decided that the teacher should 
become my mentor and co-promotor.
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After completing my research work in 2015, another phase of my research arrived. I needed 
to finalise writing my dissertation. I founded great tips in a book “Writing Your Dissertation 
in Fifteen Minutes a Day: A Guide to Starting, Revising, and Finishing Your Doctoral Thesis” 
by Joan Bolker and in the project management approach that my promotor (the teacher) 
suggested to me. Another important constructor in that phase was Aart van der Vlist, at that 
time the CIO of UWV, who asked me to become the CISO of UWV and encouraged me to 
finalise my PhD alongside this demanding role. I had the pleasure of debating with him and 
he gave me the opportunity to put my academic work into practice. During that period again 
my teacher as well as my wife each played a vital role. That gave me the direction and energy 
that was necessary to continue and finalise my writing.
During the entire research I worked with organisations where I received all kinds of advice, 
especially the importance of touching base with practice and talking with people in all kinds 
of disciplines. From chairs of listed companies to security engineers. From students and 
teachers to regulators and government bodies. The entire list of all the people who gave me 
practically-oriented motivation are acknowledged at the end of this thesis. In particular, I 
would like to acknowledge my promotors Erik Proper and Steven De Haes.
Besides these acknowledgements I would like to pay my sincere respect to two people who 
were crucial to my PhD. First “the teacher” – who became my co-promotor, and later on my 
friend and mentor Hans Mulder. Hans and I established a sincere friendship based on deep 
respect and understanding. According to Kris Parker “Real men are real friends, showing 
their real commitment”. Hans revealed a great commitment to helping me finish my PhD. 
And my wife Nicole, who stands behind every adventure I undertake. Her friendship and 
love encourage me to do the right things at work as well as when being a father raising our 
two daughters. I think everybody needs a role model or friend: someone who shows faith 
in anything you do and has endless commitment. In my opinion teachers play a vital role in 
anyone’s life, whatever your age or professional status. I’m thankful to be able to lead, learn 
and teach. And surround myself with great friends.
Driebergen-Rijssenburg, 2018
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In this chapter I discuss the main motivations for this research project: on the one hand from 
my point of view as a practitioner and on the other hand as an academic exploration. This first 
chapter is my point of departure for a long research journey into examining ways to improve 
business in-formation security maturity within mid-market organisations. In Chapter 2, I 
describe the numerous methods used in the following chapters, both to examine the topic as 
well as clarify the design and engineering of my artefact, which was created to improve the 
Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS).
1.1.        MOTIVATION BASED ON PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS 
Organising Information Security (IS) within companies is complex [1]. When I started my 
consulting practice, security managers had a difficult job and that is still the case today. I 
observe companies struggling in their departmental silos with Excel and Word documents 
scattered throughout the organisation, with no integral view or one single source of truth 
that could be used to gain control. This becomes even more challenging as compliance and 
“control statements” represent a licence to operate for many firms. My main observation 
when starting my research in 2010 was that there was a lack of adequate knowledge and 
insights into relevant prac-tices and parameters that could be used to improve Business 
Information Security (BIS) maturity. Insight in these parameters is necessary and, in some 
cases, compulsory due to various regulations [2]. Standardised frameworks such as the 
ISO27000 are being applied in order to implement Information Security. According 
to Siponen [3] “these frameworks are generic or universal in scope and thus do not pay 
enough attention to the differences between organisations and their information security 
requirements”. 
In practice I have seen the application of frameworks falter because they tend to become 
a goal on their own rather than a supporting frame of reference to start dialogues with 
key stakeholders. The absence of collaboration and exchange of perspectives that is based 
upon underlying data, is limiting organisations in their effective execution of IS. Kluge 
et al. [4] for example also noted that the use of frameworks as a goal on its own does not 
support the intrinsic willingness and commitment to improve information security maturity 
This motivated me to examine the academic literature as well as “best practices” and the 
potential “barriers” that companies – and their key stakeholders - face when applying BIS. 
This is especially the case for mid-market organisations since they lack dedicated staff or 
sufficient budgets. During my quest I came across an inspiring research effort by Puhakainen 
and Siponen [5] that criticises information security approaches as lacking not only 
theoretically grounded methods, but also empirical evidence of their effectiveness. Many 
other researchers [6], [7], [8] have also pointed out the necessity of empirical research 
into practical interventions and preconditions in order to support organisations with MBIS. 
These theoretical voids, as well as the practical observation of failing compliant-oriented 
approaches, widen the knowledge gap [9]. This “knowing doing gap” [10] is what also 
motivated me as a business problem-solving researcher to examine the key concepts of this 
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phenomenon through Design Science Research (DSR) and, with this study, to build a design 
artefact that could contributes to solving real problems.
1.2.       MOTIVATION BASED ON LITERATURE
The widely used term Information Technology (IT) Security focuses mainly on information 
technology controls that are used to detect or mitigate information security risks. Recent 
research has shown that the number of IT security incidents has increased in recent years, 
as has the financial impact per data breach [11]. In 2009, an average of 25 percent of 
EU organisations experienced a data breach. The main factors influencing the increase in 
security incidents are the multiplication of data (Big Data), the increase in the number of 
high-speed internet connections, disruptive technology [12], [13] the Internet of Things, 
[14] (IoT), the increase in social media interactions [15], and the increase in cybercrime 
activities [16], [17]. Mastering this complex subject requires a team. Since IT security 
professionals must protect critical information, they need to know about the value of 
information and therefore the impact it might have if this information is threatened [18]. The 
IT risk management discipline requires capabilities, knowledge and expertise [19] that are 
clearly different from those that IT security professionals needed in the past. Hubbard [20] 
refers to the failure factor of insufficient ‘expert knowledge’ within impact estimations. He 
refers to the necessity of experience, beyond the fields of risk and IT security. This is why IT 
security increasingly also encompasses Human Resource Management (HRM) aspects [21], 
financial aspects [22], marketing aspects, etc. [23]. According to Von Solms, IT security goes
beyond the IT department into business domains such as HRM, marketing, legal etc [24]. 
When we study Information Security, we observe an expanding range of disciplines related to 
securing businesses and their critical assets [25]. Traditional Information Security controls 
such as the segregation of duties in critical business processes are no longer the domain 
of just IT systems [26]. According to Neubauer and Heurix [27] business processes are 
permanently exposed to a variety of threats, organizations and are forced to pay attention to 
security issues. They state “Although the security of business activities is widely recognized 
as important, business processes and security aspects are often developed separately and 
without considering different objectives”.These processes are designed [28] and maintained 
by the business, in this case with multiple people judging a certain business process (e.g. 
Segregation of Duties (SoD) in handling insurance claims). Another example is awareness 
training of employees, which is no longer in the hands of security technicians but part of 
integral business management [29], e.g. corporate culture [21] or HRM onboarding 
[30]. Business also includes the context that business is operating in and relationships 
with stakeholders who rely on information assurance, such as business partners, clients, 
shareholders, unions, pension funds, social communities and regulators [31]. Internal and 
external stakeholders of organisations who, according to the press, appear to have suffered 
security incidents such as ASML [32], UWV [33], ING [34], Yahoo [35], Gemalto [36], 
SONY [37], Dutch Tax Department [38], Diginotar [39] and Target [40] often suffer 
indirectly from security incidents. Those who are responsible – and accountable – in these 
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organisations are boards of directors and executive managers. These board members 
struggle with responsibilities and liabilities in relation to information security and cyber 
risks [18]. This can have serious consequences since they are also legally liable [40], [41]. 
Incidents such as Target [40] show us that the security of organisations is no longer in the 
hands of technicians or security officers only, but increasingly also in the hands of the CIO 
and CEO, employees, and it is subject to external influences. Altegrity [42], Diginotar [43] 
and Impairment Resources [44] reveal the power of negative perceptions and social media 
in causing a snowball of accusations that can ultimately lead to a firm’s bankruptcy [45]. 
The Diginotar official investigation reports a lack of information security and audit practices 
[43]. This detailed report based on a trial in court [39] reveals failures in the security of 
systems prior to the hack, but also a lack of procedures around password management and 
patch management. The report also revealed the fact that proper in-depth due diligence 
was not performed by the buyer Vasco and Vasco was also not proactively informed by the 
seller about the prior security findings of the third-party auditors (ITsec Security Services 
B.V.). The penalties as well as the bankruptcy of Diginotar made the company’s owners aware 
of their obligations. It also made stakeholders aware that bankruptcy can be the result of 
inappropriate management. It shed a stronger light on the need for proper Information 
Security Management (ISM). Nowadays Information Security Management is a strategic 
issue for business leaders and several institutions and communities have launched numerous 
initiatives to encourage business leaders to ensure good stewardship in this area [46]. 
The associated compliance obligations and the increase in security breaches have made 
many business leaders aware of its impact on the business continuity [47], civil and legal 
liabilities [43] reputation [48], [49], employability and financial position [50], [51] 
of companies. This is why Von Solms and Von Solms [52] have argued that Information 
Security Management (ISM) should be part of Information Security Governance (ISG) 
[52]. The IT Governance Institute (ITGI) states that ownership of data and its information 
risks are the responsibility of businesses and their owners [18]. Within the multidisciplinary 
context of Information Security we therefore use the term “Business Information Security” 
[53]. Managing Business Information is a prerequisite for improving Business Information 
Security maturity [54]. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) [55] and ISACA 
[56] describe information security as an integrated enterprise activity requiring proper 
governance of the work done in this area by the board and executive management.
In their 2006 publication on Information Security Governance (ISG), Basie and Rossouw von 
Solms [57] differentiate three levels: The strategic level (Board of Directors and Executive 
Management), the tactical level (Senior and middle management) and the operational level 
(lower management and administration). The figure below presents these layers and the 
associated activities. All directive-setting and controlling activities (including monitoring 
and evaluating) are seen as part of the strategic level of governance [57]. An example is 
the adoption of Information Security Control Frameworks such as the Information Security 
Forum (ISF) Standard of Good Practice. All activities designed to put these directives into 
practice take place at the tactical management level. The tactical level involves formulating 
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policies and guidelines, for example establishing minimum standards that the organisation 
needs to adhere to, such as incident management and supply chain management. The level 
below the tactical level is where these policies and guidelines are translated into procedures 
and working methods. For example, this is the level where monitoring software is configured 
which triggers incident response processes or imposes stricter guidelines for suppliers. 
Governing the topic of Business Information Security is a relevant prerequisite for the 
Maturing Business Information Security process. Julia Allen of Carnegie Mellon University 
points out: “Governing information security means viewing adequate security as a non-
negotiable requirement of being in business. If an organisation’s management and boards 
does not establish and reinforce the business need for effective information security, the 
organisation’s desired state of security will not be articulated, achieve or sustained. To achieve 
sustainable information security maturity organisations must make information security the 
responsibility of leaders at a governance level, not of other organisational roles that lack the 
authority, accountability and resources to act and enforce compliance” [54]. Increasing 
or maintaining the level of BIS maturity depends on the desired state an organisation 
wants to achieve. Determining the desired state of BIS maturity and the Governance of 
BIS is, according to Allen, a board-level activity. To arrive at a clearer definition of Business 
Information Security Governance we first consider the definition of Enterprise Governance 
as used by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) “Enterprise governance is the 
set of responsibilities and practices exercised by the board and executive management with 
the goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring that objectives are achieved, ascertaining 
that risks are managed appropriately and verifying that the organisation’s resources are used 
responsibly” [55]. 
This definition was modified by the international Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA) as follows: “Information Security Governance is the set of responsibilities 
and practices by the board and executive management with the goal of providing strategic 
direction, ensuring that objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risk is managed 
appropriately and verifying that the organisations resources are used responsibly” [56].
Both bodies view information security as an integrated enterprise activity requiring proper 
governance.
Von Solms and Von Solms [57] mention in their research work that governance is relevant for 
Directing, Monitoring and Controlling, but also for evaluating, reflecting and learning from 
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incidents. Governance refers to "all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a 
government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organisation 
or territory and whether through laws, norms, power or language." [58] It relates to "the 
processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective 
problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms and 
institutions.” [59]. Reflection and learning from experiences as noted by Von Solms and Von 
Solms [57] is also mentioned by Lebek et al. [7] as a prerequisite for improving BIS [7].
PROBLEMS FOR THE MID-MARKET
Most of the contributions to the various best-practice publications by community bodies 
such as ISACA [56], National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Information 
Security Forum (ISF) [19] and ITGI [18] are prescriptive in nature [60]. The objective 
is to guide organisations through a structured way of working, e.g. checklists, guidelines 
or sets of principles that can help companies achieve a desired state. Yet the problem for 
organisations lies in the fact that these prescriptive models and frameworks have limitations 
when they are implemented in the real world [3]. According to Siponen and Willison, these 
frameworks are perceived as complex and overwhelming [3]. They do not take into account 
all kinds of intangible factors such as stakeholder demands, culture [61], and industry type 
or company size [5]. According to studies by Siponen, [61], Kluge et al. [4] and Sanchez et 
al. [62], business leaders in mid-market organisations therefore find it difficult to understand 
where to start, and how to maintain certain business information security governance 
processes [63]. Kankanhalli et al. [63] investigated the effectiveness of IS and revealed the 
fact that mid-market organisations engage in fewer deterrent efforts compared to larger 
Figure 1: The IS Governance Direct Control Cycle taken from Von Solms and Von Solms [57].
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organisations, even though these deterrent activities contribute to better IS. This is due to 
the amount of money needed to invest in IS and to a lack of sufficient knowledge [9]. The 
problem is that boards of directors in smaller organisations do not have an extended staff 
with advisers and also have other priorities, such as keeping ‘the store’ open and making 
money [63]. The problem with regard to mid-market organisations has the elements 
described below.
Due to an increase in the use of technology by society (Internet of Things) and the 
complexity of BIS, combined with an increase in sophisticated cyber threats, organisations 
have limited insights into potential risks and their impact on personal, financial and/
or legal liabilities. Information Security tends to stay at a tactical IT management level 
(not at the strategic board level). The absence of adequate knowledge and awareness of 
insights needed to understand tactical and operational facts reduces the sense of urgency. 
In addition, organisations still practice Information Security as an ad-hoc project [64] in 
a fire-fighting mode, rather than as part of a continuous improvement cycle as proposed on 
Demings [65] PDCA cycle in most Information Security literature and adopted by Tewarie 
[66]. This ad-hoc approach leaves little time for reflection in order to improve and hinders 
the awareness of a continuous learning process and self-reflection [9], [67]. 
The main problem we aim to address in this research project is to contribute to the 
required knowledge sharing, build the necessary consensus on priorities (where to start), 
make informed decisions and create the necessary engagement among stakeholders. In 
this research we capture; knowledge sharing, consensus building, decision making and 
stakeholder engagement as the collective term “Collaboration”. 
We thereby encountered two challenges:
 − Low stakeholder involvement and awareness
 − The inherent complexity and dynamics of BIS due to more IT within organisations and 
society (IoT) and emerging –innovative- cybercrime methods. 
Social interaction, collaboration and self-reflection are important precursors for determining 
what kind of tactical process data and operational log data needs to be captured for 
measuring, assessing and reporting to the strategic level so that managers and boards can 
form their opinion on BIS maturity performance. We want to examine if existing industry 
leading community practices such as International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
SysAdmin, Audit, Network and Security (SANS), ISF, etc., can be considered as input for the 
required data analysis, measurement and reporting method.
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1.3        PROBLEM STATEMENT
The reflection and learning noted by Von Solms and Von Solms [57] as well as Lebek et al. [7] 
is a prerequisite for continuously improving BIS on the people side [68], [7] as well on process 
[27] and technology. To include such a continuous reflective process within the existing models, 
each actor is required to develop feedback and feed-forward activities as part of the predefined 
processes. By doing this, a continuous reflexive process of self -learning and self -studying can 
result in continuous improvement [69]. A successful implementation of these self-reflexive 
processes is already adopted in software development via ‘retrospectives’ as part of daily team 
rituals, adopted from Lean process improvement [70]. To note this continuous reflection 
between the organisational layers and within the layers, arrows are added in the Direct Control 
Cycle in the figure below in order to address the problem we chose to work on. Since BIS is 
implemented within a dynamic environment, we also added this element in Figure 3. The 
conceptual model in Figure 3 represents the research area of this thesis and the scope of this 
research project is focused on the strategic level (Board of Directors). 
This brings us to the problem statement of this research project: “Organisations have to 
contend with BIS incidents. Board members struggle with their responsibilities and legal 
liability in relation to this topic, because it is not perceived and practised as a continuous 
collaborative discipline that is integrated into business management, with clear parameters 
and frequent contextual alignment”. 
Figure 2: The PDCA cycle on Direct Control Cycle of Van Solms & Von Solms based on Tewarie [66].
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‘Parameters’ here refers to a set of possible practices and interventions through which 
they can reach, monitor and maintain an integral view and achieve a particular level of BIS 
maturity.
BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY PROCESSES AND DATA
The key Information Security Governance layers of information risk and security to gain this 
integral view, based on Von Solms and Von Solms Direct Control Cycle [57], are highlighted 
in Figure 4. To better understand the BIS processes and data, on Governance, Management 
and Operational level, which are required for this integral view and do the BIS administration 
we describe each of them with some examples. The directive-setting objectives come from 
the strategic level. The risk appetite and accompanying policies are communicated to senior 
management in the form of requirements. Senior management is then mandated to put these 
policies into standards (e.g. technical, human and process requirements). These standards 
are applied in terms of all kind of risks (e.g. through maintenance of risk logs) and security 
(e.g. security action plans) processes and controls (e.g. general IT controls). These processes 
and controls rely on underlying processes such as service processes, change management 
processes and operational processes with clear requirements, such as firewall rule 
verifications, log handling, etc. Most of these processes are semi or fully automated. Some 
examples are Technical State Compliance Monitoring (TSCM), Vulnerability management 
(VM), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM), Data Leakage Prevention (DLP), Threat Intelligence (TI), Secure Software 
Development (SSD) and Penetration Testing. All security requirements that are needed to 
keep risks within the risk appetite boundaries are stored in data repositories and documents 
such as Business Impact Analysis (BIA), Operational Security Guidelines (OSG), Security 
Requirement Lists (SRL), etc. (a detailed meta model is shown in Figure 21). Due to changes 
in legislation, technology and business environment these requirements frequently change. 
In most organisations documents reside on SharePoint servers, desktops and end-user 
computers (mobile devices) in spreadsheets [72]. This makes it an administrative burden to 
maintain a single location for such records and documentation management becomes a risk 
on its own since there is no single place of truth. This problem increases with the growth of 
the Internet of Things, changes in technology, software-based devices and emerging cyber 
threats. Regulated companies, such as financial institutions, are better in this respect, since 
managing information risk and security is part of their licence to operate and they tend to 
allocate sufficient resources for it such as dedicated security departments with dedicated 
Governance Risk and Compliance (GRC) tools [63]. Smaller, mid-market organisations 
struggle with this [62]. Within IT operations numerous security and service management 
processes are active in order to maintain a certain level of operational security control, given 
the information risks that may arise. All these processes provide input on the performance 
and compliance of information risk and security management. Prioritising and selecting the 
appropriate parameters that reflect the relevant operational data for the right audience is a 
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Figure 3: Conceptual Model based on the Direct Control Cycle of Von Solms and Von Solms [71].
Figure 4: Conceptual model with detailed BIS processes and data, based on Von Solms and Von Solms [71].
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cumbersome task. This requires collaboration between a number of stakeholders and target 
groups. Continuous measurement and reporting on the performance of risk and security 
processes is needed in order for boards and executive management to maintain control over 
BIS.
1.4        RESEARCH QUESTIONS, OBJECTIVES AND DELIVERABLES
Considering the issues mentioned above there is a need to; establish a more collaborative 
way of working among stakeholders when addressing the dynamics of the environment and 
the organisation, gain a more qualitative and integral view based on facts related to tactical 
and operational data, to secure an increase in awareness at board level, to employ a certain 
level of reflection and self-learning to achieve continuous improvement and to use accepted 
best-practice frameworks produced and maintained by existing security communities and 
bodies. Therefore, the aim of this research is to answer the following main research question 
“How can we establish a method which utilises best practices and collaboration for improving 
BIS maturity?”
In order to answer this main research question we follow Wieringa [73] to distinguish 
Knowledge Questions (KQ) and Design Questions (DQ). Knowledge questions provide 
us with insights and learnings that together with Design Questions contribute in the 
construction of the design artefact. This means that during the Design and development 
stages of this thesis (chapters 6 and 7) separate –requirement- design questions are 
formulated with the objective to design artefact requirements. The Design Science 
Research Framework of Johannesson and Perjons [73] is adopted and visualised in Figure 
5 including the undermentioned research questions per step in the framework. Since mid-
market organisations suffer from information risks and need to be helped with practical 
interventions at the managerial as well as at the governance level we distinguish the following 
questions. 
To get an understanding of the underscoring key concepts of BIS we formulate this as the first 
research questions. This will be addressed in chapter 3.
1. What is BIS maturity, based on the definitions derived from best practice and the literature?
(KQ)
2. Which best-practice interventions are currently used to improve BIS maturity? (KQ)
3. Which barriers do organisations experience when applying BIS interventions? (KQ)
Since BIS problems are more evident within mid-market organisations (they have limited 
budgets and IS staff, and are more likely to participate), this research focuses on mid-market 
organisations. The following additional questions therefore need to be answered:
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4. Which barriers have been identified in mid-market organisations? (KQ)
5. Which of the identified BIS interventions are practical1 in such organisations? (KQ)
6. What are the general organisational preconditions for the application of the core set of BIS 
interventions? (KQ)
These six knowledge research questions are answered via the explorative research described 
in Chapter 3. 
An additional knowledge question is formulated to gain more insight into BISG practices and 
test the method.
7. What is a useful framework for Business Information Security Governance practices, 
according to the academic literature on the subject and the views of experts? (KQ)
This research question is answered via the qualitative research described in Chapter 4. 
1  In this research we define practical as 1) effective: the intervention or a combination of relevant interventions that effectively 
increase security and 2) easy to implement: to what extent is the intervention easy to understand and apply?
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An additional design question is defined in order to determine which best practices can be 
used to measure, monitor and report on BIS maturity as well as further test the method to 
solve stakeholders’ problems. 
8. Which parameters that influence the Maturing Business Information Security (MBIS) 
process can be considered as requirements for an artefact designed to capture, measure
and report the MBIS process? (DQ)
9. How do these artefact requirements contribute to solving the business problems and meet
stakeholders’ needs? (KQ)
The last two research questions are answered in Chapter 6 and 7 respectively.
Given the above research questions we have defined the following objectives:
• Examining the key concepts and parameters that influence BIS maturity. The collective 
term parameter is used to capture terms such as interventions, barriers, practices, critical 
success factors, knowledge items and working methods that are part of the MBIS process. I 
do this not intend to examine /scrutinise the current frameworks or models and the efficiency 
of these models.
• Designing and building an experimental artefact with relevant parameters. To 
contribute to capturing the above-mentioned items by constructing an artefact which has the
initial relevant requirements and the parameters of control needed to demonstrate that it 
contributes to solving MBIS-related problems. I refer in this thesis to an artefact experiment. 
• Examining and defining a method that addresses collaboration
With these objectives in mind we aim to deliver the following deliverables as visualised in
Figure 6:
RESEARCH DELIVERABLES
1 a) Parameters, insights and viewpoints that form a conceptual framework for BIS, and 
influences the BIS maturity at management as well as governance level (Board of Directors) 
as well as insights into factors that influence the BIS maturity.
1 b) A design artefact-tool that supports the administrative work (measuring and 
reporting), which can be used to report insights into the state of BIS maturity at multiple 
levels (strategic, tactical and operational) – using the parameters defined for reporting the 
BIS maturity of the organisation – to boards, owners and other stakeholders. 
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A defined analysis method which enables knowledge sharing, consensus building on 
priorities, informs decisions, enables stakeholder engagement, contributes to increasing of 
awareness and enables reflection.
1.5       THESIS STRUCTURE
This thesis is constructed to reflect both via theoretical and practical viewpoints in eight 
chapters. The structure of the thesis is shown in Figure 7. The purpose of this section is to 
provide a guide to give readers guidance on how this thesis is constructed and which chapter 
provide answers to the various research questions. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the research philosophies and strategies that 
are relevant and applicable to Business Information Security research. It elaborates the 
strategies and methods that were chosen to answer the research questions and contributes to 
the rigour of the thesis. This chapter is based on two publications: 
 − Y. Bobbert, „Defining a research method for engineering a Business Information Security 
artefact,” in Proceedings of the Enterprise Engineering Working Conference (EEWC) Forum, 
Antwerp, 2017. url; http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1838/
 − Y. Bobbert, „On Exploring Research Methods for Business Information Security Alignment 
and Artefact Engineering,” International Journal of IT/Business Alignment and Governance, 
vol. 8, nr. 2, pp. 28-40, 2017. DOI: 10.4018/IJITBAG.2017070102
These papers focus on the several research methods used and it prescribes a Design Science 
Research approach for the development and implementation of an MBIS artefact. 
Figure 6: Thesis structure with deliverables based upon Johannesson and Perjons [66]
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Chapter 3 deals with key concepts underscoring the BIS topic. It presents a minimum set 
of concepts that are needed to answer the research questions. The outcome of this chapter 
answers research question one and forms the input for the conceptual framework for BIS that 
is applicable for the following chapters. 
Chapter 4 provides the first step in the initial exploration of management practices that 
are effective and easy to implement by organisations in order to improve the Maturity of 
Business Information Security (MBIS). This research chapter is focussed on mid-market 
organisations and also involves them in answering some of the research questions. It 
includes preconditions, barriers and enablers of the maturing process that can be used in 
the following research phases. This chapter answers –knowledge- research questions one to 
six and proposes a Business Information Security conceptual framework for management 
interventions. An important finding in this chapter is the absence of Governance practices for 
BIS, this is addressed in the next chapter 5. Chapter 4 is largely based on the publication:
 − Y. Bobbert and J. Mulder, "A Research Journey into Maturing the Business Information 
Security of Mid Market Organizations," International Journal on IT/Business Alignment 
and Governance, 1(4), 18-39, October-December 2010, United States, 2010. DOI: 
10.4018/jitbag.2010100102
This publication describes the literature review, expert judgement via Group System 
Support (GSS) and mid-market validation of a core set of interventions that mid-
market organisations can take into account for improving their BIS. The final core set of 
interventions are set as artefact requirement candidates in a later stage of the research. 
Chapter 5 provides an extensive, in-depth literature survey of governance practices that 
are relevant for MBIS. It establishes a rigorous process of literature research and expert 
validation, leading to a core set of governance practices and critical success factors put 
forward in a framework that can be of relevance for Boards of Directors, which can be used in 
further research and design of an MBIS artefact. This chapter is based on the publication:
 − Y. Bobbert and J. Mulder, "Group Support Systems Research in the Field of Business 
Information Security; a Practitioners View," in 46th Hawaii International Conference on 
System Science, Hawaii USA, 2013. DOI 10.1109/HICSS.2013.244
This publication elaborates how the research among 4 experts was done to validate the 
literature on Governance practices via a collaborative process and documented in GSS. 
The title of this publication is: Group Support Systems Research in the Field of Business 
Information Security; a Practitioner’s View. It was presented in Hawaii in 2013 and the 
outcome was taken into account to further establish and demonstrate the artefact. 
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Chapter 6 deals with the design and development of an MBIS artefact with a Design Science 
Research approach. There are five cases of artefact requirements that were adopted for 
building the artefact. All five cases have gone through the entire Design Science Research 
(DSR) cycle. This chapter was partly build upon two publications:
Y. Bobbert en J. Mulder, „Governance Practices and Critical Succes Factors suitable for 
Business Information Security,” in International Conference on Computational Intelligence and 
Communication Networks, India, 2015. DOI 10.1109/CICN.2015.216.
This paper describes the research process of collecting literature data on BISG and validates 
this via the GSS expert panel to establish a core set of BIS practices and Critical Success 
Factors. This research was conducted in 2011 and 2012. The derived BISG practices are used 
in the further establishment of the BIS artefact. 
Y. Bobbert, „Porters' Elements for a Business Information Security Strategy,” ISACA Journal, vol. 
1, nr. United States, pp. 1-4, 2015.
This publication reflects the research effort into strategic forces organisations cope with while 
drafting their strategic BIS plans. This chapter provides answers to design research question 8 
and knowledge question 9. 
Chapter 7 evaluates the way the artefact works, based on the five cases from chapter 6 
and reveals its explicit contribution to solving practical problems that arise before, during 
and after the MBIS process. It also demonstrates how it solves problems experienced by 
stakeholders. It concludes with a thorough comparison study to demonstrate the relevance of 
the artefact functionalities and thereby further substantiate the answers to research question 
8 and 9.
Chapter 8 contains the overall findings, conclusions and limitations of this research project. 
It reveals its practical and academic contribution and how the process of valorisation is 
realised through exploration and practical exploitation of the artefact.
The names of people who contributed this research project are blanked or scrambled for 
privacy reasons. 
The appendices contain all the evidence data used to construct this thesis. These are 
separated data files that can be downloaded from the electronic archive: 10.17026/dans-
zbu-hfdc.
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This chapter deals with the research philosophies and strategies that are relevant and 
applicable to research on Business Information Security. It elaborates the strategies and 
methods that were chosen in order to answer the research questions and to contribute to the 
academic rigour of the thesis. This chapter consists of a survey of relevant research methods 
and techniques, followed by a discussion and research assumptions.
2.1        INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I explore a research methodology for studying the process of improving 
the Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS) at the governance and executive 
management level. Within the domain of Business Information Security (BIS) there is 
little scientific research on research methodologies that has examined the parameters 
which influence achieving and maintaining an adequate level of Business Information 
Security Maturity. This chapter contributes to this discourse by examining several research 
philosophies and methods for conducting BIS research. It examines several philosophies, 
such as quantitative versus qualitative research and the differences in relation to BIS. It 
concludes by proposing a Design Science Research strategy which makes it possible to 
answer the main research question and it highlights the ontological and epistemological 
aspects within BIS and how they relate to the various qualitative methods. Ontology relates to 
how we view ‘things’ such as organisational change as a result of engaging in the information 
security maturing process. Epistemology relates to how and what knowledge is acquired and 
shared during that process. It deals with how we learn what we need to learn and how we 
can capture the right amount and depth of knowledge in the information security maturity 
change process.
This chapter is based on two publications that focus on the several research methods 
used and it prescribes a Design Science Research approach for the development and 
implementation of an MBIS artefact.. 
 − Y. Bobbert, ”Defining a research method for engineering a Business Information Security 
artefact,” in Proceedings of the Enterprise Engineering Working Conference (EEWC) 
Forum, Antwerp, 2017. url; http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1838/
 − Y. Bobbert, ”On Exploring Research Methods for Business Information Security Alignment 
and Artefact Engineering,” in International Journal of IT/Business Alignment and 
Governance, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 28-40, 2017. DOI: 10.4018/IJITBAG.2017070102 
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2.2        SELECTING RESEARCH METHODS
2.2.1   QUANTITATIVE & QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
As explained in the previous chapter the BIS problem is too complex and ambiguous to 
be examined using a predefined method. Researchers describing methodological issues 
distinguish between qualitative and quantitative research methods. This classification“can 
be a helpful umbrella for a range of issues concerned with the practice of business research 
[74].” Quantitative research employs variables and measurements, whereas qualitative 
research does not. According to some researchers the differences go much deeper than 
the superficial issue of the application of quantification [75]. According to some writers 
quantitative and qualitative research also differs with respect to epistemological foundations 
[76]. Within quantitative research the principal approach is deductive in nature i.e. testing 
a theory with the help of quantitative data collection methods. Within qualitative research 
the principal orientation is inductive in nature. The objective is to generate theories. Within 
quantitative research the ontological orientation is objective. It has the view of social 
reality as an external objective reality, referred to as objectivism [76]. Objectivism is an 
ontological position that claims that social entities (e.g. organisations) exist in a reality that 
is external to, and independent of, social actors. Within qualitative research the ontological 
orientation is that of constructing the situation based on the details, and attempting to 
understand the reality behind it. This is often associated with the term constructionism or 
social constructionism [76]. “Constructionism follows from the epistemological orientation 
of the interpretivist position to explore the subjective meanings motivating the actions 
of social actors in order for the researcher to be able to understand these actions” [76]. 
Interpretivism is the epistemology that sees the role of the researcher as part of a ‘social 
subject’.” The researcher observes, analyses and interprets phenomena which he or she 
is part of. Positivists believe in applying methods from the natural sciences to study social 
reality. The epistemological orientation behind quantitative research is a particular form 
of positivism and it involves applying quantitative methods from natural sciences models to 
research the subject at hand. It would be wrong to suggest that several research methods 
cannot be combined. On the contrary, most of the research done in Information System 
Science or in Information Security involves a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Qualitative characteristics such as explorability or complexity can be combined 
with ‘strong’ quantitative characteristics, such as generalizability and deductibility [77]. 
Figure 8 visualises the various qualitative and quantitative methodologies. 
Lebek et al. [7] reveal that most academic research (including 55% percent of IS research 
papers) is empirical and based on quantitative methods (see Figure 8). Non-academic based 
research projects and publications also largely depend on quantitative data sets. One of the 
best known practical-oriented research institutes, Ponemon, uses large quantitative data sets 
to derive qualitative statements [78]. Gartner and IDC also use numerous methods to gather 
quantitative data to generate qualitative theoretical assumptions. To a certain extent these 
institutes indicate the limitations of their research outcomes and the conclusions that 
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they draw. For example, Ponemon raises an important limitation in the sense that they 
“decided to omit other important variables from analyses such as leading trends and 
organisational characteristics.” Many of the ontological and epistemological issues within 
the information security area arise precisely from these organisational characteristics. For 
example, culture, attitudes, perceptions, etc. (relational mechanisms) are hard to capture 
without making use of qualitative methods (e.g. interviews, case studies and expert panel 
research). A paper by Lebek et al. reveals that scientific researchers still tend to focus on 
quantitative research methods when examining non-quantitative topics, such as awareness 
and behaviour. Figure 9 is the result of an extensive literature study that Lebek et al. 
performed from 2000 to 2012 on 144 publications dealing with employees’ security 
awareness and behaviour. The researchers encourage the application of qualitative and 
interpretivist studies to explore more deeply factors such as user misbehaviour and a lack 
of user awareness. There is a need for more qualitative and interpretive studies in the BIS 
research field, as Workman et al. also found [6]. This is also acknowledged by Dhillon, who 
stated: “There has been little research in information systems security that can be termed 
as interpretivist in nature. Generally functionalists do not even acknowledge the existence 
of such research efforts (ibid.). For them such approaches are ‘abstract’ and ‘too general’” 
[79]. However, because of increasing dissatisfaction with the prevalent security approaches, 
there is a growing body of researchers who have begun to consider alternative philosophical 
viewpoints in their efforts to develop secure information systems. 
Figure 8: Qualitative and quantitative methodologies, taken from Recker [77].
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Another relevant contribution was made by Abraham [80]. She did literature research 
on publications that examined intangible factors that influence user security behaviour, 
including the behaviour of senior management and decision-making skills [80]. Her study 
defined three major themes:
 − Management and peer influences
 − Deterrence efforts or sanctions
 − Rewards and the level of employee participation in security efforts within the organisation.
Management and peer influence relates to the extent to which employees follow guidelines 
set by management (e.g. compliance regulations) through leading by “good example” or 
setting the “tone at the top.” If managers do not act in accordance with their own predefined 
guidelines, it is likely employees will follow that behaviour [81], causing IS programmes to 
fail. In her study Abraham noted a lack of studies that empirically evaluated the effects of 
management’s use of security practices on end users’ security behaviour. 
Deterrence effects or sanctions relates to the effects these measures have on IS behaviour 
and IS adoption by employees. Rewarding employees can act as a motivator, creating 
commitment to IS. This was also found by Spurling in 1995 [82].
Rewards and the level of employee participation in security efforts in the organisation relate 
to the degree of positive influence user participation can have on IS strategy formulation 
and implementation. If users are involved at an early stage of the IS planning process (i.e. 
maturing towards a desired state) [82], [83], indicate that user participation contributes 
to “improving security control performance through greater awareness, greater alignment 
between IS security risk management and the business environment, and improved control 
development” [84].
Abraham examined 52 studies, studying individuals’ IS behaviour. She refers to a lack 
of qualitative studies that examine group interaction and behaviour using qualitative 
methods; “information security is a complex phenomenon and its repercussions extend 
beyond individuals to groups and teams in organisations. While numerous studies have 
addressed end-user security behaviour, we lack studies that examine security group behaviour. 
Individuals can act differently in group environments [85] especially when groups are 
responsible for ensuring security. We identify the need for studies that examine the dynamics 
of security behaviour in group and team settings in organisations.” This confirms the 
importance of qualitative research in this domain.
Three major studies over the last 15 years by Abraham [80], Lebek et al. [7] and Siponen 
[86] have examined the literature on intangible factors of MBIS success such as user 
awareness, management commitment, peer influences and behaviour. According to 
Workman, the limited amount of research in this area is restricting the IS field. Zooming
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deeper into a study by Lebek et al. [7], she states that only five of the 144 studies include 
>500 respondents. The authors argue that “An empirical sample is relevant as long as it is 
representative and generalizable. Samples consisting of students and/or IS professionals 
do not reflect the population of interest. With reference to internal, external and construct 
validities, surveying students and IS professionals is seen more critically than having a smaller 
sample size, as long as it represents reality.” Four publications; Siponen et al [87], Al-Omari 
et al [29], Pahnila et al. [88], Hovav and D’Arcy [89] interviewed >500 respondents, who 
were employees, i.e. valid representatives. The remaining studies involved professionals or 
students as respondents. This clearly indicated the importance of qualitative research on 
relevant stakeholder groups in order to formulate qualitative statements. 
2.2.2  ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF RESEARCH
The philosophy of ontology is about the nature of reality. Ontology raises questions about the 
assumptions researchers have about the way the world works and the commitment to hold 
particular views [76]. From a research perspective it raises the main question: What is out 
there to know? And how do we conduct our research to capture what we need to know. As Jan 
Dietz stated in his book Enterprise Ontology “Ontology requires us to make a strict distinction 
between the observing subject and the observed object.” [90]. Dietz continues: “This also 
puts the researcher into another obligation that of clarifying the philosophical stance taken 
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Figure 9: Frequency of applied information security research methods, from Lebek et al. [7].
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with respect to this subject-object dichotomy.” The philosophy of epistemology examines 
what constitutes acceptable knowledge criteria in the field of study, knowledge perspectives 
such as adoption, capturing, transformation and presentation. Epistemology deals with the 
question: “How will we know what we need to know? It also deals with the subject-object 
dichotomy of the researchers’ position. The position of the researcher can be viewed from an 
objectivist, subjectivist or constructivist standpoint. “Somewhere between the objectivist and 
the subjectivist is the constructivist. Constructivists agree with the subjectivist that there is no 
absolute objective reality but a form of semi-objectivity reality that they call intersubjective 
reality.” [90] This reality is created through the process of detailing the factors of influence 
(scope and context) and also the factors working behind them – intangible factors such as 
leadership or culture. In this research project we take the constructivist position, believing 
there is no absolute reality. Therefore the ontological ‘reality’ of the object is built through 
a continuous process of observing, analysing, negotiating and achieving social consensus 
among subjects. 
So it’s necessary to examine and explicate the ontological aspects in order to get a better 
understanding of phenomena. In this case the context (e.g. technology or business 
opportunities) influences the organisation as well as the ‘construct’ of the organisation (a 
certain view of the organisation). The scope and the context of the organisation determine 
why an organisation requires a certain level of BIS maturity, i.e. due to regulations, 
stakeholder demands [91] or the need for compliance with reporting guidelines [92]. 
The purpose of the organisation also determines the business objectives and therefore the 
Information Function (IF) of the organisation. This results in a certain need to protect critical 
information assets. The scope of the construct therefore also determines the scope of the 
object. So everything that is out there to know about the organisation and its characteristics 
needs to be examined in order to determine the level of knowledge required in order to 
understand “what is out there to know?” 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, much of the successful adoption of BIS phenomena is 
grounded in intangible factors [93], [87]. Studying tangible methods leading to successful 
information security (such as ISO27001, ITIL and COBIT) is common [94], [3], but studying 
intangible factors (e.g. knowledge and culture) alongside tangible factors and making both 
explicit is not. 
2.2.3  EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF RESEARCH
Epistemology deals with the science of knowledge. It explores aspects of knowledge 
management and deals with research questions such as what level of knowledge is 
relevant to understanding and forming opinions on a certain subject [76]. To get a better 
understanding of “knowing what we need to know” at boardroom level, we highlight the 
important epistemological aspects of BIS.
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“Knowledge has been described by Davenport and Prusak as a mixture of experience, 
values, contextual information, and expert insight that supports an individual to evaluate and 
incorporate new experience and information. An individual that is able to efficiently handle 
both new experience and information, and apply it in different scenarios, is often described 
as a “knowledgeable individual.” Human knowledge, data and information altogether defines 
organisational knowledge, and when properly shared among organisational members, is a 
valuable asset which can be used to aid decision-making, improve efficiency, reduce training 
cost, and reduce risks due to uncertainty [9].
2.2.4  TACIT KNOWLEDGE
One concept of knowledge is tacit knowledge; this is the knowledge which is implicit in the 
heads of people within the organisation. It is hard to capture on a systematic way and hard to 
transfer via speech or in writing. Nevertheless, this form of knowledge can be very valuable 
during periods of change, e.g. knowledge of certain business processes or procedures, or 
knowledge of certain beliefs or behaviours that are typical of an organisation. It is hard to 
observe and pinpoint them, but these aspects clearly influence the “way people do things.” 
Action learning is an effective method that can be used to generate and capture tacit 
knowledge.
2.2.5  EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE
Explicit knowledge is knowledge that can be articulated, coded, accessed and verbalised. 
It can also be transferred to others. Most forms of explicit knowledge can be stored in 
data stores. Included in this type of knowledge for example are methods (NIST2, SANS), 
frameworks (COBIT3, ISO), and other prescribed forms of guidance. The opposite is implicit 
knowledge. Implicit knowledge refers to a lack of awareness of certain knowledge [95].
Another aspect of knowledge is the way we generate knowledge among individuals and 
transfer it to others. This is what we refer to as knowledge sharing. Effective knowledge 
sharing mechanisms can help individuals to effectively share both implicit and tacit 
knowledge [9]. Nonaka [96] refers to “a continuous dialogue between implicit and tacit 
knowledge via patters of interaction, socialisation, combination, internationalisation and 
externalisation”. In line with Nonaka’s dynamic theory of knowledge creation between groups 
and individuals and vice versa [97], Cook and Brown suggest that organisational knowledge 
is created via balancing knowledge and knowing [98]. 
In this research project we aimed to examine aspects of the knowledge management process 
that are involved in generating, capturing, recording, codifying, selecting, presenting and 
transferring knowledge. And the aspects of knowledge management content, i.e. what is it 
what we need to know in order to master a problem. In 2015 Flores published “Information 
2  National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST is an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
3  Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (Source; ISACA)
502 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
security knowledge sharing in organisations: Investigating the effect of behavioural 
information security governance and national culture” In it he states an important 
aspect of knowledge sharing within the Information Security domain: “establishment of 
knowledge sharing is beneficial as the individual knowledge possessed by information 
security professionals is transformed into organisational knowledge and transferred to end 
users and other stakeholders. Flores refers to organisational learning in order to “prevent 
security-related information and tacit knowledge from being laid scattered throughout the 
organisation or preserved by information security personnel as their personal property.”
In Figure 10 the research methodology proposed by Fayolle et al. [99] is visualised from 
an ontological and epistemological perspective. What is visualised is that the process from 
ontological and epistemological knowledge is captured, analysed and presented using 
numerous methods and thus forms the methodology of this research project (to gain a more 
qualitative view of boardroom parameters). 
2.3         RELEVANT RESEARCH METHODS FOR BIS RESEARCH 
To explore methods suitable for qualitative research on Business Information Security I 
address the most important qualitative interpretivist methods that consider ontological and 
epistemological aspects. We start with literature research as a way to position the problem 
and to ground it in academic rigour. Then I examine the Delphi research method to elicit 
qualitative views and standpoints from experts in order to explore whether Delphi can 
contribute to solving the epistemological problem. Group Support System (GSS) research 
is examined as a method for overcoming knowledge issues related to ‘groupthink’ and 
knowledge sharing. Finally case study research (CSR) is explored as a qualitative method for 
in-depth research.
2.3.1  LITERATURE RESEARCH
Examining the literature is an essential starting point for each research project. It helps 
researchers – by conducting a thorough analysis of the existing body of knowledge – to 
make a new contribution. Literature research helps the researcher, whether a scientist or 
a practitioner, to engage critically with the ideas and knowledge of other writers. Within 
literature research we define three types of knowledge: 1) knowledge about the domain and 
topic of interest. 2) knowledge about relevant theories, which helps frame research questions. 
3) knowledge about relevant research methods in order to get answers to research questions 
and thus develop new knowledge, build innovative artefacts or articulate new questions [77].
When encountering a business problem, it is not always clear what to examine in order to 
arrive at answers and solutions that can explain and potentially solve the problem. Business 
problems are usually not well defined and lack clear boundaries.
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Golden-Biddle and Lock [100] view literature review as an important starting point for 
storytelling. They distinguish two processes in the way the literature review is carried out 
and expressed. Constructing intertextual coherence refers to the way literature is analysed, 
structured, synthesised and presented in such a way that the researcher demonstrates his 
or her contributions to and relationship to the research reported. It thus appeals to readers’ 
interest. The techniques for constructing intertextual coherence involve: synthesising 
coherence, progressive coherence and non-coherence (this refers to a lack of consensus 
among practitioners). In Information Security research papers we observe a lot of consensus 
among academia, but there is considerable disagreement among practitioners [9], [3] 
[84] on how to frame this embryonic topic and the numerous problems it causes. The 
disagreement among practitioners is also caused by the multiplicity and complexity of 
solutions or advice [9]. This suggests a need for more academic research to provide clear 
definitions and it also highlights the importance of more empirical research [6]. Explicating 
a problem with academic rigour involves thoroughly decomposing the theoretical concepts 
contributing to the problem and systematically deriving concepts and related topics from the 
literature. Conducting systematic literature review is described by Tranfield et al. The authors 
recommend systematic literature review to improve the quality of business management 
research, which they argue tends to ‘lack thoroughness” and reflects the bias of the 
researcher. [101]. The authors also propose this method for audit trailing of the researcher’s 
steps and decisions during the research process. Research “that involves systematic literature 
review is argued to be more strongly evidence-based because it is concerned with seeking 
to understand the effect of a particular variable or intervention that have found in previous 
studies” [101]. 
Figure 10: The paradigm and methodological choices in scientific research, based on Kyrö [99].
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In the case of Information Security numerous technology vendors produce research reports 
that lack a clear audit trail of the scope, methodologies used and timeline, as well as framing 
of the concepts and the validity of the respondents. Saunders et al. point out that some 
researchers become uncritical due to the influence of previous research. Often their work is 
little more than annotated bibliographies [102] – individual items that are selected because 
they fit what the researcher is proposing. The outcomes of, for example, vendor research 
reports are based on different methodologies and the outcomes are often tendentious. In 
some cases they leave it to the imagination of consumers or business decision makers to 
work out what methodologies were used. In the case of BIS research the entire community 
would gain more trust and credibility by adopting more systematic and evidence-based 
research strategies in their business propositions and practices. The sector tends to suffer 
from “Fear Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD)” [103] because of selling arguments, which causes 
a psychological side-effect: cognitive dissonance [104] within the information security 
practitioner community. 
USING LITERATURE REVIEW FOR BIS RESEARCH 
When examining executives’ practices and establishing the level of governance based on the 
literature, it is advisable to code or rubric the literature based on certain criteria. The codes 
relate to criteria that the researcher can identify before, during or after the literature research 
as relevant to the research project. Coding literature also establishes a more organised 
and structured way of working. For BIS research we can identify for example two genres: 
academic literature and practitioner’s literature. Another successful example of coding in 
the quest for BIS governance parameters based on the literature is presented by De Haes 
and Van Grembergen. The authors researched Business and IT Alignment and Governance 
practices. They distinguished governance practices based on structure practices, process 
practices and relational mechanism practices [105]. This distinction made it easier for 
business managers to implement the presented list of practices in their organisation. This 
same classification of structures, processes and relational mechanisms was later adopted 
by ISACA and integrated into the COBIT5 for Information Security guidelines [56]. Thanks 
to the rigour of the researchers and the ISACA Institute, these governance practices were 
embraced by the practitioner community.
There are no strict guidelines for conducting systematic literature research. Tranfield et al. 
[101]propose a so-called ‘funnel’, ranging from outlining the choice of certain words and 
databases used to narrowing down to a brief overview of key ideas and themes to compare 
and contrast the research of the key writers. The aim is to highlight key concepts and to detail
relationships. This is necessary to define your own contribution in the form of fresh findings 
[76].
Literature research encourages academic and practice-oriented researchers to think 
critically about their subject and scrutinise their concepts, constructs and viewpoints in order 
to clearly explain the research problem and formulate their research questions. When it 
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comes to BIS, systematic literature reviews form an important basis for business advice. The 
main reasons for using systematic literature review principles in BIS research would be to 
move away from FUD towards rigorous thoroughness, and to remove researcher bias. Bias 
is a pitfall for interpretive researchers. Thus, literature research is proposed in BIS research 
as the basis for an objective, unbiased, structured point of departure. This is why I define two 
levels of literature research in this thesis. One is literature research used to substantiate the 
major concepts, as described in Chapter 1. This generic literature research is also applied 
in Chapters 4 and 5. The second is literature research used as a method for examining a 
specific problem encountered in the business environment. Literature research is therefore 
a research method that can be used to investigate a problem, articulate a problem statement 
and define requirements for an artefact designed to solve that problem. This is what is 
described in this chapter.
2.3.2  THE DELPHI RESEARCH METHOD
Delphi research is mainly used to gain a deeper qualitative view of a certain phenomenon 
– to examine propositions, theories and viewpoints through the use of an iterative process 
[106]. Delphi can be used to elicit views from experts, but also standpoints of user groups, 
expert groups, stakeholder groups and consumer panels. This form of research enables 
the researcher to propose practices or theories and, through a number of iterations, get 
a group of respondents to form a qualitative view [106]. The respondent group can then 
either rank, prioritise or scrutinise this view. In the case of Information Security it enables 
the researcher to position organisation-specific elements that might influence the process 
or the content. For example, a researcher may have derived certain best practices from 
the literature but want to validate them with a certain group of respondents. Schmidt et al. 
[107] developed a ranked list of common risk factors for software projects as a way to build 
theory about IS project risk management. The participants were three panels of experienced 
software project managers from Hong Kong, Finland and the United States. Thus, Delphi 
is not geographically limited. Delphi research can be performed via the internet in the 
form of survey questionnaires and it is thus possible to approach a large set of respondents 
throughout the world. Okoli et al. studied the difference between traditional surveys and the 
Delphi method [108]. One of their main findings was construct validity. “In addition to what 
is required of a survey, the Delphi method can employ further construct validation by asking 
experts to validate the researcher’s interpretation and categorisation of the variables. The fact 
that Delphi is not anonymous (to the researcher) permits this validation step, unlike many 
surveys.” This enables the researcher to validate certain findings from the Delphi method at 
a later stage. In addition of traditional surveys, “Delphi studies inherently provide richer data 
because of the numerous iterations and the response revision due to feedback. Moreover, 
Delphi participants tend to be open to follow-up interviews.” [108]
A crucial factor in qualitative research is the personality of the respondent and the researcher. 
Potential bias is therefore a pitfall for all qualitative research (e.g. via interviews and case 
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study research), but it is limited within Delphi research, because of the distance between the 
researcher and the respondent as well as the anonymity of the participants. This enables an 
objective representation  of the research process, with limited personal interference.
Initially the knowledge of the researcher is used as input for the Delphi research method. 
The researcher can collect concepts, constructs or viewpoints about the topic from, for 
example, the literature. He or she collects a specific set of data about a topic (content) or 
about a certain approach (process) and it is then judged by the respondents. De Haes 
and Van Grembergen used the Delphi research method to study IT governance practices 
from numerous literature sources [109]. They used a pre-ordered dataset which was 
ranked by experts according to a predefined set of criteria. This gave the researchers not 
only new insights into the phenomena, but also a prioritisation for practical use based on 
“ease of implementation” and “easy of effectiveness”, with the objective of establishing, in 
collaboration with experts, a set of core practices that practitioners can use in the field. 
The Delphi research in this case was used to generate knowledge about the content e.g. 
practices but also new knowledge about the process of applying the practices in a certain 
sequential order. This rigorously developed core set of practices has been successfully 
applied by numerous companies. Their research contribution shows that the Delphi method 
is a qualitative method that can be used to generate, gain, transfer, capture and report 
knowledge elements which can immediately be applied to solve business problems. De 
Haes and Van Grembergen also applied – as an extension to their earlier work – additional 
extreme case study research to benchmark their previous results [105].
Kim Maes did similar work in his PhD research project [110]. Maes collected elements 
affecting IT investments by making use of the Delphi method. He used the collective 
knowledge of a large number of experts to derive a set of practices that contribute to the 
value proposition of IT investments. So, he made use of experts to create new knowledge 
on a certain topic and transferred that knowledge through his publications and consulting 
work. With his research, Maes contributed to academic rigour while making a practical 
contribution. 
APPLYING THE DELPHI RESEARCH METHOD WITHIN BIS
When seeking parameters for MBIS, via anonymous views from experts, the research by 
Maes, De Haes and Grembergen seems promising, in particular for generating standpoints, 
practices and criteria among experts and thus solving the epistemological problem of knowing 
too little or too much. In the case of research about Information Security strategy formulation, 
the decision-making process for those at this strategic level is evident [111]. In other words, we 
can derive and share knowledge about strategy but, as long as directors or executive managers 
do not take this knowledge into account, it is useless. So to effectively transfer the knowledge to 
other groups, in order to establish the learning organisation [9], we might consider the same 
or perhaps other qualitative methods, in order to transfer propositions to other groups (such as 
management teams, board of directors, project teams, etc.). 
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2.3.3  GROUP SUPPORT SYSTEM RESEARCH
The application of GSS for large-scale and longitudinal research has been identified by De 
Vreede et al [112]. De Vreede et al. substantiated their findings with the following case studies:
Boeing Aircraft corporation (USA)
 − 654 participants in 82 GSS sessions (average team size 7.9); 
International Business Machines (IBM) (USA)
 − 441 participants in 55 GSS sessions (average team size 8.0); 
Nationale Nederlanden (Netherlands)
 − 414 participants in 41 GSS sessions (average team size 10.0).
A case study from The Dutch Policy Academy was based on 45 GSS sessions from 2005 
to 2011 in which 763 Academy students participated [113]. The average group size was 
16.9. Research on GSS shows an average of 8 to 17 participants per session. The literature 
indicates in these cases that the number of items to be generated organised and evaluated 
ranges from 30 to a maximum of approximately 50 items [113]. The rationale behind the 
planning and guarding of a limited number of items – which is part of the preparation of the 
meeting and the responsibility of the facilitator is the ‘limited’ time and ‘processing’ power of 
teams with group sizes up to 17 participants. The current research project involved smaller 
groups such as security experts, Boards of Directors and Management Teams. The size of 
these teams is often two to four times smaller than the average group size. 
Focus/expert groups make it possible to elicit views and perceptions from a diverse group of 
experts [114]. When making use of facilitating functions such as a computer-assisted analysis 
of qualitative data (CAQDAS), it is essential to respect the GSS ground rules as researched 
by Hengst in 2005. Her research presents an approach to gathering valid information 
for determining the optimum set of facilitation functions and ground rules that have been 
applied in a current research project [115].
 − Generating new data between the participants and thus creating awareness and 
transferring knowledge
 − Testing assumptions
 − Sharing relevant information (knowledge) with the participants
 − Using specific examples and agreeing on what important words mean
 − Explaining reasoning and intent
 − Focusing on professional opinions, not personal opinions
 − Combining advocacy with inquiries
 − Jointly designing next steps and ways to test disagreements
 − Discussing ‘undiscussable’ issues (barriers)
 − Ranking outcomes (parameters or intervention candidates)
 − Comparing outcomes and discussing variables.
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INFLUENCES OF GROUP SIZE IN GSS
There is no ‘ideal size’ for a focus group [116]. “Focus group sessions can be structured, or 
unstructured, depending on the purpose of the research. The group discussion is led, and 
controlled, by a facilitator whose role it is to: stimulate a free-flowing discussion; help members 
share their experiences; elicit the views of all participants; keep group members on track; 
and capture responses.” [114] The role of the facilitator is important in order to avoid the 
“Asch Effect” where certain individuals dominate the group and therefore the outcome of the 
discussion [117]. Since group size influences the ability of groups to achieve a productive 
outcome [118] the selection of the right (number of) experts is key to obtaining collective 
intelligence. The quality of the outcome of the group discussion ought to be better than 
individual opinions before the discussion [119]. Inviting the right number of participants 
with the appropriate kind of expertise is an important step. If their number is too high, there 
might be too much “noise.” Too few participants may result in insufficient qualified data to 
generalise the opinions of the experts. Moreover, the number of items to be discussed is an 
important variable in the setup of the meeting. Participants discuss comprehensive lists of 
items and a number of measures are necessary to facilitate this process. One measure for 
retaining attention during the meeting is to introduce a ‘carrousel’ in which each expert 
starts with a different list of items to comment on. After this first round, the expert reviews 
the comments of the expert sitting next to him/her. In this way, all the other lists of items are 
reviewed. This measure also speeds up the process of generating unique comments. Once all 
the comments by individual group members have been generated, the group discusses them 
– guided by the facilitator. Another way to handle many items is to ask every participant to 
study the items on the agenda in advance. Invited experts are then also able to verify whether
they really are experts in the domains that are to be discussed.
GSS FOR KNOWLEDGE SHARING
In “How to make collaboration work” Strauss [120] examines how to build consensus and 
to generalise opinions phase-by-phase with small groups. Designing systems to support 
collaborative processes for knowledge gathering, capturing and sharing and formulation of 
alternative viewpoints is grounded in areas such as group decision-making, nominal group 
techniques [121], the Delphi method [106], computer-mediated communication systems 
[74], social judgement theory and decision theory as well as online communities [122].
Apart from respecting the ground rules of working with GSS in qualitative research, 
recording is also relevant for reviewing the process of discussion, opinions, brainstorming 
and decision-making. And recording can be used to analyse the session afterwards. Another 
reason for recording the GSS sessions is to support claims about “reliability and truth” 
[75]. Using an audio-visual recording mechanism substantiates observations made by the 
researcher (makes them reliable) and gives readers the ability to form their own opinions 
about the perspectives of the participating experts. Pols [123] used GSS to the overcome 
interpretation problems that normally occur when sending out questionnaires. Each 
individual interprets these differently and this reduces the reliability of blind surveys as a 
qualitative method. GSS was used to increase understanding of questions. 
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APPLYING GSS IN BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY RESEARCH
However, GSS is only rarely applied as a system in which hundreds of participants share 
their knowledge about hundreds of items in a specific domain [124]. Business Information 
Security research presents an opportunity for carrying out large-scale longitudinal research. 
Especially because nowadays knowledge is mainly gained at the micro (organisation) level 
and there is limited knowledge exchange between industries, countries and jurisdictions. 
So the knowledge stays in the company and sometimes within the department [9]. The 
opportunity for larger scale longitudinal research lies specifically in gaining knowledge 
at the organisational level and using that data, collected with GSS system technologies, 
to establish a collective knowledge base. This larger set of data can then form a frame of 
reference for a certain industry, country or community and thus contribute to other sectors, 
countries or communities. The application of GSS for such large-scale longitudinal research 
has been identified by De Vreede [112]. He and his co-authors substantiated their findings 
with hundreds of cases. Another author, Murray Turoff states that using data from large data 
sets gained from larger groups can be very helpful to generate more and better ideas. He 
also encourages users to establish process variables. This is desirable because “when the 
group represents an organisational membership this is probably a very feasible and desirable 
pre-step to the execution of the examination of the issue” In respect to BIS in boardrooms or 
management teams this means collectively sharing knowledge and gaining group consensus 
at the beginning of the problem as well as on the solution. Turoff continues: “anything that will 
promote involvement in the design will increase motivation and the results of participation 
during the process” [125] According to Pai [67], this early stakeholder engagement is also 
relevant for solving epistemological and ontological problems and it makes GSS suitable as a 
“collaborative research method”.
Group discussions, thinking and decision-making have been evolving as web-based 
technologies, such as WebEx, Facetime, Google+, Skype, can facilitate this process  [125]. 
Individual input can generate a large set of meta-data that represents a collective knowledge 
base. “Over time this sort of system would become an evolving knowledge base for virtual 
or online communities” [125], [126]. In 2012 Feledi and Fenz [1] investigated how 
machine-readable information security knowledge was shared between information security 
experts from different organisations on the basis of a web portal. According to Moorsel et 
al., knowledge-sharing facilities such as GSS provide the solution to the epistemological 
problems of knowledge capturing, sharing and thus feed decision-making [127]. GSS is 
therefore proposed as a qualitative research method for knowledge management and the 
decision-making process within the field of Business Information Security. 
The field of BIS suffers from many problems. The first is a sense of urgency within the 
boardroom. The second is ad-hoc approaches to solving problems. Approaches can involve 
an attitude or a perception (how we think) or can be the approach to a certain problem, 
whether process-based or ad-hoc (how we do it). The approach to the topic is mainly formed 
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by knowledge of the domain (contextual knowledge) and in-depth knowledge. An absence 
of knowledge fails to trigger individuals’ latent behaviour, beliefs and attitudes towards 
the problem and therefore the way an individual is trying to solve a problem, i.e. via an ad-
hoc intervention or embedding it in the processes of the organisation. This gap between 
what we know but don’t do is referred to as the knowing-doing gap [10]. This is a gap that 
often prevents organisations being successful in a certain practice. GSS can bridge this 
gap in two ways, first by making the problem explicit based on theoretical constructs and 
concepts. Second, by establishing awareness and a mutual level of knowledge among those 
involved with the problem (object and subject) to stimulate group dialogues and facilitate 
socialisation [96] thinking [7], discussions [129] and using the decision-making process for 
strategic planning [67]. 
2.3.4  CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
Case Study Research (CSR) is one of the most popular ways of doing qualitative research 
[75]. It is widely used within Information System research, by business management to gain 
a qualitative view of a certain phenomenon. Robert Yin defines CSR as an empirical inquiry 
that is used to investigate contemporary phenomena within a real-life context [130]. It’s 
especially useful when boundaries between the phenomena and the context are not clear. 
Case studies provide deeper qualitative insight into a phenomenon, making use of numerous 
data sources and numerous data collection methods, such as documentation, observation, 
interviews and secondary data gained from other sources. CSR is used for confirmatory 
purposes (testing theories) and for exploratory purposes (building theories) [131], [77]. 
Another objective of CSR is to explain. Typically interpretive CSR seeks to explore possible 
explanations.
Within CSR we distinguish two types of research: positive and interpretive. The positive 
researchers’ ontological view of the world is objective – they act as external observers. 
They mainly collect, analyse and interpret data ‘from a distance’ to judge if it counts as 
evidence and knowledge. And they present the data with a rational view of the phenomena. 
Positive CSR involves formulating hypotheses and testing them with case study findings. 
Researchers explore the phenomena and generalise, primarily based on statistical data. 
Interpretive research involves focusing on research options to get a deeper understanding 
and interpretation – mainly to find explanations based on one’s own interpretation and social 
view of the world (as part of the research subject). When conducting case study research it is 
essential to understand the researcher’s own position towards the subject and the object to 
be researched, both from an ontological and an epistemology perspective. 
There are two ways to conduct CSR: either via a single case study or through a multiple case 
study. A single case study provides an opportunity to explore a certain phenomenon within 
a certain organisation but it is limited in terms of the generalisability of the data. Multiple 
case study research provides us with more data to be analysed, replicated or compared and 
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therefore makes it easier to generalise findings. Generalisability of findings is desirable in 
Business Information Security research. First of all because the data collected from cases, 
for example successful practices can be replicated elsewhere (knowledge gained from 
the first case is transferred to others). Secondly, a deeper qualitative analysis of the data 
might provide more in-depth knowledge in certain industry practices. Through conducting 
numerous cases, and capturing this knowledge, cross-sectional knowledge sharing can take 
place.
CSR can involve numerous methods: interviews, observations, surveys, etc. and the data can 
be captured via recordings, transcripts, video, questionnaires, documents, reports, field 
notes, diaries, etc. Gathering this type of data within cases is limited because most of the 
time it is not recorded in the body of knowledge. The researcher must be alert to the fact that 
data is usually uncertain, complex, incomplete and messy. This can be mastered by thorough 
preparation. For example, by analysing the pre-collected information about the object and 
subject, preliminary discussion and during the CSR recording all the data. This leads to a 
better reading of the data afterwards to derive main issues and focal points, which can be 
interpreted from theoretical perspectives (bringing in the theory) and by reflecting on the 
data (questioning the theory).
Gioia et al. [132] proposed a data structure model for CSR. The authors defined the steps 
for gaining first-order concepts and deriving second-order themes. This eventually leads 
to aggregated dimensions that characterise the main problem. The authors have tried to 
articulate an approach that enables both the creative imagination and provides systematic 
rigour in conducting qualitative research. The Eisenhardt [131] approach is an example of 
constructing evidence collection in such a way that the data is collected, recorded, analysed 
and reported in a very precise and structured manner. “The theory is emergent in that it is 
developed by recognising the patterns of relationships among constructs within and across 
the cases.” In her paper “Building Theories from case study research a process that utilises 
case study research [131] Eisenhardt presents a claim that a “triangulation of methods 
(interviews, observations and archival sources) provides stronger substantiation of constructs 
and hypotheses.” Moreover, the combination of data types can be highly synergistic. “The 
qualitative data are useful for understanding the rationale or theory underlying relationship 
revealed in the quantitative data” [131]. So, in situations where it is desired to combine 
quantitative data with qualitative data and understand the rationale behind it, case study 
research – with a structured process of data collection, recording and reporting – is 
preferred. To increase reliability and objectivity, Eisenhardt advocated working in research 
teams, using multiple researchers with clearly predefined assigned tasks. This creates more 
confidence in the findings and increases the likelihood of surprising findings [131]. It also 
permits knowledge sharing among researchers and transferring lessons learned to the 
business setting.
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Constructing arguments based on CSR traditionally relies on the traditional criteria of 
“Reliability, Validity and generalisability” [74]. New insights into these criteria are added, 
such as objectivity and accountability (who is accountable for the objectivity?). Another 
new insight criteria introduced by accounting scholars is ‘auditability’ (show how it is done) 
[133] and ‘transferability’. This refers to the fact it can be used elsewhere and it is action
oriented.
In BIS research the findings are sometimes biased by the researcher’s or the interviewee’s 
personal motivations. Sometimes information is held back or is simply unknown (i.e. blind 
spots) [134], [130]. This requires additional skills from the researcher, such as questioning 
skills [135]. It can also be resolved by working in teams (of two to three persons). Another 
limitation is the fact that interviewing requires attention by the researcher in asking 
questions, observing non-verbal communication and listening, all at the same time. This 
multi-dimensional perspective can also be covered by working in pairs [131]. In some areas 
(e.g. auditing) a four-eye principle (or simultaneous evidence collection) is desirable. 
Many debates in CSR have focused on changes to data collection methods. Eisenhardt 
claims that alterations to data collection during the research project are allowed as long 
as the alteration is likely to better ground theory or to provide new theoretical insight. 
“This flexibility is not a license to be unsystematic. It provides a controlled opportunity for 
researchers to take advantage of the uniqueness of a specific case and the emergence of new 
themes to improve resultant theory.” With this evolving view of case study research, validity 
is increased, since a certain case can reveal emerging, previously undiscovered, information 
that is relevant to the field.
Another limitation is that single CSR is limited to one organisation. This micro level of 
research limits options for comparing cases or drawing generalizable conclusions [75]. 
We clearly require more than just one or two cases to represent an industry. Single CSR is 
also limited from a validity perspective. To eliminate single-case bias numerous cases are 
required. In a single case study knowledge transfer mostly takes place on an individual basis 
(unless it is published), since only a limited number of people are involved in the business 
environment [136]. This issue can be resolved by setting up a case evidence database in 
which all records and data can be stored and managed [77] and later on extracted and 
shared by others. Successful knowledge sharing in Information Security via web-based 
databases was researched by Feledi et al. [1]. Feledi encourages the use of knowledge 
database systems for knowledge-intensive topics. 
APPLYING CASE STUDY RESEARCH IN BIS RESEARCH
In Business Information Security research there is a need to explore generic interventions. 
This can be done by using qualitative methods such as Delphi, Surveys or Group Support 
methods. Although the strength of these methods is their ability to reach out to a larger 
population of respondents, CSR makes it possible to dive deeper based on previously 
collected data. It provides us with a more in-depth understanding of the phenomena. With 
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numerous cases it “strengthens the results by replicating the pattern-matching ability and 
hereby increases confidence in the robustness of the results” [77]. In Business Information 
Security research the effects of intangible factors are relevant for successful engagement 
in the MBIS process, or for the implementation of certain controls. These intangible factors 
(e.g. leadership and culture) can be examined by using CSR. Extreme case studies provide 
more detail on specific ontological and epistemological issues observed during for example 
a face-to-face interview. Extreme case studies can also be used to validate artefacts or 
instruments (e.g. security surveys or checklist). In the case of BIS a body of knowledge can be 
built where there is no list of governance practices that can be used by practitioners. CSR can 
be used to validate such a list, together with directors or managers (people in the business 
environment). Within BIS research it is becoming more important to collect evidence, 
due to stricter regulations and auditing guidelines. CSR that encompasses systematic data 
collection (observations and interviews) stored in an artefact (e.g. data collection tooling) 
that can be validated by an auditor increases plausibility and credibility. Credibility because 
it provides proof of outcomes and plausibility because, due to the use of tooling, the 
researcher is forced to collect and store knowledge items that are relevant. This triangulation 
of methods where data that is gathered – observing, interviewing and documenting – is 
captured in a tool that includes corroboration [137].
In conclusion we can state that CSR is limited when exploring and generating generalizable 
data. To explore general propositions we propose the use of questionnaires. And to capture and 
transfer knowledge we propose GSS or surveys. These can play a role in the quest for Business 
Information Security Governance practices that can form a frame of reference. For practitioners 
we propose the use of group discussion and group prioritisation. The resulting data set can 
be used later on to make a deeper qualitative analysis of the findings from GSS or Delphi 
research. CSR can also be used to study certain intangible factors such as culture, leadership 
and perceptions. Within BIS research these factors play a major role in determining whether the 
board of directors adopts BIS and they therefore influence the success of improving MBIS. CSR 
can also be performed to examine the impact of certain parameters on MBIS. 
2.3.5  DESIGN SCIENCE RESEARCH STRATEGY
Triangulation of methods is increasingly used within Design Science Research to clarify the 
problem, define requirements for an artefact and demonstrate whether the artefact solves 
that problem. “The design-science paradigm seeks to extend the boundaries of human and 
organisational capabilities by creating new and innovative artefacts [138]. The design 
science strategy is about solving real-life problems. According to Johannesson and Perjons 
[73] DSR involves building artefacts to solve predefined business problems. “The design 
science research strategy is about creating things that serve human purposes and these things 
are then assessed against criteria of value or utility. Rather than posing theories as in natural 
science, design science strives to create models, methods and implementations that are 
innovative and valuable [73].
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When investigating Business Information Security and the kind of problems that can arise we 
can distinguish two types of problems. Horst Rittel [139] refers to “wicked problems”, e.g. 
problems that are difficult or impossible to solve (for example poverty) and “tame problems” 
– those that are solvable with a certain solution within a certain timeframe (e.g. involving 
algorithms and constructions) [73]. Conklin quotes; “when working on wicked problems in a
socially complex environment, it is much harder to notice that our tools are simply not “picking
up the dirt” [140]. In information security, changing culture and behaviour is perceived as
a wicked problem, as eighty percent of the time it is the ‘human factor’ that causes security 
incidents [23]. Understanding and getting a grip on the complexity of cybercrime is also 
a wicked problem. There is no ‘stopping rule’ that tells us when a wicked problem has been 
solved [141]. 
Johannesson and Perjons [73] state that there are problems in which the current state 
is viewed as truly unsatisfactory and the desirable state is seen as neutral. And there are 
problems where the current state is seen as neutral and the desirable state is regarded 
as a potentially huge improvement. Often such problems are not perceived until some 
innovation arises and captures people’s imagination. So the term ‘problem’ is used to denote 
troublesome situations as well as promising opportunities. We follow the same reasoning in 
this research project and consistently use the term ‘problem’ to refer to an issue that can be 
addressed with Design Science Research. 
In DSR the principle is that “knowledge and understanding of a design problem and its 
solution are acquired in the building and application of an artefact. The term artefact is 
central to design science research and is used to describe something that is artiﬁcial, or 
constructed by humans, as opposed to something that occurs naturally.” [73] Five types of 
artefacts can be distinguished:
 − Constructs (vocabulary and symbols)
 − Models (abstractions and representations)
 − Methods (algorithms and practices)
 − Instantiations (implemented and prototype systems)
 − Design theories (improved models of design or design processes).
DSR FOR THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARTEFACTS
Design Science Research (DSR) has attracted increasing interest in the Information System 
research domain. March and Mith initiated important DSR work with their early paper on 
a two-dimensional framework for research on information technology [142]. Hevner et 
al. [138] produced a broad framework which is used worldwide to perform and publish 
DS work. This framework is visualised in see Figure 11 contrasts two research paradigms 
in information system research: behaviour sciences and design sciences. Both domains 
are relevant for Business Information Security (BIS) because the first is concerned with 
soft aspects such as the knowledge, attitudes and capabilities required to study and solve 
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problems. The second is concerned with establishing and validating artefacts. To put it 
more precisely, Johannesson and Perjons distinguish between the design, development, 
presentation and evaluation of an artefact [73]. Wieringa distinguished many methods for 
examining numerous types of problems, e.g. design problems and knowledge problems 
[143]. In this BIS research project we used Hevner’s work as a frame of reference for the 
entire DSR project and we used Wieringa’s approach to address the many BIS problems 
that we encountered. As mentioned in Chapter 2, numerous methods are applied, mainly 
because BIS problems are diverse and rather complex. This is why the methods used to 
master them are not straightforward. Johannesson and Perjons’ work delivered a research 
strategy for thoroughly structuring the DS research process as developing artefacts. 
Johannesson and Perjons also address numerous methods for examining problems and 
setting artefact requirements. 
Figure 11: Hevner’s Design Science Research Framework [138].
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DOING DSR IN A BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
It would be too much to expect this research project to be performed in a perfectly situated 
environment and in an ideal sequence. Like any other longitudinal research new insights 
emerged from the problems we encountered during the execution of the research. The 
entire project, especially the design of the artefact, was performed in a practical business 
environment, so it was sometimes delayed by day-to-day problems. It is therefore required 
to re-engineer the entire research process and map it onto the Johannesson and Perjons 
guidelines for designing, presenting and validating artefacts [73].
THE PROCESS OF VALORISATION
According to Hevner, DS Research is based on three major domains: the ‘Knowledge 
base’ domain, the ‘Environment’ domain and the ‘Design Science’ domain. The first is 
concerned with knowledge items produced and maintained with academic rigour. Theories, 
frameworks, models and techniques are produced in science and contribute to such rigour. 
These are then applied via the design science cycle to the practical environment, which 
includes organisations, systems and people with real-life problems. At the heart of the DS 
research framework is the design science cycle, which is concerned with receiving input 
from the knowledge base, applying this in environments and receiving feedback, in order 
to master problems and establish artefacts. The three cycles at the centre of the framework 
represent the continuous feed-forward and feedback cycles which strengthen the design 
and development of the artefact. The main function of this design cycle is to establish and 
maintain the artefact and the main purpose of the artefact is to solve problems. The process of 
assessing and refining the artefact requirements is necessary to continuously test the artefact 
for its relevance to the practical environment (mainly to solve problems) and its contribution 
to the academic rigour (knowledge base). Creating business value due to the application of 
DSR artefacts is described as valorisation. 
2.3.6  USING DESIGN SCIENCE RESEARCH TO CREATE ARTEFACTS
Johannesson and Perjons state “Design science is the scientiﬁc study and creation of artefacts 
as they are developed and used by people with the goal of solving practical problems of 
general interest. An artefact is an object made by humans with the intention to be used for 
addressing a practical problem.” [73].
Wieringa distinguishes between knowledge problems and practical problems leading to 
differences in research questions. In his paper “Design Science as Nested Problem-Solving, 
the author claims; Practical problems call for a change of the world so that it better agrees with 
some stakeholder goals. Knowledge problems by contrast do not call for a change the world 
for a change our knowledge about the world [143]. To solve knowledge problems requires 
knowledge-oriented questions. Wieringa refers to “problem investigation” methods to avoid 
research methodology challenges and proposes a framework of guidelines for design science 
researchers to achieve certain goals. In his guidelines Wieringa defines the regulative cycle 
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as an important step after identifying the type of problem, e.g. a practical or a knowledge 
problem. In this regulative cycle various stakeholders are involved: architects, product 
managers, system engineers, etc. In this sense the regulative process is the general structure 
of a rational problem-solving process. The proposed guidelines are closely related to 
Nunamaker and Chen’s [144] guidelines for system development. These authors also 
propose a regulative process but in contrast to Wieringa focus less on problem investigation 
and problem nesting. In the case of BIS this is important since we sometimes think practical 
problems can be solved by technology rather than by knowledge. Johannesson and Perjons 
also propose such a regulative process in the form of explicating the problem via a structured 
method of defining knowledge problems and design problems. In this research we follow 
Johannesson and Perjons’s guidelines since this framework is not limited to the design of 
requirements but also covers demonstration and evaluation of the artefact. The BIS problem 
is nested in three knowledge domains. First there is a lack of awareness, which is mainly 
due to a lack of knowledge about the context (regulations, forces of power, influences) and 
how to interact and perform at a certain maturity level within this context. Second there is 
the problem of how to get a grip on the topic, i.e. knowledge about managerial parameters. 
This topic brings technological, legal, personal and financial issues into the organisation 
and makes it complex to monitor and manage. The last domain is knowledge, meaning and 
understanding (i.e. epistemology), i.e. what knowledge is and how it can be acquired, and 
the extent to which knowledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired. It 
asks the question: “how do we know when we have done enough?” At what level of knowledge 
does this end, or does it perhaps not end and can we only contribute to solving these issues 
by designing and establishing knowledge acquisition and sharing vehicles to address and 
solve these problems? The research goal in this project is to address three types of practical 
problems that are of general interest:
 − knowledge problems
 − awareness problems and
 − design problems. 
One limitation of DSR is the need for continuous alteration and maintenance of the artefact. 
Validation of the artefact, in order to execute DSR, has been attempted by numerous authors 
[145] and it is also seen as one of the limitations of DSR publications, since validating is 
hard and complex [145]. Another limitation is objectivity; this refers to the extent to which 
research is impartial and freed from the subjective judgement of the researcher, especially 
with interpretivist research such as BIS [77]. DSR is sometime limited in precision due 
to the absence of rigour in practical environments. The output of the research iterations 
largely depends on the way the problem is framed. When the input into the design science 
framework is insufficient or incomplete, the outcome is poor. As Johannesson and Perjons 
state in their book on design sciences “The problem needs to be precisely formulated and 
justiﬁed by showing that it is signiﬁcant for some practice. The problem should be of general 
interest, i.e. signiﬁcant...” [73]. This identification and explication process within BIS research 
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would ideally come from literature, GSS and/or Delphi research methods. In Figure 12 the 
DSR steps in the framework are visualised.
Artefacts are developed, tested and validated through the use of the design science 
frameworks such as those used by Johannesson and Perjons [73], Wieringa [146] and 
Hevner in 2004 [138]; see Figure 11. In Hevner et al. [138] on the right is a representation 
of the theoretical knowledge base that provides the materials through which design 
science is accomplished. This Body of Knowledge consists of prior established frameworks, 
foundations, theories or constructs. The knowledge base in fact establishes the academic 
rigour of the design sciences. On the left side the practical business environment is 
represented. This defines the problem space in which the topic and its related problems 
arise. The environment encompasses people, organisational systems (structures, processes 
and relational mechanisms), technology, etc. and confirms the relevance of design science. 
In the centre of the framework the design science artefact is crafted by process activities 
related to designing, building, developing and evaluating an artefact that meets an identified 
business need. As a follow-up to Hevner’s work Johannesson and Perjons present seven DSR 
guidelines [73] – guidelines that can assist researchers in understanding the requirements 
for effective DSR. Although design science is mainly focused on the artefact and not primarily 
on the execution of procedural steps, these structured steps offer strict guidance during the 
artefact establishment phases and I therefore propose to use the framework developed by 
Johannesson and Perjons for this research project. 
2.3.7   RELEVANT METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR THIS RESEARCH PROJECT
Considering the assumptions and methodological aspects of this research, an iterative 
process of qualitative research methods is proposed based on the following arguments:
Literature research is proposed to ‘construct validity’ based on previous academic research 
in the field. This includes concepts, propositions and theories within a certain subject or 
about a certain object. This first step is essential due to the complexity and multiplicity of the 
BIS domain. It also helps structure thinking.
Group Support Systems (GSS) research to validate and prioritise elements within the 
topic and to establish a common ground of awareness and knowledge (also to overcome 
epistemological challenges). The aim is to achieve consensus on the urgency of the topic. 
GSS in relation to transformation processes is proposed as an instrument to enable decision-
making in groups (e.g. by management teams or Boards of Directors (BoD)). To encourage 
boards to get out of an ad-hoc mode and adopt a continuous process thinking mode. 
After prioritising certain items, the next step is to facilitate the decision-making process, 
for example in strategy sessions among BoDs or management teams. GSS also captures 
and records findings during the research and decision-making, which enables knowledge 
management (generating, sharing and transferring knowledge). GSS can also be used as an 
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instrument for carrying out Delphi research [106] and thus across geographical distances 
without group interference and with some degree of anonymity [106]. In this research 
project we position GSS research as referring to groups such as boards, stakeholders and 
users. It facilitates a research method that encourages discussion and group thinking. GSS 
research is also proposed as a qualitative research method for generating and prioritising 
artefact requirements [147]. 
The Delphi research method is proposed to establish new questionnaires or to revise 
existing ones without group interference, for example ISO/NIST/ISF4 questionnaires. 
It establishes a broad view on a topic and can be used to express either quantitative or 
qualitative views, for example generic factors that can influence the MBIS process. These 
include leadership, culture and knowledge. Due to web-based techniques the Delphi method 
can include numerous international expert respondents if needed. Delphi, which involves 
numerous iterations to review previously collected data, is proposed for expert groups but 
it is limited within companies where the objective is to collaborate and debate. Data can be 
generalizable at the macro level (across sections, industries, regions and jurisdictions, etc.). 
Delphi is proposed in BIS research to set requirements for establishing, re-evaluating and 
maintaining the artefact. 
Case study research as a field testing technique within the relevance cycle in DSR is 
proposed for gaining deeper insights and to explore or explain certain viewpoints [77] 
once GSS research has already taken place. Using earlier findings gained in previous 
qualitative studies, it allows us to dive deeply into certain company-specific topics. Although 
CSR is limited in terms of the number of cases, examining extreme cases can provide 
more in-depth knowledge on intangible factors that influence MBIS and how these factors 
4  Numerous practitioner communities produce interview templates, questionnaires, surveys and best practices.
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Figure 12: Overview of the framework for design science research [73].
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manifest themselves. CSR can also be used to compare certain practices between one or two 
industries. CSR is particularly valuable in BIS for validating previously collected data. This is 
increasingly required by regulators and auditors.
In conclusion we assume that ontological and epistemological objectives can be addressed 
by using these mixed methods of qualitative research and the iterative process of ensuring 
academic rigour and practical relevance. A qualitative research method such as GSS can 
facilitate both acquiring and sharing knowledge and it can help explain the problem. GSS 
can be a useful follow-up to literature research, to gain consensus about certain concepts 
and to encourage group thinking. Whenever it’s possible to use knowledge thus and to share 
it in the decision-making process, GSS uses that phase of the research as well, which makes 
it suitable for addressing problems and turning them into actionable items in a business 
environment. GSS can also facilitate the creative process of setting functional requirements 
for a design science research artefact [147], i.e. indicators of the individual maturity level. 
The Delphi research method (using surveys) would ideally be positioned parallel to or before 
GSS to scrutinise or validate specific content in the literature. According to Tremblay [147], 
validation through expert opinions (in focus groups) would enhance the academic rigour 
as well as the relevance of research and contribute to a knowledge base. Case studies can 
deliver valuable data on intangible factors of influence that Delphi or GSS cannot externalise. 
CSR can be used to evaluate and test the artefact. This is visualised in Figure 13.
2.4         PROPOSED MULTI-METHOD APPROACH
Numerous methods are examined, based on the literature, for designing and engineering 
a BIS artefact. The core contribution of these methods, which are used in combination with 
DSR, is summarised in Table 1. 
Figure 13: Multi-methods used in DSR, based on the Johannesson and Perjons framework [73].
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Table 1: Research methods and their contribution to BIS research.
TYPE OF RESEARCH 
WITHIN DSR
Contribution to designing and engineering a BIS artefact to 
support the analytical work
1.LITERATURE 
RESEARCH
Explicating and defining the problem in a systematic, 
structured way. Objectivity removes Fear Uncertainty and 
Doubt (FUD). Providing an unbiased, structured point of 
departure for the design cycle. Requires a certain level of 
expertise in the topic.
2.DELPHI 
RESEARCH 
Providing an anonymous inventory and selection of views and 
standpoints (preferably based on data in the literature). 
Rigorous examination process for scrutinising the problem 
via, for example, expert opinions. Collecting global views on 
criteria requirements with the use of technology. Knowledge 
sharing. Enables double loop learning [148] via numerous 
iterations. Automated. No geographical limitations. Limited 
in group interaction and discussion.
3.CASE STUDY 
RESEARCH (CSR) 
Deeper qualitative insight into BIS parameters and 
requirements within a certain industry/country. Used for 
confirmatory and exploratory studies related to validating 
requirements. Detailed insight into the effectiveness of 
requirements (i.e. critical success factors). Supports 
retrospective approaches. The personal approach encourages 
the target group (Boards of Directors) to engage in BIS. CSR 
is time-intensive. 
4.GROUP SUPPORT 
SYSTEM RESEARCH 
Makes creating, sharing and capturing knowledge possible 
as well as discussion of design items. Stimulates design 
thinking and stakeholder collaboration due to the ‘group 
element’. Provides an ability to collect, assess and select 
product requirements in a very short timeframe. Supports 
the regulative process [146] of testing and validating 
requirements. Processing large data sets. Double Loop 
learning [148]. Bridging knowing-doing gaps. Stimulating 
group dialogues (i.e. among Boards of Directors and 
Management teams). Makes it possible to establish group 
consensus. Supports the decision-making process. Threat 
of the ‘law of the decibel’. Requires professional group 
moderation skills [149]. 
The proposed research method starts with the initial phase of rigorous literature research (1) 
to explicate the problem and this is followed by Delphi Research (2) to predefine views and 
standpoints and further explicate the problem via numerous views and iterations. After that, 
Case Study Research (CSR; 3) provides in-depth knowledge and data on certain influences 
on BIS such as context, regulations, technology and culture. 
The data gathered during Delphi and CSR is used in GSS to support collaboration and 
improve the decision-making. GSS can also be applied to determine the requirements 
among stakeholders and to prepare or guide the stakeholder-user group in discussing the 
implementation (making it fit for purpose). 
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2.5         
The aim of this research was to define parameters of control using qualitative research 
methods, with the potential opportunity of setting requirements for the initial experimental 
development phase of the design artefact that does the administrative work. When the 
qualitative approach is further evolved via the rigour and relevance cycles and data from the 
environment is entered into the artefact, it becomes a knowledge base, allowing quantitative 
analysis on the data gathered. In Figure 14 the continuous improvement cycle of BIS is 
divided and detailed per PDCA step towards collaboration and administration (collaboration 
to gain consensus and administration to capture and report the BIS status).
The following chapters (4, 5, 6 and 7) all use GSS as a multi-method research technique 
as a collaboration tool with the objective of examining potential artefact requirements and 
exchanging knowledge. 
QUALITY ASSURANCE WITHIN THE PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed method of qualitative interpretivist research inherently has some risks. To avoid 
any influence of the researcher e.g. based on personal biases towards the research results, 
the following mitigating mechanisms have been used. These mechanisms are designed to 
secure the objectivity (independence), reproducibility, precision and transparency of the 
research work:
− Apply the DSR framework proposed by Johanneson and Perjons [73]. This framework 
prescribes clear steps and criteria throughout the artefact development process.
− Make use of numerous participants from a wide variety of organisations/professions.
− Record the GSS sessions and demonstrations on video and/or audio. 
− Publish the – intermediate – research work in peer-reviewed-journals and at conferences. 
− Document all sessions (GSS meeting reporting) as well as the artefact development 
process (e.g. via change logs, version documentation, backlogs, etc.).
− Use an external professional moderator during the GSS sessions.
These activities and mechanisms, which should ensure objective, precise and reproducible 
research, are included in the appendices. 
Figure 15 displays the methods applied in the several phases of the research, in order to 
provide answers to the research questions.
RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS
The research propositions presented in Chapter 1 provide the basis for examining the 
BIS topic. In order to determine whether the building blocks of the research project i.e. 
the factors (variables, constructs, concepts) are comprehensive (are all relevant factors 
included?) and parsimonious (can we leave out factors since they add little value to the 
understanding or are similar to others?) [150], we denote each factor that has an influence 
on the theoretical construct. 
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Figure 14: Proposed method and PDCA-based activities used to improve the maturity of BIS.
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Figure 15: Thesis structure, based on the DSR Framework of Johannesson and Perjons [73].
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The objective here is to define clear research assumptions to take into consideration during 
the research project. The research methodology propositions also provide the foundation 
for examining the contributing factors that enable the BIS maturing process.
In line with Whetten [150], the theoretical construction of the research project and therefore 
its theoretical contribution lies in the questions “what”, “how”, “why”, “who”, “where” and 
“when.”
The grey boxes represent the what of our theory, providing the construct that we need 
to consider to help explain an organisation and its context. These constructs consists of 
numerous elements and are enumerated in the next section in Figure 16. 
The scope and context of the organisation differ and these two constructs are therefore 
situational. In terms of the context we answer the question “Who do I need to do this for?” 
(e.g. stakeholders), while scope answers the question “What do we need to do?” Elements 
of the context are shareholders’ objectives, geographical location, geopolitics [46], 
jurisdiction, etc. Elements of the scope are regulations, corporate social responsibility norms 
and certain business restrictions. Both are considered to be external forces that influence 
the organisation and the transformation process (represented by the dotted arrow), e.g. the 
maturing process.
The various elements are categorised under three major constructs:
− The construct of Management and organisation relates to all elements that formalise 
the structure and the processes within the organisation, from policy formulation to 
operationalisation.
− The resource capabilities relate to the internal competences and skills employees can 
use to put strategic plans into operation. Usually we refer to the processing power of the 
organisation needed to bring about changes. This concept is directly related to the scope. 
Thus, what we need to do in order to mature must be achieved with internal resources.
 − The culture of the organisation relates to attitudes and behaviour to BIS and therefore 
the willingness to engage into a maturing process. As Peter Drucker put it, “Culture eats 
strategy for breakfast.” This key assumption has considerable effect on the success of the 
maturing process [7].
These three internal constructs address the what question stated by Whetten [150]. The lines 
and arrows in the figure above represent the how question, i.e. how the constructs relate to 
each other.
Whetten [150] also refers to the “who, where and when” questions. These relate to limitations 
to the propositions generated from a theoretical model. Since the BIS phenomenon is 
embryonic, it is very hard to predefine limitations upfront. The major question who is 
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indicated by the green box and the dotted red arrow. It shows that we focus on exploring 
parameters that organisations can apply in order to mature (from the current to the 
desired situation). It is also important to highlight the fact that this research only focuses 
on governance and executive management (strategic level) practices. The where question 
relates to the fact that this research project is performed with Dutch organisations and 
in collaboration with Dutch respondents. This might limit the generalisability of the data 
gathered to Dutch industry. The major assumption behind this research was that there is 
a limited direct relationship between the individual constructs. Usually events occur and 
have a positive or negative effect on the change process. This might be by coincidence or on 
purpose, but usually this is not a rational or visible event. A combination of events can enable 
the maturing process. So we refer to preconditions, barriers and critical success factors, all 
predefined items that strongly influence the success of the BIS maturing process. 
Figure 16: Denoting the why, what and how, from Whetten [150], in relation to MBIS research.
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Figure 17: Enumeration of the theoretical constructs.
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3.1       INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter key concepts that relate to BIS are addressed. It is not the intention to be 
exhaustive since BIS is a broad domain. Only the concepts that have relevance in getting 
answers to the research questions are detailed in this chapter and form the ingredients for 
the conceptual framework suggested in chapter 1. 
Key concepts underscoring the topic of Business Information Security and the problem 
area are visualised in the diagram below. This starts with the main business orientation, 
which is to deliver services to customers, with the support of IT services. These services are 
established with IT components, including IT security services. Besides IT services business 
organisations are supported by numerous other support functions such as HRM, legal, 
risk management, etc. In past decades the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) has 
focused on the IT elements [151]. Due to human error, regulations and cyber-attacks, this 
CISO role has now changed into a more business-oriented discipline, which increasingly 
involves strategic planning [25]. This relates to the “resource-based view of the firm” theory 
(RBV) [152] in which organisational excellent performance and successful transformations 
rely on the capabilities of the resources that are involved in strategic planning. These 
resources are increasingly influenced by, e.g. human error, regulations and cyber-attacks 
and therefore indirectly influence the task and knowledge requirements of the CISO. Within 
the RBV of the firm theory, knowledge refers to these resource characteristics [153], [154]. 
In the section below the changing role of the CISO is elaborated in more detail. In relative 
smaller organisations the role of the CISO is not a dedicated function but a combination 
of responsibilities within the function of the Chief Information Officer, IT Director, or Chief 
Technology Officer. Since this research project focuses on the strategic level within mid-
market organisations we do not hypothesise that there is necessarily a dedicated CISO-
position.
3.1.1    INFORMATION RISK AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT
In recent decades IT security has become ‘information security’ [61]. ISO specifies 
information security as “protecting information assets from a wide range of threats in order 
to ensure business continuity, minimise business risk and maximise return on investment and 
business opportunities” [155], [156], [94].
The core principles for information security are confidentiality, integrity and availability, 
which are usually referred to with the acronym CIA [155], [157]. 
 − Confidentiality means preventing disclosure of information to unauthorised parties.
 − Integrity seeks to prevent unauthorised modification of information.
 − Availability is the term for all kind of ways to make necessary information available to users 
within an enterprise and within the ‘extended enterprise’.
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In addition ISO added other properties such as authenticity, accountability, non-
repudiation5, reliability, and auditability due to audit and compliance regulations. Thus 
Information Security deals with assurance of a certain level of system quality [158]. 
Information security is directly related to information risk management. Many authors have 
performed research into risk management models and methods such as CRAMM6, OCTAVE, 
[159], NIST, [160] and ISFs’ IRAM [161], particularly into risk analysis and risk assessments 
in order to analyse threats, vulnerabilities and the impact on information systems and derive 
controls for mitigation. To determine the information security requirements, e.g. controls in 
the form of process controls, technical controls or people controls is based on the risk and 
impact estimation on the critical business assets.
THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER
The Chief Information Security Officer’s role (CISO) was introduced as a response to the 
emerging domain of Information Security. The role of the CISO has emerged from a pure IT-
oriented role to become a strategic boardroom advisory role [25] “The CISO is generally the 
“heart and soul” of an information security program in most organisations. There is no better 
way to obtain a pulse regarding cyber risk” according to The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
[162]. The CISO “defines the information security strategy and organises and manages the 
organisation’s information security in line with the organisation’s needs and risk appetite”, 
according to the European Competence Framework [163]. This framework prescribes 
clear directives for the role of the CISO as wells as the required skill set. Numerous reports 
emphasise the importance of the CISO role in having an effect on Information Security 
strategy formulation and implementation. IT Policy Compliance Group reports that firms that 
standardise procedures and controls for IS and manage IS via a dedicated IS staff which is 
led by a CISO achieve 8.5% higher revenue than industry averages (n= 3000 organisations) 
[164]. This report also reveals that benchmarks conducted during the past year show that 
one of the key factors influencing outcomes related to the loss or theft of customer data is 
whether a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is in charge of the information security 
and assurance function of the organisation. In 2015 Accenture [165] did research7 into so-
called ‘leapfrog’ companies that outperform in the field of Information Security compared 
to others, for example, due to the positioning of the CISO as a strategic role [165], [166]. 
“These relatively new aspects of the role require CISOs to be successful change agents. 
To do this they need to be able to reflect on, and understand, the impact of their role on 
organisational culture” [25] The role of the CISO is that of a strategic board adviser, were as 
Hooper et al. states “organisations need to embrace their concern about cybersecurity and 
build it into their selection criteria for board members” [25].
5  ISO 2.54: The ability to prove the occurrence of a claimed event or action and its originating entities.
6  CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method) is a risk management methodology, currently in its fifth version, CRAMM 
Version 5.0. (source Wikipedia)
7  A total of 247 companies participated in this study, which was performed by Accenture in collaboration with Ponemon Institute.
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Various authors address the importance of the role of the CISO into balancing the 
responsibilities of risk and security into the first, second and third line. In 2012, The IIA 
proposed the three lines of defence concept to assist organisations govern enterprise 
risks and help executives understand the topic without confusion. If an organisation has an 
effective governance model, the second line of defence is responsible for performing most 
of the governance functions related to Business Information Security. According to IIA this 
role is headed by the CISO, who defines the policies, standards, and minimum technical 
configuration standards [162]. This concept is frequently examined and published by 
numerous bodies, such as COSO [167], ISACA [168] [169] and Forrester [166]. The main 
concepts of this “three lines of defence” concept are;
The first line of defence has line management oversight and is mainly the IT operations 
function and the “business”. This first line implements the policies and standards and 
is responsible for monitoring of the networks and infrastructure. The first line is also 
responsible for the workforce awareness and behaviour. The first line has process controls 
in place (e.g. encryption, anti- malware, data leakage prevention) and mechanisms in place 
to test the effectiveness of the controls (e.g. least privileged, segregation of duties etc.). In 
the second line of defence the CISO Office, according to Forrester [166], is responsible for 
governing those tasks and ensuring that the appropriate monitoring, reporting, and tracking 
of key controls is being performed by IT operations. In this second line also risk management, 
financial control, quality management, compliance, threat intelligence and brand monitoring 
is taking place. This second line reports to the board or senior management. Since the 
role of the CISO is becoming increasingly important to IT enabled companies the IIA 
states; “The board must ensure that the CISO is reporting at the appropriate levels within 
the organisation. Keep in mind that, although many CISOs continue to report within the IT 
organisation, sometimes the agenda of the chief information officer (CIO) is in conflict with 
that of the CISO. As such, the trend has been to migrate reporting lines to other officers, 
including the general counsel, the chief operating officer (COO), the chief risk officer (CRO), 
or even the chief executive officer (CEO), depending on the industry and the organisation’s 
dependency on technology [162]. Finally the third line of defence, internal audit, reviews 
the first and second line to ensure that the controls are effective, have suitable coverage, are 
deployed consistently and are proofed with evidence. So the external auditor and regulators 
can perform their external duties. Recently the IIA and COSO collaborated into a examining 
the main principles to consider for the CISO when navigating between the first, second and 
third line of defence.
3.1.2   BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY MATURITY & ALIGNMENT
Information risk and security management within organisations evolves in a similar way to 
organisational growth and development. An important growth model that can be used to 
identify the several stages of growth was developed by Larry Greiner [170]. It identifies two 
phases: growth and crisis. According to the Greiner Model, each phase of growth implies 
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a phase of crisis. Examples of crises include those related to leadership, simply because a 
start-up requires another type of leadership than a company that is scaling up. The larger 
the company gets, the more it depends on coordination and collaboration. This is especially 
the case when a company lacks clear boundaries due to extended networks, internet or 
electronic interfaces (e.g. XBRL8). Phase 5 implies a process of continuous collaboration 
and improvement. Greiner refers to a sixth phase that suggests that “growth may continue 
through merger, outsourcing, networks and other solutions involving other companies”. Each 
phase of organisational growth and the current state it is in also influences the level of BIS 
maturity.
Ferraiolo and Sachs [171] refer to maturity models as models that can be used to measure 
an organisation’s current state of information security maturity, irrespective of industry type 
and organisational size. In this context, maturity implies a potential for growth in capability 
and indicates both the richness of an organisation’s security process and the consistency with 
which it is applied in projects throughout the organisation.
To express a company’s security maturity in the form of a number we refer to COBIT4.1. This 
method was extracted from the Capability and Maturity Model (CMM) developed by the 
Systems Security Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University (SSE-CMM, 2003) 
[172]. CMM is mainly used to make a snapshot of the current situation to determine what 
is missing in order to attain the next maturity level. CMM is an important predecessor of 
other maturity models that are used in information security, such as Citigroup’s Information 
Security Evaluation Model (CITI-ISEM)3, COBIT® Maturity Model 4, Gartner’s Security 
Maturity Model, Stacey’s Security maturity Grid and many others. We highlight the 
most relevant ones for this research project, either because they have a direct or indirect 
relationship to BIS or reveal certain limitations that we need to consider during this research 
project.
8  XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) is a freely available, XML-based global standard for exchanging business 
information that is used to define and exchange financial information.
Figure 19: Three lines of defence concept taken from the IIA report from 2013 [162].
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Smit [173] researched the levels of business continuity management (BCM) maturity levels 
and why organisations first need insight into their BCM state before they can develop a BCM 
strategy to reach the next maturity level. She developed a model based on the BCM theory 
instead of looking at existing models. Smit integrates security management into BCM and 
makes it an integral part of the model. Smit concentrates on building a practical model 
rather than looking at actual applicability in practice. She did not include real-life testing of 
her model, leaving that to future research.
Chapin and Akridge [174] studied information security metrics in order to measure and 
then improve their incorporation into a continuous Total Quality Management (TQM) 
process. They adopted the ISO17799 (now ISO27001) standard to develop a complete 
security programme (the Security Program Maturity Model), which involves a large number 
of security elements (10 ISO elements) that would eventually provide insight into the state 
of security maturity. This study, which was adopted and published by ISACA (Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association), is a good example of making maturity measurement 
practical for large as well as mid-market organisations. However, practical testing and 
validation of the method is still needed.
AlAboodi [175] studied the existing models of the Code of Practice (BS7799) in 
combination with his self-developed maturity model. The author did not explain the 
measurement of the level and the granularity of interventions per maturity level in detail. This 
study is limited as it excludes practical research and validation within organisations (and 
their environment).
El Aoufi [22] did action research with the COBIT 4.1 maturity model within several 
organisations. He applied the model first to demonstrate a common language and apply 
frame of reference to the business as well as the security departments. In later research he 
presented the required controls in order to maintain this security level. Each security 
intervention in place in these organisations was then assessed based on this model. It seems 
wise to adopt this way of working in order to ensure not only that the maturity model way of 
working is accepted but also to achieve consensus and mandate future steps on the individual 
controls (e.g. interventions).
In 2014 Tewarie conducted PhD research on principle-based auditing and the necessity of 
structuring the Term of Reference (ToR) for auditing [176]. Tewarie developed a maturity 
model framed as the Information Security Object Maturity Model (under development and 
still to be published). This model preserves scope for decomposing in detail each maturity 
level requirement per object and revealing the relationship between the maturity levels. This 
model requires additional empirical validation.
Ferraiolo and Sachs [171] define maturity level as: “A well-defined evolutionary plateau on 
the path towards becoming a mature information security within the organisation”. Each level 
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provides a step in continuous security process improvement. Each level then provides the 
foundation for improvements undertaken to reach the next level.
Most of the above-listed information security maturity models provided by academics 
(Smit, Chapin & Akridge, AlAboodi, Tewarie, etc.) lack practical validation in the business 
environment. Empirical validation of IS methods and models was also acknowledged in 
Siponens’ research work [61]. These models are therefore limited in their feedback in terms 
of the rigour – in the form of publications – of the empirical application of the model. In his 
2005 research paper Siponen emphasised that future work on Information System Security 
(ISS) should move towards a more social and adaptable (empirically grounded) ISS method. 
On the contrary, the generic CMM model developed at Carnegie Mellon University is one 
of the most popular models due to its continuous sponsorship and improvements by the 
Department of Defence and successful adoption in IT governance models such as COBIT 
[177]. 
Maturity models provided by practitioner communities such as ISO/IEC, Gartner [178], 
NIST, etc. are widely adopted and accepted. In general, the number of levels in the 
maturity model varies, as well as the criteria per level. It is the detailing of the criteria and 
Figure 20: Greiner’s growth model defines five stages of growth taken from Greiner [170].
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requirements per level that determines the quality and applicability of the model. Originally 
the ISO15504 provided freedom in criteria per level in order to determine the software 
process improvement and capability determination. This model was later revised to use it into 
other areas and to create more freedom in its applicability. This freedom is also desirable 
within information security, especially when measuring numerous areas of improvement, 
e.g. the entire organisation, the software security lifecycle, the security of the network, etc. 
The ISO15504 did not gain a similar adoption as the CMMI model. This CMMI model 
remains popular in the IT, software and security areas, due to the fact that it was one of the 
first models and through its sponsorship by the US Department of Defence [179]. Another 
relevant model which was established due to intensive collaboration among software vendors 
is the “The Building Security in Maturity Model” (BSIMM)9 for software security [180]. Due 
to its extensive use by practitioners the popularity is increasing rapidly. 
THE CONCEPT OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY PROCESSES AND DATA 
(IN DETAIL)
In the visual in Figure 21 show the key elements of information risk, security and compliance 
are highlighted. The information security strategy forms the input for the Information 
security planning. The scope of information security risk and security is determined based on 
reference models and standards prescribed by numerous bodies or regulators. Depending 
on the type of industry a company is in. The policies and standards determine the risk appetite 
of the organisation which is formalised in the risk management process of; risk identification, 
registration, treatment and acceptance. All security requirements that are needed to keep risk 
within the risk appetite boundaries are stored in repositories and documents. Within the IT 
operations numerous security process and service management processes are active in order 
to maintain a certain level of operational security control on the information risks that arise. All 
these processes are input on the performance management of information risk and security 
management. Selecting the appropriate parameters that reflect the relevant operational data 
for the right audience is a cumbersome task. A continuous measurement and reporting on the 
performance of the risk and security processes is needed in order for boards and executive 
management to maintain control over the Business Information Security maturity levels. In this 
visual the grey areas represent the scope of this research. 
9  The Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM) is the result of a multi-year study of real-world software security initiatives. The 
model is built directly from data observed in sixty-seven software security initiatives, from firms including Adobe, Aetna, Bank of 
America, Box, Capital One, Citi, Comerica Bank, EMC, Epsilon, F-Secure, Fannie Mae, Fidelity, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Intel, Intuit, 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Lender Processing Services Inc., Marks and Spencer, Mashery, McAfee, McKesson, Microsoft, NetSuite, 
Neustar, Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks, PayPal, Pearson Learning Technologies, QUALCOMM, Rackspace, Salesforce, Sallie 
Mae, SAP, Sony Mobile, Standard Life, SWIFT, Symantec, Telecom Italia, Thomson Reuters, TomTom, Vanguard, Visa, VMware, Wells 
Fargo, and Zynga. The BSIMM is a yardstick for measuring software security.
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3.1.3  BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY ALIGNMENT
Business processes rely greatly on IT systems and technologies. Parallel to complying with 
expanding legislation, organisations have to cope with the rise of dynamic but complex 
technologies. These emerging – and sometimes embryonic – technologies, Internet of Things, 
domotica, social networks and the threats they pose [181] cause new headaches for business 
leaders. This is especially the case because these new technologies interconnect10 more and 
more with extended enterprise and core business applications. The possible exploitation of 
vulnerabilities within technologies is ‘generally’ covered by the vendor, either in the form 
of lab testing by certification bodies11 or by ‘security’ related functionalities that need to be 
configured and customised. The complexity of connecting several actors (authentication of 
actor, authorisation of actor, administration of actor) on several information layers with a wide 
variety of complex protocols is increasingly subject to human error [182]. Large enterprises, 
government departments and multinationals seem to cope better with security challenges 
due to the application of adequate frameworks, methods and best practices [183]. 
Smaller so-called mid-market organisations do not have sufficient resources [4] and some 
companies lack sufficient knowledge about frameworks to successfully align the business 
goals to security programmes [184]. ISACA12 put great effort into applying the SABSA13 
framework into the COBITs14 framework, with the objective of aligning strategic goals to 
operational architecture requirements. In 2008 I have did empirical research on applying 
DEMO15 and the Enterprise frameworks to Information Security architecture principles in 
order to align the business to the information security function [185]. Previous Alignment 
studies [109] and Alignment assessment models were used to measure performance. 
An important contribution was made by Luftman [186] and later on by other researchers 
[187], [188]. COBIT 4.1 did the initiation in measuring the maturity level of Business and IT 
alignment, which was later adopted by the security community in order to measure the level 
of security maturity alignment [22].
3.1.3  CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
In this thesis we refer to maturity as the process an organisation undertakes while moving 
towards the desired state of control in protecting critical assets. The objective is to provide 
analysis and insight, based on a maturity model, in the current state, and to provide analysis 
and insights into the capabilities and requirements for the desired state. It is not my intention 
to examine the numerous security maturity models, but to provide freedom of movement 
10  Interconnect can for example be portals, collaboration software such as Google docs or Office live. Or social variants such as 
Instant Messaging, iTunes music sharing etc.
11  Bodies such as:  NIST, National Institute of Standards and Technology. ICSA labs, Consortium Operations, Security Product Testing, 
and Certification Programs.  FIPS, Federal Information Processing Standard, CC, Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation. EAL, Evaluation Assurance Level of an IT product or system, is a numerical grade assigned following the 
completion of Common Criteria.
12  ISACA is an international professional association focused on IT Governance. Previously known as the Information Systems Audit 
and Control Association
13  SABSA Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture
14  COBIT Control Objectives for Information and related Technology
15  DEMO Design & Engineering Methodology for Organizations,
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in selecting and applying the appropriate model, depending on the situation or the subject 
to be examined. The steps needed in order to achieve the desired state of maturity are 
framed as Interventions. Interventions can be denoted as ‘planning’ interventions, ‘doing’ 
interventions, ‘checking’ interventions and ‘acting’ interventions (PDCA): 
 − Planning interventions (Plan) have the characteristics of formulating plans to establish 
objectives and processes that are necessary to deliver results in accordance with expected 
output. This planning requires alignment with all stakeholders involved. 
 − Doing interventions (Do) are concerned with the execution of interventions articulated 
in the plan. A major component of this phase is implementing controls and/or collecting 
factual data (evidence) in order to measure and monitor, to provide input for the ‘check’ 
and the ‘act’ phase.
 − Controlling interventions in order to check if a certain intervention is executed to establish 
the desired state (Check). This phase requires actual and factual data collected in the 
previous phase in order to ascertain deviations and examine the appropriateness and 
completeness of the plan to enable execution.
 − Interventions that are corrective in nature (Act). In the previous phase it is checked 
whether the steps taken, which are distilled from the plan, reveal an improvement 
according to the prior standard (baseline) or require additional corrective interventions 
 
PLAN: Decision Actor 
(Direct) 
CHECK: Control Actor 
(Control)
DO/ACT: Execution 
Actor (Execute) 
Figure 22: The PDCA cycle on Direct Control Cycle of Von Solms & Von Solms based on Tewarie [66]
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in order to achieve the desired state. If the CHECK shows that the PLAN that was 
implemented in DO is not an improvement, then the existing standard (baseline) will 
remain in place and require some additional learning through repeated PDCA cycles.
Tewarie mapped in his SIVA [66] research work the Von Solms and Von Solms [71] Direct 
and Control model as defined in 2006 [71] onto the PDCA cycle . The planning activities 
are carried out at the strategic level, the execution is the responsibility of management and 
operations, and the controlling activities are assigned to the actor who needs to check the 
object on quality based on compliance regulations. Tewarie made this mapping in order to 
reveal the relationships between the actors involved and their assigned responsibilities. 
Continuous improvement, as part of Total Quality Management [189], is established 
by executing this PDCA cycle numerous times and studying interventions, in order to 
understand their effectiveness during the maturing process. Edward Deming [65]16 refers 
to this learning element as the PDSA cycle, a Plan-Do-Study-Act [69] cycle, which builds 
deductive and inductive learning into learning and improvement cycles [190]. Most of the 
maturity models and frameworks developed within the security arena have PDCA elements 
incorporated. 
This PDCA cycle within IS is usually designed, maintained and reported via spreadsheets 
[191]. Volchkov stated that collecting evidence on the effectiveness of controls in this way 
has limitations [72]. Filling in spreadsheets with answers to questionnaires is subject to 
manipulation because it is not a closed cycle. Spreadsheet data is limited to subjective 
opinions and leaves little room for reflection and learning, indirectly hindering continuous 
improvement. What’s more, spreadsheet data cannot always be gathered from the 
original sources, which limits the authenticity, integrity and therefore the reliability of the 
information. Thus, Governance Risk and Compliance (GRC) tools, which were designed 
for large enterprises in response to the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were transferred from 
financial risk to information risk. GRC implementations are complex and the maintenance 
requires dedicated staff [192]. Integration of GRC tools with operational data for example 
via Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) is only feasible for companies 
that can afford expensive tooling or have sufficient staff to implement and support these 
functionalities [192]. 
3.1.4    STRATEGIC PLANNING
In literature the solution to solving Information Security (IS) issues lies in strategic planning, 
in directing and controlling [56]. But what are the key differences? Strategy is a method or 
plan chosen to bring about a desired future, such as achieving a goal or solving a problem. In 
the perspective of this research project strategic planning is not strategic thinking. Confusing 
these two can be misleading in the execution of a strategic plan. Strategic thinking about the 
desired outcome must be done by the Board. Executing (planning, monitoring, evaluating) 
16  This traditional PDCA cycle was established by Edward Deming. Deming is considered the founding father of modern quality 
control and he strives for continuous improvement. [65]
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the strategic plan to achieve these goals is the role of executive management [57], [56]. 
This confusion lies at the heart of the issue: i.e. most successful strategies are visions, not 
plans. Mintzberg states: “When companies understand the difference between planning and 
strategic thinking, they can get back to what the strategy making process should be: capturing 
what a manager learns from all his sources and then synthesising that learning into a vision 
of the direction that the business should pursue” [193]. Practising Information Security 
as a strategic topic has been addressed by Von Solms and Von Solms. They emphasise the 
leadership role that boards need to take to articulate security visions [194]. Sveen et al. point 
out that establishing a vision based on strategic thinking requires adequate knowledge [195]. 
Such knowledge gives meaning to the implications of the strategic plan, in the form of time, 
money and resources [196]. And it indicates the interrelationships between stakeholders.
3.1.5    INFORMATION SECURITY AS A STRATEGIC UNIQUE SELLING POINT (USP)
In 2007 Harvard professors Hunter and Westerman examined companies that treated risk 
management as a continuous improvement process and revealed the fact that those who 
did were perceived to have higher value [197]. Gordon et al. [198] examined companies 
which are open to voluntary disclosures concerning information security and publicly accept 
feedback on their security investments and activities. Here, too, there was an increase in 
company value [199]. A similar effect was shown in Japan [50], on the effects of information 
security incidents on corporate values in the Japanese Stock Market. In 2011 Shackelford 
[200] quotes; “over 90% of respondents to a survey by the Ponemon Institute [201] reported 
experiencing a cyber-attack during the last year, costing on average more than $2 million per 
organisation. Such attacks have been shown to negatively impact the stock prices of targeted 
firms [200], Gordon et al. and Shackelford warn investors to be careful with investing 
in firms that do not proactively treat security risks. Shackelford quotes; “As losses mount, 
investors will likely stop treating cyber-attacks as a corporate nuisance. Instead, they may start 
treating such attacks as the serious threat they are to the survival of firms and, at a macro 
level, the long-term competitiveness of knowledge economies built on intellectual property.” 
For some companies BIS is perceived as a competitive advantage which helps them 
distinguish themselves from competitors [202]. Herath et al. developed a cyber-insurance 
model for insurance premiums using a numerical example with ICSA17 data [203]. Based 
on numerous publications on cyber security insurance from researchers [204], [200] and 
institutions [205], insurance companies such as Interpolis, AON and Chubb have been 
able to enter new markets with new products (cyber insurances) while others have added 
information security as a unique selling point in their marketing. Igor Ansoff refers in his 
matrix to product development and diversification of strategic portfolio planning in order 
to achieve competitive advantage [206]. In 2015 Ponemon and Accenture suggest in their 
research publication The Cyber Security Leap: From Laggard to Leader [165] that companies 
that address BIS as a strategic topic perform better and can ‘leapfrog’ others. 
17  ICSA Labs (International Computer Security Association), ICSA Labs is providing resources for research, intelligence, certification 
and testing of products (source: wikipedia)
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3.1.6   GOVERNANCE OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
There are various ways in which organisations can attain their strategic objectives. Three 
dimensions are of strategic importance in this respect: Governance, management and 
operations. In this section we define Governance as “the guidance of a setting in which 
others can manage effectively”, Management as “the making of operating decisions” [207] 
and the actual operations as systems in which people and processes produce products 
and services. These three dimensions need to be harmonised in order to achieve business 
objectives, aligned with the appropriate risk. Recent ISACA (Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association) papers on COBIT5 [208] separate Governance from Management. 
They are viewed as two disciplines encompassing different activities, organisational structures 
and therefore serving different purposes. In COBIT5, Governance is defined as follows: 
“Governance ensures that enterprise objectives are achieved by evaluating stakeholder 
needs, conditions and options, setting direction through prioritisation and decision-making, 
and monitoring performance, compliance, and progress against plans.” In most enterprises, 
Governance is the responsibility of the Board of Directors under the leadership of the 
chairperson. In COBIT5, Management is defined as the discipline that “plans, builds, runs 
and monitors activities in alignment with the direction set by the Governance body to achieve 
the enterprise objectives” [56]. In most enterprises, management is the responsibility of the 
executive management under the leadership of the CEO.
Basie and Rossow Von Solms [52] are among the few academics who have researched the 
area of Information Security Governance (ISG). In their study they emphasise that Security 
Governance ought to be part of Corporate Governance and IT Governance (illustrated 
in Figure 23). Their Information Security Governance definition is: “ISG consists of the 
management commitment and leadership, organisational structures, user awareness and 
commitment, policies, procedures, technologies and compliancy enforcements mechanisms, 
all working together to ensure that the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of 
the company’s electronic assets (data, information, software, hardware, people, etc.) are 
maintained at all times”. The importance of information, technology, people and processes 
[209] has transformed Information Security (IS) from a technical responsibility into an 
integral part of the daily business operations called “Business Information Security”. 
Therefore, the following definition for Business Information Security Governance is 
relevant here; “Business Information Security Governance (BISG) is an integral part of
Corporate Governance exercised by the Board overseeing the definition and implementation
of processes, structures and relational mechanisms in the organisation that enables 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of the business operations towards all 
stakeholders”.
The word integral in this definition refers to the fact that BISG involves numerous disciplines 
besides IT, e.g. high-level accountability on a legal level [52]. ‘Exercised by the board’ implies 
that the highest level of the organisation is directed towards management and operation. 
With this definition I aim to incorporate all previous definitions relevant to Governance of 
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Business Information Security. Because the term ‘activities’ does not cover all the structures, 
processes and cultural aspects relevant to BIS, I use the broader terminology of “practice”.
Starreveld et al. [211] defines in his theoretical model Governance, Delegation, 
Accountability and Control (GDAC). This model implies a continuous “Business Control 
Cycle” (BCC). This model is used in accountancy disciplines throughout the Netherlands. 
Governance relates to the highest decision actor concerned with activities such as decision-
making, determining goals and ambitions (e.g. creating a mature business environment) 
and achieving goals. The goals are then delegated to execution actors. The agency theory 
[212] identifies the agency relationship where one party, the principal delegates the work 
to another party, the agent [59]. An example of delegation by executive management, 
to achieve a certain maturity ambition, could be a specific intervention or practice. The 
execution actor e.g. the agent, is responsible for providing “evidence-based” reporting to the 
accounting discipline (accountability actor). The control function refers to internal control 
task that act on behalf of the decision actor. The Starreveld model is used in combination 
with the Von Solms model in the work of Tewarie [176], which is also applied into practical 
environments. Tewarie distinguished Starreveld’s governance model and De Leeuw’s system 
paradigm [213] in order to differentiate activities at the governance and management 
levels. Activities at management level are planning, implementing and controlling the 
operational level. The relationship between the actors mentioned are based on the “principle-
agent approach” in which two actors depend on each other, to avoid conflict of interest and 
establish control agreements in order to achieve mutual goals and with equal interest. In 
governance studies this is referred to the Stewardship theory, where directors are regarded 
as the stewards of the company’s assets and will be predisposed to act in the best interest of 
the shareholders [214].
Figure 23: Information Security Governance according to Von Solms and R. Von Solms [210].
Corporate Governance
Information Security Governance IT Governance 
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This entire governance and executive management body operates through structures, 
processes and relational mechanisms [215]. COBIT [56] and ISO3850018 applied these 
theoretical foundations to their Body of Knowledge. 
RESEARCH RELEVANCE
In the light of Von Solms analysis of the beneficial effects of the exchange of practices between 
Corporate Governance practices and Security Governance, research into Corporate 
Governance practices is needed. Following the strategic organisational theory of De Wit & 
Meyer [216], De Haes and Van Grembergen researched “effective” IT governance practices 
and their ease of implementation [217]. Their Governance practices have been successfully 
applied into organisations and are therefore also relevant to the aim of this research.
3.1.7    INTERVENTIONS & PRACTICES
An intervention is an activity or event that changes the current status quo into a desired state, 
i.e. it involves the development of the organisation. In relation to the maturing process of 
Information Security within the organisation this requires insight into a current situation, 
maturity models that relate to this view, and insights into the activities and events an 
organisation needs to attend in order to achieve the desired state. Cummings and Worley
[218] define the term intervention as “a sequence of activities, actions, and events intended
to help an organisation improve its performance and effectiveness”. In order to establish a
desired outcome the authors emphasise the importance of intervention “design principles”. 
“Intervention design, or action planning, derives from careful diagnosis and is meant to
resolve specific problems and to improve particular areas of organisational functioning 
identified in the diagnosis. In order to distinguish effective interventions that are relevant for
the influence and measurement of Business and IT Alignment (BITA) Pols [123] adopted 
the Cummings and Worley method in order to establish a core set of interventions that 
contribute to influencing and measuring BITA. These interventions have been applied in 
consultancy practices throughout the Netherlands.
Therefore, in this research project, we also adopt the Cummings and Worley design 
principles for interventions such as situational factors that must be considered when 
designing any intervention [219]. In this research we refer to the following more precisely 
formulated situational factors: Barriers, Practices, Critical Success Factors and Preconditions 
that enable or limit organisational development (OD). The authors also refer to readiness 
for change. This element is addressed in this research due to the use of numerous methods 
to engage all relevant stakeholders (i.e. mid-market companies, security professionals, 
experts, target groups) [220], [221]. The capability to change is addressed through the 
element “resource capabilities”, which denotes the elements that are required in order to 
determine capability (skills, experiences, competences, knowledge) and ability (willingness, 
commitment, culture) [222]. By engaging the environment (organisations) in this research 
18  ISO/IEC 38500 is the international standard for corporate governance of information technology (IT).
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Governance
Control
AccountabilityDelegation
IT-environmentBusiness-
environment
Plan
Implementation
Control
Plan
Business
IT Alignment
Implementation
Control
Figure 24: The conceptual model of GDAC processes based on Starreveld et al. [211] & De Leeuw [213].
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project the Capabilities of the Change Agent are addressed, hence the fact that; “Many 
failures in OD result when change agents apply interventions beyond their competence”. An 
interesting finding from Pols’ research is that most of the derived interventions are indeed 
general Business Management practices (page 439). An interesting research assumption in 
relation to BIS is if the interventions and practices that can be applied to BIS in fact originate 
in generic business management principles.
PRACTICE
In the context of this research project we refer to practices as a working method or activity 
introduced to establish or maintain a certain state. A collective set of practices can be part 
of a larger whole, e.g. an intervention. In this research project we relate to interventions 
as a set or sequence of activities, working methods or practices with the objective to help 
an organisation improve BIS maturity. A security control such as identity and access 
management is considered a control and is part of one or more activities. As mentioned 
above, a situational factor can be a practice that is applied prior to the execution of the 
intervention in order to increase its effect [218]. 
3.1.8    STRUCTURES, PROCESSES AND RELATIONAL MECHANISMS
Strategic management theories address the core purpose of the company and the desired 
organisational design needed to achieve business goals. These methods capture all of the 
dimensions that could influence the desired outcome. In the book Strategy Synthesis, De 
Wit and Meyer [223] advance a strategic organisational theory, containing three major 
components of an organisation: Firstly, Organisational Structures (the firm’s anatomy), 
for instance the hierarchical reporting lines within a firm or towards regulators or other 
stakeholders. Secondly, Organisational Processes (the firm’s physiology) i.e. processes and 
procedures for the most efficient organisation of a firm: escalation and communication 
processes; knowledge and competences processes. Finally, they distinguished Organisational 
Culture (the psychology of the organisation) e.g. awareness, participation and collaboration. 
In this research we use the more exhaustive terminology Relational Mechanisms (RM) 
because it addresses additional soft and intangible factors of an organisation such as 
perceptions, attitudes, behaviour, leadership, etc.
This SPRM theory, which was successfully applied in several previous studies [105], [111], 
led to an effective framework for the Enterprise Governance of IT. Due to the research work 
of Steven De Haes at Antwerp Management School and his involvement in the COBIT5 
for Information Security review process, ISACA adopted the integration of SPRM into the 
COBIT5 model [56]. Hence this management model, which was based on work by De Wit 
and Meyer, is being successfully applied by boards to enable better dialogue with upper 
management. This theory-based business approach also shows its practical contribution 
[187] to the financial sector environment in Belgium as well as Bodies of Knowledge such 
as ISACA’s COBIT5 for Information Security [56]. Hence this De Wit and Meyer theory, 
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which enables a decomposition of the strategic elements, increases the awareness of upper 
management and categorises the numerous interventions and practices to be explored, is 
therefore considered in this research project. 
3.1.9    REQUIREMENTS
There are several forms of requirements. According to the Business International Institute 
of Business Analysis in their Guide to the Business Analysis Body of Knowledge (BABOK) a 
classification of several requirements is made. Three major ones are:
 − Business requirements relate to the overall statements of the business goals, objectives, or 
needs of an organisation.
 − Architectural requirements relate to the explanation of identifying the necessary systems 
structure and systems behaviour.
 − User (stakeholder) requirements relate to mid-level statements of the needs or demand of 
a particular stakeholder (regulators, customers, civilians) or group of stakeholders. They 
usually describe how someone wants to interact with the intended solution. Often acting 
as a mid-point between the high-level business requirements and more detailed solution 
requirements19.
According to Wieringa [224], “A requirements specification consists of a specification of 
product objectives and a specification of required product behavior”. “The generic objective 
of any product is to answer needs that exist in its environment. Any development process starts 
with a statement of product objectives and produces behaviour specifications and product 
decompositions along the way”. Wieringa defines business needs as the initial starting 
point for setting requirements. The needs, for example business problems, are translated 
into product objectives which are defined in terms of the product and specifications about 
desired behaviour of the product. Each product specification is a statement of objectives 
for its subsystems. In client-oriented development, “the needs of the client may even change 
because of the determination of objectives. This is called requirements uncertainty. The 
characteristic feature of product evolution is that an evaluation of experience of the product 
after it is developed, leads to a (re)development of the product. The logical structure of 
product evolution is the same as the logical structure of feedback control” [224]. We call 
the initial process of defining functional and non-functional technical requirements in the 
first iteration of the artefact an ‘experiment’. It is not necessary to be completely precise and 
exhaustive when exploring these requirements. The initial aim is to work on establishing initial 
requirements that cover most of the problem. The objective is to engineer an artefact that can 
serve numerous stakeholder needs and – due to its experimental stage – accept uncertainty 
and ‘fuzziness’ during development [225]. In later iterations of the artefact, additional 
requirements can be built in, based on reflections and feedback from the user community.
According to Wieringa in client-oriented development, “the needs of the client may even 
19  Source: A Guide to the Business Analysis Body of Knowledge (BABOK) Guide version 3
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change because of the determination of objectives. This is called requirements uncertainty. 
The characteristic feature of product evolution is that an evaluation of experience of 
the product after it is developed, leads to a (re)development of the product. The logical 
structure of product evolution is the same as the logical structure of feedback control” 
[224]. Thus, in this thesis practical problems and business issues items relate to "business 
requirements". These items require something from the business in order to bring about 
the desired outcome or solve a particular problem. This can be achieved by articulating and 
implementing certain functional or non-functional requirements in an artefact. 
INFORMATION RISK AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Wieringa [226], wrote numerous publications on setting requirements for software security, 
according to Ionita, Bullee and Wieringa “Information Security Risk Assessment can be 
viewed as part of requirements engineering because it is used to translate security goals into 
security requirements, where security requirements are the desired system properties that 
mitigate threats to security goals”. In order to automate the secure software development 
process based on risk analysis, Yu et al. [227] proposed an automated analysis of security 
requirements through risk-based argumentation via RISA. RISA (Risk assessment in Security 
Argumentation), “uses public catalogues of security expertise to support the risk assessment, 
and to guide the security argumentation in identifying rebuttals and mitigations for security 
requirements satisfaction.” [228] The empirical validation made by Yu et al. included 
proposing a product called OpenRISA, which contributes to solving three major software 
security problems. The following are important considerations for this research project:
1. Vulnerabilities – due to the lack of secure software modelling and development – are 
integrated into the modelling language. 
This ‘security by design’  principle is applied in this research since it embodies continuous 
learning and improvement via feedback and feed-forward loops, in close collaboration with 
stakeholders (in order to ensure safe products and processes (e.g. artefacts)) [70]. 
2. The lack of a continuous feed of software security improvements from the existing body of 
knowledge is resolved via automated feeds of publically available libraries. 
Existing frameworks are used in this research in order to develop, maintain and utilise 
security best practices. 
3. The lack of formalised arguments; these are challenged and checked for soundness in 
prior security risk assessments. This rigorous method contributes to more robust software 
design and development.
Open collaborative dialogues are used to reflect, learn and prioritise, thus enhancing 
existing bodies of knowledge. Empirical testing is used to achieve improvements in the 
practical environment.
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3.2        CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have identified and defined the concepts that relate to the research 
questions set in chapter 1. It is not the objective to be exhaustive with all concepts. It is the 
primary aim to demonstrate correlations and viewpoints from various sources how BIS 
is perceived and practiced. It provides guidance for the further research and reader to 
appreciate research deliverable 1. A, the conceptual framework for BIS. Out of this chapter we 
can derive a definition for BIS maturity; BIS Maturity is the state, process or period of being 
mature as an organisation when it comes to Business Information Security, expressed via a 
maturity model which constitutes of multiple levels with predefined criteria. With Business 
Information Security we address the entire End-to-End process of information processing 
including all relevant stakeholders. 
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4.1        INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we examine the results of an exploratory study that uses literature study, 
expert panel research via GSS and survey research to examine contributing interventions 
to the process of maturing the level of Business Information Security (BIS). First we define, 
based on literature research, some key concepts and second we examine the results of the 
study. The research also examines barriers for not implementing these interventions by the 
organisations. This chapter finalises with proposing a minimum core set of interventions for 
organisations as well as new insights and requirement propositions for the measurement 
of BIS via Design Science Research Artefact construction. It describes the Design Science 
Research process of researching the literature (Rigour Cycle) on interventions and practices, 
scrutinise the latter via a GSS expert panel research and present them as requirements 
for the first iteration of the artefact (Design Cycle) in Chapter 6. To later on be validated in 
practice (Relevance Cycle) in Chapter 7.
This chapter was partly published in the International Journal of IT/Business Alignment and 
Governance (IJITBAG) 1(4), Page 18-39, in December 2010 under the title A research 
journey into Maturing the Business Information Security of Mid-market organisations.
4.2        DEFINING THE MID-MARKET AS A RESEARCH AREA
A segmentation of the market in order to carry out research has been made by Gartner. 
Gartner defines small and mid-sized business (SMBs) “by the number of employees and 
annual revenue they have. The attribute used most often is number of employees: 
 − small businesses are usually defined as organisations with fewer than 100 employees. 
 − mid-sized enterprises are organisations with 100 to 999 employees.
The second most popular attribute used to define the SMB market is annual revenue: 
 − small businesses are usually defined as organisations with less than $50 million in annual 
revenue
 − mid-sized enterprises are defined as organisations that make more than $50 million, but 
less than $1 billion in annual revenue [229].
Gartners’ main focus is on the United States. To examine the European and more specifically 
the Dutch market, a definition of this market made by the Central Bureau of Statistics in the 
Netherlands (CBS) is used. CBS defines medium-sized organisations – also known as mid-
market organisations – as those providing work for 50-100 employees. In the appendix a 
list of selected branches, with numbers of employees defined according to several sources is 
added. As the European Commission increasingly emphasises the importance of information 
technology, this research partially follows this EU definition of mid-market segmentation 
criteria. Partially, because when considering the number of employees, the European 
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Commission defines the limit of mid-market organisations as 250 employees.
ENTERPRISE CATEGORY HEADCOUNT TURNOVER OR BALANCE SHEET TOTAL IN  €
MEDIUM-SIZED / 
MID-MARKET
< 250 ≤ € 50 
million
≤ € 43 million 
SMALL < 50 ≤ € 10 million
≤ € 10 million
MICRO < 10 ≤ € 2 million
≤ € 2 million 
An important observation is that 250 employees do not equal the number of automated 
systems (servers, PCs, printers) a company is using. In theory a potential security breach 
can be caused by an ‘actor’ (i.e. a person, system or application) that is directly or indirectly 
connected to the internet, creating some form of a threat. Such threats will increase as more 
and more managed corporate devices are connected to the internet, not to mention non-
managed corporate devices and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. According to Deloittes’ 
report on mobile usage in 2013 a Dutch individual has 4.3 devices at his or her disposal 
compared to 7.3 in Spain [230] and these are seldom managed by the organisation itself. 
They create a form of Shadow IT that poses an increasing risk to organisations [231]. This is 
why it is hard to determine the exact number of systems. In practice a company defined as a 
mid-market organisation, with 250 employees, for example a factory, can have 10 systems 
to run their business. Based on the EU criteria20 this factory would be in the mid-market, but 
from a research perspective it is small. 
Another method used to measure the size of a business, and to define mid-market 
segmentation, according to the European Commission, is the annual turnover or the balance 
sheet total. When companies exceed a total amount of annual revenue or have a certain 
balance sheet total, they do need to comply with certain reporting regulations, for example 
IT audit regulations and “wet op de jaarrekening” [232]. Taking into consideration the 
limitations of employee headcount and the limitations on disclosure, I define the mid-market 
segment based on automated systems. This way of counting and selecting organisations is 
fairly effective and plausible with respect to the research problem. On the one hand, the 
number of systems tells us something about the reliability on IT for the business processes, 
and thus the potential IT risk profile. And it tells us something about the type of industry the 
company is in (generally factories have fewer systems than, for example, banks) and, on the 
other hand, the estimated revenue. This provides an indicator for the relevant legislation that 
might be applicable. We cap the number at 2500 systems. Generally, organisations with a 
higher number of systems have security management practices in place.
20  Taken from the European Union website: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
Table 2: Market segmentation according to the EU Commission based on headcount and financial figures.
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4.3       PROBLEMS FOR MID-MARKET ORGANISATIONS
In chapter 1 the main problems organisations face nowadays are described. It seems hard 
to cope with rapidly changing threats on one hand and upcoming business demands on the 
other [209]. Enterprise focused frameworks to operationalise the IT, in order to align with 
the business goals, seem to fail mid-market companies [87]. This mid-market segment, 
with 100-2500 systems, is increasingly subject to cyber threats [233], [234] and the 
lack sufficient knowledge [235] about attainable interventions in order to become security 
compliant [87]. The problem of insufficient knowledge about security interventions in this 
segment and the increase in security incidents subsequently led to the research questions 
described in chapter 1 to examine which interventions mid markets can adopt in order to 
increase the BIS maturity. Summarized in the question; What set of interventions, based on a 
best-practice maturity model, can be applied to enhance the maturity level of business security 
within mid-market organisations?
Various studies [236], [237] present many interventions that contribute to an increase of the 
security maturity levels of an organisation. However interventions that are essential and which 
are actually effective and easy to implement for mid-market organisations have not yet been 
studied. This led to a scientific approach of selecting, comparing, validating and presenting 
Figure 25: Market segmentation based on number of systems.
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effective and easy to implement interventions that increase business information security, 
i.e. a core set of interventions. The data for this research was collected during the first two
quarters of 2010 in the Netherlands.
4.4       RESEARCH APPROACH FOR EXPLORING MANAGEMENT INTERVENTIONS
The main objective of this research project is to select, assess and present effective and easy 
to implement interventions that increase business information security, i.e. a core set of 
interventions. The research method we use in this part as described in chapter 2 is; literature 
research to explicate the problem, GSS for judgement and prioritisation of interventions and 
finally Delphi research to validate the practical management interventions gained earlier 
via GSS. These selected interventions derived from experts with GSS are presented to the 
market in order to achieve “real-life” validation on applicability and acceptance of these 
interventions. This approach is visualised in Figure 26, the conceptual model of this research. 
Also potential barriers that might hinder the implementation of these interventions were 
investigated.
To investigate which interventions are required as a core minimum several steps are taken 
in order to collect answers to the research questions. These questions directly relate to the 
research questions set forward in chapter 1:
1. What is BIS maturity, based on the definitions derived from best practices and the
literature?
2. Which best-practice interventions are currently used to improve BIS maturity?
3. Which barriers do organisations experience when applying BIS interventions?
4. Which barriers have been identified in mid-market organisations?
5. Which of the identified BIS interventions are practical in such organisations?
6. What are the general organisational preconditions for the application of the core set of BIS
interventions?
To provide answers to these research questions, relevant literature on maturity models 
and interventions, which interventions exist and which best practice can be applied, was 
performed. In order to prioritise interventions for mid-markets it is essential to select 
interventions that are required by law and which are effective and easy to implement, 
according to academics and practitioners. All selected interventions were assessed 
by expertsv via an expert panel interview. These experts carefully assessed all relevant 
interventions based on ‘ease of implementation and effectiveness’ ranked on a scale ranging 
from -5 representing not contributing, 0 being neutral and +5 being very contributing. In 
addition the experts were asked to list barriers which make it difficult if not impossible for the 
market to implement certain interventions.
The outcome of this initial research phase was then analysed, interpreted on relevance and 
applicability for further research and then presented in a survey questionnaire. This survey 
was then sent out to 40 organisations in the mid-market segment. The survey objective was:
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 − to test awareness of information security law and legislation in the market
 − to test the perception of current security maturity levels and required ambition levels in the 
coming 2 years
 − to test which of the core interventions, derived from experts, are enforced within the market
 − to test which barriers they experience while implementing security
 − to test what they find to be the most contributing interventions in order to increase their 
security maturity.
The combination of expert panel research and the mid-market survey was performed in 
order to get answers to all the research questions but also to measure the current state of 
business information security of Dutch organisations and examine the initial state of maturity 
for mid-market organisations in the Netherlands.
Figure 26: Conceptual model on mid-market interventions research.
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4.4.1   CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SELECTION OF INTERVENTIONS
An intervention refers to a mixture of various actions, processes or mechanisms which 
contribute to the security process. The following intervention frameworks were used, as 
source of inspiration, in order to derive the relevant interventions.
ISO/IEC 27001
The ISO (International Organization for Standardization) and the IEC (International Electro 
Technical Commission) have established a joint committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1, in order to 
deal with their mutual interest in the area of information technology. This committee has 
a number of subcommittees with different responsibilities. The committee responsible 
for information security standards and practices is the SC27. The most recent one in this 
range is the ISO27001 which specifies Information Security Management System (ISMS) 
standards. This system is designed for all organisations in every sector. It is a management 
system and not a technology specification. It is the first of a series of international information 
security standards which are all in the 27000 range [94]. The ISO27000 range has a 
strong relation with the other ISO standards, for example Quality Management (ISO9000), 
Business Continuity Management (BS25999), IT Service Management (ISO20000) and 
others. The ISO/IEC27001 ISMS standard adopts the Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA) process 
approach. This PDCA approach encourages continuous improvement, since information 
security is a complex and dynamic matter this PDCA approach is a prerequisite for good 
ISMS [238]. The precursor of the ISO Security standard, the British Standard (BS7799), 
and ISO27001 are both examples of standards that offer guidance on how to approach 
information security through means that have been proven to work in many organisations 
[239]
ISO/IEC 27002
The objective of the ISO/IEC 27002 is to provide information to organisations responsible 
for implementing information security [94]. It is a best practice for developing and 
maintaining security standards and management practices within organisations to improve 
reliability on information security in extended enterprise relationships. It specifies 138 
security controls in 11 domains. It emphasises the importance of risk management and 
elaborates that it is not mandatory to implement every control in each domain (only those 
controls that are relevant). The controls vary in the domain of: security policy, organisational 
security, asset classification and control, personnel security, physical and environmental 
security, communications and operations management, access control, systems development 
and maintenance, business continuity management and compliancy. 
The combination of the ISO 27001 and 27002 standard provides a useful model for 
establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving 
an Information Security Management System. ISO provides a clear description of a security 
policy and implementation of its interventions [175]. In this research we use the ISO27002 
EXPLORING MANAGEMENT 
INTERVENTIONS4 105
controls (version 2005) as a source of potential core interventions that is going to be 
examined by experts on numerous perspectives.
COBIT
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) has been an 
internationally accepted set of guidance materials for IT governance since 1992. It is 
developed by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) and the IT 
Governance Institute (ITGI) [240]. The aim of COBIT is to translate business objectives to 
IT Goals to IT processes to assist in the actual implementation of effective IT governance 
throughout an enterprise. In December 2005 version 4 was introduced. In version 4.0 the 
overlap with the ITIL framework was reduced and the alignment with ITIL practices improved, 
which led to a director relation to the business objectives [237]. Several information security 
controls (according to the Code of Practice) were introduced in the COBIT framework. In 
December 2007 COBIT4.1 was developed which was mainly driven by studies performed 
by the University of Antwerp Management School [108], [105]. COBIT currently receives 
more attention because the current version 5 is more suitable and better applicable to 
compliance requirements. This version helps organisations to operationalise their IT in such 
a way that they are compliant with regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), Basel III and PCI DSS for 
payment card industries.
ENTERPRISE 
GOVERNANCE 
OF IT 
COBIT5
2011
IT GOVERNANCE 
COBIT4
2005IT MANAGEMENTCOBIT 3
2000IT CONTROLCOBIT2
1998IT AUDITCOBIT1
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Time
Figure 27: Evolution of COBIT.
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COBIT is appreciated for its enterprise wide perspective and integration with project 
management standards such as PMBOK, Prince2 and architecture frameworks such 
as TOGAF. The COBIT version 4.1 is updated as a result of the University of Antwerp 
Management School studies and COBIT users input [108]. This resulted in the COBIT5 for 
Information Security [56]. It is more pragmatic in nature now and therefore more suited to 
adoption by the mid-market segment. The perception of the complexity of COBIT is reduced 
with version 5. Important changes that contribute to the ‘acceptance’ of COBIT by mid-
market organisations are:
 − Enhanced executive overview and clear directives [209];
 − Improvement of the list of business goals and IT goals as a result of Antwerp Management 
School studies [241], [187], [105] , [109] , [215];
 − Explanation of goals and metrics in the framework section [217];
 − Better definitions of the core concepts. It is important to mention that the definition of a 
control objective changed, shifting more towards a management practice statement;
 − Improved control objectives as a result of updated control practices and Val IT21 activities;
 − Application controls have been reworked to be more effective, based on work to support 
controls effectiveness assessment and reporting.
In order to successfully execute the business objectives, for example to be compliant 
with regulation, an IT organisation can effectively use the facilitating function of IT. The 
COBIT framework contributes to this by making a direct link from business objectives to 
organisational –security- controls. The improvements for version 5 are based on the view 
of enterprise governance defined by ISACA’s Taking Governance Forward (TGF) initiative. 
The COBIT 5 Process model reflects the main topics and demonstrates the incorporation 
of industry best practices. Relevant industry standards and best practices are mapped on 
COBIT5 in the appendix of the COBIT5 for Information Security. The most relevant ones are 
mentioned below (taken from COBIT5 for Information Security, page 59 [56]):
 − The 2011 Standard of Good Practice for Information Security, Information Security Forum 
(ISF), UK, 2011
 − ISO/IEC 27000 series
 − National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
 − Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation SM (OCTAVE), 
Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI)
 − Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS)
 − The Business Model for Information Security (BMIS ) [209]
 − Common Security Framework (CSF), Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST), USA, 
2009
21  Val IT is a governance framework (based on COBIT) that consists of a set of guiding principles, and a number of processes 
conforming to those principles that are further defined as a set of key management practices (www.isaca.org).
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 − Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)/Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH), USA, 1996 and 2009, 
respectively
With respect to this research and its objective, to get the top interventions and their 
framework accepted by the mid-market, I would like to emphasise the following main 
considerations for the mid-market:
1. Since, businesses are more web-centric, focused risks related to information are 
increasing. In order to keep up with information security risks that might impact the 
business continuity it requires more Business and IT alignment. COBIT enables business 
and IT alignment and because it also incorporated security management it also enables 
business and security alignment;
2. Business executives require understanding and control of IT-related investments 
throughout the lifecycle [242]. COBIT provides a proven method to assess whether IT 
services and new initiatives are meeting with business requirements and are likely to 
deliver the benefits expected;
3. This mid-market segment requires standardisation, preferably by an international 
accepted standard [4]. COBIT is a widely adapted and accepted international standard. 
And ISACA has a proven community and track record throughout the world. It provides 
an authoritative, international set of generally accepted practices that helps boards of 
directors, executives and managers increase the value of IT and reduce related risks;
4. This mid-market segment requires an out-of-the-box framework of principles and controls 
to contribute to policy development [233]. COBIT provides guidance in principles and 
controls to initiate and maintain a clear policy. The minimum standards provided by other 
bodies such as NIST, ISF can be integrated in the COBIT framework, or left our if desired 
[237];
5. This mid-market segment requires a clear insight in investments on IT and security [62]. 
COBIT provides directions to ensure that (IT) investments support the business. It relies on 
respected project management practices such as Prince2 and PMBOK;
6. If stricter EU regulations require an IT Governance framework COBIT is likely to be the 
one, due to its proven track record and wide acceptance by enterprises and financial 
institutions [60] [91];
7. From a business security perspective, measure, monitor and act (PDCA) are at the core 
of the mitigation of risks. This mid-market segment requires a framework that enforces 
that principle. It requires insights into its security maturity level in order to take necessary 
steps to the desired ambition level. Because of the adoption of ISO’s ISMS and a Maturity 
Model this segment can benefit directly. COBITs’ maturity model taken from 4.1 or the 
ISO15504 maturity reference models can be applied in the overall framework.
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The application of capability and maturity models enables more efficient and successful 
auditing and benchmarking (Sox audits, DNB Audits [91]; GBA audits22, EDP audits, NEN 
audits or ISO audits). In this research it is the objective to explore a core set of Information 
Security interventions that contribute to measuring, monitoring and thus improve the 
maturity level of the organisation. Thus the objective is to examine interventions and not 
the effect of the applicability of individual standards or frameworks such as ISO2700X. The 
ISO27000 is used as repository to examine the intervention candidates through the use of 
experts and mid-market organisation validation.
4.4.2  SELECTING THE SOURCE OF INTERVENTION CANDIDATES
To achieve acceptance in the target market segment, a widely adopted standard is desired 
[87], referring to a holistic approach to information security that addresses people, 
processes, legislation, and IT aspects [238]. For the qualitative collection of the data, a 
combination of qualitative research and quantitative research is performed. The initial step 
was to select a framework or norms that encompass intervention candidates that might be 
relevant for mid-markets. To collect this data numerous sources with technical controls, 
process controls were reviewed and compared due to the current literature on framework 
and control mapping [237]. The selection of candidate interventions is subject to several 
perspectives that needed to be considered. These perspectives are based on the “Ten Deadly 
Sins of Information Security Management” which was published in 2004 by Von Solms 
and Von Solms [194]. The authors list numerous dimensions that require attention when 
successfully adopting Information Security.
COMPLIANCE PERSPECTIVE
First, compliance regulations form an important incentive for increasing business 
information security maturity, as these organisations simply must comply with certain 
minimum standards. For example, in the Netherlands medical organisations need to 
be compliant to the NEN which is mainly based on the ISO27K standards. Government 
organisations need to be compliant to the Baseline Information Security Government 
(Baseline Informatie beveiliging Rijksdiensten). In the preselection, we consider interventions 
and frameworks that are known, approved and prescribed by the authorities and regulators.
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE
Secondly, security is no longer an IT issue only. To align the business more with security, it 
required to preselect interventions that do just that. So the condition for the intervention 
framework was that they need to be understandable and acceptable by the business, its 
managers and its owners.
22  Periodically required audit on Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie for privacy details.
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AUDIT PERSPECTIVE
Third, standardisation in financial reporting, to be ‘in control’ is another incentive why 
organisations Must increase security maturity [92]. This is valid for large and relatively 
smaller organisations (> € 8 million in annual revenue). In the preselection, we considered 
interventions that act as a standard for security and encapsulate the CIA triad of Electronic 
Data processing (EDP) auditing. This audit and assurance perspective makes it necessary not 
to define mid-markets as SME but as ME and larger, e.g. mid-market. As mentioned in the 
previous sections.
QUALITY PERSPECTIVE
Forth, when organisations do not need to comply but have a sense of urgency to increase 
security maturity from a quality perspective the interventions need to do just that. They need 
to promote the quality of the business information or assure its confidentiality, integrity and 
availability in the first line of the business. The suggested interventions preferably had to 
follow other quality methodologies such as Deming’s Plan, Do, Check and Act or embrace 
quality norms such as ISO (9000). When building security into processes and technology 
‘by design’, it reduces the chances of risks and security controls that need to be built in 
afterwards. 
MATURITY PERSPECTIVE
Last, when organisations want to make sure where they are in the security maturity process 
the need to have interventions that contribute continuously. Once interventions are selected 
they need to be as generically as possible and exchangeable with other maturity models and 
have focus on “The Measurement/Metrics” [194]. 
These perspectives form an important source of inspiration when selecting a frame of 
reference that can be used when selecting MBIS intervention candidates. 
4.4.3.  ISO AS A FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR BIS INTERVENTIONS
FIRST SELECTION
With the above-mentioned perspectives in mind, the interventions suggested by the Code 
of Practice are considered to be most applicable because they are used globally and are 
generally accepted in the ISO 27000 range. From a compliancy perspective, the list 
of interventions (controls) in the ISO27002 is generally accepted. For example, when 
organisations need to comply with the norm, the suggested interventions in this norm are 
derived from the same Code of Practice. Also, to make sure that companies comply with the 
financial reporting norms EDP auditors use the interventions described in this ISO norm 
(Code of Practice). The suggested interventions also address management involvement and 
make sure the security policy is enforced by senior management before it can take effect 
in the operation (e.g. IT). Addressing the business domains as well as contextual influences 
such as laws, regulations (art 15) and business partner security (art 10). ISO27001 
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integrated their ISMS (Information Security Management System) as a process approach. 
Ensuring that security is seen as a continuous process rather than an end state, the Deming 
Cycle is introduced and incorporated into the interventions (art 13, 14). Several scientists 
demonstrate the successful mapping of ISO to a maturity model [175], [243], [244]. The 
interventions are generic and can be applicable to numerous security maturity models. The 
organisations’ security maturity ambition determines the applicability of the intervention on 
a certain level. Thus ISO provides potential core interventions that can be used as a source 
of inspiration for this MBIS research into core interventions. The objective of this research is 
to distil core interventions based on the 138 controls/intervention candidates. It is not the 
objective to test the individual effect of the controls or to do qualitative research on applying 
the ISO2700X standard or ISO27002 controls. 
2ND SELECTION OF INTERVENTIONS
A total of 138 interventions in 10 categories that cover the necessary elements, from 
e-commerce security to physical security, etc. From 138 interventions covering all elements, 
we want to establish a core minimum set that can form a frame of reference. A certain 
number of these interventions are generic and thus require additional selection to ensure 
mid-market ’relevance’. The objective is not to be exhaustive, but to be concise, with a 
minimum core set of essential interventions that are relevant to the mid-market segment and
contribute to improving the maturity of business information security. Some of the criteria 
are for example generic, large enterprise-oriented and budget-intensive. thus there was a 
preselection of these interventions, before the experts started assessing a large number 
of non-relevant interventions. Siponen and Willison [3] addressed the ‘suffocation effect’ 
of having too many controls and the complexity of frameworks resulting in organisations 
not being effective in their information security [3], [151]. Some examples of less relevant 
managerial interventions for mid-markets are: 
1. synchronisation of time clocks; synchronisation of the clocks is important, but only
contributes indirectly to improving BIS maturity 
2. management of network routers (11.4.7)
3. management of network session timeouts (11.5.6)
4. systems for password management (11.5.3).
Such interventions are necessary, but mainly in the technical domain. Thus, for this second 
round the objective was to preselect BIS management interventions that are relevant for 
mid-markets and can serve as intervention candidates to be examined by experts. A certified 
ISO 27000 lead auditor (CISSP, CISA, CISM23) was asked to judge the selection of all 138 
interventions. This individual acts as a trainer for ISO auditors and has more than 10 years 
of experience in security management and ISO audits. He or she was asked to assess each of 
the 138 interventions on relevance for mid-market organisations. An extra external assessor 
filtered the total of 138 interventions to ensure objectivity in the preselection phase. The final 
23  Official Security Certifications: CISSP, Certified Information System Security Professional, CISM, Certified Information Security 
Manager, CISA, Certified Information Security Auditor
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list of selected interventions derived in this step can be found in the appendices of Chapter 4. 
The total number of interventions selected by the lead auditor is 58.
MINIMUM PERSPECTIVES
Apart from the perspectives mentioned above, organisations who consider doing business 
(transactions) via the web, house intellectual property, pursue a spotless reputation or handle 
confidential information comply with a limited set of minimum basic interventions.
1.  EDP AUDITING PERSPECTIVE
For mid-market organisations with more than 75 personnel and more than €8 million of 
annual revenue, an audit on IT systems is performed in order to insure the statement of ‘in 
control’ from the accountant. This law is compulsory for companies that are listed. Mid-market 
segment organisations will need to comply with this EU regulation in the years ahead. In 
order to select the core interventions that contribute to this demand the EDP auditing criteria 
were used for the selection. This exercise resulted in a set of 50 (of the 58) interventions 
to take into consideration from an EDP auditing perspective. Thus eight interventions were 
dropped due to the fact that these are not directly required for EDP audits.
2.  ISO AUDITING PERSPECTIVE
For mid-market organisations that want to comply with ISO and later on want to audit 
themselves, another criteria is applied in this selection: the ISO auditing clauses. This 
preselection, also performed by the lead auditor resulted in another additional 19 candidate 
interventions, taken from the ISO standard, due to the fact that these are required in order 
to become compliant with the ISO standard. This resulted in a new set of 69 interventions 
(50+19).
This new set of 69 interventions derived from the ISO standard, filtered on the basis of 
multi-criteria from multi-perspectives are considered relevant to the mid-market segment. 
The qualified list of 69 interventions was not fully completed and the mid-market may, 
themselves, need to consider other necessary additional interventions. These final suggested 
interventions are a guide towards the objective of a minimum, but essential, intervention set 
in order to improve MBIS. The next step was to further investigate, assess and judge these 69 
interventions with experts via qualitative research, named the “expert panel research”. This 
was done via a Group Support System research method. The steps described are visualised in 
the diagram below. 
This research phase has the intention to, based on a preselection of relevant intervention 
derived from a representative frame of reference, to establish via experts a core set of 
interventions for mid-markets. The use of experts in combination of GSS enables to 
brainstorm, discuss and raise additional relevant interventions that are not yet present in the 
BoK or have been overlooked in the initial step. 
1124 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
4.4.4  EXPERT PANEL RESEARCH FOR THE SELECTION OF MID-MARKET INTERVENTIONS
All previously selected interventions now need to be assessed from an expert perspective. 
In this research an expert is a person with the following characteristics: Extensive track 
record in security management as a scientist or practitioner. A Master’s degree (or certified 
at the same level) in the field of security management and or certified by Code of Practice 
/ ISO and or certified auditor and/or accounting auditor. An expert has more than 15 
years of Information Security and Risk management experience within large enterprises. 
The objective of making use of experts is to collect qualitative data, argumentations and 
justifications on certain interventions. To have an expert view if interventions are applicable, 
attainable or acceptable and on the basis of which criteria. Six experts were selected to judge 
the latter. Hereby the size of the group does not have to negatively influence the duration of 
the meeting. On the contrary, larger groups can influence the quality of the meeting and 
decision-making process [118].
The expert session programme was divided into five parts to structure the process and aim 
for maximum output. The expert panel session began with a clear presentation about the 
expert session objectives and the background and motivations of this research project. The 
research problem and the research approach (i.e. how to gain certain data from various 
angles) were presented. At the beginning of the session, the researcher clearly stated what 
the expected outcome should be – a core set of interventions for the mid-market - and why 
a certain output was required (rank of top interventions) in order to further the research 
(questionnaire survey for the mid-market segment). In this way the complete group clearly 
knew the goals and the expected end result.
Numerous business and IT alignment studies [245], [186] have been performed by 
scientists including summaries of studies, best-practice interventions, similarities, etc. and 
others proceed on those studies. Van Grembergen and De Haes [105] have investigated 
“Practices in IT Governance and Business IT Alignment”. They look at how mid-sized to 
large financial service organisations implement IT governance to achieve a better alignment 
between the business and IT. Their primary objective was to come up with a minimum set of 
practical interventions to increase the alignment between business and IT and pre-describe 
a core set of (expert -fed) interventions in order to Governance IT. This resulted in a practical 
frame of reference to implement a baseline of IT Governance. The fact that this scientific 
framework is used in practice and accepted by the market, forms the main argument for 
research based on this best practice. The research method of assessing interventions via 
an GSS expert panel, based on a Likert scale from -5 to 5, is therefore part of this research. 
Primarily to compile a weighted set of core security interventions for the mid-markets and to 
elaborate, based on a ranging scale, which intervention contributes to being (non) effective 
or (not) easy to implement for mid-markets in order to increase the security maturity.
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FIRST STEP IN THE SESSION
An exercise made the experts familiar with the facilitating GSS. Experts were asked what 
they would bring to a deserted island. Firstly, the participants summed up a number of 
items. Secondly, the list of items was shown on the screen and the chauffeur categorised 
the outcome. Then, the items were ranked according to the amount of time the selection 
had taken. This exercise showed the participants how the system worked. They could also 
experience the speed of generating, originating, evaluating and analysing. The experts 
could get an idea of how to read, interpret and decide on core BIS interventions. Then a brief 
explanation was done that the 69 interventions were based on ISO on the basis of existing 
literature. The objective was to give the experts insights into the researcher’s intervention 
selection.
An important step in selecting the core interventions was to have the expert judge the 
presented 69 interventions and generate the interventions that they find important. This was 
important because:
1. Compliance 2. Business 3. Auditing 4. Quality 5. Maturity / measure
Von Solms Dimensions
Determined the decision to select ISO as a Source of intervention candidates
138 Intervention candidates 
Resulted into 69 intervention candidates
Were assessed by experts in a Group Support System Research 
Group 
Support 
System 
Expert 
session
Were assessed by a ISO auditor on mid market relevance
Figure 28: Preselection of intervention candidates.
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 − New insights into the phenomena of security interventions were generated;
 − Justification of these new insights. Why does an expert find these newly generated 
interventions important for this segment?;
 − What is the extra value of these new interventions that the initial research phase 
overlooked?
POSITION PRACTITIONER SCIENTIST AUDITOR TEACHER
1. Security Manager (IT auditor 
(RE)) at a bank with 8000 
employees
Y N N N
2. CISSP, CISM, CISA, security 
consultant and ISO27001 lead 
auditor trainer
Y N Y Y
3. Master’s degree level, accountant 
(RA) and IT auditor (RE) 
Y N Y N
4. EDP auditor, security manager at 
insurance company, editor of an 
Information Security magazine 
(PvIB)
Y Y Y Y
5. PhD in security, business 
consultant. Author of the 
book Economic Evaluation of 
Information Security, editor of 
an Information Security magazine 
Y Y Y Y
6. Master in Information Security 
Management, Information Security 
officer at University of 
Technology, teaches information 
security 
Y Y N Y
4.4.5  SCORING OF INTERVENTIONS ON EASE OF IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
A new set of potential interventions was generated. Twenty one interventions were added 
to the list of sixty nine interventions. The next step was to make a qualified selection of 
practicable interventions for the mid-market. In order to make interventions attainable, 
acceptable and applicable in practice, we distinguished two criteria. Ease of implementation 
and Effectiveness.
The experts weighted an intervention on these two criteria to a scale of -5 to 5. -5 represents 
a negative effect, 0 as neutral and +5 represents a positive effect.
The result was a list of all interventions carefully selected by experts on 2 criteria and 
automatically ranked based on the qualitative output. The deviations in weight were, if 
required, commented by the experts. This provided the research with new insights:
1. New insights into the phenomenon of security intervention effectiveness and ease of
implementation;
Table 3: Expert panel characteristics.
EXPLORING MANAGEMENT 
INTERVENTIONS4 115
2. It became clear why experts gave more weight to certain interventions;
3. Deviations in the view of an expert became clear.
This step provided a selection of interventions based on important mid-market acceptance 
criteria, derived from expert opinions. This provided new insights into the reasons for 
differences in views on practicality and answered the research question “Which of the 
identified BIS interventions are practical in such organisations?”.
In this research phase we also quest to understand why mid-market may not adopt security 
interventions. During this research phase, the experts pondered the reasons, assumptions, 
hunches, objections and other forms of barriers to the implementation of security 
interventions by the mid-market. Through the use of GSS a variety of barriers were generated. 
This data was valuable once we want to test it in a later phase of the research, i.e. the mid-
market survey questionnaire.
4.4.6   FINAL SELECTION OF BIS INTERVENTIONS 
To effectively qualify, categorise and assess all 69 interventions a computer system was used. 
According to Silverman [75], the advantages of using a computer are “Speed at handling 
large volumes of data, freeing me to explore numerous analytic questions and Improvement 
of rigour, including the production of counts of phenomena and searching for deviant 
cases”. Using a computer system enables to focus on questioning and exploring unexpected 
variables in outcomes. In this case 69 interventions were judged by 6 people on 2 criteria. 
In theory this meant that 828 feedback options needed to be recorded, coded, analysed, 
interpreted and reported by one brain. It also provides you with assistance in sampling 
decision. In this case 69 interventions were ranked on 2 criteria which led to a set of 
representative interventions that could be presented in the survey questionnaire. Figure 29 
displays the GSS meeting process that was followed in this research step. 
4.4.7   MAIN BARRIERS FOR MBIS ACCORDING TO THE EXPERTS 
All barriers that arose during the expert panel research with GSS were categorised in 4 main 
barrier categories:
Management and organisation: Examples of barriers that address the management of the 
organisation or the processes and configuration of the organisation. Examples that where 
collected during the research were; no process in place; no priority; lack of management 
commitment; the issue does not appear on the management agenda; no direct business 
demand; no necessity; no strategy on IT and definitely not on security. All of these barriers are 
categorised in Management and Organization.
1164 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
Perception and attitudes: Barriers collected in the category of ‘perception and attitudes’ 
are; overwhelming amount of security information from different angles leads to confusion; 
difficult to implement and maintain; seen as a cost; no strong belief in necessity; we do not 
have incidents so everything goes well; information security equals technology; customer 
does not ask for it; denial of problems, afraid to admit security holes, etc.
Knowledge and Skills: Barriers mentioned in this category are; too many compliancy 
demands from numerous bodies; complexity of the phenomenon; lack of insights into current 
security level; inadequate level of knowledge at IT department; security is an expertise on its 
own; huge dynamics of threats, on the one hand, and keeping up with these threats, on the 
other.
Budget refers to arguments that are related to money. Budget is the exhaustive terminology 
for everything related to the financial side of the security intervention investment. Just as 
we learned from the barrier ‘management and organisation’, we again deal with BIA-like 
barriers. It appears that business security and the intervention implementation suffer the 
same hurdles. Barriers that arise in this category are; security is seen as a cost instead of an 
investment; returns are not seen; difficulty of financially planning; lack of a dedicated budget.
Expert panel member EA mentioned during the panel session, and in earlier studies about 
the economic evaluation of information security, it is the lack of insights into future cost 
savings, derived from the prevention of losses due to information security breaches.
Other barriers that were not mentioned but are applicable all the same: no security project 
coherence and no security project portfolio management backed up with business cases 
(management & organisation) [246].
4.4.8   EXPERT PANEL DATA ANALYSIS
After identifying the deviations between the experts an analysis was performed. For this 
research section we analysed the interventions with the most significant variety or interesting 
feedback during the research.
Information Security as part of the business continuity plan scored 1.5 on effectiveness 
and 0.5 on ease of implementation. The deviation on its effectiveness was caused by the 
fact that this depends on the person who’s assigned for this job. Some experts say that there 
are more effective ways to increase the security, while others say it is a prerequisite for any 
organisation. When we consider business continuity and avoid loss of revenue due to security 
breaches this intervention is vital, even though it scores very low on ease of implementation.
The intervention with a slight deviation was ‘Creation of audit and log files’. Main reason 
for this was that the pure security expert argument is that “you need to do something with it, 
otherwise it is a waste of megabytes or paper’. The auditing and accountancy experts from 
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the panel confirmed the idea that it is necessary in order to be ‘in control’ and to have proof 
in case of incidents. Quote: “the audit trail is very important for financial auditors, because 
they have to test the working (test of controls)”.
Performing IT risk analysis. Experts’ opinions vary in the complexity of this intervention. 
One experts said it is hard to do this very thoroughly and you need to master all the 
economic evaluation criteria. Others say it is ‘wet finger work’, as long as it is done. ‘That’s the 
most important thing’.
Non-disclosures. According to the experts this is a false sense of security. It is really hard 
to constantly maintain and ensure, especially with temporary personnel, interns, factory 
workers, etc.
Reporting security vulnerabilities. This variety in experts’ opinion was because some 
experts say this required knowledge and expertise in order to assess technical vulnerabilities, 
this explains the low score on ease of implementation. Others say you can in-source this 
expertise but it is a necessity in order to know where which intervention is necessary, that 
explains the high score on effectiveness.
Figure 29: GSS expert meeting process flow
Round 2: Assess 
and rank all the 
interventions based 
upon effectiveness 
and ease of 
implementation 
(record commentary 
from the 
participants in 
GSS)
Round 1: 
Brainstorm on 
additional 
interventions 
which are not in 
the predefined 
list
Round 3: Raise 
barrriers why 
interventions are 
not implemented in 
Mid markets
Result: Core set of 
interventions and main 
barriers for 
implementation
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Security awareness training. All experts agree this is very effective (3.67) primarily because 
human errors lead to most of the security breaches. When you increase the awareness of 
security you decrease the potential change to human errors. Experts argue that awareness 
training need to be mandated by management and management is not involved and 
therefore security awareness does not reach the agenda or priorities. Separation of duties 
led to differences of opinions by the experts. Some say it is very hard to realise (score 
0 on ease of implementation), other say it is a necessity from accounting perspective. 
Quote: “segregation of duties has to be implemented adequately. In the case of insufficient 
segregation of duties it has a negative influence on the auditor’s report. Qualification the 
audit report”. All experts judge this intervention to be effective (3.17).
Managing user access rights caused deviations of 66% because it scores 0.17 on ease of 
implementation. Mainly because it is expensive and requires a lot of knowledge. It scores 
4.33 on effectively mainly because it takes care of a lot of security issues. Quote from the 
experts: “is necessary to avoid 'doublers in function'”
Identifying applicable laws and legislation. According to the experts this is a prerequisite 
for every organisation. But it’s quite hard when you don’t have the necessary knowledge or 
expertise.
4.4.9   RELEVANT INTERVENTIONS 
During the expert panel session input was collected to take into consideration in the next 
research phase, the survey questionnaire aimed at the mid-market segment. Experts 
suggested that the following interventions must be included in the survey questionnaire in 
order to have an exhaustive list of relevant interventions:
Change management on security devices: experts argued that “this is needed for 
applications with financial effect for the annual accountants/ financial figures”. And in order 
to be in control for compliancy means.
Protection of Information and securing privacy information. This intervention is a 
prerequisite for any organisation in the EU. Since strict regulations need to be followed, all 
organisations need to have this intervention in place;
Since the subject of this research is business security an intervention addressing business 
continuity is appropriate;
Management of technical vulnerabilities is a necessity in order to be in control of outbreaks 
or security breaches. In order to be in control, organisations also need to have a plan which 
can only be effective when an organisation knows what to safeguard;
EXPLORING MANAGEMENT 
INTERVENTIONS4 119
Risk and impact analysis. In order to invest in security intervention, an organisation needs 
to know to what extent to safeguard their business (information) and what the related costs 
of potential breaches are. The only way to do this efficiently is to conduct business, risk and 
impact analyses;
Separation of duties. According to the experts, this is a very effective intervention but 
difficult to implement. One expert said: “segregation of duties has to be implemented 
adequately. In the case of insufficient segregation of duties it has a negative influence on the 
auditor’s report”. Separation of duties is the first method to avoid security problems and the 
best way to track who has done what (audit trail);
Identification of applicable law. This intervention was substantiated by the experts as 
“compliance with laws and regulations is essential for an enterprise to be in control”.
INTERVENTION
PERCEIVED 
EFECTIVNESS
(-5 TO +5)
PERCEIVED EASE OF 
IMPLEMENTATION
(-5 TO +5)*
1. Management commitment to information 
security
5 4.33
2. Protection against malicious and 
Mobile Code
3.55 4.17
3. Systems classification 3.33 3.5
4. Cryptographyc controls 3.83 2.67
5. User identification and authentication 3.67 2.67
6. Screening before employment 3 3.17
7. Information backup 4.83 1.33
8. Equipment maintenance 2.67 3.17
9. Access Control Security 4.4 1.2
10. Disposal of media 3.6 1.8
11. Allocation of information security 
responsabilities
3.17 2.17
12. Creation audit and logfiles 3 2.33
13. Secure Log-on procedures 3 2.33
14. Use of supplier guidelines 2.4 2.8
15. Mission, vision, strategy of buisness 
seen as a whole
3.17 2
16. On-line transactions 3.83 1.33
17. Management of special privileges 3.33 1.83
18. Equipment sitting and protection 3.33 1.67
19. Monitoring and review of third party 
services
3.17 1.67
20. Learning from security incidents 2.67 2.17
* A scale of -5 to +5 is used, -5 being not contributing, 0 being neutral and +5 being highly contributing
Table 4: Top interventions according to experts
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The entire GSS session was recorded on film and reported into a meeting report format. This 
can be found in the appendices and can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-
zbu-hfdc
4.5       PERFORMING THE DELPHI RESEARCH VIA A SURVEY
The expert panel research produced a wealth of valuable information on essential 
interventions, carefully assessed on effectiveness and ease of implementation based on a 
proven scientific method. A core set of interventions and insight in possible barriers evolved 
from this research. With this information a survey questionnaire was compiled to conduct 
data about the mid-market state of security maturity. This survey was conducted during the 
second quarter of 2010 and was sent out to 50 organisations from which 40 participated. 
The objectives of the blind mid-market survey questionnaire, as proposed in chapter 2 to 
avoid group influence, were:
1. Test the assumption that organisations do indeed want to increase their security maturity
level (based on COBIT maturity model);
2. Test organisations maturity levels and ambition levels;
3. Test if organisations are aware of applicable law and legislation;
4. Measure and test which essential interventions are enforced;
5. Measure and test barriers;
6. Ask for feedback (qualitative) on the interventions which contribute most to their opinion.
Quantitative research (Yes/No questions) was applied in order to collect data that provides 
direct insight into the current status of the participating organisations, compared to the 
desired state of information security maturity. This also provides direct insight into whether 
organisations actually want to increase their maturity levels. Some open questions are of a 
more qualitative nature, which enables participants to provide feedback that can be useful in 
building up a complete picture of security.
4.5.1   COMPOSING THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
In the previous section the interventions that needed to be validated by the mid-market 
organisation was compiled by the experts. In order to get more contextual information about 
the organisations and their variety of industry the respondents were asked some additional 
questions:
1. What sector is the mid-market organisation part of?
2. In order to test whether the organisation is aware of applicable law or legislation one
question addresses that item.
3. In order to plan business information security, I would like to explore whether organisations
actually have the ambition to increase their security maturity. I assume they do but a 
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question addressing this item is included for the sake of the reliability of the research.
4. In order to know where organisations are at this moment in time (baseline), I want to 
explore how representatives of organisations judge their own organisation based on the 5 
scale maturity model of COBIT.
I intentionally included this question, and received answers on applied interventions. That 
gave me a testing method to test the actual maturity level of that organisation and the 
reliability of the respondents. For example, if he/she judges the organisation’s level at 4 or 5 
and core interventions are not applied, one can doubt the reliability of the respondent and 
delete the answer from the results.
5. Respondents were asked which intervention contributes most to increasing security maturity in 
their view. They were asked to motivate their answers, leaving room for interesting arguments 
that helped me to get a better picture of mid-markets view on security.
6. Participants were also asked for additional feedback (on items that they had missed in the 
session).
The compiled research questionnaire was carefully reviewed by KS a PhD, and lecturer in 
academic research techniques at Utrecht University of applied sciences. Then the list was 
sent to four sample participants in order to test the methodology, the completeness of the list 
and the clearness of the questions. I wanted a non-security person to be able to understand 
the questions, especially because the intended outcome must be accepted by business 
managers as well. The only way to achieve this result is to have a clear and consistent business 
terminology. Mentioned below are the most relevant questions. For the complete survey 
questionnaire see appendix.
4.5.2   SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
The definition of a mid-market is an organisation with between 100 and 2500 computer 
systems. To conduct a survey within 40 organisations I have a substantial number of 
organisations representing this mid-market segment. To get feedback on relevant questions, 
and to motivate the participants, I have sent approximately 50 people a personal email 
with an invite to participate in my research. Eventually 40 responded to participate. 
Screenshots of the original email are in the appendix and can be accessed via http://dx.doi.
org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc. 
After the participants accepted the invitation to participate, a second email was sent out with 
instructions about the survey and how to fill in the questionnaire. Also a guiding document 
on how to interpret the maturity model (based on COBIT) and the barriers (derived from 
the experts’ opinion). Emphasis on the deadline on when the participants needed to fill in 
the questionnaire was also added in this mail. Screenshots of the original email are in the 
appendix, accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc..
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4.5.3  SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (WEB-BASED)
When the participants received this email they were guided to a website where the 
questionnaire could be filled in. The survey was guided with a brief explanation on what the 
purpose of the questionnaire is and how people need to fill in the form.
The second part of the questionnaire includes interventions and their barriers. Brief 
explanations guided the participant into the questionnaire.
“Research has shown several interventions that are important for maturing the information 
security. Below is a list of the top interventions Please indicate on this list at each intervention 
whether your organisation enforce this intervention completely. If it does, then select Yes. If 
your organisation does not enforce or only partially enforce the intervention then select No 
and at the next question give the reason.”
After receiving all the participants’ data, a broad collection of this data was put into a 
database in order to do a thorough analysis. The complete survey data is enclosed in the 
appendix. A summary of the most relevant data that could answer most of the important 
research questions is presented in under mentioned figures and tables.
4.5.4  SURVEY PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR INDUSTRY
The first selection on the data collection was made on industry type. Additional a timestamp 
was added in order to assure authenticity of the participant in combination with his/her 
personal ID. This personal ID referred to organisations names and contact details of the 
participants. In order to assure confidentiality that data was kept separate. In the Table 5 all 
participating companies were identified based on a personal login code which was provided 
via email. The time of login was registered. The participants were asked in which industry 
their company is active.
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Figure 30: Indication of the maturity level in 2010.
 
Figure 31: Indication of the desired maturity level in 2012.
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TIMESTAMP
PLEASE FILL 
IN YOUR PER-
SONAL CODE
WHAT SECTOR IS 
YOUR ORGANISA-
TION IN?
DOES YOUR 
ORGANISATION 
HAVE TO BE 
COMPLIANT 
TO CERTAIN 
RULES, LAW 
AND/OR LEG-
ISLATION?
INDICATE, 
BASED ON 
THE MATU-
RITY MODEL 
LEVELS, 
YOUR CUR-
RENT SECU-
RITY MATU-
RITY LEVEL 
INDICATE, 
BASED ON THE 
MATURITY 
MODEL LEV-
ELS, YOUR 
DESIRED OR-
GANISATION 
SECURITY MA-
TURITY LEVEL 
AT 2012
3/5/2010 
10:50:04
QuRKaZa12OX27 Media Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3/5/2010 
11:05:59
QuRKaZa12OX4 Detailhandel 
(Retail)
Ja (Yes) 3 Defined
3/5/2010 
11:42:53
QuRKaZa12OX35 Government 
(Overheid)
Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3/5/2010 
11:58:49
QuRKaZa12OX48 Installatie 
techniek
Ja (Yes) 1 Initial/
Ad hoc
3/5/2010 
14:12:51
QuRKaZa12OX7 Health Care 
(Gezondhe-
idszorg)
Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
5 Optimized
3/5/2010 
16:32:50
QuRKaZa12OX72 Government 
(Overheid)
Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
4 Managed / 
measurable
3/5/2010 
22:09:42
QuRKaZa12OX51 Government 
(Overheid)
Ja (Yes) 3 Defined 4 Managed / 
measurable
3/6/2010 
13:38:27
QuRKaZa12OX31 Health Care 
(Gezondhe-
idszorg)
Ja (Yes) 5 Optimized 5 Optimized
3/6/2010 
15:06:34
QuRKaZa12OX6 Finance (Finan-
ciele dienst-
verlening)
Ja (Yes) 4 Managed / 
measurable
4 Managed / 
measurable
3/8/2010 
7:01:06
QuRKaZa12OX5 zakelijke di-
entverlening
Ja (Yes) 3 Defined 4 Managed / 
measurable
3/8/2010 
9:42:17
QuRKaZa12OX26 Logistiek Nee (No) 3 Defined 4 Managed / 
measurable
3/8/2010 
12:43:48
QuRKaZa12OX50 Government 
(Overheid)
Ja (Yes) 1 Initial/
Ad hoc
2 Repeatable 
but intuitive
3/8/2010 
12:47:37
QuRKaZa12OX3 Health Care 
(Gezondhe-
idszorg)
Ja (Yes) 1 Initial/
Ad hoc
3 Defined
3/8/2010 
15:55:52
QuRKaZa12OX49 Government 
(Overheid)
Nee (No) 3 Defined 4 Managed / 
measurable
3/8/2010 
22:44:15
QuRKaZa12OX42 Health Care 
(Gezondhe-
idszorg)
Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
4 Managed / 
measurable
3/9/2010 
12:00:56
QuRKaZa12OX9 Legal Nee (No) 4 Managed / 
measurable
5 Optimized
Table 5: Mid-market sectors and current versus desired maturity state.
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3/10/2010 
13:18:21
QuRKaZa12OX40 Retail Nee (No) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3 Defined
3/11/2010 
11:00:45
QuRKaZa12OX10 Onderwijs (Edu-
cation)
Ja (Yes) 3 Defined 4 Managed / 
measurable
3/11/2010 
14:26:43
QuRKaZa12OX8 Retail Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
4 Managed / 
measurable
3/11/2010 
16:40:35
QuRKaZa12OX24 Industrie (in-
dustry)
Nee (No) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
4 Managed / 
measurable
3/12/2010 
11:31:46
QuRKaZa12OX73 Maatschappeli-
jke opvang en 
welzijn (Social 
care)
Ja (Yes) 3 Defined 3 Defined
3/15/2010 
15:12:35
QuRKaZa12OX71 Finance (Finan-
ciele dienst-
verlening)
Ja (Yes) 3 Defined 4 Managed / 
measurable
3/15/2010 
15:34:23
QuRKaZa12OX39 Internet Retail Ja (Yes) 3 Defined 4 Managed / 
measurable
3/15/2010 
18:52:52
QuRKaZa12OX52 Food Ja (Yes) 1 Initial/
Ad hoc
3 Defined
3/16/2010 
0:34:34
QuRKaZa12OX29 Health Care 
(Gezondhe-
idszorg)
Ja (Yes) 1 Initial/
Ad hoc
3 Defined
3/16/2010 
11:21:00
QuRKaZa12OX61 Government 
(Overheid)
Ja (Yes) 1 Initial/
Ad hoc
3 Defined
3/16/2010 
11:26:31
QuRKaZa12OX11 Finance (Finan-
ciele dienst-
verlening)
Ja (Yes) 4 Managed / 
measurable
4 Managed / 
measurable
3/16/2010 
11:26:48
QuRKaZa12OX33 Pharmaceutical Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
4 Managed / 
measurable
3/16/2010 
11:39:44
QuRKaZa12OX21 Housing (Onro-
erendgoed voor-
ziening) 
Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3 Defined
3/16/2010 
12:13:22
QuRKaZa12OX18 Agri Culture Ja (Yes) 1 Initial/
Ad hoc
1 Initial/
Ad hoc
3/16/2010 
12:22:31
QuRKaZa12OX25 Government 
(Overheid)
Nee (No) 4 Managed / 
measurable
4 Managed / 
measurable
3/16/2010 
12:26:26
QuRKaZa12OX46 retail food Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
4 Managed / 
measurable
3/16/2010 
12:30:38
QuRKaZa12OX35 Government 
(Overheid)
Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3 Defined
3/16/2010 
15:01:25
QuRKaZa12OX59 Onderwijs (Edu-
cation)
Nee (No) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3 Defined
3/16/2010 
20:00:16
QuRKaZa12OX19 logistiek & 
financiele dien-
stverlening
Ja (Yes) 4 Managed / 
measurable
4 Managed / 
measurable
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3/17/2010 
9:40:51
QuRKaZa12OX47 Finance (Finan-
ciele dienst-
verlening)
Nee (No) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3 Defined
3/18/2010 
8:44:02
QuRKa-
Za12OX100
Finance (Finan-
ciele dienst-
verlening)
Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3 Defined
3/18/2010 
10:01:49
QuRKaZa12OX54 Government 
(Overheid)
Ja (Yes) 4 Managed / 
measurable
5 Optimized
3/18/2010 
14:18:58
QuRKaZa12OX70 Government 
(Overheid)
Ja (Yes) 1 Initial/
Ad hoc
2 Repeatable 
but intuitive
3/18/2010 
14:46:32
QuRKaZa12OX22 Industrie (In-
dustry)
Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3 Defined
3/19/2010 
10:37:10
QuRKaZa12OX15 Recycling Ja (Yes) 2 Repeatable 
but intui-
tive
3 Defined
4.5.5   ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA
After capturing the data via a secure web-based tool we analysed the data and elaborate 
some important findings.
TOP INTERVENTION SUGGESTION ACCORDING TO MARKET
1. Management involvement for 
information security
22%
5. Personnel education & training on 
information security awarness
22%
13. Risk and impact analysis 16%
10. A Company continuity management 
policy
14%
14. Appointing responsabilities for 
information securit
8%
11. Management of technical 
vulnerabilities
5%
12. Classification of information 5%
16. Separation of duties 3%
3. Access security 3%
8. Systems users, identification and 
authentication
3%
Most researched mid-market organisations suffer from a lack of management commitment, 
even though research institute literature indicates that C-level people (Chief level) see the 
value of increasing their security levels to enhance customer trust, employee loyalty and 
Table 6: Top intervention suggestions according to mid-market organisations.
EXPLORING MANAGEMENT 
INTERVENTIONS4 127
company integrity, etc. [11]. The mid-market indicates this intervention as the number one 
contributing intervention to increase their business security maturity.
A total of 83% of the mid-market companies do not educate and train personnel on security 
awareness, even though 22% of the respondents indicate this intervention to be the second 
most contributing intervention of increasing their own information security maturity level. 
It scores high on wish list and is seen as a necessity. Perception is the biggest barrier for 
implementing this intervention. The paradox is that the perception of the effectiveness of 
training and educating stands this important barrier in the way.
A small proportion (34%) have risk and impact analysis enforced. This intervention is 
necessary to adequately know what you need to protect. The mid-market recognises this and 
ranks this one third on their suggestions to increase their business security. They recognise 
the need to know the value of the data and information in order to financially justify the 
implementation of an intervention. Top barrier in this respect is perception and knowledge 
(32%) since most of the people (e.g. experts) say this could be seen as complex and requires 
specific economic expertise.
Budget is listed as the most irrelevant barrier, even though today’s economic climate seems 
to indicate the opposite. It is also interesting that so far management has not been involved by 
many organisations. Security is perceived as a highly complex topic, the result of which is that 
essential interventions are not being enforced.
Conclusive we can state the organisations under review are unable to identify essential 
interventions and struggle because of insufficient knowledge and skills, even though the 
absence of implementation of core interventions could seriously endanger the continuity of 
these organisations. On the basis of these findings, it can be argued that communication 
between business and security is misaligned.
4.6        CONCLUSIONS OF THIS STUDY INTO BIS MANAGEMENT INTERVENTIONS
Experts created a top list of interventions from ISO27002, based on the practicality of each 
intervention. As a conclusion to the survey research performed in the mid-market segment, 
I encountered a willingness to implement certain interventions in order to increase security 
maturity. These were not enforced due to several reasons. As a conclusion to the mid-market 
survey I observed:
 − The barriers “management and organisations” as well as “perception and attitudes” are 
two categories scored high in the survey. These were also raised by the experts during the 
panel as main barriers.
 − Mid-market organisations state in the survey that involving management would raise their 
security maturity level. On the other hand, security is perceived as a complex topic and 
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this contradicts the above. How can a security person with the wrong perception advise 
management on interventions contributing to maturity enhancement?
 − The survey showed that 22% of the mid-market suggest that ‘training and educate 
personnel on awareness’ contributes most to security; this equals the opinion of experts 
according to the expert panel research. The main question remains how they want to do 
that in the face of insufficient knowledge and skills.
 − The experts mentioned during the expert panel research phase that the overwhelming 
number of applicable laws and frameworks might suffocate the mid-market. This seems 
to be acknowledged by the fact that perception is the biggest barrier and 20% of the 
organisations do not know that there is indeed applicable law. The mid-market has 
difficulties identifying these, according to the survey outcome.
 − Budget is raised as a barrier by the experts but not listen as an intervention, for example 
“more money”. In contradiction to the barrier perception where the intervention is training 
and educating on awareness. And for the barrier “management and organisation”, the 
intervention management involvement is suggested by the mid-market organisations.
 − According to the survey “perception and attitudes” is the biggest barrier to the 
implementation of the third most contributing intervention, risk and impact analysis. 
Important questions for mid-market organisations remains open, i.e. by whom they want to 
have this risk and impact analysis performed, since they consider it to be complex and lack 
the necessary knowledge and skills.
In conclusion, we can state that filling in the survey questionnaire has raised the awareness of 
mid-market participants. Responses to open questions such as “that’s a good idea”, “needs to 
be developed”, “good idea to apply this” proved this.
BARRIERS
4. Budget
Budget
12%
3. Knowledge and skills 
Kennis en vaardigheden
25%
2. Perception and attitudes
Perceptie en houding
32%
1. Management and organization
Management en organisatie
30%
Table7: Barriers according to companies in the mid-market
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4.7       CONTRIBUTION & RECOMMENDATIONS
The presented list of interventions forms the first step towards the conceptual framework 
for BIS, and list of interventions for mid-market organisations in order to improve business 
information security maturity. A carefully selected list of interventions presents those 
interventions that are most effective and easy to implement for a market that, according to 
the performed survey, struggles with the enforcement of essential interventions. By making 
use of a combination of the ISO best practices and for example the COBIT maturity model 
organisations can have better insights into the interventions they have applied as well as those 
they need to apply in order to achieve a certain maturity level. Translating the most important 
conclusions of the research into mid-market specific recommendations in order to increase 
their security maturity, by applying a framework (of interventions, suggested maturity model, 
organisational preconditions) the research primarily recommend mid-market organisations 
to:
1. Identify applicable (mid-market) laws and legislation.
2. Perform risk and impact analysis in order to justify the implementation of necessary 
interventions in order to achieve the desired security maturity level.
3. Apply relevant norms in order to comply with law, legislation or regulations or a framework 
that is derived from these norms, for example COBIT.
4. Involve management about the business impact of not having these essential interventions 
in place.
5. Increase the awareness of security throughout the organisations since human error is 
a predominately cause. Train and educate with focus on the correct perception about 
security on the technical as well as the business side of the organisation.
6. Measure and monitor all potential technical and organisational vulnerabilities (security 
assessments) as a continuous process in order to be in control and achieve the desired level 
of security maturity.
7. Continuous maintain knowledge and skills that are essential to keep being “in control”.
4.8        LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
A limitation of this study is the use of a set of predefined interventions of ISO. Although they 
are accommodated through the GSS session with additional insights and new interventions 
it is still limited. This can be solved by the continuous research into new interventions 
or practices, perhaps gained in other disciplines such as risk management, business 
management, etc. The ISO 27K interventions are also limited to mainly the tactical level 
of management of information security, limited to the strategic level (Board of Directors 
and executive management of Information Security). This argument of mainly management 
focus within the Information Security field was raised by Von Solms [247] and proposed the 
involvement of the strategic level [71], in the Governance of Information Security. This is also 
recognised and addressed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) [113]. As important initiative the ISO committee established the 
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standard for proper Governance of IT (ISO38500)24 in 2008. The ISO38500 was later on 
examined and implemented into the COBIT5 for Information Security framework [56], still 
principally influenced on IT practices instead of Corporate Governance.
Another limitation of this study is the sample size and the characteristics of the respondents. 
The sample size of n=40 seem limited for quantitative analysis but is fairly large for a 
qualitative analysis. The sample was random, and in random sampling the samples are 
selected by a chance-based method that gives all observations an equal likelihood of 
appearing in the sample [248]. If the objective is to perform statistical analytics on this data, 
the sample size needs to be larger and have a certain amount of shared characteristics. This 
increases the generalizability of sample results, e.g. external validity. This also requires a 
more valid representation of the participants in this research. In this case organisations could 
not be interviewed as such, but rather individuals in different roles (IT managers, security 
managers, etc.). Thus it is hard to perform any statistics on this mainly qualitative dataset, 
which has too much variation in the characteristics of the respondents. The objective of this 
research was to examine and determine parameters to be built into the artefact. Further 
research can be performed on organisations, which are mostly represented via individual 
respondents with close-to-identical characteristics (e.g. function, education, certifications, 
hierarchy in the organisation, budget span, span of FTE control, etc.) and therefore 
eligible for statistical inference. The population of these 40 organisations with different 
respondent criteria is too random in order to sufficiently generalise the data. This is why the 
recommendations for mid-markets raised in this chapter are limited in their generalizability 
and are subject to the above- mentioned limitations.
The main objective of this chapter was to examine the first iteration of potential parameters. 
These parameters evidently change due to time, technology and business requirements 
and require continuous assessment. Again, the aim here is not, in this initial phase, to be 
exhaustive in terms of interventions or requirements.
24  ISO/IEC 38500:2008 provides guiding principles for directors of organizations (including owners, board members, directors, 
partners, senior executives, or similar) on the effective, efficient, and acceptable use of Information Technology (IT) within their 
organizations. The ISO38500 was amended in February 2015 (Source iso.org)
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This chapter provides an extensive, in-depth literature survey of governance practices 
relevant for the improvement of BIS maturity. It establishes a rigorous process, based on the 
proposed research techniques in chapter 2, of literature research and expert validation, 
leading to the establishment of a core set of governance practices that are relevant for Boards 
of Directors, which can be used in the next research phases.
This chapter was published and presented in 2013 on the 46th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) in Hawaii United States under the title: Group 
Support Systems Research in the Field of Business Information Security; a Practitioner’s View.
5.1        INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter we have examined potential management interventions for the 
improvement of BIS maturity. The result is a conceptual framework for BIS. This chapter 
picks up the identified need for examining BIS Governance practices since they seem to 
be lacking in current bodies and have been addressed by the mid-market respondents as 
relevant to have for the improvement of BIS. This chapter presents the findings of a second 
research phase, as a follow-up to Chapter 4, and presents a comprehensive, thoroughly 
selected core set of BISG practices to be used by practitioners in the business environment. 
It elaborates the Design Science Research process of researching the literature (Rigor Cycle) 
on practices, scrutinise the latter via a GSS expert panel research (Design cycle) and present 
them as requirements for the artefact in the later chapters. The objective is to examine BIS 
Governance practices that can be part of the conceptual BIS framework mentioned in the 
first chapter. In this part we use the proposed research methods of literature survey, to collect 
a list of governance practices from other domains that can form an inspiration and assess 
that complete list via experts in the field. Thus, we do not focus on validating this with mid-
markets, and purely use experts. 
5.2       BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
In the previous chapter a conceptual framework for BIS interventions was presented [249]. 
This set of security practices proposed by the group of experts and subsequently validated 
by organisations, showed a lack of attention to governance practices. These findings are 
supported by literature [250], [209], [247]. The lack of attention to governance practices 
is a problem for two reasons: firstly, governance is a necessity for mandating security 
management [239]. Secondly, security ought to be part of the organisational culture but is 
not [251], [194]. The aim of this research project is to develop a framework supported by a 
large-scale and longitudinal Group Support System to monitor, evaluate and direct business 
security governance with small teams (e.g. Boards of Directors, Executive Management 
Teams). The framework can be used as input for requirement setting in the design artefact. 
Therefor separate –requirement- design questions are formulated in this chapter. 
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The first section of this chapter consists of definitions within the BISG topic. The second 
section deals with a review of recent academic and practice-oriented literature relevant to 
BISG. A number of experienced security experts were subsequently asked to assess this large 
amount of data (228 practices). The experts selected, organised and ranked the practices 
via GSS. The results enabled further examination of the factors influencing Governance 
Practices. These findings will serve as potential input for developing a framework to monitor, 
evaluate and direct BISG.
5.3       RESEARCH METHOD & FINDINGS
5.3.1    LITERATURE REVIEW
The current research project started with an extensive literature study, capturing all literature 
on Governance Practices relevant to the topic of Business Information Security Governance. 
The reviewed governance practices are;
1. Corporate Governance practices;
2. Risk Governance practices;
3. Enterprise Governance of IT practices and
4. Information Security Governance Practices.
1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
Approximately 50 best practices from the Corporate Governance discipline were examined.
The major sources of origin of these practice are: The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance [252]; the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance [253]; 
Internal Control Guidance to Directors, Turnbull Report [254]; The Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) Combined Code [255], The King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa [256]; Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Basel principles for enhancing 
corporate governance [257], Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)  add-ons to SoX, 
Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise 2003. Most of them can be found in 
the Corporate Governance Book (Oxford University Press) which covers all international 
Corporate Governance codes [59].
2. RISK GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
A major component of practising good governance is the Risk Governance discipline.
Insufficient Risk Governance and management have enormous consequences for all 
major stakeholders [20]. The judgement and management of IT-related risks has become 
increasingly important to the success of businesses [197]. For the assessment of all relevant 
Risk Governance practices, I examined literature from: COSO‘s Enterprise Risk Management
Integrated Framework [258]; COSO’s “Embracing Enterprise Risk Management”: Practical 
Approaches for Getting Started [259]; COSO’s “Where Board of Directors Currently 
Stand in Executing Their Risk Oversight Responsibilities” [31]; King’s Report on Corporate 
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Governance for South Africa – 2002 [256], and Douglas Hubbard’s study on Risk 
Management Failures. A total of forty Risk Governance practices were selected.
3. IT GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
Forty IT Governance practices were selected from several sources: IT Governance Institute, 
“Information Risks: Whose Business Are They?” [18]; De Haes & Van Grembergen’s 
“Practices in IT Governance and Business/IT Alignment” published in ISACA’s journal 
(Information Systems Audit and Control Association); Weil & Ross’ “IT Governance” 
[260] and De Haes & Van Grembergen’s book “Implementing Information Technology 
Governance; Models Practices and Cases” [217] and Van Grembergen’s “Strategies for 
Information Technology Governance” [108].
4. INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
During the selection of the literature, numerous academic and practice-oriented sources 
were investigated, mainly to judge their appropriateness for ISG practices. I investigated a 
large number of resources on Information Security Governance, because this discipline is 
the most closely related to Business Information Security Governance (BISG). I investigated 
sources from an international context to avoid missing out on important developments 
worldwide; multi-sources (research institutes such as IDC and Gartner) and academic 
journals and books (from Harvard Business Press, Springer, and Wiley). The research 
also focused on best practices institutes such as ISACA, ITGI, ISF, SABSA, etc., and other 
communities practising Security Governance. An examination of highly respected and well-
established literature sources resulted in a selection of 98 practices. The major literature 
sources are: the 2004 Corporate Governance Task Force Report of the National Cyber 
Security Summit [261], chapters “Information Security Governance and Responsibilities of 
the Board of Directors/Trustees”; De Haes & Van Grembergen’s ”Practices in IT Governance 
and Business/IT Alignment” (in ISACA’s journal, 2008) [105]; Von Solms’s, “The 10 deadly 
sins of information security management” [105] and other major relevant sources on the 
BISG topic [262], [22], [263], [63], [264], [209], [52].
The practices that where examined and selected may be potentially applicable for BISG. In 
order to delete doubles, vaguely articulated practices and so on, a thorough validation of all 
228 practices by an expert panel is essential. Before presenting the total of 228 practices 
to the expert panel, I first structured them by marking them with their origin (source of 
literature) as well as their discipline (RG=Risk Governance; CG=Corporate Governance; 
ITG=IT Governance; ISG=Information Security Governance). In addition, I organised 
the candidate practices by marking them according to De Wit & Meyer’s Strategy Theory 
[216]: “Organisational Structures, Processes & Relational Mechanisms” respectively. In the 
current research project, I use a more exhaustive terminology when discussing Relational 
Mechanisms because the term addresses more than just the culture of an organisation such 
as respect, attitude or behaviour. De Wit and Meyer’s theory was successfully applied in 
other studies [187] and was applied by Van Grembergen and De Haes in the development 
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of a framework for the Enterprise Governance of IT. This framework and the three major 
components for compiling a set of BISG practices are applied in the current research project. 
During the literature review all 228 practices were marked including marks for Process 
Contributing Practices (P), Structure Contributing Practices (S) and Relational Mechanisms 
Practices (RM). The experts were presented with a complete list of 228 practices. They 
were asked to analyse and investigate this list which was defined as the “Complete List of 
Governance and Management Practices”.
5.3.2  EXPERT PANEL
EXPERTS CHARACTERISTISC AND DISCIPLINES
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BSc
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Security Officer 
at Bank Y Y Y Y N >20
BSc CISSP 
CEH
Security Architect 
Telco N Y Y N Y >10
MSc RE Manager at IT Advisory Y Y Y Y Y >15
MSc BSc 
CISM
Security 
Consultant N Y Y Y Y >20
In order to organise, assess and rank the practices, a Group Support System (GSS) was 
used in order to facilitate the expert focus group. Quality is preferred over quantity since I 
wish to achieve a thoroughly analysed and ranked set of practices according to true experts. 
Four experts were selected according to the following criteria: they have a BA or MA degree 
in Information Systems, completed with industry certificates i.e. Certified Information 
Security Manager (CISM); Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH); Register EDP auditor (RE). The 
chosen experts have over 10-year experience in Business Information Security; they are 
full-time practitioners in Business Information Security and have (had) a link to the strategic 
management of organisations. These four experts are perfectly situated to select and rank 
this huge amount of data in the literature which makes their assessments highly relevant. 
Due to their multidisciplinary backgrounds (see table 1), their opinions are generalisable 
across numerous domains and different types of industries. The group size is similar to a 
Board of Directors or Executive Management Team and will therefore enable us to test on 
collaboration in small teams with large data sets.
Table 8: Experts panel characteristics used in the BISG research.
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5.3.3  RESEARCH FINDINGS
All 228 practices relevant to the topic of Business Information Security Governance were 
examined via GSS by the four experts. Because of the time available for assessing and 
organising the items, each expert pre-assessed each of the four data sets and passed it back 
to the group (carrousel concept). Short commentaries were given within GSS to justify the 
deletion or undoubling. See below for some examples of experts’ judgements and opinions 
on certain practices. The practices that are potential candidates for further research and with 
a wide variety of opinions as well as relevant critics are discussed below. The entire session 
was recorded and documented and can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-
zbu-hfdc.
50 practices from the Corporate Governance literature were assessed and organised 
by experts’ opinion via GSS. One of the first and most essential ones is the role of the 
stakeholder:
CG P Determine the Role of Stakeholders. The corporate governance framework should 
recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. Source: The OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 2004 extracted 24 September 2011 from www.oecd.org
- The experts’ commentary on this Corporate Governance practice is that it is identical to the
stakeholder analysis mentioned by numerous other sources. They also comment that this one 
is focused on financial institutions. One of the experts also commented that the role of the 
stakeholder is often regulated in laws.
CG RM Adequate Knowledge on protection of Intellectual Capital. Ensure the motivation and 
protection of intellectual capital intrinsic to the corporation, ensure that there is adequate 
training in the corporation for management and employees, and a succession plan for senior 
management (principle 12) Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance [253]
- The experts commented that the wording of these practices was rather vague. They 
mentioned that awareness is the key word here. According to the experts, these practices can
be assembled to Creating awareness by adequate knowledge on protection of Intellectual
Capital
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CG S Responsibilities of the Board. The corporate governance framework should ensure the 
strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, 
and the board's accountability to the company and the shareholders. [252]
- The experts commented that this is a Duplicate of other sources mentioning the importance 
of assigning a accountable and responsible person at the Board of Directors level. One expert 
said ”although I agree that the entire board should take responsibility, not just one man”. 
The expert panel agreed on the replacement of this practice by more specific practices: 
Appoint a responsible and accountable board member for risk management and sees that the 
company has implemented an effective ongoing process to identify risk, measure its potential 
impact against a set of assumptions, and then activate what it believes is necessary to 
proactively manage these risks [256].
During this research step, the experts concluded that Corporate Governance practices 
are often vaguely phrased and therefore it is difficult to implement them or perhaps not 
implemented at all because the organisation does not know how. Because of this vague 
specification of important Governance Practices, I asked the experts to rephrase these 
practices into a more understandable format. Many of the Corporate Governance practices 
are a derivative of others so a large number of practices are marked as duplicates. The 
experts were asked to mark these and they were subsequently deleted with the facilitator 
agreeing. All of the experts pointed out that many of the governance practices they assessed 
are crucial to the final implementation of good Security management practices into 
operations. They are pre-requisites for any organisation.
RG P Aligning risk appetite and strategy. Management considers the entity's risk appetite 
in evaluating strategic alternatives, setting related objectives, and developing 
mechanisms to manage related risks [258].
-One of the experts commented that this should be formulated more simply; risk appetite 
should be aligned with business strategy and accompanying objectives. Determining the 
organisations risk appetite is stated in most of the Governance academic and practice-
oriented sources, mainly because history taught us the importance of doing so (see for 
example cases like Enron, MCI Worldcom, etc.).
RG RM BoD understanding of risk philosophy and appetite. The board should understand 
the entity's risk philosophy and concur with entity's risk appetite [259].
- The experts commented that the risk philosophy always needs to be linked to business 
strategy and therefore risk appetite. It is important to note here that understanding risk 
philosophy has more to do with the awareness to recognise and understand the risk 
philosophy at board level and the behaviour and attitude towards risks.
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During this step a large amount of consensus was achieved. Most of the experts recognised 
the most relevant Governance Practices. This is acknowledged by the fact that during 
this step of the research the lowest level of variety is measured in GSS. This is especially 
the case with the practices: “Determine Roles, Accountabilities and Responsibilities” and 
“Transparency”.
Numerous Risk Governance practices again overlap with each other or even other 
disciplines: for example, Roles and Responsibilities, Stakeholder identification and identifying 
events that can threaten the business continuity. It is interesting that the leadership of driving 
Risk Governance practices seem to be important. COSO mentions this numerous times in 
several reports [259], [258]. Within Corporate Governance practices literature, this subject 
is never mentioned perhaps because it’s assumed that leadership is inherent to the nature 
of any board member. Nevertheless, according to the literature leadership is one of most 
contributing factors to business success or failure [20], [265]. In this case it is an essential 
finding to take into consideration.
In this first step we assessed the Governance practices within the Enterprise Governance of 
IT domain. Since businesses depend more and more on IT, the security of these systems is 
greatly important. Not only the confidentiality of the information but also the integrity and 
availability. This makes the practices from Governance of IT relevant to an examination of 
Business Information Security Governance. Again, we address the best candidates and the 
ones that were discusses most intensely;
ITG P IT performance measurement (e.g. IT balanced scorecard) 
[217]
- The experts commented that this could be aligned with the BSC from business units.
ITG P boards review the risk management approach for the most important IT-related 
risks on a regular basis, at least annually [18]
- Experts mentioned that these plans could be integrated in the total of risk management 
(so IT risks should not be separated).
ITG R IT leadership [105]
- Experts pointed to the very high level of this practice. All of them emphasised that 
leadership is always a very important practice, especially at Governance level. In other 
words “Lead by good example”.
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During this step of the research, the experts find full consensus that the IT Governance 
practices mentioned above are less relevant to the security topic. The main reason for this 
is that there is a huge overlap with the other practices. IT is part of the organisation but 
less integrated than for example risk management (risks arise on multi-levels, personnel, 
finance, safety, etc.). Another argument is that IT Governance practices can be incorporated 
by rephrasing them into Information Security Governance Practices. In other words, we use 
the relevant practices from this step and incorporate them into the next step: assessing and 
organising the Information Security Governance Practices.
Finally, organising Information Security Governance (ISG) Practices was on the agenda 
of the experts’ panel session. This practice appears to be the most closely related the 
topic of Business Information Security Governance. Therefore, it potentially hides the best 
candidates. The next important step is have experts assess all of them and make comments if 
they disagree. An important consideration for me was that Information Security Governance 
is not the same as Business Information Security Governance. Incorporating the security 
of the business - and all its related dimensions e.g. risk management- as a whole is of the 
essence in the exact distinction and specification of this domain. The hypothesis that most of 
the relevant practices for BISG might potentially lie in other disciplines than IT and Security 
can be told by the score of the practices. If only ISG practices arise in the ranking, the 
hypothesis is false. If other Governance disciplines arise, the hypotheses are confirmed.
Acknowledging all relevant Governance practices in selecting the core BISG practices is 
important. Especially because all previous research and literature address the necessity 
of Security management and do not address Governance. Governance is a necessity for 
mandating security management. Hence, “Good Governance” is essential to mandating 
it into the efficient operationalising of security management. An assessment of the ISG 
practices provides the following findings;
ISG RM IT Dependency. Understanding the critical nature of information and information 
security to the organisation. [261]
 − Experts comment that this practice is vague. “What to understand, and especially, how to 
measure understanding? And by whom?” The experts also mentioned that this practice is 
relevant since some of the BoD members are not aware how much their business relies on IT.
ISG RM Security awareness at level of board of directors. A certain level of awareness about 
business risks, business critical information, level of information (IT) dependency, kind of 
threats from outside and inside. [217]
 − Experts completely agreed on this practice since organisations nowadays do not have 
adequate knowledge or the awareness to enforce appropriate action.
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Experts agreed that practices ought to be simple and easy to understand by board members. 
Examples are;
ISG P Do simple risk assessments. Do simple, subjective risk assessments, and put your effort 
into improving security [261].
ISG P Report simple (Red-Yellow-Green). Use a simple High-Moderate-Low (Red-Yellow-
Green) ranking [261].
ISG RM Create a measurable security-aware culture [262].
ISG P Security maturity assessments. Determine current BIS maturity level based on COBIT 
[22].
In conclusion, we can state that, at the end of this step (analysis of and completing practices 
per domain), the expert panel team derived a ‘clean’ list of practices from a large amount 
of data in the literature. Some of the practices were deleted (duplicates) and some were 
rephrased to avoid misinterpretation in the next research step, ranking the practices on 
effectiveness.
5.3.4   RANKING THE GSS DATA
The level of effectiveness is the first selection method. A Likert scale was used on which 0 
ranks as not effective and 5 ranks as highly effective, mainly because it is our intention to 
select the best working practices according to experts. In this way this research project can 
contribute to solving the problem of the low level of security within organisations. These best 
working practices can later be used as candidates for the next ranking on “Ease of Design 
and Realisation”, “Ease of Maintenance” and “Ease of Implementation”, also on a scale from 
0 to 5. Assessing and ranking all practices over these three dimensions will enable us to 
determine which practices will work on a management level according to the principles of 
ISO38500 standard, and can be monitored and evaluated by the Board (Governance level).
In consensus with the experts I decided to rank the top practices, measured from 4 and 
above on effectiveness. In order to compile a list to be judged on these four criteria (1. 
“Effectiveness”, 2. “Ease of Design and Realisation”, 3. Ease of maintenance and 4. Ease 
of Implementation) that contributes to the ongoing process according to the ISO 38500 
principles. The graph in Figure 32 reflects the outcomes of this research phase. It displays 
the accumulated score on Effectiveness, Ease of Design & Realisation, Implementation and 
Maintenance. This ranking also provides insight into the level of theoretical practices ranked 
via GSS for practical use. These views of the practitioners on the practical usefulness of the 
theory in question provide the latter with necessary and meaningful feedback. 
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5.3.5   FRAMEWORK FOR BISG PRACTICES
The research question formulated at the beginning of this project - “What is a framework 
for Business Information Security Governance practices, according to the academic 
literature on the subject and the views of experts?” - can now be answered in a dual way. 
Firstly, the framework for Business Information Security Governance consists of all the 
relevant literature on the topic, which has been examined and elaborated on throughout 
this section of the thesis. Secondly, this framework consists of three components: structures, 
processes and relational mechanisms. With the help of the expert panel research, through 
GSS team collaboration, the researchers organised, ranked and captured the most relevant 
and effective ones, per component in the theoretical framework visualised in Figure 33. 
This framework can serve as a theoretical departure for further research on the basis of the 
following important questions:
Which factors influence the acceptance of Governance practices in an organisation? These 
factors include budgets, knowledge, innovation, culture, demographics and so on.
Do these practices address the major business risks inherent to the current security problems?
Figure 32: Top 20 Practices for BISG according to the Literature and Experts Validation.
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5.4        CONCLUSIONS
This research contributed in the delivery of a set of practices that contribute the conceptual 
framework for BIS. The final result of this research part is reflected in a top 20 Business 
Information Security Governance (BISG) practices. The top 10 is listed in Table 9. And 
the entire data set can be accessed via https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-
dataset:77502 
The use of GSS enables the researcher to objectively examine practices by making use of 
an objective facilitator. This objectivism is a safeguard to avoid the personal bias of the 
researcher, as referred to in Chapter 2. The hypothesis that other Governance practices than 
IT and Security would deliver relevant practices for BISG has been confirmed. Half (50%) 
of the top twenty Governance practices for Business Information Security come from either 
Corporate Governance or Risk Governance. As a result of our findings, a highly significant 
core set of Business Information Security Governance and Executive Management practices 
could be established. In the next phase of this research project, this core set must be tailor-
made for specific (organisational) environments by:
1. Analysing the influencing factors mentioned in the framework section;
2. Testing the acceptance on the part of the executive management of organisations;
3. Investigating whether these practices can be evaluated, directed and monitored, according 
to ISO38500 Governance within the organisation.
Figure 33: Framework for BISG research
Literature 
Research
GSS research Business Information Security Governance Framework
Processes Structures
Relational 
Mechanisms
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In this further research, the researchers present the core set and the influencing factors (i.e. 
large data sets) to an organisation, to small groups of BoD and MT’s within this organisation. 
And ask them to participate in the collaboration process as to what works for them and how 
organisations organise and measure their state per top practice (e.g. roles, risk appetite, 
incident response) and formulate follow-up actions (monitor, evaluate, direct) in order to 
maintain a certain level of Business Information Security maturity. This practice-oriented 
research will contribute to organisations since the latter can adopt the core set of governance 
practices. In this way a socially justified method (due to team collaboration on a large set 
of predefined data (i.e. top 20)) of practical Business Information Security consultancy 
will “encompass social and adaptable security methods that are rigorously developed along 
with practice” [151]. The result of this research is the design of a conceptual framework 
to monitor, evaluate and direct business information security governance. According 
to Hevner’s design science research method [138], the next phase will consist of the 
implementation of the framework in the design artefact. 
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# TOP 10 BISG PRACTICES SCORE LEVEL SPRM
1 Determine Roles. Accountability and responsibility 
for Business Information Security at Board and 
Executive management level. Including the role of 
the stakeholders.
11.25 Governance Structure
2 Corporate internal communication on cyber 
downside. e.g. cybercrime, fraud, theft, forgery, 
piracy, bullying. Internal communication channels 
such as intranet. HRM letters. Workshops can be 
used to educate employees.
11.25 Management Relational 
Mechanism
3 Awareness at level of Boards of Directors. 
A certain level of awareness about business 
risks. Business critical information. Level of 
information (IT) dependency. Kinds of threats 
from outside and inside. 
11.00 Management Relational 
Mechanism
4 Board and Senior Management Leadership. Lead by 
good example. Clean desk policy. Limited personal 
web exposure (personal blogging. video). Software 
piracy. Shred confidential papers, etc.
11.00 Governance Relational 
Mechanism
5 Lessons learned. Sessions after security 
incidents. Document and report incidents that 
occur. Also what kind of response to the 
stakeholders was made and how such an event can 
be prevented. Take these in consideration for the 
formulation of strategy.
11.00 Governance Process
6 Transparency. The company should also consider 
the need for a confidential reporting process 
(whistle-blowing) covering fraud and other risks.
10.75 Governance Process
7 Determine risk appetite. The level of risk and 
exposure a company is willing to take when it 
comes to Information Security Risks. To justify 
decision-making on investments/insurance. 
10.25 Governance Process
8 Internal control. Regularly review processes 
and procedures to ensure the effectiveness of 
its internal systems of control. so that its 
decision-making capability and the accuracy of 
its reporting and financial results are maintained 
at a high level at all times.
10.00 Management Process
9 Regular reporting on security adequacy and 
effectiveness. Requiring regular reports from 
management on the programme's adequacy and 
effectiveness.
 10.00 Management Process
10 Ensuring the integrity of the corporation. 
Accounting and financial reporting systems. 
Including independent audits. Ensure that 
appropriate systems of control are in place. In 
particular, systems for risk management, financial 
and operational control and compliance with the 
law and relevant standards.
 9.75 Management Process
Table 9: Top 10 Business Information Security Governance practices in detail.
 6
DESIGNING AND
DEVELOPING THE
ARTEFACT
DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING THE 
ARTEFACT6 147
"There cannot be a greater mistake than that of looking superciliously on practical 
applications of science. The life and soul of science is its practical application..." 
-Lord Kelvin in Electrical Units of Measurement", May 3, 1883
This chapter deals with the design and development of an MBIS artefact within a Design Science 
Research Framework. There are five cases of practical problems that led to artefact requirements 
that were adopted in building the artefact, these are described in Chapter 7. A case study, 
investigates an instance of a phenomenon in depth [73]. All five cases have gone through the entire 
Design Science Research (DSR) cycle as proposed in chapter 2. Thus in this chapter we first explicate 
the problem before we can set the requirement for the artefact.
6.1        INTRODUCTION
Solving numerous practical problems via a Design Science approach requires a) a designed 
artefact that improves something for stakeholders and b) empirically investigating the 
performance and effect of an artefact in its context. Within Design Science the design cycle 
is used to address design problems, via design questions, of the artefact and the empirical 
cycle is assigned to knowledge questions to gain insights in improvements. In this section the 
use of numerous DSR methods in order to design and develop the artefact requirements is 
addressed. This is demonstrated via five DS research projects in recent years (2010-2015) 
within the Business Information Security domain. All projects were under supervision of 
Antwerp University and my co-promotors. Some cases have been reported in peer-reviewed 
published work.
1. The first case involves examining the core functionalities of the MBIS artefact in relation
to the target group (which operates in a business environment). The main research 
question was: Which management information would CIOs and CISOs consider to be of
Figure 34: Explicating the problem for the design of the artefact based on Johannesson and Perjons [73]
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importance when managing their business security (from governance to operation)? In 
this case we used customer opinions through GSS research. This request provided input 
for establishing the functional requirements for the artefact. The participants in this case 
were CIOs and CISOs from mid-market organisations and the research was done in Q4 of 
2012.
2. The second case involves exploring and predefining governance practices for Business 
Information Security, using expert opinion acquired via GSS. The main research 
question was: Which governance practices and critical success factors do boardroom 
members require in their daily management that can help them direct, monitor and 
control the governance of BIS? The outcome of that research also formed a set of artefact
requirements. This research was performed in Q1 of 2012. We demonstrated the design
and development of the requirements.
3. The third case involves exploring and setting requirements for a core set of management 
interventions which organisations need to take into account in order to increase the 
maturity level of BIS. The main research question was: Which core interventions do
managers find effective in enhancing BIS maturity level? In this case we made use of expert
panel opinions (through GSS research) to generate and select a core set of interventions 
that can form requirements for the MBIS artefact. This research was performed in Q1 of 
2010.
4. The forth case involved demonstrating how Delphi Research can contribute to generating
metric requirements for an artefact. The main research question was: Which metrics
are effective for governance, management and operation in order to measure the 
MBIS process? In this case we zoomed into specific knowledge items on metrics that
organisations can consider when measuring the maturity level via the artefact. This 
research was performed using Delphi research in Q1 of 2013 among 40 security 
managers.
5. The fifth case was used to demonstrate which new knowledge items should be included 
in the design and development of the artefact in order to better cope with new contextual 
influences. The main research question was: What external forces of influence do security
managers recognise and how do they cope with them in BIS strategy formulation? We used
experts’ opinions via Delphi research to generate new knowledge items. This research was 
performed in Q1 of 2013.
6.2        EXPLICATING THE PROBLEM TO DEFINE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DESIGN
The initial activity of DSR is to make the problem explicit (explain the problem). This is the 
initial phase in the process of defining artefact requirements, as shown in Figure 35. The 
objective of this activity is to address the problem, indicate its magnitude and the need to 
solve it, so it is mainly about the importance of the problem and exploring causes. It forced 
me to think about solutions to the problem and preselect functional or non-functional 
requirements [224]. It addresses the question: “What is the problem experienced by some 
stakeholders and why is it important?” [146].
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Guidelines for ‘explicating’ the problem are taken into consideration during the examination 
of the five cases and these are used to structure the research process and thesis sections. 
Explaining each problem is necessary in order to define requirements for the artefact [73]. 
And later on to evaluate the artefact.
1. Position the problem. This is important to make the problem that is experienced by some 
stakeholders explicit and why it is important to investigate. A problem is a gap between the 
current and the desirable state.
2. Formulate the problem precisely. This is important to gain a mutually accepted view 
and perception of the problem, the implications and the possible root causes. A problem 
should be defined precisely so that everybody understands it in the same way. This also 
helps scope the design science project, making the problem easier to address.
3. Justify the problem. This is important because it should always be positioned in some 
practice and well justified so that people can agree it is worth addressing.
4. Ensure that the problem is of general interest. It should address a general problem and 
not just a local practice.
5. Ensure that the problem is solvable. This is important to keep the problem small and thus 
solvable in a timely manner. Root cause analysis can be performed to identify underlying 
causes and to pre-synthesise possible solutions to the problem, in order to determine if 
they are indeed solvable.
6. Specify the sources of the problem. This is important to determine the size and impact of 
the problem and the fact it is indeed a general problem.
7. Describe how the problem has been explained. This is important to address how the 
problem is taken into consideration by stakeholders, in the literature and by other interest 
groups. It can be explained by involving different kinds of stakeholders, such as directors, 
managers, regulators, employees and customers.
For each of the five cases the initial step, according to the guidelines, is to explain the 
problem and then – at a later stage – to outline the artefact’s functional and non-functional 
requirements.
Figure 35: Overview of the DSR framework based on Johanneson and Perjons [73].
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6.2.1  EXPLICATING THE PROBLEM PER CASE
6.2.1.1    CASE 1: WHICH DASHBOARD MANAGEMENT INFORMATION WOULD CIO’S AND 
CISO’S CONSIDER TO BE IMPORTANT WHEN MANAGING THEIR BUSINESS SECURI-
TY (FROM GOVERNANCE TO OPERATION)?
INTRODUCTION
Business managers use business models to operationalise the strategy of the organisation. 
The use of management models and methods such as balanced scorecards and key 
performance indicators are well-known instruments that are used to measure the 
performance of an organisation. For information security some efforts were made to 
operationalise the management behind it. The most well-known management instrument 
is the ISO27001 Information Security Management System and the GASSP25/GAISP 
and SSE-CMM model. According to Siponen: “These management systems are generic or 
universal in scope; consequently they do not pay enough attention to the differences between 
organisations and the fact that their security requirements are different [3]”. To explain the 
problem we go into the detail of predefined guidelines:
Guideline Description
1. Position the problem Managers lack fact-based BIS management information which influences decision-making. 
Riabacke (2012) mentioned in his study on decision-making: “the lack of information and 
precise objective data, that risk and probability estimations made by the managers are often 
based on inadequate information and intuition,..most decisions are based on intuition and 
gut feeling” [266] Self-built Excel-based performance sheets lack business priority-related 
security controls [184] As a result, directors, regulators and other stakeholders currently rely 
on historical data which is scattered throughout the organisation [9]. 
2. Formulate the 
problem precisely
The lack of a centralised fact-based view on BIS (dashboard) limits decision-making and thus 
poses a liability risk for the organisation and its stakeholders. 
3. Justify the problem Due to these liability risks and the unknown impact on business owners  [18] (whether 
personal or financial), a minimum of management steering information is required [268]. 
4. Ensure the problem is 
of general interest
A lack of core BIS management information (facts) and mechanisms to gather data might 
result in legal, financial and personal implications that are of general interest and are not 
limited to a department or individual.
5. Ensure the problem is 
solvable
Provide visibility in a minimum ‘set of management information’. This encourages the 
underlying organisation to provide factual data. The origin of these facts may be databases, 
log files, scan reports, surveys, processes, reports, observations, checklists, etc. 
6. Specify the sources of 
the problem
The problem has been addressed in the literature and by practitioners [6, 9]. Not only the 
lack of a dashboard but also the fact that there is often not a process to be monitored at all. 
Most organisations still practice BIS as a project with ad-hoc interventions [4] and ad-hoc 
reporting. They lack a consistent working Information Security Management System [3], 
[61]. 
7. Describe how the 
problem has been 
explained
The BIS topic is multi-dimensional. A director may require a brief summary of BIS facts, for 
example current state and the route towards a desired state [60], whereas management may 
want more insight into details. Another perspective is that of the regulator. Regulators require 
different information in a different format [91]. So multiple stakeholders have multiple 
demands. In this example we scope the problem of creating a core set of management 
information. Hence, managers can use this to inform their board. 
25  Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP)
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6.2.1.2    CASE 2: THE LACK OF GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
FOR BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
Theorists and practitioners generally observe good security management practices but also 
indicate that less attention is paid to governance [239], [18]. This is a problem because 
security breaches have tremendous implications for the continuity [7], civil or legal liability, 
reputation, employability and financial position of firms [269], [270]. Most of the security 
models focus on management and pay less attention to security governance. The lack of 
dedicated governance practices for Business Information Security is a limitation for today’s 
boards of directors. We explain the problem according to the guideline:
Guideline Description
1. Position the 
problem
A board of directors lacks insights into adequate governance practices for BIS and factors of 
influence (critical success factors). The literature prescribes many corporate governance, risk 
governance and IT governance practices but there is a lack of Information Security governance 
practices that have been tested rigorously and validated. This becomes problematic when 
regulators demand a governance process in order to maintain a licence to operate.
2. Formulate 
the problem
precisely
A lack of insight into governance practices that can function as a core set of principles that 
contribute to increasing the Security Governance Maturity of organisations.
3. Justify the 
problem
Due to the increase in cyber threats to organisations it is evident that boards of directors 
require insight into practices that they can adopt, direct, monitor, control and measure in a 
continuous manner. Due to the liability risks for the organisation and the unknown impact on 
board members, a core set of governance practices is required that boards can apply.
4. Ensure the 
problem is 
of general 
interest
Insight into proper governance practices and the accompanying critical success factors is 
needed in order to stay compliant and to perform good stewardship. If non-compliance is 
accompanied with failing governance processes, this has broad implications for stakeholders, 
customers and employees (exceeding the impact of local practices). 
5. Ensure the 
problem is 
solvable
By providing visibility for a core set of governance practices for BIS the first step in solving 
the problem is made. Adding a set of critical success factors that board members can apply 
and act on will further contribute to solving the problem. By continuous use of the list, today’s 
boards also have monitoring capabilities (e.g. parameters of control).
6. Specify the 
sources of the 
problem
The source of the problem lies in the embryonic field of BIS. There are numerous best practices 
at an operational and tactical level, but these are limited at a strategical level. One main cause 
is that the solution lies not only in instrumentation, but also in softer intangible factors e.g. 
leadership and culture. 
7. Describe how 
the problem 
has been 
explained 
This lack of adequate governance practices for BIS is a problem for boards as well as for 
regulators that want to keep track of the company’s performance by evaluating, directing and 
monitoring BIS. One set of BIS practices involves achieving consensus among stakeholders, 
provides strategic direction and enables control of the subject. 
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6.2.1.3    CASE 3: THE LACK OF A CORE SET OF INTERVENTIONS FOR MBIS
In Chapter 4 the problem of “the absence of a core set of interventions that can be applied to 
enhance the maturity level of BIS within mid-market organisations” was explained. This made 
it unclear for managers what to implement in order to increase security maturity. Managers 
also experience a knowledge gap in terms of “whether they are doing the right things” [90] 
(efficiency) and, if they do the right things, “whether they are doing them well” (effectiveness) 
[64]. This makes it a dual problem. The first problem is the lack of a clear list of interventions 
that contribute to improving BIS. The second problem is the absence of adequate knowledge 
to maintain this list of core interventions in a practical environment.
Guideline Description
Position 
the problem
Managers’ lack of a core set of interventions that are effective and easy to implement in order to 
increase the level of BIS maturity. In the literature this problem is addressed as a management 
and directors’ problem [31]. The problem becomes more complex due to the overwhelming 
number of frameworks [3], [62] and their complexity [9]. 
2. Formulate 
the problem
precisely
The absence of a core set of rigorously established interventions for managers leaves them 
struggling with complex and overwhelming frameworks. 
3. Justify 
the problem 
Due to the liability risks towards the organisation and the unknown impact to board members, 
a minimum set of interventions that an organisation needs to adopt in order to improve the 
maturity of the BIS position is required.
4. Ensure the 
problem is 
of general 
interest
Small, medium and large companies share the same problems. Big companies are perhaps 
regulated and therefore more likely to reserve budgets but mid- market companies suffer from 
insufficient resources, a lack of a sense of urgency and the need for simple tools that fit their 
limited needs. A lack of core BIS interventions results in legal, financial and personal implications 
that are of general (stakeholder) interest and are not limited to a department or individual. When 
the organisation plays a vital role in the economy or infrastructure of a nation it is also a social 
problem.
5. Ensure the 
problem is 
solvable
Gaining insight into a minimum set of BIS interventions and adopting these in business 
processes will contribute to solving the problem and provide directives for future monitoring. 
6. Specify the 
sources of 
the problem
The problem has been addressed in the literature by academics and practitioners. Several 
authors have described BIS as complex and they warn organisations about knowledge gaps [9]. 
The authors also address the problem of the complex and overwhelming frameworks such as 
ISO27K [3], which are hard to maintain and monitor [61].
7. Describe 
how the 
problem 
has been 
explained
The absence of a core set of security maturity interventions has been described in the literature 
[64]. The problem becomes more visible as companies increasingly trade digitally and suffer 
financial damage if security is not practised at a certain maturity level [175], [272]. 
This problem led to a research problem that was answered via Group Support System 
(GSS) expert panel research and an extra validation by responsible managers in mid-
market companies. This step was done to increase the validity of the construct that was to 
be established at the next stage. The final result is a set of interventions which mid-market 
organisations can use and they can also function as requirements for the design and 
development of the artefact.
1.
DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING THE 
ARTEFACT6 153
6.2.1.4  CASE 4: THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE METRICS AT THE GOVERNANCE, MANAGEMENT 
AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN ORDER TO MEASURE THE MBIS PROCESS
Practitioners have developed numerous BIS metrics for organisations, for example NIST 
[273] and ISACA [208]. Pironti [274] stated; “Information security is an ever-changing and
evolving activity. To have accurate visibility to these changes, an organisation must establish, 
maintain, monitor, interpret and report effective metrics and measures. The threats that 
an organisation’s information infrastructure faces, along with the controls and capabilities 
that must be deployed to counteract these threats, are constantly changing and evolving. 
This requires the measures and metrics that are employed to monitor the performance of 
Information Security governance to be adaptable and flexible to be a positive and valuable 
asset to the organisation [274]. With this, Pironti [274] emphasises the need for clear
metrics that boards of directors can understand and monitor. ISACA developed, in COBIT5 
for Information Security, a set of metrics per COBIT domain [56]. This resulted in a huge 
number of metric candidates that can be selected and implemented, from the governance 
down to the operational level. Jaquith [275] developed metrics for operational, technical and
security programmes. Limited academic research has been done on developing metrics for 
the governance of Business Information Security.
Guideline Description
1. Position 
the 
problem
Boards of directors lack clear predefined metrics to direct, monitor and control BIS governance. 
The knowledge that is required for developing and maintaining these metrics requires continuous 
effort. This makes measuring and controlling BIS problematic.
2. Formulate 
the 
problem 
precisely
Without measuring criteria and instruments BIS becomes hard to direct, monitor and control. 
Because it is not yet known what is good or bad. There is no empirical evidence compared to for 
example the automotive or aviation industry. This also applies to external stakeholders who need to 
judge if adequate management is done, based on predefined metrics or KPIs.
3. Justify the 
problem
Due to the liability risks for the organisation and the unknown impact on board members, key 
metrics for measuring and managing – as well as the knowledge needed to maintain these items – 
are required. 
4. Ensure the 
problem is 
of general 
interest
A lack of metrics limits the board/manager in doing his or her job, taking or delegating 
responsibility and ensuring accountability. The implications of having limited or no steering 
information results in legal, financial and/or personal implications which are of general 
stakeholder interest and therefore not limited to a department or individual. 
5. Ensure the 
problem is 
solvable
Having knowledge and insight into metrics that are relevant can contribute to solving the problem. 
6. Specify 
the sources 
of the 
problem
The source of the problem is dual. First there is the required knowledge about which relevant 
metrics to consider, implement and maintain. Then there is a need for insight into which types of 
metrics are useful for a specific organisation. 
7. Describe 
how the 
problem has 
been 
explained 
Numerous management authors describe the necessity of management instruments and KPIs to 
successful steer a company [268], [47]. Limited research has been done on metrics relevant for 
BIS [174] and how to acquire and develop reliable knowledge about BIS measurement models 
and metrics. 
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6.2.1.5 CASE 5: A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT STRATEGIC EXTERNAL FORCES OF 
INFLUENCE THAT ARE RELEVANT TO BIS STRATEGY FORMULATION
The risk of exposure after an incident, as well as the financial implications should be 
enough for most organisations to reconsider their business information security strategy. 
The economic impact of breaches on organisations has been studied. Ishiguro et al. [50]. 
Cashell et al. [47] studied movements in the stock price in the aftermath of an information 
security breach or after a privacy incident [276]. All of these studies confirm the need for a 
dedicated security strategy. But designing and implementing a security is a challenging task 
to master, especially when certain knowledge is not available. Pai states [67], in his study, that 
sharing knowledge at a very early stage is necessary. Michael Porter states that knowledge 
sharing about influential forces is of the essence in order to determine which battle to choose. 
Michael Porter’s five forces model is an example of a management instrument which can 
assist business leaders in making strategic plans and reveal knowledge on why certain forces 
must be controlled and others need not. Initiating the right forces that are relevant during 
execution is essential. Porter states: “A perfectly executed but mediocre strategy won´t really 
help the organisation” [277]. To get an understanding of strategic knowledge items we 
consider using proven methods or models for strategising and re-using these in BIS. First we 
articulate the problem of the absence of strategic knowledge items and, at a later stage we 
determine the requirements of the artefact.
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Guideline Description
1.  Position the
problem
The BIS domain is dynamic and complex [9] and cyber threats are evolving at a rapid pace. This 
makes it difficult for managers to predict certain strategic evolutions. Nevertheless it is up to 
these managers to protect the organisation against unforeseen surprises. So they rely on those 
living in a ‘system world’ [278] to articulate ‘mystic’ technological language. We can compare 
this with the domain of competitive analysis for strategy formulation. It is hard to predict 
tomorrow’s competitors but modelling the competitive field into groups helps structuring and 
doing analysis [216]. A good example is the five forces model of Harvard professor Michael 
Porter. When we compare this to the BIS domain, we need additional knowledge on strategising 
the future influences of the company and help in predicting and advising the board on strategic 
directions. 
Formulate 
the problem 
precisely
A lack of adequate knowledge and existing management models to continuously advise boards 
of directors on strategic choices in the BIS domain*. 
Justify the 
problem
Strategising the future of the company is self-evident. Formulating and implementing a security 
strategy is important but rarely done [111], [265].
Ensure the 
problem is of 
general 
interest
When organisations do not take BIS into consideration in their strategy this can have numerous 
implications. On the reputational side due to a loss of trust, on the continuity side and on the 
perceived value of the company [51], [50]. This can sometimes result in bankruptcy [43], so it 
has become a socio- economic problem of general interest.
Ensure the 
problem is 
solvable
The use of existing management models about strategy, to be used by security practitioners, will 
contribute to solving the knowledge issue. Boards of directors can help security practitioners 
gain insight into their management models and shed new light on solving new problems with 
proven methods and models.
Specify the 
sources of the 
problem
More impact can be made on boards by using existing models from the world of business 
[278], focusing on risks that are recognised in this world and articulated in its language. 
Describe how 
the problem 
has been
 explained 
Knowledge about the strategy of the company lies with the board, while knowledge about 
the security of systems lies with security experts [278]. A lack of knowledge exchange 
between these groups is limiting the success of security adoption by boards of directors [9]. 
Understanding both worlds would contribute to solving this problem [279].
*At the Infosec Dialogue in London (UK) on 4 October 2015 I polled 30 CISOs on their acquaintance with Michael Porter’s five
forces model. None were familiar with the model. Video recorded on 4 October 2015.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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6.2.2        FIVE CASES OF DSR REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
Now that we have articulated five cases of business problems, we can start defining the 
artefact requirements accordingly. This step addresses the question: What artefact can 
provide a solution to the explained problem and which requirements for this artefact are 
important for which stakeholders? First we examine the articulated questions more in 
detail to set specific requirements for the artefact. The function of a requirement is to show 
what the artefact can do in solving a predefined problem for a stakeholder. The function 
is translated into requirements and these functional requirements become the structural 
requirements of the artefact. This structure represents the internal working of the artefact, 
the components it is built of and how they interrelate with each other. Another aspect is the 
definition of non-functional requirements. Those requirements are not functional and can 
be structural or environmental in nature (context). The context is the external surroundings 
and the conditions in which the artefact will operate. The effects of the artefact are the way 
in which the artefact will change the context. Effects can be divided into intended effects 
and side effects. In this chapter we elaborate, based on the five cases of practical problems, 
the research methods used in order to examine the problem and to derive solutions. The 
primary objective is to distil potential artefact requirements that can contribute to solving 
the problem. To move from a problem definition towards requirements definitions and 
include the contribution to the stakeholder, Wieringa’s method [143] is applied. Wieringa 
proposes so-called contribution arguments. These encouraged me to justify the choices 
involved in setting requirements and a contribution argument is thus articulated. This is an 
argument that satisfies the stakeholders’ needs and contributes to a stakeholder goal in the 
problem context. Jackson (1995) also refers to satisfaction arguments as part of the software 
engineering problem-solving approach [278]. A contribution argument has the form:
(Artefact requirements) x (Context assumptions) contribute to (Stakeholder goal)
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the applied research strategies and methods are creative, on 
the one hand to answer knowledge questions, and parallel to that to solve real-life problems 
that occur in organisations, with the underlying intention to generate new knowledge for the 
knowledge base. Use is made of creative methods such as surveys, expert groups and action 
research to gain knowledge about stakeholder’s perceptions about a potential solution. So 
the solution lies in a method which captures and records these requirements. A working 
method is required that encourages people to critically (re)think when carrying out a certain 
process. When this representation of an idea, such as a method, becomes concrete or 
tangible, one can speak of an instantiation.
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6.2.2.1   CASE 1: DEFINING KEY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION FOR BIS AS ARTEFACT RE-
QUIREMENTS
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
We now explore the artefact requirements through the use of a GSS panel discussion with the 
target group representing the stakeholders that suffer from the problem. The main research 
question was: Which management information would CIOs and CISOs consider to be of 
importance for managing their business security (from governance to operation)?
RESULTS OF THE GROUP SUPPORT SYSTEMS SESSION
We make use of GSS to elicit views from professionals that advise board members on current 
and future topics, such as security. GSS facilitates brainstorming, discussion and prioritising 
and captures per step all relevant data that was referred to by the participants [114], [112]. 
To set the scene during the GSS session I started with introductory questions. By making 
use of the Gartner Hype cycle I provided a view on future evolvements in the industry and 
how they relate to the CIO or CISO profession. To brainstorm and share a common views 
on trends in IT the participants were asked to discuss innovations for the next five years, and 
then they were asked to raise any extra relevant innovation besides that provided by the 
researcher.
The first introductory question was: Discuss with your partner an innovation – over the next 
five years – to be included in the session
This resulted in list of eight items which they were asked to rank, based on their importance to 
the organisation in terms of business information security.
The second introductory question was: Rate the importance to your organisation for the next 
five years from the perspective of business security. Scale: Rate from -5 to +5
This resulted in a ranked list of innovations for the next five years according to the CIO and/
or CISO in relation to BIS.
With this knowledge about future innovations and a certain mind set created during the 
session, the CIOs and CISOs were asked to raise key management information. They were 
asked:
Which management information would you consider to be of importance to manage your 
business security (from governance to operation)?
In the next phase of the research the participants were asked to prioritise the management 
information items. This resulted in a prioritised list of items (displayed in Table 10.)
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ITEM RATING ABSTAIN VARIABILITY 
1. Risk thermometer 10 0 0%
2. Policy versus implementation versus checking with
numbers 
8.8 1 48%
3. Factual figures (for management presentation
purposes) 
8.8 0 43%
4. Hot items 8.3 1 45%
5. Audits, "traffic light reports" trigger is
confidentiality
8 0 61%
6. Technology risk exposure to the company expressed as
red-yellow-green
8 0 61%
7. Awareness 7.8 1 51%
8. Number of system intruders 7 1 68%
9. Starting point in a number, to compare and measure 6.8 1 45%
10. Number of unsafe communications 6.8 0 62%
11. Fraud reports 6.5 1 46%
12. Market / environment 5.8 1 71%
13. Image damage 5.5 1 100%
14. Insight into only high risks 5.3 2 46%
15. Work instructions. SMART targets and milestones 5.3 2 10%
16. Policy 5.3 2 10%
17. Tasks, responsibilities and authorities (accountable
versus responsible)
5.2 0 74%
18. Stakeholders we are digitally dealing with 4.8 1 67%
19. Spam report 4.8 0 67%
20. Numbers of insecure devices (e.g. login attempts) 4.6 0 67%
21. Number of password resets, number of digital attacks 4.2 0 71%
In the last phase of the GSS session the CIOs and CISOs were asked “what keeps them up 
at night?” The purpose of this question was to first identify new knowledge items that had 
not been examined, raised or discussed before and thus check if the session covers most of 
the knowledge items. Secondly to share knowledge and meanings between the participants 
and leave room for final discussion that might be of interest in the advancement of this 
research. An interesting finding raised by one of the participants is a “trashbin check” 
and “speer phishing the CEO.” This is interesting because trashbin checking is something 
we know from marketing research but not within security. Speer phishing the CEO is an 
upcoming phenomenon (sometimes referred to as Advanced Persistent Threats), which is 
relevant for boardroom members to know and how they can protect themselves against this 
phenomenon.
Table 10: Case 1: Designing and developing the artefact. Key management information.
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The session was held in Veenendaal in the Netherlands in Q1 of 2012. The complete report 
can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc.
CONTRIBUTION ARGUMENTS
To formulate the contribution argument a decomposition of the problem into requirements is 
made.
ARTEFACT REQUIREMENT CANDIDATES
The first three items gained from the group from Table 10 were translated into the 
contribution argument. Primarily, to solve the main problem of the stakeholder, being 
the absence of insights into factual data on risks and policy implementations (regulator 
policies with the objective of complying). This core management information will encourage 
stakeholders and directors to gain knowledge on BIS in order to increase awareness of the 
topic. These three items, facts, risks and policy are set as requirements for the artefact. We 
frame these three core functionalities as “Key BIS management information.” Obviously 
more functionalities besides the top three were discussed. Since I intend to justify the further 
process of establishing the artefact in the next phase, just these three items are promoted as 
candidates.
6.2.2.2   CASE 2: DEFINING BISG ARTEFACT REQUIREMENTS
This section focusses on establishing artefact requirements. The data used in this case is the 
same as chapter 5. In chapter 5 the focus is to examine relevant Governance practices based 
upon the proposed method of literature research and GSS, in this chapter the same data is 
used to design the artefact requirements. 
This section was published at the International Conference on Computational Intelligence 
and Communication Networks in 2015, in Dehradun, India, pages 1097-1104 under the 
title: Governance Practices and Critical Success factors suitable for Business Information 
Security. The complete publication can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-
zbu-hfdc.
Case 1: Defining key management information for BIS as artefact requirements
Method Intended 
effect
Side effect (knowl-
edge)
Stakeholder 
Goal
Artefact re-
quirement
Context as-
sumption 
Contribution 
argument
Through GSS 
the stakehold-
er group dis-
cussed (brain-
stormed) on 
numerous 
items that 
influence their 
view on the 
BIS topic. 
New gained 
knowledge 
within the 
group. 
Exchange 
of knowl-
edge and 
viewpoints 
between the 
participants.
Take notion of 
future trends 
and hypes in the 
IT industry that 
influence BIS
Gain control 
over core BIS 
management 
information via 
a prioritised 
set of items
A prioritised 
key set of BIS 
management 
information cri-
teria that can 
be used and 
presented in a 
dashboard 
More 
awareness by 
stakeholders 
(such as 
regulators), 
directors and 
managers. 
As well as 
more insight 
into the BIS 
state of the 
organisation 
Provide stake-
holders more 
BIS detailing on 
implementation 
of the policy’s, 
high risks and 
thereby encour-
age the entire 
organisation 
to deliver the 
underlying facts 
(evidence)
1606 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
The second problem articulated in the previous section is the “absence of adequate 
governance practices for BIS for boards” and insight into factors of influence (critical success 
factors). The objective of this section is to define artefact requirements that contribute 
to potentially solving this problem through the use of a DSR artefact. In order to set 
requirements for the design, artefact “requirement design questions” are formulated in the 
text below. 
The absence of governance practices relates to the low level of awareness of security issues 
on the part of businesses [27], [78]. Theorists and practitioners generally observe relative 
proper security management [280] practices but also indicate that less attention is paid 
to governance practices [281], [210], [282]. This is a problem because security breaches 
have tremendous implications for the continuity [43], civil or legal liability [283], reputation 
[49], employability and financial position of firms [48], [51]. Hence, it could be argued that 
information security and its implications no longer only affect the IT department but also 
several other disciplines.
Research from Ponemon institute has shown that the number of security incidents has 
increased over the years, as has the financial impact per data breach [11]. In 2009, 25% 
of EU organisations experienced a data breach (with 47% of Finnish organisations in the 
leading position). As a result, the European economy has suffered an annual multi-billion 
euro loss in (source: Europol). The main causes of security incidents are the multiplication 
of data (Big Data), social media interaction [15], and the increase in cybercrime activities 
[284], [17].
Chapter 4 revealed that 39% of the examined organisations scored an average security 
maturity of 2 out of 5. Empirical (measurements) research performed over 2012 and 
2013 within 27 organisations confirmed that companies mainly focus on operational 
security (e.g. firewalling, anti-virus technologies) and less on governance (e.g. compliance, 
policies, business continuity management). Thus, judging from these studies, there has 
been a decrease in information security maturity over the last three years, mainly because 
the current frameworks are “complex and generic”, as Siponen and Willison [3] argued 
in their research publication. Most of the security maturity measurement models focus 
on management and only pay attention to security governance in quite a limited way. For 
example, governance is represented in only 2 domains in the ISO27001 framework, namely 
‘Security policy’, i.e. the guidelines in which those concerned with information security need 
to direct, monitor and report. Compliance refers to the regulations the organisation needs 
to be compliant with in order to keep their ‘licence to operate’.
The absence of clear practices that can be adopted by boards is a limitation for organisations 
and for the MBIS process. This research aims first to remedy this by investigating, ordering 
and ranking relevant practices. And second to define requirements to be adopted in the 
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artefact. This research is the same research as that described in Chapter 5, only the objective 
here is to distil artefact requirements, as the aim in Chapter 5 was to elaborate the use of GSS 
as a research method.
The low level of security maturity and the absence of clear governance practices bring us to 
the problem statement of this research, namely: There is a lack of insight into governance 
practices that can successfully function as a core set of principles i.e. requirements in an 
artefact that can potentially contribute to increasing the Security governance Maturity of 
organisations.
I intend to contribute to academic rigour and practical relevance by examining governance 
and executive management practices that contemporary Boards of Directors (BoD) can take 
into account. The Board sets the direction, monitors and evaluates the effects of this direction 
(Direct-Control Cycle), when it comes to governing the continuous process of securing and 
assuring the critical assets of organisations. The international body of Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA) COBIT5 Framework makes a clear distinction: 
“governance ensures that enterprise objectives are achieved by evaluating stakeholder 
needs, conditions and options; setting direction through prioritisation and decision-making; 
and monitoring performance, compliance and progress against agreed-on direction and 
objectives (EDM).”
“Management plans, builds, runs and monitors activities in alignment with the direction set by 
the governance body to achieve the enterprise objectives (PBRM).”
Basie and Rossouw Von Solms [52] define Information Security governance (ISG) as follows: 
“ISG consists of the management commitment and leadership, organisational structures, 
user awareness and commitment, policies, procedures, technologies and compliancy 
enforcements mechanisms, all working together to ensure that the Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability (CIA) of the company’s electronic assets (data, information, software, 
hardware, people etc.) are maintained at all times.” These authors also differentiate between 
information security, management and governance, and define information security 
management as: “Management must ensure that the policies and procedures are in place 
and the operational environment is managed and running smoothly on a day-to-day basis.” 
In the practical field, organisations have become more successful in implementing security 
management but are still struggling with the implementation of Information Security 
governance [250], [239]. The scope definition in this research is governance. This means 
that all the directive-setting and controlling (including monitoring and evaluating) activities 
are seen as governance [71]. All activities to translate these activities into decisions are 
seen as management and thus beyond the scope of this research. This is also valid for 
operational practices. In this research we follow Van Solms’ distinction between governance 
and management [239]. Furthermore, we specifically distinguish between executive 
management activities and senior and middle management activities. For semantics we use 
the collective term governance (by which we also mean executive management).
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DEFINING THE REQUIREMENT DESIGN QUESTIONS:
The research question underlying this research part is: “Which practices at the level of 
governance are relevant for Business Information Security Maturity?”
To determine which governance and executive management practices are described in 
the literature, a thorough investigation of all relevant literature in the field was carried out 
(academic as well as practitioner-oriented literature). Numerous IT governance studies 
[105], [241], [260] propose process-oriented practices, structure-oriented practices and 
culturally oriented practices to implement IT governance in practical environments. They do 
not rely on individual interventions, for example the right structure of the Chief Information 
Security Officer (CISO) reporting to the CEO. Nor do they emphasise the right culture 
of awareness at the top to protect intellectual properties. Essentially, the synthesis of the 
right set of Structures, Processes and Relational Mechanisms (SPRM) delivers a powerful 
whole [285], [216] and potentially contributes to better governance of BIS. To determine 
the potential SPRM-based candidate practices for this right set, research question one is 
formulated as:
RQ1: Which governance practices in the literature are relevant for Business Information 
Security governance (BISG)?
Investigating and structuring the current literature on potential practice candidates for BISG 
contributes to the academic rigour of security. A thorough validation by experts enables the 
practical relevance of the BISG practice candidates. This brings us to the second research 
question:
RQ2: How do experts validate and rank the Business Information Security governance 
practices derived from the literature from numerous perspectives?
An additional design question is raised: Which BISG practices can de designed and 
engineered in the artefact?
RESEARCH APPROACH FOR EXAMINING AND VALIDATING BISG PRACTICES 
FOR THE DESIGN OF THE ARTEFACT
LITERATURE REVIEW
Little research has been done in the field of governance for information security. Most of the 
work is based on practitioner-based sources [286], [286], [11]. Thorough academically 
based literature research was used to answer RQ1. Golden-Biddle and Lock [287] 
distinguish important steps in reviewing and presenting literature research work.
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Initially Constructing intertextual coherence – existing knowledge represented and organised 
in the literature – is needed to denote the contribution of practice in another discipline to 
the BIS domain. I.e. is a governance practice from a certain discipline applicable in another 
domain. In order to construct intertextual coherence, a technique that is used is: Non-
coherence: recognition of many contributions being made in a certain domain but where 
there is considerable disagreement among practitioners. In this BIS domain there seems to 
be disagreement on the governance practices needed to be implemented but in fact this is 
not done, as is shown by the graph (figure 1) in the introduction showing the low maturity 
level of governance-related domains. There seems to be non-coherence between theory and 
practice and this leaves room for a contribution to be made. A research aim was to investigate 
the existing literature on governance practices in terms of Inadequacy: items that have 
been overlooked, or ways of looking at it that can improve understanding, and alternative 
perspectives or frameworks that can contribute to the current body of knowledge of BIS. 
The key point of Golden-Biddle and Locke is to achieve a number of things: a) to develop a 
new version of the literature in such a way that it contributes to the body of knowledge, and 
to present new insights that could be used to solve a practical problem, and b) The gap or 
problem in the literature that is identified leads to the research question.
The methodology of the literature review, as proposed in chapter 2, aimed at exhaustively 
investigating relevant literature for several years (2009-2012) and to create a structured list 
of these literature sources and derive relevant practices. The methodology used is presented 
by Bruce in 1994 [288] and it comprises the following steps as proposed by Brymann and 
Bell in their Book Business Research Methods [74]:
 − List: A list of comprising pertinent items representing the literature of the subject is 
compiled from relevant disciplines and multiple sources (academic and practitioner-
oriented) [74]:
 − Search: Identify relevant information. From various disciplines: Corporate governance 
(CG), Risk governance (RG), Enterprise Governance of IT (ITG), Information Security 
governance (ISG). These related disciplines are specified in previous research work from 
Professor Von Solms [52] in 2009 and were used as a point of departure for this literature 
review. During this stage it was important to identify relevant criteria for the further 
research phases: a) is the practice identified as a governance practice or as an executive 
management practice? b) are the practices identified as process, structural or relational 
mechanism practices? See below for further detailing.
 − Survey: A critical survey of past and present writing by respected researchers, institutions, 
committees and authorities. Evaluating the relevance of the literature, considering 
numerous questions such as How recent is the practice/source? Is it likely to have been 
superseded? Is the source relevant for inclusion (i.e. governance or executive management-
oriented and applicable for BIS)? And evaluating the value of the literature. Does the item 
(practice) appear to be biased? Is the source acknowledged as and international standard/
institution? Does the item provide guidance for future research?
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 − Vehicle: Because of the dynamics of the subject and the international orientation of most 
practices the literature review functions as a knowledge vehicle. During the literature 
research years, new insights emerged that helped me gain additional knowledge and 
viewpoints. This enabled the completeness of the literature review. Investigating more 
in-depth important citations in the literature helped ensure an exhaustive list of relevant 
literature and thus enabled the completeness.
 − Facilitator: The literature review facilitated new insights into the phenomena. It helped 
sharpen the methodology and next research phases (i.e. input for the next (GSS) research 
phase).
 − Report: The focus was on identifying and framing practices in the literature that can 
provide a contribution to the embryonic field of BIS, thus framing a point of departure 
for further research. In this case validating the literature research and enriching it with a 
practitioner’s view.
Figure 36 shows how 228 practices from numerous literature sources were marked with 
relevant criteria according to Bruce. This is relevant to trail back the source, author, origin, 
etc. at a later stage. The criteria were:
Discipline: The business discipline that the practice is related to
Dimension: Whether a practice is a structure, process or relational mechanism (see next 
section)
The name: The term used for the practice
Summary/explanation: The description the intention and objective of the practice
Source: The original source of the practice
Date of extraction: The date and time it was extracted
Data source: The digital source from which the practice is extracted.
The entire literature research dataset can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-
zbu-hfdc
STRUCTURES, PROCESSES AND RELATIONAL MECHANISMS AS A METHOD 
FOR MARKING THE DATA IN THE LITERATURE
Earlier research by Van Grembergen & De Haes [187] and Luftman [186] served as 
a starting point for aligning business goals to governance practices. De Haes & Van 
Grembergen [108], [217] suggest deploying a collective set of structures, processes 
and relational mechanisms (SPRM, e.g. culture and knowledge) in order to successfully 
implement IT governance in organisations. In this research we propose the same 
methodology to mark the data in the literature and subsequently distil a core set of practices 
and CSFs that can be used by practitioners. This theory was successfully applied in previous 
studies and led to effective and practical methods such as COBIT [208].
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In this research we used this SPRM methodology to mark the data in the literature, and 
later on distilled a core set of practices that can be used by practitioners. These also formed 
requirement candidates for the artefact.
Such work as exists is based on practitioners [286], [280], [78], [281]. We propose to 
add another layer to this type of research by also examining academic literature in order 
to answer RQ1. The methodology of the literature review was to exhaustively investigate 
relevant literature over several years (2009-2012) and to list items in a structured way using 
the methodology proposed by Bruce in 1994 [288]. Other disciplines closely related to 
BISG were investigated. These were Corporate Governance (CG), Risk Governance (RG), 
Information Security governance (ISG) and Information Technology Governance (ITG).
RIGOUR AND RELEVANCE
Most of the current rigour in the security domain is prescriptive in nature. To acquire a more 
profound understanding of the gap between what needs to be done to ensure academic 
rigour and what is prioritised by practitioners (relevance) validation of the collected list 
by practitioners is required. Firstly, we needed to know which practices are lacking in 
the literature and whether this might cause a low level of governance maturity. Secondly, 
in order to get the practices adopted by Boards of Directors an expert panel research 
is proposed. Finally, it is our aim to answer RQ2: “How do experts validate and rank the 
Business Information Security governance practices derived from the literature from multiple 
perspectives?”
Figure 36: Sample of marking governance practices during the literature research.
 
1666 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
The experts were requested to supplement, improve and test the earlier collected practices 
from multiple perspectives (relevance criteria, i.e. effect, ease of design, implementation, and 
maintenance) and rank them in order to achieve a certain sequence in the application of the 
practices. Figure 37 displays the research process flow used to find answers to the research 
questions.
GSS EXPERT PANEL RESEARCH FOR DEFINING THE BISG PRACTIES
After collecting all the data in the literature, expert views were needed to enrich, assess and 
evaluate the identified practices in more detail, using a Group Support System (GSS). Expert 
groups make it possible to elicit views and perceptions from a diverse group of experts [114], 
[112]. The role of the facilitator is important in order to avoid the “Asch Effect” where certain 
individuals dominate group dynamics and therefore the outcome of the discussion [117].
Moreover, the number of items (in this case 228 practices) to be discussed is an important 
variable in the setup of a GSS meeting. Participants discuss comprehensive lists of items and 
a number of measures are necessary to facilitate this process. To enable experts to remain 
focused during the meeting a ‘carrousel’ is introduced in which each expert starts with a 
different list of items to assess and comment on [129]. The experts were selected according 
to the following criteria: they have a BA or MA degree in Information Systems, plus industry 
certificates e.g. Certified Information Security Manager (CISM), Chief Information Security 
Auditor (CISA), Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) and Registered EDP Auditor (RE). They have 
more than 10 years of experience in Business Information Security and they are full-time 
practitioners. The four experts were perfectly situated to select and rank this huge amount of 
data in the literature, which makes their assessments highly relevant.
RESEARCH FINDINGS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND EXPERT VALIDATION
Literature mainly refers to governance where it leads to executive management practices 
(e.g. C-suite level). We started our research by examining all literature on governance and 
executive management practices relevant to the topic of Business Information Security. These 
governance and executive management practices and their related sources, according to Von 
Solms [210], are:
1. Approximately 50 best practices from the Corporate Governance discipline were
examined. Major sources of origin of these practice: The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance [252]. The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance [253]. 
Internal Control Guidance to Directors, Turnbull Report [254], The Financial Reporting
Council (FRC) Combined Code [255]. The King Report on Corporate Governance 
for South Africa [256]. Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Basel principles for 
enhancing corporate governance [257]. Security and Exchange Commission add-ons 
to SoX, Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise 2003. All of these can be 
found in the Corporate Governance Book (Oxford University Press), which covers all 
international Corporate governance codes [59].
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2. A major component of practising good governance is the Risk Governance discipline. 
Insufficient Risk governance and management has enormous consequences for all major 
stakeholders [20]. The judgement and management of IT-related risks has become 
increasingly important to the success of businesses [197]. For the assessment of all 
relevant Risk governance practices, I examined literature from: COSO’s Enterprise 
Risk Management Integrated Framework [258], COSO’s “Embracing Enterprise Risk 
Management”: Practical Approaches for Getting Started [259], COSO’s “Where Boards 
of Directors currently Stand in executing Their Risk Oversight Responsibilities” [31], 
King’s Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa – 2002 [256], and Douglas 
Hubbard’s study on Risk Management Failures. A total of forty Risk Governance Practices 
were selected.
3. Forty IT governance practices were selected from several sources: IT Governance 
Institute, “Information Risks: Whose Business Are They?” [18], De Haes & Van 
Grembergen’s “Practices in IT governance and Business/IT Alignment” published in 
ISACA’s journal (Information Systems Audit and Control Association). Weil & Ross’ “IT 
Governance” [260] and De Haes & Van Grembergen’s book “Implementing Information 
Technology Governance; Models Practices and Cases” [217] and Van Grembergen’s 
“Strategies for Information Technology Governance” [108].
4. During the selection of the literature, numerous academic and practice-oriented sources 
were investigated, mainly to judge their appropriateness for ISG practices. I investigated 
a large number of resources on Information Security governance, because this 
discipline is the most closely related to (BISG). I investigated resources over a longer time 
Figure 37: Research process, including research questions for defining BISG practices
Literature Research into Governance Practices
GSS Expert Research into BIS Governance Practices
RQ1: Which governance practices
in the literature are relevant
for Business Information Security
Governance (BISG)?
RQ2: How do experts validate and rank
the Business Information Security
Governance practices derived from
the literature from multiple perspectives?
Core Set of BIS Governance Practices
Corporate Governance (CG), Risk Governance (RG),
Information Security Governance (ISG), IT Governance (ITG)
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period (2 years) in an international context to avoid missing out on important worldwide 
developments; multi-sources (from Research institutes such as IDC and Gartner) 
and academic journals and books (published by Harvard Business Press, Springer, 
Wiley among others). I also looked at best practices institutes such as ISACA, ITGI, ISF, 
SABSA etc., and other communities practising Security Governance. An examination 
of highly respected and well-established literature sources resulted in 98 practices. 
The major literature sources are: the 2004 Corporate governance Task Force Report of 
the National Cyber Security Summit [261] chapters “Information Security governance 
and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors/Trustees.” De Haes & Van Grembergen’s 
”Practices in IT governance and Business/IT Alignment”, published in: ISACA’s journal in 
2008 . Von Solms’ “The 10 deadly sins of information security management” [51] and 
other major relevant sources on the ISG topic [262], [22] , [263], [63], [264], [209], 
[52].
This literature research resulted in a list of 228 practices. In this phase of the study, 
the focus was on researching BIS relevant practices, not on determining where these 
practices are operationalised. This was done by the experts.
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Many of the practices show overlap even within disciplines. For example, the role of the 
stakeholder in Corporate governance articulates the same intention of the practice in a 
different way. The OECD refers to “The corporate governance framework should recognise 
the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage 
active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises.”
Whereas the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance refers to: “identify the 
corporation’s internal and external stakeholders and agree a policy, or policies, determining 
how the corporation should relate to them (Principle 8)”
The question arises why so few countries have governance codes for overseeing technology 
risks. The few countries that have developed sound directives are South Africa [256] and The 
United States [261]. These countries specifically address technology risks in their practices, 
mainly because they suffer the most from cyber criminality. At the time of writing, the 
European Commission has also addressed cyber risks as a “Board responsibility.”
I have observed the usability of a tremendous number of Corporate and Risk governance 
practices applicable in the domain of BIS. Judging from practical experience, basic principles 
such as determining responsibility and accountability (Turnbull Report, COSO, King Report) 
and the role of stakeholders [253], [31] are not implement by many organisations.
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A limitation of this literature review is time, since the dynamics of this subject and the 
constantly changing context (e.g. compliance, politics and technology) greatly influence the 
accuracy of the literature. Another limitation is globalisation. Many governance practices are 
not widely published, so this research concentrates on the most dominant and internationally 
accepted ones. We need to acknowledge that it could be relevant to examine these practices. 
Language is a limitation as well, mainly because this research has focused on the English 
language and cites only English governance practices (excluding Asian, Arabic, and Spanish 
examples for instance).
GSS EXPERT RESEARCH
The initial list of 228 practices was further evaluated by a group of four experts during a four-
hour GSS session led by an experienced facilitator. In the first round of this evaluation, the 
experts were asked to justify the quality (adding, undoubling) of the practices. This took two 
hours with all experts in one group assessing all the practices together at a rather fast pace. 
In the next round, the experts were asked to evaluate the practices against some attributes 
such as perceived effectiveness, ease of design and realisation, ease of maintenance and ease 
of implementation. This took two hour and the experts were not allowed to exchange their 
view or score with each other.
During this first research phase of undoubling, the experts concluded that Corporate 
governance Practices are often vaguely phrased and that it is therefore difficult to implement 
them. They might not even be implemented at all because the organisation does not know 
how to do so. Because of this vague specification of important governance Practices, I asked 
the experts to rephrase them into a more understandable format. Many of the Corporate 
governance practices are derivatives of others so a large number of practices could be 
marked as duplicates. The experts were asked to do this marking and these duplicates were 
subsequently deleted with the facilitator agreeing. All of the experts pointed out that many 
of the governance practices they assessed are crucial to the final implementation of good 
security management practices into operations. They are critical success factors for any 
organisation.
After the assessment of the Corporate governance practices, the experts went on to judge 
Risk governance and practices within the Enterprise governance of the IT domain.
During the GSS session, the experts unanimously told the GSS facilitator and me that 
Enterprise Governance of IT practices is less relevant to the security topic. The main reason 
for this is that there is a huge overlap with the other practices. IT is part of the organisation, 
but it is less fully integrated than for example risk management (risks arise at multiple 
levels, such as personnel, finance, safety, etc.). IT governance practices can therefore be 
incorporated into Information Security governance Practices (for instance by rephrasing 
them). In other words, we use the relevant practices from this phase and incorporate them 
into our next phase: assessing and organising the Information Security governance Practices.
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The final item on the agenda of the expert panel session was the organisation of Information 
Security governance (ISG) Practices. These appear to be the most closely related to the topic 
of Business Information Security Governance. The next important step was having the experts 
assess all of them and making comments if they disagreed.
An important consideration was that Information Security governance is not the same as 
Business Information Security Governance. Incorporating the security of the business – 
and all of its related dimensions e.g. risk management – as a whole is of the essence in the 
exact distinction and specification of this domain. The assumption that most of the relevant 
practices for BISG can potentially be found in other disciplines than IT and Security can be 
seen by the score of the practices.
In conclusion, we can state that, at the end of this phase (analysis of and completing practices 
per domain), the expert panel team derived a ‘clean’ list of practices from a large amount 
of data in the literature. Some of the practices were deleted (duplicates) and some were 
rephrased to avoid misinterpretation in the next research phase, ranking the practices 
on effectiveness. The three remaining disciplines of Corporate Governance (CG), Risk 
Governance (RG) and Information Security governance (ISG) now present respectively 
34, 31 and 61 practices. This amounts to a total of 126 ‘specific’ practices of processes, 
structures and relational mechanisms. This total of 126 practices was used in the next 
‘ranking’ phase.
RANKING THE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
After the expert panel had compiled a set of practices, it was important to rank them on 
relevance for an organisation. In order to compile a comprehensive and practical list that can 
function as principles, I formulated these four ranking criteria as:
1. Effectiveness
2. Ease of Design and Realisation
3. Ease of Maintenance
4. Ease of Implementation.
The result should be a frame of reference of core principles and the level of effectiveness 
was the first selection method. Ranking practices on effectiveness directly contributes to 
the potential increase in security maturity. Based on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (not 
effective) and 5 (highly effective) the experts were asked to judge the remaining practices. 
This was done with the aim of selecting the best working practices according to experts 
which in its turn will contribute to solving the problem of the low level of security within 
organisations. These best working practices could later be used as candidates for the next 
selection Ease of Design and Realisation, Ease of maintenance and Ease of implementation, 
also from 0-5. Assessing and ranking all practices over these three dimensions enabled 
me to comprehensively select the practices which can be monitored and evaluated by the 
Board (governance level). In consensus with the experts I decided to rank the top practices, 
DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING THE 
ARTEFACT6 171
measured from 4 and above on effectiveness. Consensus was achieved due to all experts 
voting in favour of limiting the number of remaining practices because the aim of the expert 
research was to derive a core set of high scoring practices. The final list presents a cumulative 
score of the sum of the score per criterion.
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We can conclude that experts consider the current literature on practices to be rather vague 
and complex. They supported that view with numerous remarks in the GSS systems during 
the expert session. This vague or complex formulation of practices might have the result that 
they are not applied, as Kluge argued in earlier research [4]. Empirical research within 27 
organisations also demonstrates this consequence. Some literature suggests more simple 
and practically-oriented practices – Report simple (Red-Yellow-Green) and Do simple risk 
assessments – with the objective of increasing the adoption of governance practices. The 
experts also indicate overlap in many practices.
It is interesting to note that there is no sequential order to the list. For instance, the experts 
rank the effect of “determination of risk appetite” (ranked 7) before “conduct a risk 
assessment” (ranked 12). Normally, the sequence is the other way around: one cannot 
determine one’s risk appetite if it is unclear where and what the risks are. That is why ranking 
on effect does not imply a particular sequence. Another example of the limitation of ranking 
on effect only is the first one of ISG, “Incident response.” It is perceived as having much 
Figure 38: Conceptual model of the literature research, divided into relevant disciplines.
50 Corporate
governance Practices
40 Risk 
Governance Practices
Experts analysis on 
228 Business Information Security
Governance and management practices
via Group Support System
40 Enterprise 
Governance of 
IT Practices
Structure
BISG Practices
Proces
BISG Practices
Relational Mechanism
BISG Practices
98 Information
Security Governance
Practices
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effect when it is in place but difficult to implement if you do not know who to respond to. 
The relevant stakeholders first need to be identified (e.g. public, media, regulators) and the 
appropriate response type needs to be established. This process requires an owner. This 
practice – “Define ownership” – was ranked 5th by the experts with a 4.5 but was perceived 
as difficult to implement (score: 2.5).
Our final finding is that the top practices needed to be undoubled as well. An example is 
“Appoint a responsible and accountable board member for risk management” This can be 
articulated as determine roles. They both imply the necessity to appoint a responsible and 
accountable board member for risk management (e.g. technology, information, data risks).
The final list contributes to the academic rigour of security in the absence of proper Business 
Information Security governance practices and Critical Success Factors. By validating both 
practical and academic literature on the subject through expert panel research, a more 
ordered list was assembled in Table 11. This list can function as conceptual framework for BIS. 
By making a clear distinction between governance and executive management, the practices 
are applicable in various organisations (independent of a one-tier board or two-tier board). 
Finally these practices can function as requirements for the business, as well as technical 
requirements in the artefact. The entire research data including the conceptual framework 
derived from the literature and GSS expert panel can be accessed via http://dx.doi.
org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
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# GOVERNANCE PRACTICE AND/OR CRITICAL SUCCESS 
FACTOR DESCRIPTION
SCORE 
 
LEVEL SPRM
1 Determine Roles. Accountability and responsi-
bility for Business Information Security at 
Board and Executive management level. Including 
the role of the stakeholders.
 11.25 Governance Structure
2 Corporate internal communication on cyber down-
side. e.g. cybercrime, fraud, theft, forgery, 
piracy, bullying. Internal communication chan-
nels such as intranet. HRM letters. Workshops 
can be used to educate employees.
 11.25 Management Relational 
Mechanism
3 Awareness at level of Boards of Directors. 
A certain level of awareness about business 
risks. Business critical information. Level of 
information (IT) dependency. Kinds of threats 
from outside and inside. 
 11.00 Management Relational 
Mechanism
4 Board and Senior Management Leadership. Lead by 
good example. Clean desk policy. Limited per-
sonal web exposure (personal blogging. video). 
Software piracy. Shred confidential papers, etc.
 11.00 Governance Relational 
Mechanism
5 Lessons learned. Sessions after security in-
cidents. Document and report incidents that 
occur. Also what kind of response to the stake-
holders was made and how such an event can be 
prevented. Take these in consideration for the 
formulation of strategy.
 11.00 Governance Process
6 Transparency. The company should also consider 
the need for a confidential reporting process 
(whistle-blowing) covering fraud and other 
risks.
 10.75 Governance Process
7 Determine risk appetite. The level of risk and 
exposure a company is willing to take when it 
comes to Information Security Risks. To justify 
decision-making on investments/insurance. 
 10.25 Governance Process
8 Internal control. Regularly review processes 
and procedures to ensure the effectiveness of 
its internal systems of control. so that its 
decision-making capability and the accuracy of 
its reporting and financial results are main-
tained at a high level at all times.
 10.00 Management Process
9 Regular reporting on security adequacy and ef-
fectiveness. Requiring regular reports from 
management on the programme's adequacy and ef-
fectiveness.
 10.00 Management Process
10 Ensuring the integrity of the corporation. 
Accounting and financial reporting systems. In-
cluding independent audits. Ensure that appro-
priate systems of control are in place. In par-
ticular, systems for risk management, financial 
and operational control and compliance with the 
law and relevant standards.
 9.75 Management Process
Table 11: Designing and developing the artefact: Top 10 BISG and Critical Success Factors in detail.
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CONTRIBUTION ARGUMENTS
After compiling the list of BISG practices and Critical Success Factors the goals and 
requirements were decomposed to articulate a contribution argument. This is an argument 
that an artefact that satisfies the requirements would contribute to a stakeholder goal in the 
problem context [146].
Artefact requirement candidates
The main research question and sub-questions: “Which practices at the level of governance 
are relevant for Business Information Security Maturity” can now be answered. Firstly, security 
governance practices were investigated. Secondly, the experts ordered these practices and, 
thirdly, they were ranked.
By doing so, together with the experts I compiled a final list of BISG practices that can 
function as a frame of reference for Board of Directors. Moreover, this list of criteria may 
serve as basic parameters of the level of BISG maturity within organisations. Thus, before 
organisations are able to mature at a governance level, they first need to identify the criteria 
on which to base their BISG maturity level. For example, if a certain practice is not in place, 
the indicated level is 0. If it is in place and the existence of the practice can be proved, the 
initial step towards maturing is made. Ideally, practitioners as well as academia can use these 
criteria and the proposed method to enhance the BISG maturity of organisations. The top 10 
items from Table 12 can function as requirements to be set in the artefact.
Example 2:Literature and GSS with experts on BISG 
Method Intended 
effect
Side effect 
(knowledge)
Stakeholder 
Goal
Artefact re-
quirement
Context 
assumption 
Contribution 
argument
-Through 
literature 
research 
and GSS the 
stakehold-
er group 
discussed 
and ranked 
various 
governance 
practices to 
be relevant 
for BIS. 
-Validating 
and ranking 
numerous 
governance 
practices 
from various 
literature 
sources
-Establish 
new insights 
and a struc-
tured list.
-Validated liter-
ature research.
-New insights 
for the experts.
-New insights 
for the stake-
holders.
-Insight into 
critical success 
factors for im-
proving BISG 
maturity. 
-Have notion 
and form 
meaning by 
governance 
practices for 
BIS and its 
critical success 
factors.
-A prioritised 
set of BISG 
practices to 
measure and 
maintain BISG.
-A prioritised 
key set of 
BISG prac-
tices that can 
function as 
question-
naires to 
measure and 
maintain the 
BISG matu-
rity. 
-Increase 
awareness by 
stakeholders 
(such as 
regulators), 
directors and 
managers.
-Increase in 
knowledge 
over the BISG 
maturity state 
of the organ-
isation. -Take 
BISG into 
consideration 
when report-
ing on tech 
risks. 
Provide stake-
holders with 
assessment 
criteria to 
assess the or-
ganisations
BISG maturi-
ty and provide 
knowledge 
and meaning 
items (i.e. 
CSF) for 
Board of Di-
rectors in or-
der to direct, 
monitor and 
control. 
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RANK  SCORE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE FOR BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
1,00  11,25 Determine roles
2,00  11,25 Corporate internal communication
3,00  11,00 Awareness
4,00  11,00 Board and Senior Management Leadership
5,00  11,00 Lessons learned 
6,00  10,75 Transparency
7,00  10,25 Determine risk appetite 
8,00  10,00 Internal Control 
9,00  10,00 Regular reporting
10,00  9,75 Ensuring the integrity of the corporation
11,00  9,75 Periodic knowledge evaluation
12,00  9,50 Risk assessments 
13,00  9,00 Incident response 
14,00  9,00 Identify key information systems and business owners 
15,00  8,50 Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest 
16,00  8,50 Response to risks 
17,00  8,50 Risk controlling mechanisms and processes
18,00  8,25 Security as an integral part 
19,00  8,00 Identify key risk areas and KPIs
20,00  8,00 Alignment strategy and approval by the board 
6.2.2.3   CASE 3: DEFINING BIS MANAGEMENT ARTEFACT REQUIREMENTS
This section was published in the International Journal of IT/Business Alignment and 
governance (IJITBAG) 1(4), pages 18-39, in December 2010 under the title A Research 
Journey into Maturing the Business Information Security of Mid-Market organisations. The 
complete publication can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc.
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
The problem of the “absence of a core set of interventions” is key. As Workman puts it in his 
research, organisations are remedied with empirical validated interventions [6]. There are 
many reasons why we engage empirical exploratory research methods, rather than the more 
commonly used deductive, hypotheses-testing methods. Primarily because exploratory 
research is concerned with the generation of ideas [289] and interventions. The problem 
statement made in Chapter 4 led to the research question “Which core interventions do 
managers find effective in order to enhance the BIS maturity level?” and this was examined 
via Group Support System expert panel research. Extra validation was performed in mid-
Table 12: Designing and developing example 2 of the artefact: Top 20 BISG and Critical Success Factors
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market companies to increase engagement, as suggested by Workman et al. [6]. This last 
step was performed to increase the commitment of stakeholders, and to increase the validity 
of the construct to be established. The final result is a set of interventions which mid-market 
organisations can apply and these can function as requirements in the artefact.
FROM RESEARCH FINDINGS TO KNOWLEDGE ITEMS
Experts created a top list of interventions from ISO27002, based on the practicality of each 
intervention. As a conclusion to the survey research performed in the mid-market segment, 
I encountered a willingness to implement certain interventions in order to increase security 
maturity. The following items need to be considered in the design and development of the 
artefact but are also relevant during the evaluation of the artefact, because they are relevant 
to improving the maturity of BIS process:
Knowledge items: The barriers “management and organisations” as well as “perception and 
attitudes” are two categories that scored high in the survey. These were also raised by the 
experts during the panel as main barriers.
Mid-market organisations state in the survey that involving management would raise their 
security maturity level. On the other hand, security is perceived as a complex topic and 
this contradicts the above. How can a security person with the wrong perception advise 
management on interventions contributing to maturity enhancement?
The survey showed that 22% of the mid-market suggest that ‘training and educating 
personnel on awareness’ contributes most to security; this was the opinion of experts 
according to the expert panel research. The main question remains how to do that in the face 
of insufficient knowledge and skills.
The experts mentioned during the expert panel research phase that the overwhelming 
number of applicable laws and frameworks might suffocate the mid-market sector. This 
seems to be acknowledged by the fact that perception is the biggest barrier and 20% of 
the organisations do not know that there is indeed applicable law. The mid-market sector 
has difficulties identifying these, according to the survey outcome. This knowledge item is 
positioned in the context and scope of the maturing process.
Budget is raised as a barrier by the experts but not listed as an intervention, for example 
“more money.” This is in contradiction to the barrier perception where the intervention is 
training and educating on awareness. And for the barrier “management and organisation”, 
the intervention management involvement is suggested by the mid-market organisations.
According to the survey “perception and attitudes” is the biggest barrier to the 
implementation of the third most contributing intervention, risk and impact analysis. An 
important question for mid-market organisations remains open and that is by who they want 
to have this risk and impact analysis performed. They have the perception that it is complex 
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and lack the knowledge and skills to do this.
In conclusion, I state that filling in the survey questionnaire has raised the awareness of mid-
market participants. Responses to open questions such as “that’s a good idea”, “needs to be 
developed” and “good idea to apply this” proved this.
KNOWLEDGE ITEMS AS PRECONDITIONS FOR IMPROVING MATURITY
The list of interventions presented in Chapter 3 forms a frame of reference for mid-market 
organisations in order to practically increase business information security maturity. A 
carefully selected list of interventions presents those interventions that are most effective and 
easy to implement for a market that, according to the performed survey, struggles with the 
enforcement of essential interventions. By making use of a combination of ISO best practices 
and for example the COBIT maturity model organisations have insights into the interventions 
they have applied as well as those they need to apply in order to achieve a certain maturity 
level. Translating the most important conclusions of the research into mid-market specific 
recommendations in order to increase their security maturity, by applying a framework 
(of interventions, suggested maturity model, organisational preconditions) the research 
primarily recommends that mid-market organisations:
 − Identify applicable (mid-market) laws and legislation.
 − Perform risk and impact analysis in order to justify the implementation of necessary 
interventions in order to achieve the desired security maturity level.
 − Apply relevant norms in order to comply with law, legislation or regulations or a framework 
that is derived from these norms, for example COBIT.
 − Involve management in assessing the business impact of not having these essential 
interventions in place.
 − Increase the awareness of security throughout the organisations since human error is 
the main cause of insecurity. Train and educate with a focus on correct perceptions about 
security on the technical as well as the business side of the organisation.
 − Measure and monitor all potential technical and organisational vulnerabilities (security 
assessments) as a continuous process in order to be in control and achieve the desired level 
of security maturity.
 − Continuously maintain knowledge and skills that are essential to stay “in control.”
 − Besides these seven knowledge items, the final results of this empirical exploratory 
research on assessing, selecting and prioritising a core set of security interventions can 
function as requirements for the artefact.
CONTRIBUTION ARGUMENTS
After compiling the list of interventions we could now justify the choices for setting requirements. 
And we articulated the contribution argument. This is an argument that an artefact that satisfies 
the requirements would contribute to a stakeholder goal in the problem context.
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ARTEFACT REQUIREMENT CANDIDATES
The design research question: “Which core interventions do managers find effective in order to 
enhance the BIS maturity level?” can now be answered. Firstly, management interventions based 
on ISO27K were investigated. Secondly, the experts ordered these practices and, thirdly, they 
were discussed, enriched and ranked. By doing so, I and the experts compiled a core set of MBIS 
interventions. Secondly these interventions were validated by the target group (stakeholders) to 
create commitment and increase the validity and reliability of the research. The final list of core 
interventions is presented in sequence in a flow diagram to indicate the maturity level. This flow 
diagram is used in the next section of this DS research project when developing the artefact 
requirements.
Case 3: Defining a BIS maturity assessment
Method Intended 
effect
Side effect 
(knowledge)
Stakeholder 
Goal
Artefact re-
quirement
Context as-
sumption 
Contribution 
argument
-Through 
literature 
research and 
GSS the stake-
holder group 
discussed 
and ranked 
a core set of 
management 
interventions 
relevant for 
MBIS. This set 
was validated 
and priori-
tised by the 
stakeholder 
target group 
through a 
survey. 
-Validating 
and ranking 
BIS man-
agement 
interventions 
though ex-
perts.
-Established 
new insights 
and a struc-
tured list that 
was validated 
by the stake-
holder group.
-Create com-
mitment with 
the stake-
holder
Group
-Validated BoK 
literature from 
ISO27K
-New insights 
for the experts.
-New insights 
for the stake-
holders.
-Insight into 
relevant knowl-
edge items to 
consider in the 
MBIS process. 
-Have notion 
and form mean-
ing through par-
ticipation in the 
survey research
-collectively 
establish a 
core set of BIS 
management 
interventions
-Via a prioritised 
set of MBIS 
interventions to 
measure and 
maintain MBIS.
-A prioritised 
key set of MBIS 
interventions 
that can 
function as 
questionnaire 
to measure 
and maintain 
MBIS. 
-Increase com-
mitment by the 
stakeholders/
target group
-Increase in 
awareness by 
stakeholders 
(such as regula-
tors), directors 
and managers. 
Shown by the 
response of the 
participants.
-Knowledge 
over the BIS 
maturity posi-
tion (current 
situation) of the 
organisation 
and ‘to be’ situ-
ation.
Provide stake-
holders with 
assessment crite-
ria to assess the 
organisation
BIS maturity and 
provide knowl-
edge and mean-
ing items (7 
preconditions, in 
order to manage 
the MBIS pro-
cess). 
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Figure 39: Maturing Business Information Security assessment tree.
Level 5 Optimized
Level 4 Managed
and Measureable
Level 3 Defined
Level 2 Repeatable
but inuitive
Level 1 (Ad-Hoc)
Level 0 (Non-Existing)
Informal (cral) Security
Policy in place
Core interventions
enforced
Business and IT security
domain is harmonized in
achieve secure business goals
Yes/No
All core interventions are in
place and continous
monitored for improvement
Responsible and
accountable IS people
are assigned
IS the security police 
documented and applicable to
entire organisation or just to IT
Formal Security Policy in 
Place mandated by 
business management
Management involvement
Start
Yes/No
Reporting on business
risks is done
Yes/No
To ITTo All
Yes/No
Yes/NoYes/No
Yes/No
Yes/No
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6.2.2.4  CASE 4: DEFINING BISG METRICS AS ARTEFACT REQUIREMENTS
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
To overcome the gap between security professionals and boards in terms of knowledge 
and language common ground is necessary. Lord Kelvin26 insightfully observed that 
“measurement is vital to deep knowledge and understanding in physical science.” Hence, 
common ground on essential elements of BIS is needed to gain a certain degree of 
understanding and consensus. In 2009 a successful contribution to bridging the gap 
between management and operations was made in the field of Security Metrics by NIST 
[273]. NIST addressed the necessity of quantifying security for three reasons: 1. Strategic 
support, i.e. in the decision-making process boards need to rely on facts such as historical 
data, trends and numeric developments. 2. Quality assurance, for example using metrics 
in the software lifecycle development, user access management (i.e. the number of over-
privileged users). 3. Tactical oversight for monitoring and reporting the security posture 
of IT systems. NIST also stress the importance of rigorously developing this premature 
field of security metrics: “Advancing the state of scientifically sound, security measures 
and metrics (i.e., a metrology for information system security) would greatly aid the design, 
implementation, and operation of secure information systems.” In this research project we 
explored two major items. One was the metrics per level of the organisation; i.e. operational 
metrics (operations), tactical (management) and at the strategic level governance and 
executive management. We explored whether there were adequate metrics, new insights 
and knowledge that needed consideration in further research. Another item was to explore 
whether these items are suitable for adopting in the artefact, mainly to measure the MBIS 
process. As mentioned before, maturity is a process which requires continuous attention and 
monitoring. So we formulated the main research question as follows: “Which metrics are 
effective for governance, management and operational level in order to measure the MBIS 
process?”
RESEARCH METHOD TO ANSWER KNOWLEDGE AND DESIGN QUESTIONS
To explore security metrics per organisational level we made use of Delphi research with 38 
experts working in the security field. The Delphi method was used to collect qualitative data 
from individuals and eliminate any form of group influence, in contrast to GSS. In this case 
the objective was to get experts thinking about which SMART27 metrics they find are suitable 
for their organisation in order to improve maturity of the BIS process and to generate new 
ideas. The Delphi method was also used to ask additional knowledge and design questions in. 
In the first iteration the experts were asked:
1. Which SMART metrics do you propose for measuring BIS at the level of governance &
executive management?
2. Which SMART metrics do you propose for measuring BIS at the level of management?
26  Lord Kelvin (1824) was a British physicist and mathematician of Irish origin. William Thomson is popularly known as 1st Baron 
Kelvin, the creator of ‘absolute zero’, which are low-limit temperature units now represented in units of ‘Kelvin’ in his honour.
27  S.M.A.R.T. is the abbreviation for Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, Timely
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3. Which SMART metrics do you propose for measuring BIS at the level of operations?
RESEARCH RESULTS ON GOVERNANCE METRICS:
1. The result of this first step was a list of 25 SMART metrics. The entire list can be seen in the 
appendix (in Dutch). When analysing the data set clear process-oriented metrics can be 
distinguished and these are marked in bold. These can be used to initiate direct, measure 
and monitor the BIS maturity process.
The relevant items for measuring BIS maturity according to the experts are listed below. The 
items that relate to the BIS maturity process are marked in bold.
 − Overview of realised versus planned BIS improvements and changes per period
 − Compliance audit reports per period
 − Percentages of contribution to meeting business goals
 − Frequency of meetings (e.g. steering committees)
 − Presence of a BIS organisation (steering committee, CISO, CRO)
 − Business impact analysis (frequently performed) and GAP analysis (on e.g. ISO27K)
 − Presence of a working risk management process
 − Presence of policies and guidelines
 − Number of deviation in penalties, incidents and violations (benchmarked)
 − Presence of an audit policy and an appointed auditor
 − Number of deviations according to the agreed BISG objectives and issues
 − The cost of BIS as a percentage of revenue/profit
 − Level of compliance with internal and external policies
 − Number of business continuity disruptions due to BIS incidents
 − Success due to well working security practices
 − Number of audit remarks (for example ISAE3402 or compliance audits) in relation to 
the SLAs of suppliers and the internal organisation.
Below are two examples of fresh insights into metrics. Although it’s debatable whether 
they are actually governance metrics, these are perhaps examples of instruments that 
can operationalise the measurement process. A risk register can be used to monitor the 
effectiveness of a risk management programme as well as measure and assess the individual 
risk-related items.
 − Risk register and rating against this register
 − Reporting security roadmap, incidents, projects and KPIs
Fresh new insights on metrics although it’s debatable whether these are governance metrics 
(and not management or operational metrics):
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 − Percentage of business-driven innovative programmes where security was involved in an 
early stage
 − Percentage of IT-related projects were security was involved in an early stage
 − Number of security incidents.
Encouraging remarks were made by two of the experts: “I’m seeking good security metrics 
because currently we only report on our known risks” and “If I could have had an answer to all 
three questions. This is what I’m looking for.” These last two remarks also show the necessity of 
this research and the exchange of these insights. It also shows the high level of engagement 
of security professionals to participate in academic research and confirms the remark 
by Lord Kelvin at the beginning of this chapter about science being all about its practical 
application.
RESEARCH RESULTS ON MANAGEMENT METRICS
2. The result of the second step (question) was a list of 24 management metrics for BIS. The 
most relevant items were filtered out, creating the following clean list of management metrics
according to the experts; again the items that address the BIS maturity process are marked in 
bold.
 − Number of security incidents, effectiveness of security controls, development of the 
maturity level.
 − Level of BIS awareness at management level (to be tested).
 − Number of adjustments made to the security baseline during a certain period.
 − Follow ups to previously set KPIs
 − Working incident management process (#disruptions outside the SLA).
 − Number of tested BCM plans.
 − BIS programme progression.
 − The number of new business opportunities that were acquired due to the security 
proposition of the organisation (Security as a Unique Selling Point).
 − The positive feedback on customer surveys on the security position and trust they have 
in the organisation. Measure the perception of customers.*
 − Number of data breaches per period.
 − Customer damage as a result of security incidents
 − Number of questions towards the security organisation during a certain period.
 − Availability of a full-time security officer.
 − Involvement of security at the early stage of projects.
 − Achieved CMM level per BIS domain (i.e. physical security, BCM, governance, etc.).
 − Time spent on repressive versus preventive measures.
 − Number of audit remarks (for example ISAE3402 or compliance audits) in relation to 
the SLA’s of suppliers and the internal organisation.
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*This fresh idea of getting customers involved in BIS assists the manager in reflecting on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the internal security programme. Although this is not directly
a process metric it can help to address it. For example, when organisations reach a certain 
maturity level, they can actively engage their customers in their security programmes.
Examples of ideas that arose during the Delphi research questionnaire but actually are 
mechanisms used to operationalise measurement:
 − Report on the number of risks that occurred during a certain period
 − Risk register and rating against this register.
 − Examples of metrics that arose during the survey but are indeed more operationally 
oriented:
 − Overview of number of managed end-point devices
 − Number of successful entrances (attacks) during a certain time period against the total 
number of attacks
 − Pen-test findings
 − Number of (over) authorisations
 − Percentage of ex-employee with withdrawn accounts.
The knowledge of the participants was triggered by remarks such as:
These items can be very organisation-specific. He suggested relating the domain of the 
manager specifically to a certain metric. So he/she does not have to be engaged with all the 
items.
And again the remark was made: “I’m seeking good security metrics because currently we 
only report on our known risks.”
RESEARCH RESULTS ON OPERATIONAL METRICS
3. The result of the third step is a list of 24 items which is presented below. Again only the 
most BIS relevant items are adopted, to present a final clean list. The experts raised the
following operational metrics:
 − Reporting on data from Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), firewalls (FW), anti-virus (AV) 
systems and proxies.
 − Number of operational incidents that occur during a certain period
 − Results on Access Control Management (factual figures versus baselines)
 − Average detect, response and fix rate on security incidents
 − Level of awareness of security with operational personnel (testing)
 − Percentage of failed pen tests
 − Level of compliance with the security baseline
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 − Performance on KPIs
 − Number of tested backup procedures
 − Number of incidents within or outside the SLA
 − Number of deviations based on the security guidelines (unpatched systems, cleaning of 
over- authorisations)
 − Number of applications with no security incidents/vulnerabilities
 − Percentage of systems that undergo frequent vulnerability analysis
 − Percentage of critical perimeter devices/applications and the pen-test results
 − Mean time between failures and mean time till failure as a result of security incidents
 − Average time of security change requests
 − Percentage of unpatched systems and active anti-virus software
 − Number of business disruptions of the primary business process considered urgent
 − KPI on vulnerability management
 − Number of resolved versus unresolved security incidents.
The metrics below were raised as operational but are indeed more managerial, perhaps 
residing within the HRM department:
 − Percentage of new employees who followed a BIS awareness programme and the 
periodically refresh of this programme.
 − Percentage of employees with a screening.
 − Number of certified IT personnel
 − Cost of BIS as percentage of revenue/profit
 − Employee performance.
The second iteration in the Delphi research was questioning the experts on their opinion on 
new insights and new knowledge. In other words “what does this research contribute to them 
as a security professional?” Important knowledge gained by the security experts during the 
research were:
 “The complexity of assuring (measuring and monitoring) BIS becomes much clearer.”
“There are differences in drivers between government (compliance-driven) organisations and 
commercial organisations (risk and profit-driven).”
 “This research revealed new knowledge and stimulated me to further develop security within 
my own organisation.”
 “I have gained new insight into new perspectives on BIS.”
Some said they did not get new insights into the topic. This might be the result of using an 
anonymous form of qualitative research instead of a group-thinking-discussing oriented 
method, such as GSS.
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTION ARGUMENTS
With the above-mentioned aggregation at an organisational level of metric candidates 
deeper insight was gained into measurement practices. Not only for me but also the experts 
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themselves gained new knowledge and were encouraged to think and generate new insights. 
A limitation in this research is that the experts could not discuss the items. So the result is a 
messy list of remarks and items that needed proper analysis and structuring. Analysing and 
reorganising the list was done based on the following viewpoints: Does the answer indeed 
answer the question? Is there a SMART formulation? (i.e. is it usable for further research?). 
Some answers were not formulated SMART; indeed most of them were not. Some answers 
were directives or advice but not metrics. The positive effect of doing qualitative research 
among these stakeholder groups is the opportunity to capture personal opinions and 
encouraging remarks, such as the one about the necessity of exploring and summarising 
metrics.
The final result is a set of BIS metrics which can be applied in measuring and monitoring 
the process of maturity. In this research project we focus on setting the requirements for the 
artefact. I did not intend to determine or debate the validity of the metrics in isolation. I also 
did not intend to create an exhaustive list of metrics. The primary objective was to establish an 
artefact. Below two metric candidates, per organisational level, are promoted as requirement 
candidates:
GOVERNANCE
• Progression in establishing a BIS organisation28 (steering committee, CISO, CRO).
• Overview of realised versus planned BIS improvements and changes per period.
MANAGEMENT
• Number of security incidents (via observations29), effectiveness of security controls, 
development of the maturity level.
• Number of audit remarks.
OPERATIONS
• Percentage of failed pen tests
• Level of compliance with the security baseline.
The entire Delphi research data set is documented in the appendices and can be accessed via 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
28  A security organisation with clear responsibilities, accountabilities, etc. A method used to define roles is a responsibility assignment 
matrix as RACI matrix (RACI) . A RACI describes the participation by various roles (officiers, managers) in completing tasks 
(directing, monitoring and controlling the security function) or providing deliverables within the business process.[4] It is especially 
useful in clarifying roles and responsibilities in cross-functional/departmental projects and processes [328]. In security this 
functional steering across departments is relevant.
29  In Dutch noted as “bevindingen”
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Case 4: The Delphi method for defining BISG metrics as artefact requirements
Method Intended 
effect
Side effect 
(knowledge)
Stakeholder 
Goal
Artefact require-
ment
Context as-
sumption 
Contribution 
argument
-Through Del-
phi research 
among secu-
rity managers 
(sec profes-
sionals) new 
insights were 
gained on se-
curity metrics.
-The insight 
into metrics 
assists board 
of directors 
and security 
professionals 
to create a 
common 
ground of 
knowledge 
and consen-
sus on impor-
tance.
-The Raised 
list of metrics 
can guide 
directors in 
challenging 
their security 
staff and set 
priorities 
on what 
they want to 
measure in 
order to get 
in control.
-Create aware-
ness among 
security profes-
sionals on new 
insights and the 
use of metrics 
(the respondents 
raised their 
enthusiasms 
during the par-
ticipation)
-Stimulate secu-
rity professional 
to think per 
organisational 
level about the 
relevance of 
certain data to 
capture and 
measure.
-Contribute to 
the rigour with a 
clear set of met-
rics raised from 
security experts 
with +15 years of 
experience.
- Insight in mea-
suring criteria 
and instruments 
so BIS becomes 
easier to direct, 
monitor and 
control.
- Also for 
external stake-
holders to judge 
if adequate 
management is 
done, based on 
predefined met-
rics or/and key 
performance in-
dicators (KPI’s).
- Gain adequate 
knowledge which 
metrics are rele-
vant and how to 
maintain them.
-Numerous 
requirements 
were raised but 
the focus lies 
on define the 
requirements 
for the artefact 
that enables the 
director to mea-
sure and mature 
the BIS process. 
We defined for 
Governance: :
-Progression 
monitoring on 
the information 
security organi-
sation
-Progression 
monitoring on 
BIS improve-
ments (BIS 
programme 
management)
On Manage-
ment;
- The number 
of incidents, 
effectiveness of 
the control and 
number of audit 
remarks. And on 
operational level 
the percentage 
of failed and 
passed penetra-
tion tests and 
the level of com-
pliancy towards 
the security 
baseline. 
-Increase 
knowledge 
and commit-
ment by the 
stakeholders 
on metrics 
and the rele-
vant items to 
measure.
-Set priorities 
for boards 
in BIS plan-
ning and 
its security 
investment 
strategy.
-
Provide stake-
holders insight 
into relevant 
items to mea-
sure divided per 
organisational 
level.
This insight 
creates a com-
mon level of 
knowledge and 
consensus on 
what priorities to 
set and what to 
monitor in order 
to establish a 
desired state 
of security ma-
turity.
-An evi-
dence-based 
way of initiating 
conversations 
on risk-based 
priority’s setting 
for security pro-
grammes. 
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6.2.2.5  CASE 5: DEFINING REQUIREMENTS BASED ON PORTER’S FIVE FORCES MODEL 
This section has been published in ISACA Journal Volume 1 in 2015 under the title Porters’ 
Elements for a Business Information Security Strategy. In this chapter Delphi research 
is used to define additional strategic requirements for the artefact by making use of the 
management models of porter. The complete publication can be accessed via http://dx.doi.
org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc.
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
Hackers and negative social media hypes have proven able to bring organisations and 
their perceived value [290] to their knees [291], yet many security professionals (security 
managers and security officers) lack a clear strategy with clear objectives [56]. The Finn Olav 
Sveen addresses the importance of socio-technical systems where human organisation and 
technical factors interact in operationalising the strategy [195], [265] to anticipate and 
overcome such unpredictable challenges. A Delphi research among forty security managers 
and CISOs in April 2013 was performed throughout the Netherlands. The security officers 
were asked a range of questions about the forces they deal with when formulating their 
security strategy. The main research question was:
What external forces of influence do security managers recognise and how do they cope with 
them in BIS strategy formulation?
The questions within the survey, which was sent in April 2013, were based on Michael 
Porter’s Five Forces analysis. [277] Porter’s Five Forces are a commonly used model to 
analyse and synthesise how attractive an industry is. Porter distinguishes [277]:
 − Competition from rival sellers
 − Competition from potential new entrants
 − Competition from substitute products producers
 − Supplier bargaining power
 − Customer bargaining power
This model created by Harvard professor Michael Porter can be used as a frame of reference 
to examine numerous forces that a security professional can reckon with when establishing 
his/her ‘security strategy.’ The experts were asked the following questions and they were able 
to answer yes or no and with the 3rd question they were able to answer static or dynamic:
1. Do you recognise the following external forces as relevant for BIS?
2. Are you aware of the exact impact of these forces?
3. Do you experience these forces as being static or dynamic?
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The following questions were about raising new knowledge items about other relevant forces 
and the level of influence security managers have on these forces when formulating the 
strategy:
1. What other external forces do you recognise and experience in your industry?
2. To what extent are you able, as an individual, to influence these forces to your or your
organisations' benefit?
3. To what extent is your organisation able to influence these forces to your organisation’s
benefit?
The last questions were about examining new knowledge that could help security managers 
do their job better, i.e. formulating a more adequate strategy based on newly gained 
knowledge.
1. Do you consider it important addressing and incorporating these (for you relevant)
external forces of influence in the security strategy and policy in the future?
2. Which industry specific security items (knowledge, experience, skills) do you consider vital
for your industry but not for another industry?
3. What would you as an expert provide advice (how to cope with all these forces) so that
others can learn and benefit from your expertise?
4. Please explain why your advice is helpful to others?
In the Delphi survey, managers were asked whether the various forces they faced were 
dynamic or static in nature and whether the managers felt able to bend these forces to their 
strategic advantage. The results were used to compile a list of suggestions meant to help 
managers develop a more robust strategy. The complete list of answers is in the appendices.
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the force of 
bargaining power
of suppliers
rivalry among
existing
competitors
the force of 
new entrants
the force of
substitute
products
or services
the force of 
bargaining power
of buyers
Figure 40: Porter Five Forces model.
Figure 41: Screenshot of the Qualtrics survey question about Porter.
 
1906 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
DELPHI RESEARCH RESULTS
Two-thirds of the forces security managers said they face are dynamic. In other words, they 
are unpredictable factors such as intellectual property, property theft, extortion, hacking, 
social media rumours gone wild and other new-technology phenomena. One-third of the 
forces they deal with are static, such as compliance legislation, ISO standards and mandatory 
audits. Nearly 60 percent considered it important to address these external forces in their 
strategy formulation in the future (they had not done so before the survey). The survey results 
show security managers focus their strategy on the more predictable, recurrent forces 
(compliance-related), rather than on the more plentiful and potentially more damaging 
forces.
BLIND SPOT
In response to the survey the majority indicated that supply chain risk management (e.g. 
cascade failures due to overlooked forces) should be one of the highest priorities in their 
organisation. So they understand they have a blind spot preventing them from anticipating 
risk. But knowing that is not enough. The survey showed that managers are poorly informed 
about the specific dangers they face and the potential impact of dynamic forces, much less 
about how they should respond in the event of a full-blown crisis. Nearly 80 percent of the 
respondents were poorly or only fairly able to influence these forces once they impinged on 
BIS.
An example of this can be seen through the April 2013 Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) 
attack that paralysed ING Bank, a global financial institution based in the Netherlands. 
The incident reduced shareholder value and led to a flurry of criticism via social media, 
costing ING customers [34]. If the bank had understood and respected the power of such 
dynamic forces – in this case uncensored social media causing confusion [292] – and been 
transparent about the attack, the damage could have been limited. Instead, ING denied 
the seriousness of the attack, evaded questions and remained silent for far too long, [293] 
allowing the conversation on Twitter to proliferate and leave the lasting impression that the 
bank had failed to respond. This incident, in addition to many others [294], revealed a lack of 
preparedness.
CONTAINING VS. AVERTING DAMAGE
Surely, though, it would be better if organisations averted such a crisis in the first place. By 
the time it was discovered that Impairment Resources had lost control of medical records 
belonging to the roughly 600 insurance companies it served, the damage was done. The 
lawsuits quickly piled up and no amount of transparency could have stopped the company’s 
impending demise [295]. So an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
The results of this survey showed that new knowledge gained via other models can help 
security practitioners. The survey showed how the Five Forces can be subdivided into 
dynamic and static forces and how inadequate security strategy is, with its inordinate focus 
on static forces. The second important result from the survey showed that new knowledge 
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item such as the five forces and the value chain model can be borrowed from Porter to enrich 
current strategy formulation within the BIS domain. According to the survey findings, security 
misses the mark, typically focusing on the individual activities of the organisation rather than 
considering the role each activity plays in the wider picture. For instance, security specialists 
see that their business has relationships with third parties, but seldom recognises these 
parties as potentially influential forces.
Understanding the value chain and the five forces is a prerequisite for business success 
[296]. Yet, surprisingly, Porter’s frameworks have yet to take hold in the BIS field.
These following are ranked out of 13 forces as the top five forces which security managers say 
they recognise the impact of:
1. Legislation (95 percent)
2. Inspection and supervisory agencies (88 percent)
3. Law enforcement (district attorney and police) (69 percent)
4. Partners in the (digital) chain (e.g., freight forwarders, Internet service providers, payment 
handlers) (64 percent)
5. Public opinion (60 percent).
The top five forces which security managers say they do not recognise the impact of are:
1. Trade unions (79 percent)
2. Social media (uncensored reporting) (57 percent)
3. Criminals (48 percent)
4. Customers (48 percent)
5. Suppliers (43 percent).
CONCLUSIONS
It is too easy to say that organisations simply need to get a grasp on the dynamic forces 
in the chain and all their problems will be solved. However, the problem is that very few 
management tools, steering mechanisms or key performance indicators (KPIs) are available 
to deal with these forces.
Dynamic forces can have major consequences. A surprising 71 percent of experts surveyed 
indicated that these forces are critical to their business and security strategy. They require the 
attention of every manager, board member and shareholder. The survey shows that strategies 
based on an awareness of value chains and the five forces can help organisational leaders to:
 − Increase preparedness for unforeseen influences
 − Better identify risk and establish the organisation's risk appetite
 − Anticipate crises and remain in control of strategy.
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The top five elements for a more holistic BIS strategy, according to the new knowledge 
insights from the survey, are:
1. Stakeholder approach—When developing a strategy, involve the board of directors,
management, business and all external stakeholders in the digital chain. Know the 
key performance indicators (KPIs), stakeholder expectations, and how to translate 
these demands, using the right KPIs, into concrete benchmarks for the organisation, 
management and board.
2. Risk-based approach—Look at the organisation’s critical data (crown jewels) in the
context of the entire chain. Start by gaining insight into all digital stakeholders and their
potential dependencies, weaknesses and risk—both technologically and legally.
3. Beware of blind spots—Many forces are dynamic. Ensure the organisation is not caught
unaware. No one person can stay abreast of every development in this field, so let others 
update stakeholders on what they do not know.
4. Do the right things well—It may seem easier to “learn by doing,” but those who prepare a
good strategy are less dependent on impromptu solutions.
5. Integrated organisational process—Be aware of the chain of forces that influences the
organisation. Make room for addressing these forces in the strategy and policy plans of the
entire organisation.
The conclusions of the survey results show that security managers need to zoom in on 
specific threats and prepare for them; also to zoom out and consider the entire context in 
which the organisation operates. This is not just a lesson for security managers and officers. 
It can be argued that the most important decision makers in every organisation need to 
take ownership of this problem. Information risks are owned by the business data owners, 
according to ITGI [18] “It is imperative that organisations deliver on the promise, or they will 
soon become irrelevant. [265]” Decision makers should give security people a voice in the 
formulation of overall business strategy. ICT security policy should be made a core aspect of 
the whole [56]. Only then can an organisation consider itself ready to face an uncertain and 
rapidly changing context and future [195].
The entire data set supporting this publication can be accessed via http://dx.doi.
org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
CONTRIBUTION ARGUMENTS
After compiling a set of new knowledge items from the Delphi research we can justify the 
choices for setting requirements. The gained knowledge items are not directly transferable 
into artefact functional requirements but they can help influence the stakeholder’s 
perception or have effect on defining the scope and context in which the artefact operates. 
Although some items are considerable as functional requirements most of the results from 
this survey are knowledge items to be considered and addressed in scoping the MBIS 
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process. We use the Wieringa method to formulate the contribution argument. This is an 
argument that an artefact that satisfies the requirements would contribute to a stakeholder 
goal in the problem context. A contribution argument, according to Wieringa [146] has the 
form:
(Artefact requirements) x (Context assumptions) contribute to (Stakeholder goal)
ARTEFACT REQUIREMENT CANDIDATES
Creating insight into strategic forces and the dependency the organisation has on these forces 
is necessary to:
 − Heighten preparedness for unforeseen influences
 − Better identify risk and establish the organisation's risk appetite
 − Anticipate crises and remain in control of strategy.
STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
To identify and analyse the implications of the several strategic forces which certain 
stakeholders believe should be included in the artefact. In chapter 7 is elaborated how parts 
of this stakeholder analysis is engineered in the artefact as the function; Information Risk 
Overview (IRO).
Case 5:Delphi research on knowledge items (5 forces model)
Method Intended 
effect
Side effect 
(knowledge)
Stakeholder 
Goal
Artefact re-
quirement
Context as-
sumption 
Contribution 
argument
-Through Del-
phi research 
new insights 
were shared on 
the use of ex-
isting manage-
ment models 
to suitable for 
determining the 
scope and con-
text of the MBIS 
process and 
can function as 
a set of require-
ments.
-Establish 
predefined 
knowledge 
items that can 
function as 
requirement 
setting for 
the artefacts 
scope and 
context.
-Establish 
knowledge 
items on a 
strategic 
level to 
continuously 
advice board 
of directors 
in strategic 
choices in the 
BIS domain.
-Create aware-
ness among 
security profes-
sionals on new 
insights and the 
use of generic 
management 
models. (the 
respondents 
raised their 
enthusiasms 
during the par-
ticipation)
-Equip security 
professional 
with fresh 
insights i.e. 
models and 
language to 
enable a better 
dialogue with 
boards and 
demystify the se-
curity jargon.
-Porters model 
helps articulate 
all known rele-
vant strategic 
forces and 
opens up the 
dialogue.
-The risk-based 
holistic ap-
proach enables 
security pro-
fessionals and 
their managers 
to beware of the 
blind spots.
-Define the 
strategic forc-
es, address 
the influence 
and who’s 
responsible 
in managing 
these forces.
-The stakehold-
er approach 
can function as 
a questionnaire 
framed as the 
“Stakeholder 
analysis.” That 
can indicate 
expectations 
(compliance 
regulations), 
risks, KPI’s, 
roles and re-
sponsibilities.
-Explicate tech-
nical and legal 
dependencies 
with stakehold-
ers.
-Increase 
commitment 
by the stake-
holders/tar-
get group by 
making use of 
existing and 
well-known 
models such 
as Porter.
-Anticipate 
crises and 
remain in 
control of 
strategy
-Set priorities 
for boards in 
BIS strategy 
and its invest-
ment strategy.
Provide stake-
holders with 
insight into 
stakeholders 
and its forces 
to assess the 
organisation
Security read-
iness. With 
the objective 
to Heighten 
preparedness 
for unforeseen 
influences 
-Knowledge 
and meaning 
items, e.g..5 
elements for a 
more holistic 
BIS strategy.
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6.3        SUMMARY OF EXPLICATING THE PROBLEM AND DEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS
An artefact can be described by the functions and behaviour [146]. In the previous 
described examples establishing a checklist of practices, survey or measurement 
questionnaire to gain insight into practices for maturing BIS is a form of a structure. The 
establishment of a list, accompanied with surveys, measurement questionnaires and other 
knowledge items, can assist a director in gaining more or broader knowledge on how to 
interact with his organisation and its environment and take accountability according to the 
GDAC theory [211]. And thereby form their personal meaning to their gained knowledge. 
Lists can be a questionnaire-form with a database connection, that database can store the 
details of the answers to the questionnaire. The structure of the artefact is designed in a way 
that the user can fill in the questionnaire, the scales and extra options, so that a direct result is 
experienced by the user after applying the artefact.
When a board member interacts – based on this new information – with the environment, 
he/she will experience an effect. This can be seen as a direct and intended effect. On the 
other hand there might be side effects of the artefact making certain items explicit, for 
example, employees acting in response to certain outcomes. It is my personal experience that 
after showing factual results of a low performing organisation they immediate want to take 
action.
All five examples show us that on the one hand new knowledge items to be considered when 
designing the artefact and on the other easy checklists that can function in the artefact. The 
end results of all five examples and the outcome in terms of setting requirements is shown in 
the table below. During this research project the guidelines for design and development of 
artefacts provided by Johannesson and Perjons [73]. were adopted. At the end of this section 
a summary based on these guidelines is made.
THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDER IN REQUIREMENT SETTING
In the cases given the role of stakeholders is significant. As participants in the research but 
also as a target group that could benefit from the artefact. Involving the stakeholder trough 
the DSR process is necessary in order to assurae the problems are adequately solved. In this 
section each case is detailed with the specific role of the stakeholder.
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EXAMPLE RESEARCH 
STRATEGY/
METHOD
ARTEFACT SOLUTION 
TO THE PROBLEM
REQUIRE-
MENT
FUNCTIONAL 
/ NON-FUNC-
TIONAL
IMPORTANT FOR THE 
STAKEHOLDER
Key BIS 
management 
informa-
tion
GSS A prioritised key 
set of BIS man-
agement informa-
tion to use in a 
dashboard. 
Dashboard 
items
Functional Because it cre-
ates a mutual 
ground of knowl-
edge, awareness 
and items to be 
managed.
Key BIS 
governance 
practices 
and KSF
Litera-
ture, GSS 
and Del-
phi
A rigorously pri-
oritised set of 
BIS governance 
practices to use 
as a (self) as-
sessment for BISG 
measurement.
Assess-
ment 
question-
naire
Functional Because it cre-
ates a mutual 
ground of knowl-
edge, awareness 
and items to be 
governed (eval-
uated, directed 
and monitored). 
Key BIS 
management 
interven-
tions
Litera-
ture, GSS 
and Del-
phi
A rigorously pri-
oritised set of 
BIS management 
interventions to 
use as a (self) 
assessment for 
BIS measurement.
Assess-
ment 
question-
naire 
Functional Because it cre-
ates a mutual 
ground of knowl-
edge, awareness 
and items to be 
managed and fre-
quently measured.
Insight 
into BIS 
metrics
Delphi A set of relevant 
metrics creat-
ed by experts to 
measure and man-
age BIS. 
List of 
predefined 
metrics
Non-function-
al & func-
tional
Because it cre-
ates a mutual 
ground of knowl-
edge, awareness 
on metrics to 
consider when 
managing BIS.
Use of 
existing 
management 
models
Delphi An alternative 
view on model-
ling, capturing 
and presenting 
strategic (cyber) 
forces. 
Knowledge 
items / 
Defining 
Scope and 
context 
items
Environmental Because, strate-
gic models such 
as Porter’s can 
help contempo-
rary CIOs or CI-
SOs overcome the 
knowledge gap be-
tween the CIO or 
CISO and stake-
holders.
Table 13: Summary of five examples and their relationship with the five requirements.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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1. In the first case the GSS participants are all stakeholders. They are CIOs, CISOs, 
IT directors or IT managers. So they are considered to be representative in raising 
information of what upper management or boards want to see as management 
information in a potential dashboard. They can be considered as a management 
information supplier or user.
2.  In the second case I considered numerous stakeholders during the literature 
research. Varying from regulator perspectives (COSO, PCI DSS30, SoX, DNB etc.) and 
accompanying disciplines such finance (Basel2, Solvency, KING31 etc.), IT (COBIT, 
ValIT32, RiskIT). By examining numerous accompanying disciplines such as corporate 
governance, risk governance and IT governance I established a multi-stakeholder 
approach, considering numerous views and standpoints. After the literature the latter was 
judged by GSS. Practices were discussed and prioritised by numerous disciplined experts 
(architects, managers, consultant, auditor), and this provided another stakeholder 
perspective (expert perspective).
3.  In the third case, a similar multi-method approach was used. I focused in particular on 
the target group of mid-market organisations. After a rigorously established list gained
via GSS expert research, the approach was validated by forty managers of mid-market 
organisation. By involving the stakeholder directly in addressing interventions that 
might solve the problem of low security maturity, they thereby also raised functional 
requirements for the artefact.
4.  In case four I asked a large number of CISOs what they find relevant and effective metrics 
to measure the security. Experienced CISOs can be considered as experts and since they 
are responsible for the management of security they can also considered stakeholders. By
examining CISOs via the Delphi method the stakeholders are directly involved in solving 
the problem about the absence of effective security metrics, due to the fact that they 
collectively raised numerous alternative metrics.
5.  In case five I presented the Porter model to the security professionals, in this case 
professionals within security and not in directing the company. I did this to see if the 
security professionals were familiar with business world items, such as existing models 
or methods that his/her manager is familiar with. So in this case CISOs are important 
stakeholders, to see if they know the model and are familiar with using it. In this case 
identifying cyber forces that he/she needs to reckon with while formulating a security 
strategy. So involving CISOs as stakeholders in this research has two beneficial outcomes. 
First, they gain new knowledge modelling and presenting cyber forces to be considered in 
strategic plans, and second they develop new knowledge about business world models 
that is applicable in getting their message across in the board room. 
30  The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is a proprietary information security standard for organizations that 
handle branded credit cards (Source : Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council)
31  The King Report on Corporate Governance is a code of corporate governance in South Africa issued by the King Committee on 
Corporate Governance. Three reports were issued in 1994 (King I), 2002 (King II), and 2009 (King III). Compliance with the King 
Reports is a requirement for companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. [256]
32  Val IT is a governance framework that can be used to create business value from IT investments [327]
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6.4        DEVELOPING THE SECURIMETER ARTEFACT
The main focus of this Design Science-oriented research project is deriving artefact 
requirements for solving real-life practical problems that are encountered in business 
practices, for example, solving the problem of a lack of relevant BIS parameters at the 
governance level. The problem is the lack of an artefact that captures these parameters and 
makes them explicit to the stakeholder, such as a BISG checklist in the previous sections. 
These explicit checklists can assist boards of directors in gaining insight into relevant 
problem-solving items. So the main orientation of this DS research is Problem-focused 
development of artefact requirements [143].
In this section I continue to elaborate on the previous cases with focus on the development of 
the artefact see figure below for the position in this reserach. The artefact can be described 
by specifying the function of the artefact. Thus what the artefact can do for its users in solving 
a predefined problem. In this example a list of core practices can help boards gain insight, 
knowledge and measuring criteria. The structure of the artefact, thus its internal workings, 
represents the elements it is built of and how they are inter-related to each other.
Another aspect of the artefact is the environment. This is the external surroundings and the 
conditions in which the artefact will and can operate in order to establish its objectives. The 
effects of the artefact are the way in which the artefact will change the environment. Effects 
can be intended effects or side effects. In the next section we elaborate the elements that are 
considered in the design phase and the development phase of the artefact establishment.
During the initial research described in Chapter 4 (example 3 in this chapter) the idea arose 
of constructing a software application that can capture all relevant customer data during 
the research phase, on current security maturity states and future security maturity states. 
In the beginning this pilot software was called Maturing Business Information Security 
Software and was later on named “SecuriMeter.” From now on the artefact is described as the 
technology name “SecuriMeter” or SecuriMeter artefact.
Figure 42: Research phase “developing the artefact” based on Johannesson and Perjons [73].
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6.4.1   THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURIMETER ARTEFACT ONTOLOGICAL 
LEVEL 
In this section a detailed description is made of the basic technical functionalities the 
SecuriMeter needs to have in order to properly adopt the requirements. Initially to collect 
data in a database, show the current status, and secondly report that data in a document or 
other format (dashboard). This should help organisations that want to gain insight into their 
current and future security maturity state. In Chapter 1 this is framed as the current situation 
moving towards the desired situation.
The functional design was established through numerous brainstorm sessions in 2010. After 
the brainstorm sessions between the developer, practitioners and product owner a design 
was made, based on Unified Modeling Language (UML). UML is intended to provide a 
standard way to visualise the design of a software system. This functional design is based on 
numerous iterations between myself and the software developer, starting on 6 August 2010. 
The entire project of designing, constructing and testing the SecuriMeter application was 
executed in close collaboration with Utrecht University of Applied Sciences (Hogeschool 
Utrecht).
The initial kick off of the development phase of the artefact was performed based on two 
theories; Starreveld et al. Governance, Delegation, Accountability and Control (GDAC) 
theory [211] and De Leeuw’s [213] theory as explained in Chapter 1 and visualised in 
Figure 43. These theories form the foundation for the brainstorming on business rules 
setting within the artefact in order to contribute to solving the practical problems already 
mentioned.
Establish insight into MBIS parameters (metrics, practices, critical success factors, and 
interventions) that can be set to capture essential fact-based data from the environment on 
management and operational levels about Planning, Implementation and Control.
These governance parameters form criteria to set proper directions (delegation) towards 
business environments and IT environments (management level) and towards operational 
plans, implementations and controls. With the objective of collecting the management 
and operational data (evidence) on these governance practices and achieving control and 
accountability. This is visualised in Figure 43 where the SecuriMeter artefact is positioned as 
a governance tool that measures and collects (e.g. administrates) evidence on BIS.
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Figure 43: Positioning of the artefact’s based on Starreveld et al. [211] and De Leeuw [213].
Governance
Control
AccountabilityDelegation
IT-environmentBusiness-
environment
Plan
Implementation
Control
Plan SecuritMeter
artefact
Measuring 
and evidence
Support
Business
IT Alignment
Implementation
Control
2006 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
6.4.2    THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURIMETER ARTEFACT ON INFORMATIONAL AND 
DATA LEVEL
This section describes the functional requirements for the application. The functionalities 
are described as use cases and also describe the requirements and results of these actions. 
The detailed use cases and results are in the appendix. The basic concept of the application 
is to aid consultants in performing their security audits, assessments, reviews (i.e. business 
research). The application will make it possible to enter data collected at customers into 
the application which allows the consultant to create a report based on the data and grant 
a score to the test (and company). The questions and the assessments that are taken will be 
maintainable within the system. The assessments can be branch specific. The assessments 
will contain help texts for the questions (to aid the person entering) and can contain advice 
when the requirement is not met. The application will also make it possible to maintain clients 
and their information. The system allows the entry of customers and the maintenance of their 
information. It is also possible to view the taken assessments. The clients will be placed within 
(maintainable) branches. The selected branch also limits the tests which can be taken for 
that customer. Also support for (limited) reporting will be built in. By analysing the data in 
the system reports can be generated about tests (how many were passed) or about branches 
(which tests are taken and which results were reached). The application will not implement 
automation of test tools (i.e. vulnerability scanners) since this can be quite complex and we 
in that case need to rely on certain software which can give issues regarding licensing. The 
system however can give advice regarding tooling and the interpretation of the data, but will 
rely on human judgement to determine whether a certain requirement/question is fulfilled.
The users of the application can be placed in groups which will be granted user rights. To 
enforce security and confidence confidential information will be stored encrypted. For this 
document we assume that the user executing the use case has the correct rights to be allowed 
to access this functionality. If a functionality will behave different according to the rights this 
will be noted in the use case.
Figure 44 shows how the application will function in terms of the primary processes of the 
consultant (named B-Able):
MODULAR APPROACH
The artefact application needs to be divided into separate modules. The application use can 
be limited with user rights. The following modules are defined in the artefact application (the 
name artefact and application is being used in mixed terms and implies the same):
 − Administration module
• Maintain branches and industry types
• Maintain users and user groups (+rights)
• Maintain application base data
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 − Relation management
• Maintain customer data
• Perform quick scan
 − Assessment management
• Maintain questions and question lists
• Maintain assessments
• Maintaining assessment versions and types and assign them to branches
 − Assessment module
• Take assessments
• Generate reports about assessments
• Rating of the assessment by the user and uploading final report
 − Statistics
• View statistics per assessment
• View statistics per branch.
The full UML based functional design is in the appendix
Figure 44: Design and development: the functional design of the MBIS artefact.
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6.4.3  FROM INITIAL FUNCTIONAL DESIGN TO PROTOTYPING
This section describes the technical and architectural part of the application after the first 
iteration of the functional design (25 August 2010).
ARCHITECTURE
The final application (within the first phase) is built as a two-tier application. This means 
that the application has a database layer and an application layer. The application layer 
is the client application running on the client’s computer. The database layer is the SQL 
server instance which is hosted centrally. The client application will directly connect to the 
SQL server database (via an encrypted data connection). The code within the client will be 
written in a two layer structure. The graphical representation and the business logic within 
the application are split to make future splitting of the layers into physical layer possible (like 
for example the creation of a central web service, the clients communicate with for business 
logic).
Encryption
Sensitive data between the client application and the database was encrypted. Data was sent 
encrypted to the database which stores this encrypted data. The database therefore only 
contains encrypted data. If data is retrieved from the database it is decrypted on the client. 
This solution however has one downside, being that we cannot use the search/indexing 
possibilities of SQL server. Searching for a certain company name by, for example, a part of 
its name will not be done on the SQL server but must be done on the client (after decryption 
of the data). Also encryption/decryption can slightly reduce the performance. However 
we consider both downsides acceptable due to the nature of the data in the system being 
confidential and the main target is to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of this data.
TECHNIQUES
The application will be written in the Microsoft .NET 4.0 framework. The Graphical User 
Interface will be implemented in Windows Presentation Foundation (WPF), supported by 
Windows Vista, Windows 7 and partially supported by Windows XP. Data storage will be done 
in Microsoft SQL Server (2005 or 2008). Communication between SQL Server and the 
.NET application is done via a wrapper around the default communication protocol of .NET 
with SQL server which will contain logic for encrypting and decrypting information send to 
and received from the database. In the application design phase we also considered the items 
we might want to add in the future. This section describes the elements we have identified in 
2010 as possible future improvements.
LICENSING
In future we want to have the ability to valorise this research project by selling the application 
to businesses. This is identified as phase 3 of the application implementation. To enable 
licensing of the application a wrapper will be created to check whether the licence is valid. 
Another important consideration in the resell version is the necessity of shielding certain 
DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING THE 
ARTEFACT6 203
functionalities, due to confidentiality. During that phase of development we also need to 
reconsider rollups of the code. When a new version or assessment is released, we need to 
roll these to the customer versions of the application. In the third phase of the application we 
need to make a plan how to do this without violating the user data.
SOFTWARE AS A SERVICE
One possible way of reselling the application is to enable Software as a Service (SaaS). With 
this technique the users will not receive a physical copy of the application, but can use the 
application from a server. Preparation for this version is done by splitting the application into 
separate layers from the start. By splitting the database, logic and Graphical User Interface 
(GUI) we were able to create a new GUI (possibly web-based) for the SAAS implementation.
AUTO INTERPRETATION OF ASSESSMENT SCORES (AND GIVE A RATING)
The first versions of the application will not support auto interpretation of the assessments. 
This is due to the complicating factors when rating a list. Whether a test is passed relies on 
certain factors (like a minimum score, or the compliancy of at least x items, the compliancy 
to require at least a certain (set of) item(s) or a complex combination of this. The basic 
prototyping functionality of the application is to store the important customer data and keep 
track of assessments. In collaboration with the developer I decided to leave the interpretation 
of the results also to a human, since a human is better in determining which requirements 
can cause a test to fail. The person will rate the list (with the answer report list we generated 
from the system) and will enter his rating and findings into the system. The system will store 
the rating and findings with the assessment. In future versions it might be possible to let the 
system interpret the answers and come with a score.
This first iteration of the functional design in August 2010 led to building and delivering a 
prototype version.
6.4.4   THE STRUCTURE AND THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE ARTEFACT
In this section we elaborate the technical specifications and functionalities of the SecuriMeter 
artefact. Since the SecuriMeter is a software application we will switch terminology between, 
tool, application, where we mean the SecuriMeter artefact. The description is based on 
Dynamic Systems Development method (DSDM), a form of Agile software development. This 
DSDM method is based on multiple iterations between myself and the software developers. 
This description is established on numerous writing and building iterations, data and designs 
dated May 2013 (version 3.7.4). This specification describes the various used techniques 
within the application source, the libraries used and the layering of the application.
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TECHNICAL DEPENDENCIES
The system is constructed based on Microsoft.NET technologies. For the Windows front-end 
the user should have the correct version of the .NET framework installed. For data storage 
it relies on a SQL Server 2008R2. To store the data the application landscape should have 
at least one SQL server instance installed (on a user level or on network level). The Windows 
client should support Microsoft .NET Framework 4.533, SQL Server Edition 2008R2 for 
Offline mode. For the web server the Microsoft .NET Framework 4.5 and IIS 7 or higher 
(requires Windows Server Internet Information Services/Webserver Role) is required. The 
web client should be Internet Explorer 8 or higher. The Central DB server34 should be SQL 
Server Edition 2008R2 (Express edition is supported). The system is compiled processor/
architecture independent meaning that x86 (32 bit) and x64 (64 bit systems) is supported. 
This visual presents the conceptual infrastructure model of the SecuriMeter artefact.
The application supports 2 interfaces, a web interface and a windows interface. The web 
interface is exposed through a Microsoft Unified Access Gateway (UAG) security technology 
layer which allows clients to login with their browser and access the application. There is 
also support for a Windows front-end for the consultants that are connected to the local 
network or connected via a Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology. The Windows interface 
supports assessment taking and system management where the web interface only supports 
assessment taking and reporting for one client-relation35.
When logging in on the UAG the users will get a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
(LDAP) security token. LDAP is an open, vendor-neutral, industry-standard application 
protocol for accessing and maintaining distributed directory information services over 
an Internet Protocol (IP) network which will be forwarded to the website. The website will 
determine the login by looking at the LDAP token. The Windows front-end supports LDAP 
login, but is also supporting login by username and password.
Users that are not directly connected to the network can use the offline mode of the 
application. This allows a user to work offline and sync his changes when needed36.
6.4.5   SYSTEM LAYERS IN THE ARTEFACT
The SecuriMeter application is divided into numerous layers. This allows us to respect the 
single responsibility principle and makes it possible to replace layers (or items) in a later 
phase of the project. The diagram in Figure 46 shows the main layer groups and the specific 
layers that are part of the groups.
33  32 and 64 bits compatible, the code is compiled architecture independent
34  The central DB server is the server used when numerous consultants want to use the tool with centralized data. It is not required 
since the system also supports working on a SQL instance on a client machine.
35  A user can have rights in multiple relations, but for the web access only one relation is allowed per user.
36  For more information about the offline mode please refer to the offline mode section.
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6.4.5.1  GENERAL USAGE
The general usage layer is a layer of components used throughout the whole system. The 
elements here are available in all layers and can be used to communicate data through the 
layers.
The SecuriMeter.Library.BE project contains the business entities. These entities are objects 
to store data. The objects in this layer serve as data containers and will communicate data 
between the logic layer and the front-end layer and are also used by the front-end to display 
or communicate with other parts of the layer.
The SecuriMeter.Library.Util project contains helper functions which need to be exposed 
to several layers. Helper functions are functions such as validation of certain objects, core 
classes, formatting classes, etc.
The system is also using some external libraries to perform certain actions. The following 
external libraries are part of the application:
VHCD.Library.Database37
This library is responsible for the communication with the database. This simplifies the usage 
37  This VHCD Library is a proprietary library
Figure 45: Designing and developing the artefact: The technical design of the artefact infrastructure.
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of the default .NET connection capabilities.
Microsoft.Office.Interop.Excel and Microsoft.Office.Interop.Word
This is used to perform Word/Excel export of reports.
6.4.5.2  DATA LAYER
The data layer is the layer which stores the data. In the SecuriMeter application this is a SQL 
Server database. Communication with the database is done through the Business Logic 
Layer38. The database tables are accessed through stored procedures.
6.4.5.3  LOGIC LAYER
The business logic layer contains all the logic for the application. It contains logic about 
how to access certain data in the data layer, but also contains logic to determine assessment 
scores or perform an assessment export.
The SecuriMeter.Library.BLL layer contains the communication logic for the data-access layer 
and contains logic to store and read items from that layer. The BLL will use the BE objects to 
store/load data and will perform basic validation on these objects. The BLL is also able to 
distinguish the offline and online mode and communicate with the corresponding database. 
The BLL library uses the VHCD database library to communicate with the SQL server 
database.
The SecuriMeter library contains logic which is not directly related to the database. This layer 
contains objects with logic that is used by the various front-end components. Elements in the 
library are the import and export of Word/Excel documents, authorisation handlers, etc.
6.4.5.4  GRAPHICAL LAYER - FRONT-END
The front-end layer contains all items that display or process data for/to a user. This can be 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) but also interfacing applications, updates, tests suites. Each 
layer that can produce an output or read an input is seen as part of the front-end layer. Items 
in the front-end layer mainly only serve as a display layer and therefore should contain little to 
no logic except from graphical flow logic.
The web front-end is the ASP.NET website that can be used by clients. This site uses the 
generic library and business layer for implementation of logic. The Windows front-end and 
Windows controls projects contain the graphical logic of the Windows front-end of the 
SecuriMeter. The control project contains controls such as buttons, grids, etc. which can be 
re-used over multiple Windows front-ends to ensure consistency.
38  Exception to this is the DB Updater, this specific part of the application will perform
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6.4.5.5  INTERFACING LAYER (AND EXTERNAL INTERFACING)
The interfacing layer offers a way for external interfaces to use some (but not all) logic 
from the SecuriMeter application. The interfacing layer allows developers to plugin new 
functionality in the system39. The interfacing logic in the application will scan for usable 
plugins and will be able to call these interfaces. Within the interface logic are a set of 
interface descriptions which must be implemented in the plugins. By knowing the interface 
definition the system can easily call plugins and let them do the job.
The plugin interface will provide de necessary data to the interface implementation 
and the implementation will return an updated set of data (together with processing 
information) to the SecuriMeter application. The plugins should never use business logic 
or data communication with the other layers of the system and should never perform data 
manipulation at the data layer level.
6.4.5.6  VARIOUS FORMS OF TOOLING
The project contains a light test suite which contains functions to perform automated tests 
on the application layers (library/bll/data). These tests will be run before releasing a project 
to ensure the working of the tool40. The document generator functions as front-end for the 
generation of Word template reports. This uses the logic layer to perform lookups and write 
the export document. The database updater directly works on the database. This updater 
can be used to update production/test databases to the new version. It will implement new 
tables, update or create stored procedures and if required will perform setup of initial data or 
update existing data to match the software requirements.
The update contains updates for each version (since 3.5.0) and will run a cumulative update.
SPECIFIC PARTS
This part will describe the functional and technical side of some of the specific parts in the 
system. Each of these parts forms a core part of the SecuriMeter application landscape.
6.4.5.7  DOCUMENT GENERATOR
Because of the limitations of the reporting engine, which is using Word Interop, it is not 
possible to directly generate reports in the web front-end. Microsoft advises against the 
usage of Word Interop on web servers because of potential security risks and performance 
loss. Also the licence model of Microsoft Office does not allow the use of web servers. To work 
around this issue we developed a document generator. The website will queue a report in a 
reporting queue which is monitored by one or more Document Generators. The generator 
will run on a separated machine and will pick up each report for processing. After processing 
39  Currently only applicable for tooling answer import (Qualys Vulnerability Scanner)
40  Unfortunately not all functionality is tested by this test suite yet. The test suite will be expanded with extra functionality tests during 
further development of the application.
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the tool places the file in the database and signals the website (and the client) about the file 
being ready for download.
6.4.5.8  OFFLINE MODE
To support working with the tool when no internet connection is available41 we implemented 
an offline mode. The offline mode will synchronise the data from the production database. 
For the offline mode the system uses a SQL Server Express edition instance on the client 
machine. This will attach the offline database file and use that in the offline mode. The offline 
DB is also attached when entering the synchronise mode (both ways). In that mode the 
system will read the data to copy/update in the memory and attach the destination database 
to copy the data.
The offline prepare will take an empty database and fill it with data. The prepared database is 
stored as offline database in the application folder.
6.4.5.9  EXTERNAL INTERFACING
To be able to communicate with other system we introduced the concept of external 
interfacing. This includes (or will include) possibilities for other systems to communicate with 
the SecuriMeter tool or possibilities for SecuriMeter to communicate with other systems or 
interpret the data from those systems. Interfacing can be performed on 2 levels. First people 
can communicate with the business logic layer of the application. At the moment this will 
mean communicating/linking with our DLL, but in the future we might want to expose some 
of the functionalities through (web)services/APIs42. The other option of interfacing is through 
the interface capabilities within the SecuriMeter interface, the system can offer various ways 
to load DLL’s that facilitate interfacing. Currently the method is used to facilitate interfacing 
in the assessment taking screens43.
6.4.5.10  LDAP INTEGRATION
The system supports the login through LDAP. When configuring a user the administrator 
can supply a LDAP name of the user. When LDAP is enabled the system will look for the LDAP 
token of the user (works in the web and Windows application) and look in the system if this 
token is assigned to a valid user. This way the system can login these users without requiring 
them a different login for SecuriMeter. For web the LDAP login is mandatory since the 
website does not support login with a username and password. The LDAP token is provided 
by the UAG when the user successfully logged in on the UAG with his credentials.
41  In certain cases the consultants are not able to connect to the network while at client’s location due to limitation or security 
regulation.
42  Here data will be pulled/pushed by the consuming applications
43  With this method the SecuriMeter will be pushing/pulling data
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6.4.5.11  TWO VARIOUS BUILDS (ADMIN/NON-ADMIN)
For the system there are two different builds. There is an admin build which includes all 
functionalities and a consultant build. The consultant build is equal to the admin build but 
has the user administration part removed from the GUI. This is done to prevent accidental 
changes in the consultant mode.
6.4.5.12  SQL PASSTHROUGH
Microsoft.NET, and thus SecuriMeter, allows the connection to the database to use the 
credentials of the Windows user. This can be used to obfuscate the connection credentials 
to the database and to create an extra security layer. For the consultant versions the SQL 
pass through is enabled in the configuration file. To enable users to connect to the database 
through their Windows credentials the system supports functionality to link the user account 
in the SQL database server and assign the correct rights to that user.
6.4.5.13  FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURIMETER DEVELOPMENT
In future we can consider the following technical changes to the application.
LOOSEN COUPLING BETWEEN THE LAYERS
At this moment the business logic layer is tightly coupled to the presentation layers of the 
application. This makes it difficult to “quickly” replace the logic layer within the presentation 
layers. This is not a direct problem; however the current best practices describe a model 
where we programme against an interface instead of an implementation. In the future we 
might consider applying this practice to the logic layer for consistency and maintainability.
USE AN INDUSTRY-STANDARD DATA-ACCESS METHOD
In this current version in house developed database layer is used. This relies on the default 
data readers from .NET and uses stored procedures to communicate with the database. 
While this control is just an additional layer on the default working of .NET (and only serves 
as helpful portal) we might consider using a different database connection methodology (like 
Entity Framework) to lessen the development of database calls and be able to rely on new 
cutting-edge technology. However, making this change might require a fierce rewrite of the 
business layer’s communication with the database.
ENRICH AUTOMATED TESTING
Some of the functionalities in the application are tested through automated test scripts; 
however not all were tested in these scripts. During the current development cycles we try to 
extend the automated tests with test cases for the newly developed functionalities (only the 
logic is tested, GUI’s cannot be tested). We might consider adding test cases for some of the 
existing functionalities to ensure the working of the current system in future releases.
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6.4.6   ADHERING TO THE GUIDELINES FOR ARTEFACT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
During this research project the guidelines for design and development of artefacts provided 
by Johannesson and Perjons [73] were adopted. These are:
 − Clearly describe each component of the artefact. This is done with the functional and 
technical design layout in the previous section and in the UML use case design in the 
appendix.
 − Justify each component of the artefact. Explaining the purpose of each component of the 
artefact in particular which requirements it addresses is expressed in the UML use cases.
 − Describe the use of the artefact. This is demonstrated in the UML use case diagrams in the 
appendix.
 − Clarify the originality. The originality of the artefact is in the combination of the input, 
in this case for example governance practices or management practices that contribute 
to solving the problem of MBIS, and the implementation into the artefact in the form of 
questionnaires which can be validated by proof, i.e. parsing operational security tool data.
 − Specify the sources of the design of the artefact. In the pre-definition of the requirements 
and problem articulation the role of the stakeholder and its input is considered. In the 
section on the role of the stakeholder is elaborated how he/she is involved into setting 
the requirements. In the example of the Porter model to gain new knowledge on intended 
forces worked inspirational to the stakeholder and/or inspired the design of new 
components.
 − Describe how the artefact has been designed and developed. This explains what has been 
done to design and develop the artefact, in particular how the stakeholders have been 
involved and how existing solutions and research literature have been reviewed.
6.4.7  ARTEFACT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE
In order to log development issues during the development phase an issue log was 
established. This issue log is also used as directory of future requirements that were raised. 
It enabled me to track and trace the development of the artefact based on software release 
notes. An extract of the initial issue log is shown in the table below. This issue log was initiated 
after the first official release on 8th April 2011. The initial pilot version of the artefact was 
released in March 2011.
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6.5        CONCLUSION TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARTEFACT
Ultimately a set of artefact requirements were established through a design science cycle. 
In Cases 2 and 3 this was done via numerous iterations and numerous methods. Table 15 
highlights the final requirements to be adopted in the technical design of the SecuriMeter 
artefact. According to Wieringa, non-functional requirements are operationalised by 
indicators [143]. In the next chapter we elaborate on these indicators and norms to indicate 
the direction of improvement within BIS. 
A demonstration of the artefacts working can be viewed via the video on the appendices and 
can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc 
CASE REQUIREMENT FORM
1. Key BIS management
information
Dashboard on policy status, risks 
and evidence
Dashboard
2. Key BIS governance
practices and KSF
BISG Assessment questionnaire Functional
3. Key BIS management
interventions
BIS maturity assessment 
questionnaire 
Functional
4. Insight into BIS metrics List of predefined metrics Non-functional & 
functional
5. Use of existing management
models
Knowledge items / Scope and 
context items / Stakeholder 
analysis
Functional & 
environmental
This table summarizes the requirements for the artefact and contribute in the deliverables set 
in chapter 1 and will be taken into account to be demonstrated and evaluated in chapter 7. 
Figure 47: Deliverables from chapter 6 & 7 based upon the DSR framework of Johannesson and Perjons [73].
Table 15: Summary of the 5 requirements in the artefact.
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This chapter valuates the way the artefact works, based on the five cases, and makes a 
contribution to solving practical problems that arise before, during and after the MBIS 
process. It also demonstrates how it solves problems experienced by stakeholders. 
7.1         INTRODUCTION
Explicating the problem and designing the requirements is the initial phase of the Design 
Science Research approach used to establish the artefact. In the previous chapter five cases 
were addressed via the DSR guidelines. The previous chapter addressed the problem, 
potential solutions and treatment considerations that form the requirements for the artefact. 
In this chapter we demonstrate and evaluate the artefact. First we demonstrate how the 
requirements, which are described in Chapter 6, were implemented in the artefact. How 
these requirements treat problems and how the artefact functions operate and have effect. In 
the evaluation step we elaborate how the artefact was assessed in a proof-of-concept exercise 
during the period March - June 2011. And, after the implementation of the artefact, how it 
was refined, in the “design cycle”, by two academics in two separate research projects. The 
first of these was carried out in 2013 with the objective of examining and testing the core 
requirements and functionalities according to the user. This was done mainly to enhance 
adoption by the user group. The second research project examined the gap between the 
current functionalities and the required functionalities in order for the artefact to function 
as a full “Information Security Management System” (ISMS). This last research project was 
performed in 2014 and 2015 and was driven by an increasing business opportunity due to 
regulations which require the use of a semi-automated ISMS instrument.
This chapter starts by demonstrating, based on the five cases from the previous chapter, 
how the previous requirements were implemented in the artefact and how the problem is 
treated. Finally the effect on the environment is described. This chapter deals with the last two 
iterations of the artefact establishment framework as described in Chapters 2 and 6 [73].
Figure 48: Research phase “demonstrating and evaluating” based on Johannesson and Perjons [73].
Chapter 3: Key Concepts underscoring MBIS
Initial problem
Explicate the 
problem via 
Design & 
Knowledge 
Questions
Define 
requirements 
of the 
Artefact
Design and 
Develop 
Artefact
Demonstrate 
Artefact
Evaluate 
Artefact Chapter 8 
Conclusions
Chapter 1,4,5,6 Chapter 4 & 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 7
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7.2         DEMONSTRATING THE ARTEFACT
A demonstration can be seen as a lightweight evaluation. If the artefact can address a 
problem in one case, it might be able to do so in other cases as well [73]. Hence the fact 
that a demonstration is a one-time event to demonstrate the working of the requirement 
we add the “evaluation process” later on in this chapter. We elaborate the choices we have 
made during the demonstration phase according to the “Guidelines for Demonstrating an 
artefact” put forward by Johannesson and Perjons.
TESTING THE MBIS ARTEFACT
All functional requirements that were required to be implemented in the artefact were 
subject to a change process. Initially a request for functionality was discussed with the 
software developer to determine the objective, impact and timelines related to the adoption 
of the requirements. To monitor this process an online software development tool was used 
to track and trace the software development process. See the Appendix for screenshots. This 
approach enabled me to plan enough time for the demonstration and evaluation of new 
requirements.
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7.2.1    CASE 1: DEMONSTRATING KEY BIS MANAGEMENT INFORMATION IN THE MBIS ARTE-
FACT
Case Requirement Form
1.Key BIS management information Dashboard on policy status, risks and 
evidence
Dashboard
In line with the previous Design science research approach, the guidelines from Johannessen 
and Perjons for demonstrating and evaluating the artefact are applied.
Case
Justify the Choice 
of Case Explain 
why the chosen 
case is representa-
tive of the
problem and chal-
lenging enough to 
offer an adequate 
test bed
Make Clear How 
Much of the Ar-
tefact Is Tested. 
Describe the com-
ponents of the
artefact that are 
actually used in the 
demonstration
Make clear 
how and when 
the require-
ment is imple-
mented?
Make clear how 
the problem is 
treated
Make clear 
the effects on 
stakeholders 
and the envi-
ronment
Research 
strategy 
for artefact 
demonstra-
tion (Re-
al-life, POC)
1.Key 
BIS man-
agement 
informa-
tion.
The objective here 
is to demonstrate 
the working of the 
artefact on the item 
“Key BIS manage-
ment information”. 
We choose to use 
a dummy account 
with fictive data 
named “Nivenco” 
NV. This dummy 
account captures 
all the function-
alities of the life 
version that is used 
by real-life organi-
sations throughout 
the Netherlands.
In undermen-
tioned visual we 
demonstrate the 
components “Key 
BIS management 
information” in 
the MBIS artefact. 
Functionalities; 
dashboarding, 
policy, risks and 
evidence.
Over the period 
2011-2015 
over 50 unique 
accounts and over 
200 assessments 
that make use of 
these components 
are processed.
The require-
ment “dash- 
boarding” is 
implemented 
in the initial 
version in 
2011.
Policy, risk and 
evidence is 
implemented 
in the later 
versions.
The initial prob-
lem is treated by 
implementing 
the core man-
agement infor-
mation for BIS, 
being risk, policy 
information and 
facts (evidence). 
Although the 
last one is a 
functionality that 
the user needs to 
activate himself 
it is built in in the 
artefact. 
The effect of 
making use 
of the key BIS 
management 
information 
provide 
stakeholders 
in more BIS 
detailing on 
implementa-
tion of the pol-
icy’s, high risks 
and thereby 
encourage 
the entire or-
ganisation to 
deliver the un-
derlying facts 
(evidence). 
Real-life 
with dummy 
account and 
dummy data.
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DASH BOARDING, POLICY AND RISK
In the first screenshot we see the dashboard functionality at the initial login page. On the 
right below at the bottom we see the policy functionality that can be filled in in the back end 
of the application. This is displayed in the second screenshot (right lower box).
In the screenshot below we demonstrate the risks and the indication of the risk. These are 
expressed in coloured arrows going up or down to indicate severity.
Figure 49: Case 1: Demonstrating dashboarding and policy.
Figure 50: Case 1: Demonstrating the risk overview and risk indications.
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Figure 51: Case 1: Demonstrating dashboarding operational level of virtualisation vulnerabilities
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Figure 52 displays the multiple dashboards on the three organisational levels (based on 
the Von Solms and Von Solms model). The underlying management and operational data 
is extracted from numerous sources as described in Chapter 1 and visualised in Figure 52 
below. 
Strategic level:
Board of Directors / Executive management
Tactical level:
Senior and Middle management
Operational level:
Lower management and administration
Directives
Execution
Di
re
ct Control
Performance info: Dashboarding/
Reporting on Maturity levels,
Risk levels, Benchmarking,
Compliance
Information
Security
Measurement
(Performance
information)
Information
Security
Measurement
(Process data)
IT Security
(ops data)
InfoSec Process data on Key Control
Tracking (GITC), Security Action 
Plans,Risk Register, Asset ownership
Ops Dta on e.g. IAM, SIEM, TSCM,
VM, FW, AV, IPS, SSD, TI, EDR, DLP,
OSG, SRL
Figure 52: BIS processes and data based on Von Solms Direct, Monitor and Control Cycle [57].
Figure 53: Case 1: Demonstrating the policy setting and maintenance.
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EVIDENCE-BASED
In the visual below we demonstrate that in each assessment questionnaire there is an option 
to upload evidence to substantiate the finding. With audits this can be made obligatory.
Figure 54: Case 1: Demonstrating the evidence collection.
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7.2.2  CASE 2: DEMONSTRATING KEY BIS GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND KSF QUESTION-
NAIRE
Case Requirement Form
2.Key BIS governance practices and KSF Assessment questionnaire Functional
MANAGEMENT CONSOLE
In the first screenshot the management interface of the SecuriMeter is displayed. In this 
screen the superuser can create new questionnaires or assessments. He or she can create 
answer templates, scales, question types, and other additional functionalities that are 
required. In this case the NPLF scale is displayed with 10% steps.
Case
Justify the 
choice of case, 
explain why the 
chosen case is 
representative 
of the
problem and 
challenging 
enough to offer 
an adequate 
test bed
Make clear how 
much of the ar-
tefact is tested. 
Describe the com-
ponents of the
artefact that are 
actually used in the 
demonstration
Make clear how 
and when the 
requirement is 
implemented?
Make clear 
how the prob-
lem is treated
Make clear the 
effects on stake-
holders and the 
environment
Research 
strategy 
for artefact 
demon-
stration 
(Real-life, 
POC)
2.Key BIS 
governance 
practices 
and KSF.
The objective is 
to incorporate 
the list of 20 
governance 
practices into 
the artefact. 
The initial test 
case was imple-
mentation of 
the top 20 into 
the dummy ac-
count Nivenco 
and run several 
tests. 
In undermentioned 
visual we demon-
strate the compo-
nents;
-BISG maturity 
measurement,
- ISO15504 NPLF 
scaling,
-Dashboarding and 
reporting in the 
MBIS artefact.
Over the period 
2013-2015 > 10 
unique accounts 
applied this ar-
tefact function. 
Special attention 
to this function was 
given during the 
Nyenrode Com-
missaris Cyclus in 
June 2014, in sev-
eral master classes 
(Volker Wessels) in 
2015 
This requirement 
was implemented 
after the publi-
cation of this re-
search at HICSS. 
This validation 
in academia 
legitimises to 
implement the list 
of 20 items into 
the test account 
NIVENCO. 
The problem 
is treated by 
implementing 
the list in the 
artefact, share 
the list with the 
stakeholder 
and thereby 
provide inside 
what the 
current states 
is and what 
the desired 
status could 
be. One case 
is included I 
the Appendix. 
A company 
which used the 
list for a period 
of two years 
to tread the 
problem.
The initial effect 
is providing 
insight into 
specific knowl-
edge items on 
which practices 
are relevant for 
the stakeholder 
(BoD). This 
enables boards 
to initiate the 
discussion and 
also enables the 
security profes-
sional to open 
up a dialogue 
based on corpo-
rate governance 
derived practic-
es that are rele-
vant for BIS. 
Real-life 
artefact 
was used 
and the list 
was initially 
uploaded 
it the test 
account 
NIVEN-
CO. After 
several 
tests by the 
consultants 
the test was 
promoted 
to the life 
version and 
applied by 
> 10 cus-
tomers. 
DEMONSTRATING AND EVALUATING 
THE ARTEFACT7 223
ISO15504 AS A STANDARD FOR SECURITY MATURITY MEASUREMENTS
This NPLF rating refers to the ISO15504 standard. Since it is not the objective to exhaustively 
elaborate on maturity measurement scales but only to demonstrate the working of the 
artefact, we focused on demonstrating the implementation of the functionalities such as 
applying the NPLF scales to the questionnaires. Within the artefact numerous answering 
scales are defined such as open questions, closed questions, Yes/No answers, etc. The 
functionality of question groups and answering possibilities is displayed in the screenshot 
below. A detailed description on NPLF is in the Appendix.
Figure 55: Case 2: Demonstrating NPLF Likert score input via the management console.
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THE USER INTERFACE TO SELECT THE BISG MEASUREMENT
In the screenshot below the user can choose the type of assessment he/she wants to 
execute. On the right the date, owner, percentage of completion and numerous reporting 
functionalities are displayed.
Figure 56: Case 2: Demonstrating the NPLF configuration via the management interface.
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KEY BISG IN A DASHBOARD FOR DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT.
In the screenshot below we demonstrate the six domains of the BISG maturity assessment 
that are displayed. These are: Governance processes, Structures and Relational mechanisms. 
Also executive management processes, structures and relational mechanisms. Each domain 
represents the 20 questions which are weighted via the NPLF scaling. The green percentages 
are the increase in maturity experienced during the period from 1-11-2014 to 1-7-2015.
Figure 57: Case 2: Demonstrating the BISG assessment in the artefact.
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7.2.3  CASE 3: DEMONSTRATING BIS MATURITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Case
Justify the Choice 
of Case Explain 
why the chosen 
case is representa-
tive of the
problem and chal-
lenging enough to 
offer an adequate 
test bed
Make Clear 
How Much of 
the Artefact Is 
Tested. Describe 
the components 
of the
artefact that are 
actually used in 
the demonstra-
tion
Make clear how 
and when the 
requirement is 
implemented?
Make clear how 
the problem is 
treated
Make clear the 
effects on stake-
holders and the 
environment
Research 
strategy 
for artefact 
demonstra-
tion (Real-life, 
POC)
3. BIS maturi-
ty assessment
According to the 
research results 
in Chapter 3 all 
organisations want 
to increase their 
security maturity 
within the coming 
two years but lack 
adequate insight 
how to do this. 
The initiated BIS 
maturity assess-
ment proposed 
in Chapter 3 and 
defined in Chapter 
5 as requirement 
was incorporated 
into the initial 
version of the ar-
tefact (date 2011) 
Due to the fact 
this was the initial 
requirement and 
functionality it 
was chosen to do 
this in a Proof of 
Concept. 
The POC of the 
MBIS assessment 
focused on three 
versions.
1. The quick 
assessment (only 
six questions) this 
assessment has 
the objective to 
briefly highlight 
the main items 
that indicate 
the BIS maturity 
within the organi-
sation. 2. The 
Basic Scan; this 
assessment has 
the objective to 
measure based 
on the twenty 
items raised from 
the qualitative 
research from 
Chapter 3. And 
map these items 
on the COBIT4.1 
security maturity 
ladder proposed 
in the flow dia-
gram in Chapter 
5
The requirement 
was implement-
ed in the initial 
version of the 
artefact in Q1 
2011. This was 
done via Proof of 
concept under 
authority of the 
University of 
Utrecht in the 
form of a bach-
elor research 
project. The 
implementation 
was also evalu-
ated. See next 
section. 
The problem 
is treated by 
implementing 
the list in the 
artefact, share 
the list with the 
stakeholder and 
thereby provide 
inside what the 
current states 
is and what the 
desired status 
could or should 
be. Five cases 
performed 
after 2011 are 
included in the 
Appendix. 
The initial effect 
is providing 
insight into spe-
cific knowledge 
items on which 
interventions are 
relevant for the 
stakeholder. The 
interventions 
give insight in 
the current status 
and the desired 
status and en-
ables discussion 
between busi-
ness, and securi-
ty professionals. 
The provided 
list including 
the COBIT 4.1. 
measuring scale 
provide direct 
insight for the 
stakeholder and 
its environment. 
The POC report 
in the Appendix 
also highlights 
improvement 
effects. 
POC
Case Requirement Form
3.Key BIS management interventions BIS maturity Assessment questionnaire Functional
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Figure 58: Case 2: Demonstrating the six domains of the BISG maturity assessment in dashboard gauges.
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7.2.4  CASE 4: DEMONSTRATING METRICS IN THE MBIS ARTEFACT
Case Requirement Form
4.Insight into BIS metrics List of predefined metrics Non-functional & functional
Case 
Justify the 
Choice of Case 
Explain why the 
chosen case is 
representative 
of the
problem and 
challenging 
enough to offer 
an adequate test 
bed.
Make Clear How 
Much of the Ar-
tefact Is Tested. 
Describe the com-
ponents of the
artefact that are 
actually used in the 
demonstration.
Make clear how 
and when the 
requirement is 
implemented?
Make clear how 
the problem is 
treated.
Make clear the 
effects on stake-
holders and the 
environment.
Research strat-
egy for artefact 
demonstration 
(Real-life, POC).
4.List of 
predefined 
Metrics
The predefined 
requirements 
from this exam-
ple are imple-
mented over a 
longer period of 
time (between 
2013 and 
2015). Because 
of the number 
of metrics it was 
chosen to imple-
ment them step 
by step. Each 
requirement 
was proposed 
to the developer 
via the develop-
ment process. 
Two options 
were possible; 
it was a simple 
change to a cur-
rent function-
ality or it was a 
major structural 
change.
The metric com-
ponent to measure 
and monitor the BS 
progression (BIS 
improvement) at 
governance level 
was done via:
the NPLF score 
and is displayed 
via spider diagram 
or gauge diagram. 
And via the screen 
scope were the se-
curity organisation 
needs to be made 
explicit.
The metric com-
ponent to measure 
management is 
made explicit via 
the number of risks 
and the periodical-
ly increase in risk 
compared to the 
previous measure-
ment. The effective-
ness of the control 
and number of 
audit remarks. The 
metric component 
at operational level 
is the percentage of 
failed and passed 
penetration tests 
and the level of 
compliancy to-
wards the security 
baseline.
These require-
ments were 
implemented 
after the per-
formed research 
in 2013 and 
October 2014. 
All of the re-
quirements were 
implemented 
via the Software 
development 
change process. 
The problem 
of the lack of 
adequate metrics 
was mastered 
by the initially 
refinement of rel-
evant metrics in 
Chapter 5. After 
the refinement 
the most relevant 
ones were imple-
mented in the 
artefact. We have 
distinguished 
governance 
metrics, man-
agement metrics 
and operational 
metrics. By doing 
this it enables 
organisations to 
address numer-
ous levels of the 
organisation in 
taking their re-
sponsibility and/
or accountability 
of BIS maturity. 
By distinguishing 
numerous levels 
of the organisa-
tions and their 
relevant metrics 
(according to 
the experts) this 
makes it possible 
to start the de-
bate within the 
organisation that 
is responsible 
and accountable 
of delivering the 
data. So the side 
effect is the entire 
organisation 
increase in aware-
ness on the rel-
evance and also 
the responsibility 
to gain and main-
tain knowledge in 
order to deliver 
the metric data. 
The requirement 
implementation 
with a large im-
pact, for exam-
ple the gauges 
graphs was 
done via a test 
version of the 
artefact. Also the 
Integrated risk 
overview which 
makes it possible 
to measure the 
periodically 
increase in the 
amount of risk 
was done via a 
test version. The 
minor changes 
where imple-
mented in the 
real-life version 
and tested in the 
NIVENCO dum-
my account 
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DEMONSTRATING THE METRIC AT GOVERNANCE LEVEL
 − Progression in establishing a BIS organisation (steering committee, CISO, CRO)
In this demonstration case we see the progression that was made during the last six months 
on establishing an Information Security organisation. This percentage in growth represents 
underlying questions the organisation needs to answer and proof in order to justify the score. 
In the first screenshot we demonstrate the main dashboard for the requirement “Progression 
in establishing a BIS organisation” In the second screenshot, the breakdown of the questions 
that needs to be answered and proofed (screenshot 3) by the organisation, is presented.
Figure 59: Case 4: Demonstrating the BIS organisation dashboard.
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 − Overview of realised versus planned BIS improvements and changes per period
The screenshot below shows how the requirement “Overview of realised versus planned BIS 
improvements and changes per period” is implemented in the MBIS artefact.
In the tab “Observations” all the general observations made by the organisation are 
collected. The sources can vary from audits and assessments to technical tests, etc. All of 
these observations are then prioritised for their impact on organisations and appointed 
Figure 60: Case 4: Demonstrating Business assessment (ISO) questionnaire.
Figure 61: Case 4: Demonstrating evidencing-functionality.
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to an owner who is delegated to mitigate the risks. Based on risk prioritisation a plan is 
developed which also incorporates an element of time. For example, high risks need to be 
mitigated prior to medium risks. In the screenshot below this prioritisation is done in graphs 
(dashboard) in the first column and given a priority (Must have, Should have, etc.) Also the 
estimated cost of the risk is included and a target date to resolve the issue. In the last two 
columns an indication of fixing cost as well as the due date for the next audit or assessment 
is given. This overview provides a planning that the security manager can use to base his or 
her programme on. And the financial department can use it to reserve adequate security 
funding.
MANAGEMENT
 − Number of security incidents (gained via observations44), effectiveness of security 
controls, development of the maturity level.
In the screenshot below we demonstrate in the left column the origins of the observations. 
These can be origins from self-assessments, audits, meetings, pen tests, etc. All observations 
are included in the artefact and labelled as risks or incidents. A risk is indicated based on the 
CIA triad of Confidentiality risk, Availability risk or Integrity risk. The symbols in the second 
column indicate the severity and provide a dashboard for management on the progression 
or regression of the mitigation of a specific observation (incident). In the third column the 
risk it can pose to the organisation is described; this can be technical, legal, personal or 
reputational. In the fourth column the measure (control) against the risk is defined. This 
is included by the risk owner on how to mitigate the risk and which appropriate control is 
in place. The level of appropriate controls compared to the total outstanding number of 
observations is an effective way to measure the effectiveness of the security programme.
A disciplined team of people need to maintain the observations and extract these from the 
entire organisation to create the necessary exhaustive view. It is essential to have a proper 
44  In Dutch noted as “bevindingen”
 
Figure 62: Case 4 Demonstrating BIS improvements and periodically changes via the IRO.
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risk management process in place to delegate the risk to its owners as well as continuous 
monitoring whether deadlines for mitigation are being achieved. The sixth column 
represents the potential cost for the owner to fix the risk and the seventh column represents 
the frequency the observation is audited. The last column indicates the date the next audit or 
assessment is pending. This provides the risk owner with direct insight into the due date.
 − Number of audit remarks
Current and new audit remarks are seen as observations and can therefore be added to the 
observation list as shown above. When periodically reviewing this observation overview, the 
user has direct insight into new audit remarks and their owners.
OPERATIONS
 − Percentage of failed pen tests
Doing penetration testing on systems is a way of exploring vulnerabilities that might be 
exploited and might impose a security threat to the organisation. This so-called pen testing of 
systems can be performed in several ways. An internationally well-known method for testing 
is based on the OWASP top 1045. In this research the objective used to demonstrate how the 
pen-test criterion, on which a thorough penetration test is based, is incorporated as a metric 
requirement in the artefact. It is not my intention to validate or proof the pen-test method.
In the first screenshot the main categories of penetration testing criteria are laid out. In the 
second screenshot we see more detailing for the pen tester to perform and on which Likert 
scale (based on ISO15504 maturity scaling) he or she needs to score findings. By doing this 
45  The Open Web Application Security Project OWASP Top 10 Privacy Risks Project provides a top 10 list for privacy risks in web 
applications and related countermeasures. The list uses the OECD Privacy Guidelines as a framework and can also be used to 
assess privacy risks associated with specific web applications.
Figure 63: Case 4: Demonstrating the metrics at the management level.
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we quantify qualitative datasets. In the third screen we see the functionality within the artefact 
which the user needs to attach proof to a pen-test. In this case a failed test, for example due 
to the lack of certain information can be reported here. In the last screenshot we can see 
all penetration testing results over the last year based on this penetration working method 
whereby all qualitative data gathering is converted into quantitative measurable data.
Figure 64: Case 4: Demonstrating the metrics at the operational level (pen-test scores).
 
Figure 65: Case 4: Demonstrating the NPLF scales which represent pen-test score.
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Figure 66: Case 4: Demonstrating evidence delivery for pen-test scores.
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Figure 67: Case 4: Demonstrating the dashboard information of the pen test score.
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7.2.5  CASE 5: DEMONSTRATING STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS IN THE MBIS ARTEFACT
Case Requirement Form
5.Use of existing 
management models
Knowledge items / Scope and context items / 
Stakeholder analysis
Functional & Environmental
Case Justify the choice 
of case & explain 
why the chosen 
case is representa-
tive of the
problem and chal-
lenging enough to 
offer an adequate 
test bed
Make clear how 
much of the 
artefact is tested. 
Describe the com-
ponents of the
artefact that are 
actually used in the 
demonstration
Make clear 
how and when 
the require-
ment is imple-
mented?
Make clear how 
the problem is 
treated
Make clear the 
effects on stake-
holders and the 
environment
Research 
strategy 
for artefact 
demonstra-
tion (Real-life, 
POC)
Use of 
existing 
man-
agement 
models
The major prob-
lem articulated 
in Chapter 5 is 
the absence into 
proper scoping of 
the MBIS. To be-
gin with scoping 
of the number of 
stakeholders and 
their expectations, 
requirements 
and needs. The 
problem to solve 
was to provide 
insight into the 
stakeholders and 
their dependency 
towards the or-
ganisation. This 
functionality was 
called the stake-
holder analysis.
The stakeholder 
analysis was in-
tegrated into the 
artefact in 2013. 
It was performed 
by thoroughly 
decomposing the 
stakeholders:
-Name and role 
(regulator, suppli-
er, customer etc.)
-Ownership in 
terms of who’s re-
sponsible in ade-
quately managing 
the stakeholder 
within the compa-
ny, departments 
such as Legal, 
HRM, Commu-
nication, investor 
relations.
-Affiliated risks, 
impact and de-
pendencies (i.e. 
compliance risk, 
financial risks, le-
gal risks, personal 
liabilities)
An additional 
item is included to 
judge the contrac-
tual dependency 
with the stakehold-
er. For example, if 
there is a service 
level agreement or 
other form of legal 
agreement.
The require-
ment is 
implemented 
in the artefact 
version 4. 
By explicating 
the entire field of 
digital stakehold-
ers an organisa-
tion gains insight 
into their net-
work partners. 
In addition, they 
gain insight into 
legal, technical 
dependencies.
By utilising visi-
bility this enables 
the discussion on 
how to mitigate 
certain legal or 
technical depen-
dency risks. 
By providing 
visibility the side- 
effect is the dis-
cussion among 
directors on the 
acceptance level 
of dependency 
and perhaps 
a certain risk 
appetite. This 
information has 
influence on the 
maturity level 
an organisation 
wants to attain 
and also what’s 
needed (e.g. 
knowledge) 
to maintain a 
certain level. Pe-
riodically review 
the stakeholder 
analysis provides 
more control. 
Also for financial 
partners (Ven-
ture capitalist, 
Private equity, 
insurance and 
banks) 
Knowledge 
items / 
Stakeholder 
analysis im-
plementation 
in the artefact 
test environ-
ment
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The figure below illustrates the decomposition of the artefact requirements framed as the 
“Stakeholder Analysis”
INTEGRATED RISK OVERVIEW (IRO)
To identify associated risks which certain strategic stakeholders represent and to determine 
the force (static or dynamic in nature), a decomposition of the risk is made. We define:
- Risk description. This indicates what the risk is and how is it identified (as a strategic, tactical, 
or an operational risk). Who’s the ‘owner’ of the risk and what is the likelihood that it will 
occur?
- The potential impact of the risk is indicated (based on the CIA indicators) and the impact on 
compliance is also indicated.
Integrating information system risks into an information risk overview (IRO) makes it easier 
for boards to create a holistic overview on all information-related risks.
DEFINE OWNERSHIP OF CRITICAL ASSETS
To determine ownership of critical assets it is important to set an artefact requirement that 
indicates this. The asset name, location, accountability and impact break down the necessary 
information to see if a certain force has influence on the ‘crown jewels’ of the organisation. 
Assets can be any object that contains information such as buildings, IT systems, data storage, 
paper files, people, etc.
Figure 68: Functional requirements for the stakeholder analysis.
 
 
 
Figure 69: Functional requirements for the Information Risk Overview.
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Risk assurance based on an Information Security Management System (ISMS)
To align stakeholder-related risks and critical ownership with measurements that can control 
these risks, an assurance function is proposed as the final requirement for the artefact. With 
this requirement we follow the Deming Cycle of Plan, Do, Check and Act to:
- Address a certain strategic force as a stakeholder that influences our scope as well as the
MBIS strategy and process (PLAN).
- Indicate the power, dependency and risk this stakeholder imposes on the organisation and
therefore the extent to which it can influence the MBIS strategy and process.
- Assign the stakeholder and its risks (to critical assets) to an ‘owner’ in the organisation and 
implement appropriate actions (interventions, practices, investments, etc.) to control the risk
and ensure continuity, integrity and availability (DO).
- Frequently check if all forces and related risks are mitigated by the owner (CHECK).
- Address residual risk that is not addressed by the general controlling mechanisms. Evaluate
the above-mentioned steps to initiate appropriate corrective measures (ACT). Continuously 
involving the asset owner and stakeholder in this process increases the level of commitment 
[82] [259] and therefore the success of the security programme [80].
7.3        EVALUATING THE ARTEFACT
7.3.1  TREATMENT VALIDATION
In order to determine whether the requirement setting contributes to solving problems 
and meeting stakeholder goals, validation of treatment is required. To validate a treatment 
is to justify that it would contribute to stakeholder goals when implemented in the problem 
context. “This is done after requirement setting and has the objective to pre-test the artefacts 
requirements if no real-world implementation is available to investigate whether the treatment 
contributes to stakeholder goals. [146]” Ideally the process of treatment validation is done 
Figure 70: Functional requirement setting for the asset inventory in the IRO.
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before implementation, but sometimes this is not always the case or possible, hence the 
fact that in a dynamic business environment time is limiting and laboratory settings and 
resources have limited availability. The objective of treatment validation is also to develop a 
design theory, alternate alternatives or adjustments of an artefact in a certain context and 
to test its behaviour and outcomes once it is transferred into its intended problem context. 
The theory is used to predict potential outcome or formulate assumptions and/or examine 
alternatives.
7.3.2  EVALUATION OBJECTIVES
In this chapter we describe three forms of testing and evaluation of the artefact over a longer 
period of time (2011-2015), each with a different objective.
1. During the first six months of 2011 an evaluation of the initial MBIS artefact was conducted in 
the form of a Proof of Concept with a limited number of users with the objective of examining 
how the MBIS artefact can contribute to a better BIS maturing process within the stakeholder 
group (mid-market companies). 
PERIOD: Q2 2015
2. During the last 3 months of 2014 an evaluation of the current MBIS artefact version was 
performed by a Bachelors research student at the Haagse Hogeschool, Information Security 
(specialisation management). With the objective of re-aligning the experienced business 
problems with the problem-solving capabilities of the artefact. 
PERIOD: Q3 2014
3. During Q2 of 2015 an evaluation of the MBIS artefact was performed in order to examine 
the gap between the desired functionality in the market for Information Security Management 
Systems (ISMS) and how the SecuriMeter can fill that gap/meet that need. This research was 
performed by a Bachelors research student at the Haagse Hogeschool, Information Security 
management direction. With the objective of addressing the problem of organisations 
demanding an ISMS. 
PERIOD: H1 2011
According to the guidelines for artefact evaluation provided by Johannesson and Perjons 
[73] we elaborated the problem, the treatment of the problem via requirement setting, the 
method used to evaluate the artefact and the level of stakeholder engagement.
During the period 2011 - 2014 numerous alterations were developed within the SecuriMeter 
to address practical problems. We elaborate on these three evaluation cases because they 
were performed in a controlled environment under the supervision of a University of Applied 
Sciences and a direct supervisor within the organisation. During the timeframe 2011-2014 
new versions of SecuriMeter were released and can be tracked via version control (youtrack). 
The conditions of these evaluations were therefore more constrained and under the direct 
authority of the supervisor. Also the official peer-review of the Bachelors thesis contributed to 
the reliability and validity of the evaluation work. Due to confidentially these thesis’s can be 
requested at the researcher. 
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7.3.3  PROOF OF CONCEPT TO EVALUATE THE ARTEFACT
In this research project evaluation of the artefact was initially performed in the form of a 
“Proof of Concept (POC)” with a limited number of key users representing the stakeholder 
group. The reason for a proof-of-concept setting before live testing was two-fold. In this 
project a real-world implementation was available and also a large number of stakeholders 
were enthusiastic about participating in the POC phase of the artefact design and 
development. Despite the large number of potential test users for the POC, we chose to have 
a limited number of POC users. For the Proof of Concept the key users are security managers 
and IT managers working in real environments and representing the real-life context. 
This POC was performed in the form of a Bachelor-level research project by a student at 
Hogeschool Utrecht (Utrecht University of Applied Sciences) and was limited in time (two 
months). The POC research project planning is illustrated in Table 16 in project phase 7 and 
8 (taken from the original thesis):
PHASE RESULT PLANNING
1 Research existing tooling Inventory on tooling 1-3-2010/30-6
2 Research best practices Idea generation 1-3/30-6
3 Research combinations Optimising tool sets 1-7/30-9
4 Functionality requirements Functional requirements 1-7/30-9
5 Business requirements Business requirements (company) 1-10/31-12
6 Test existing tooling Testresults 1-10/31-12
7 Apply tooling Apply tooling live 1-1/31-3
8 Evaluate tooling Evaluate findings together with 
users
1-4/30-4
9 Redesign tooling Process changes 1-5/30-6
10 Accept tooling Take in production 1-7-2011
During the POC the objective was to test and evaluate the BIS maturity assessment that was 
set in Case 3 in Chapter 6. The questions from the proposed flow diagram were implemented 
in the MBIS artefact via three types of survey questionnaires:
1. The Quick Scan. This assessment has the objective of briefly highlighting the main items
that indicate the BIS maturity within the organisation with a total of six questions that lead
to a very high-level indication of maturity.
2. The Basic Scan. This assessment has the objective of measuring – based on the twenty items
included from the qualitative research described in Chapter 4 and of mapping these items 
on the COBIT4.1 security maturity ladder proposed in the flow diagram in Chapter 5 see 
Figure 39.
3. The Advanced Scan. This assessment has the objective of indicating the maturity level based
on ISO27001 and ISO27002.
The scope of the POC was to test these three BIS maturity assessments, generate a report 
Table 16: Planning of the evaluation of the artefact via a POC.
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from the MBIS artefact and present it in the dashboard.
STAKEHOLDER EVALUATION
The three assessment types were evaluated with four stakeholders. The four stakeholder 
groups were:
1. Housing corporations
2. Insurance companies
3. Credit management and bailiff companies
4. Housing corporations.
To test whether the artefact meets the stakeholders’ goals and solves the problems described 
in Chapter 5, the following criteria were evaluated.
Questions related to the BIS maturity assessment
Testability and recurrence. Is the audit correct and repeatable?
Is the interview time acceptable, for example for boards to give a brief indication of BIS 
maturity?
Questions related to the MBIS artefact tool
Is the tool exhaustive?
Is the tool (and its functionalities) understandable?
Is the tool reliable? Does it represent a valid view of relevant BIS items?
Furthermore the POC participants were asked to provide feedback on the tool as well as 
suggestions to improve the BIS maturity assessment.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE POC
All stakeholders formed a clear opinion of the artefact’s functionalities and the BIS maturity 
assessment. In the table below a summary is made of their reactions. And in the Appendix 
there is a full report of the stakeholder evaluation. We can state that this POC gave us 
feedback on the fact that the MBIS tool actually contributes to solving the problem of the 
lack of insight into maturity levels within organisations. All participants agreed on the value 
of using a measurement instrument and were positive about the quick scan that managers 
can use to provide a high-level indication of BIS maturity. They also encourage adding the 
(more in-depth) advanced scan and the more technically oriented assessment to provide 
more evidence-based facts at the operational level of security. Important improvement 
suggestions are: add a validation function to proof the provided answers (audit purposes), 
more graph alternatives46, make the files multilingual (the POC was in English), more in-
46  The initial dashboard function is shown in the appendix document of chapter 7 in the digital archive .
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depth technical assessments and brief explanations of each question. All participants were 
enthusiastic about participating in a new MBIS artefact research evaluation project and 
would recommend the MBIS artefact to others.
An interesting finding was the fact that all participants were asked what their maturity level 
is at this moment and also what their desired state would be. All participants (100%) 
recognise the need to increase the maturity level. This underpins the earlier outcome of the 
research described in Chapter 4 that all organisations want to achieve a higher level of BIS 
than they have at the moment. This highlights the relevance of doing this research, but also 
the need to establish tooling to trace and proof steps during the maturing process.
REFLECTIONS ON THE POC
After this initial POC phase the tool was in development test mode for the next 7 months (in 
2011) to make sure all teething problems were addressed. During 2011 numerous sessions 
were held with the consultants and also external expertise was acquired to evaluate and 
test the artefact. External expertise was acquired to better anticipate certain innovations or 
areas of expertise. This external view, collaboration and development in the MBIS artefact 
research project became a recurring process in the Design Science research “design cycle” 
and made it possible to solve business problems with the artefact. In the next section some 
important design collaborations are explained.
The POC provided us with some important alterations to the design and development of 
the MBIS artefact. First, we decided to establish the artefact based on agile methodologies 
so that each functional (not technical) test was done in the live application in the dummy 
account NIVENCO. Each new functionality that was initially tested successfully in the 
NIVENCO account was added to the “live” application so that new users could participate in 
real-life testing. These were usually consultants testing the new functionality with customers 
and asking for feedback on the spot. The artefact was therefore equipped with a feedback 
button for uploading direct feedback and improvement suggestions. Each month the data 
collected via this feedback function was analysed and discussed with the consultants and 
the developer. Secondly, each relevant suggestion was put on the development list (see an 
extract of this “youtrack” list in the appendix document that can be accessed via http://
dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc).
IMPORTANT ALTERATIONS TO THE MBIS ARTEFACT AFTER THE POC PHASE
An important contribution was made by collaboration with experts in the field. Requests 
from the stakeholder evaluations to include more technically oriented assessments in the 
artefact numerous initiatives resulted in new assessments to measure the operational BIS 
level of organisations. Below we highlight the most important and significant contributions 
that were made on the operational level.
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INITIATION 
DATE 
PROBLEM COLLABORATING PARTNER RESULT # TESTS
9-8-2011 Lack of 
insight into 
virtualisation 
risks (version 4)
VMware Virtualisation 
Security 
Assessment (Deep 
and Quick)
7 assessments on 
version 4
and 8 
assessments on 
version 5 per 
4-7-2013**
12-8-2011 Lack of insight 
into Web threats
Aladdin eSafe Web application 
Vulnerability 
assessment
+20 assessments
since 2011
12-8-2011 Lack of insight 
into firewall 
configuration 
vulnerabilities
Internal 
expertise and 
tools
Firewall Security 
Assessment
+10 assessments
since 2011
9-8-2011 Lack of insight 
into Wireless 
networks 
vulnerabilities 
and risks
Airtight 
networks, 
Internal 
expertise and 
tools
Wireless 
Vulnerability 
Assessment
+5 assessments
since 2011
12-8-2011 Lack in insights 
into LAN 
vulnerabilities
Internal 
expertise and 
tools
LAN vulnerability 
assessment
+40 assessments
since 2011
5-6-2012 Lack of insight 
into Social media 
usage
Palo Alto 
Networks
Social Media 
Vulnerability 
Assessment
5 assessments 
taken on 4-7-
2013**
11-4-2013 Lack of cookie 
compatibility
Internal 
expertise
Cookie assessment +2 assessments
since 2013
11-4-2013 Lack of DigiD pre-
audit requirements
NCSC DigID Pre-Audit +10 assessments
since 2013
9-11-2011 Lack of BYOD 
vulnerabilities
Internal 
expertise and 
tools
BYOD Assessment
14-6-2013 Lack of insight 
into web 
application 
vulnerabilities
Internal 
expertise and 
tools. HP 
Websinspect
Web application 
vulnerability 
assessment
+20 assessments
since 2013
18-4-2013 Lack of insight 
into network 
vulnerabilities
Qualys* Vulnerability 
management 
assessment
+1 assessments
since 2013
13-10-2013 Lack of database 
vulnerabilities 
Oracle Database Security 
assessment
+2 assessments
since 2013
*Qualys reports all network vulnerabilities in an XML format. In collaboration with Qualys and a customer in 
the Netherlands direct import functionality was transferred from Qualys into the SecuriMeter. This functionality 
provides the opportunity to read all XML reports into the SecuriMeter using DLL parsing functionalities. In the 
Appendix the technical design and POC construction is detailed.
** See appendices for an example of evidence on how SecuriMeter keeps track of the total number of assessments.
Table 17: Summary of other operational-oriented security assessments in the artefact.
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These assessments are implemented in the artefact over a longer timeframe. In the screenshot 
below a fragment of all assessments are displayed.
Figure 71: Evaluation of the artefact: List of all the BIS assessments in the artefact.
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Besides these collaborations in the design cycle of the Design Science research phase of the 
SecuriMeter development other alterations were implemented based on feedback from the 
stakeholder evaluation.
 − The validation function to proof the provided answers (audit purposes). This functionality 
is required to support the answers with proof, for example this is a regulatory demand for 
auditing. This functionality is described and presented in the previous section.
 − More graphic alternatives were implemented during the year 2012. Besides spider 
diagrams bar diagrams and gauges were also introduced and implemented. The graphical 
interface of the SecuriMeter can facilitate al kind of graphs and visuals, depending on the 
audience. All graphs are also integrated into the numerous reports.
 − Multilingual (the POC was in English). In the initial phase of the development the material 
was only in English, but due to customer requests this was amended to include Dutch as 
well.
 − More in-depth technical assessments. This request was executed due to several initiatives 
as mentioned in the previous section. In the above-mentioned examples numerous 
collaboration initiatives were developed in the technical domain to substantiate the survey 
findings with operational proof. This functionality proved to be the function that was most 
appreciated by numerous clients. Some feedback from the field:
From MS, who is a professor in Information Security at The Hague University of Applied 
Sciences.
“With such a huge amount of norms and standards the CIO needs to deal with so many items, 
with SecuriMeter he has a simple dashboard view to monitor the most relevant items”, “For 
the CISO the SecuriMeter can be a tool to transparently report to the board if Cyber Security 
Maturity is in control.”
From Dr WT RE, who is a lecturer in auditing and assurance at the Free University in Amsterdam 
:
“Determining the level of security is a time-consuming exercise for organisations. Within 
Government the Baseline Information Security Government can be used for this (BIR). 
Organisations can facilitate this measuring process themselves by performing BIR based self-
assessments to measure their own score based on the BIR. The collected evidence can be used 
for auditing purposes, this increases the efficiency of the auditing process. This can be even more 
efficient by automating parts of this self-assessment processes, for example via the SecuriMeter. 
This instrument facilitates evidence-based maturity self-assessments.”
ARTEFACT EVALUATION ON IMPROVING THE SERVICES OFFERED
During the period 2013-2014 research was conducted by a researcher at The Hague 
University of Applied Sciences. The main research question was: How can the SecuriMeter 
artefact be applied to improve the B-Able professional services offering?
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This research had the objective of providing answers to what kind of choices are necessary 
in order to improve the artefact, with the final objective of enabling better alignment with 
current business needs and solving practical problems. The research focused on two main 
users of the artefact: the customer and the consultant. The consultant basically uses the 
artefact to collect data, do analysis and make interpretations based on that data, and to 
present the outcomes in an understandable format to the customer. The customer has other 
requirements for the artefact. For example, Do I get answers to certain questions? E.g. does 
the artefact give me insight into certain gaps? Or what do I need to do in order to get to the 
next phase? Thus, there is a need for functionalities such as reporting and dashboards, etc.
The research method used was literature review and interviewing experts via a structured 
questionnaire.
I used literature review to initially position the core functionalities that contribute to better 
service delivery for customers. I positioned the functionalities based on pro’s and con’s.
Dashboarding functionality provides direct insight into the current and the desired state. It 
highlights the gaps that organisations need to overcome in order to reach a certain desired 
state of Business Information Security. This functionality provides insight for the consultant as 
well as the customer.
Assessments is a functionality that consultants can use to collect data from multiple 
sources using multiple methods. Assessments can include questionnaires, observations, 
data gathering, scans, etc. The main purpose of assessments for the consultants is to form a 
proper view of the current state of Business Information Security. For a customer it provides 
insights into the pain per item in the assessment and what kind of interventions they need to 
implement. Within assessment we distinguish two types:
1. Generic assessments are standardised according to certain norms, for example ISO27K 
assessments and DNB assessment. These types of standardised assessments are generic 
in scope and give an exhaustive view on the domains covered. Most of the time this is from 
a regulatory perspective (PCI DSS, HIPAA, NEN, ISO, ISF). Standardised assessments are 
process-oriented and therefore do not exclude predefined items that tend to be overlooked
or neglected by human intellect.
2. Specific assessments tend to focus on certain domains. These can be technology domains,
process domains or organisational domains. These assessments tend to gain deeper 
insights into certain relevant topics in certain organisations (so they are organisation-
specific). Specific assessments also tend to use numerous research methods besides 
interview questionnaires. Usually evidence building is based on observations, documents, 
designs, policies, meeting notes, strategic documents, etc. The research process is 
therefore much more structured (i.e. better justified). 
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A third functionality is programme management trailing. Since Business Information 
Security requires continuous attention, a core functionality of the artefact is programme 
management in order to trace improvements in BIS. This enables a structured and 
managed process of change throughout the organisation without too much interference 
from other processes. The programme management functionality is constructed by 
determining ontological elements such as the context of the organisations (i.e. stakeholder 
requirements), the scope of the programme, such as compliance with a certain regulation, 
increasing security maturity to a certain desired state, etc. The scope of the programme 
can vary depending on the objective of top management. Another element of programme 
management is gaining insight into the current state: collecting data via assessments in order 
to determine the current state based on predefined structured methods (e.g. the above- 
mentioned assessments). The third element is the foundation of the programme. These are 
fundamentals which drive the programme, such as budget allocation, management mandate, 
etc.
The last functionality from the literature review is benchmarking. This functionality provides 
insight into the performance of other organisations or industries.
I used interview techniques to judge the above-mentioned functionalities. The outcome is a 
prioritised list of functionalities according to expert opinion:
1. Reporting
2. Dashboarding
3. Assessments
4. Predefined intervention database
5. Publication
6. Programme management
7. Benchmarking
8. Document management.
Additional expert judgement was based on prioritising the functionalities for efficiency 
and effectiveness. The final outcome of this research provided new insights into prioritising 
requirements setting. In the section below I highlight the most important findings and 
suggested modifications. Each item is accompanied with evidence of how the refinements 
will be made at a later stage.
7.3.4    CONCLUSIONS ON THE ARTEFACT EVALUATION 
The most important findings and recommendations are:
The scales used in the artefact are limited. The scales are mainly based on “yes” or “no” and 
“partially”. This limits the consultant and the customer if questioning in more detail would 
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deliver nuance. It also limits a more accurate view on progression steps. I suggest the use 
of more standardised measurements methods such as ISO15504, which makes it possible 
to score each process based on percentages. This also enables the artefact programme 
management functionality since smaller percentage steps provide more detail on the 
regression or progression of the Business Information Security maturity process.
The refinement that was made to the artefact based on research findings was the adoption 
of ISO15504 as a process- oriented measuring scale. In the appendices are two examples: 
the ISO27K assessment and the Wireless and Mobility assessment. In the appendices it 
is explained how the assessment questions were broken down, linked to the ISO15504 
percentages per maturity level and finally how they are presented in the dashboard. Also a 
comparison is made between the first version and the refined version.
During the interview the suggestion was made to establish a predefined set of interventions 
database. This database can be filled by users during the use of the artefact. The interview 
results concluded that most of the interventions are obvious and recurrent, so a “copy-paste” 
action from previous reports took up most of the assessment time. This is a time-consuming 
exercise and it can be solved by building in functionality that presents potential interventions 
next to each assessment question and these can then be hand-picked from a list. This enables 
the consultant to consider numerous alternatives to a problem. It also enables the consultant 
to do his or her work more efficiently; instead of copy-paste or rewriting potential advice he or 
she immediately generates and chooses the preferred option.
The storage of this data makes it possible to optimise, enrich, scrutinise the collected 
interventions and build a qualitative set of data which can be used for broader purposes, 
such as by scholars, publications and business consulting practices. Establishing such a 
qualitative set of predefined interventions enables the efficiency of the consulting process, 
since the consultant does not have to hand pick from multiple sources; it is simply presented 
in a predefined list.
Publication of the final results is done after the assessment. The current situation is that 
after finalising the assessment, the user can modify the results. From an auditor’s perspective 
that is not a desired situation. The researcher made the suggestion to introduce an extra 
validation step. So, after the assessment report is finalised, pre-publication is possible. Then, 
after final approval by the customer or a principle consultant, the report can be marked as 
“final” and nobody can alter the data in the artefact.
The researcher also raised the programme management functionality as a major 
improvement for customers. Since the core problem is gaining insight into the exact steps 
needed to increase Business Information Security I introduced programme management 
functionalities. The first step is to determine the context and the scope of the programme. 
For example, which stakeholder requires a certain risk treatment within a certain period of 
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time? To gain proper insight into the risk we want to cover during the security programme 
it is necessary to gain insight into all the risks. This brings us at the first functionality of the 
risk register. By registering the source of the risk, for example via assessments this provides 
us a first impression. It is also necessary to pinpoint the impact (on confidentiality, integrity 
and availability) of the risk and the potential implications (i.e. legally, financially and 
personally). And we want to gain insight into potential solutions designed to mitigate the risk: 
the necessary steps an organisation needs to take in order to mitigate the risk, preferably 
expressed with financial data on the cost of mitigation. By quantifying the risk as well as the 
solution, business leaders are able to make an economic trade-off as to which risk to handle 
first. This insight into risk treatment is at the heart of the business case which each security 
professional needs to have in order to build the business case to upper management in order 
to start his or her Business Information Security programme. An important conclusion is the 
need to store most of the findings during data collection, i.e. taking assessments for audit 
purposes.
Document management was built in the artefact from the beginning. Based on the 
interviews the researcher suggested this should be taken care of by other data stores within 
organisations. The first reason is storage limitations within the artefact. Another reason is 
that most organisations are already equipped with document management systems, such 
as Microsoft SharePoint. So I suggested leaving in the option for attaching documents 
throughout the assessment process – not physically attaching documents to the tool, but 
rather creating cross-references to data stores. In this way users still have a central view of 
all relevant documents but do not burden the artefacts’ storage capacity. Proper document 
management contributes to the efficiency and effectiveness of the services offered via the 
SecuriMeter artefact.
Important alterations to the MBIS artefact after the evaluation
During Q3 2014 most of the alterations were implemented in the artefact. We list the most 
relevant ones.
The used scales are standardised towards the ISO15504 range of maturity assessment. The 
numerous screenshots in this chapter demonstrate the working of these scales.
A predefined set of interventions is implemented with the ISO27001:2013 control 
assessment. Within the Business assessments al predefined assessments are available via the 
button Observations and then the button Select predefined:
2507 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
Publication of the final results is now restricted. After finalisation of the assessment it is 
no longer possible to make any alterations unless the user has certain rights. Alterations 
afterwards are logged and a warning screen pops up. See screenshot.
Document store; Categorised list of documents that can be stored in the artefact or be 
linked to a document management or file sharing system (e.g. a SharePoint portal)
Figure 72: Artefact alterations after the evaluation; a predefined set of interventions.
Figure 73: Changes after the evaluation, warning screen for locking and unlocking assessment results.
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Another important alteration that was made in version 5 was introducing the Integrated Risk 
Overview (IRO). An observation needs to be manually forced into the IRO. Therefore users 
need to deliberate choose the option which observation they perceive as a business risk and 
treat it accordingly. User must deliberately choose the function “analysed” (column A)
Figure 74: Artefact alterations after the evaluation: Document management system.
Figure 75: Evaluating the artefact; enforcement of treatment of risks.
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For the observation that was promoted to a business risk a certain number of criteria need to 
be met in the artefact. This way the observation and all changes are logged and monitored. 
Changed events will be underlined in the logging and cannot be deleted or changed 
afterwards. This fits in with evidence-based auditing requirements.
ARTEFACT EVALUATION ON MATCHING THE ISMS REQUIREMENTS
In Q2 of the year 2015 a Bachelors student at The Hague University of Applied Sciences did 
research on the main gaps between the SecuriMeter artefact and an Information Security 
Management System (ISMS). This research was required to examine the differences between 
functionalities already in the SecuriMeter and the additional functionalities needed in 
order for the SecuriMeter to function as an ISMS system. The method used was a survey of 
ISMS literature and interviews with consultants, customers and partners (stakeholders). 
In the second research phase, a GAP analysis was performed in order to determine 
the IST (current) and the SOLL (desired) situation, purely from the perspective of ISMS 
requirements. This Bachelors thesis is available on request.
The main function of the MBIS artefact SecuriMeter is to measure the organisation and its 
process of becoming more mature in order to maintain this as a continuous process.
The main function of an ISMS is a systematic approach to initiating the plan, do, check and 
act cycle on adequate security controls. ISMS can be implemented in a system in order to 
continuous monitor the controls within the ISMS framework. The most common used digital 
form of an ISMS is Microsoft Excel or SharePoint.
ISO27001 is the Information Security Management System Framework which encompasses 
the ISO27002 controls. The 27001 and 27002 are part of the broader family of standards 
that help organisations with the security of critical assets.
Figure 76: Evaluation: Artefact alteration after evaluations on IRO indicators.
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The main contributions of this research project on the evaluation of the MBIS artefact are 
five key suggestions for improvements. In the Appendix (Evaluation of the artefact - five 
suggestions for improvement) the screenshots are added, taken from the Bachelors thesis.
1. Observation registration per question in the questionnaire. This used to be per
sub-category of questions. So it was unclear which observation was linked with which
questions.
2. Filtering functionality per domain and question. This enables the security manager
to categorise certain observations and their required actions. By filtering per item and
owner, accountability of the risk becomes transparent.
3. Date and time “check” functionality. This makes it possible to track and trace the
planning and deadlines of certain predefined action items in terms of expiration. In order
to function as full ISMS continuous reminders of the PDCA cycle actions is required. In 
the screenshot in the appendix suggestions are made on how to alter the MBIS artefact in 
order for it to function like an ISMS tool.
4. Correction activity prior to a new assessment. This makes it possible to set a certain
action item before a certain assessment or audit takes place.
5. Transfer observations, proof and action items on to a new assessment. This enables us
to compare multiple assessment outcomes and observe if a certain progression is made 
compared to previous assessments. In the screenshot in the appendix is visualised how 
this functionality can be incorporated in the artefact.
7.4        DISCUSSION ON DEMONSTRATING AND EVALUATING THE MBIS ARTEFACT
In the previous sections we present some examples of the cycle involved in demonstrating 
and refining the artefact. The three research projects described in the beginning of this 
section (Evaluating the artefact) had the objective of re-evaluating the MBIS artefact and 
contributing to its relevance by making the MBIS artefact more aligned with current business 
problems that are experienced by stakeholders. The first research was performed to gain a 
broad overview of requirement evaluation with a small set of customers. A proof of concept, 
in combination with interviews, provided me with a more in-depth view of perceptions and 
suggestions from the target group (5 customers), in order to further develop the artefact 
during the design cycle.
The second evaluation focused on prioritising functionalities already implemented in the 
artefact. The objective here was to rigorously examine, via literature review and experts’ 
opinions, the existing functionalities for market fitness and relevance to the environment. 
The outcome of this research is to prioritise requirements from a consultant’s and customer 
perspective which was entirely implemented as functionalities within the artefact. The 
collective knowledge of literature and relevance (consultants) provided a prioritised set of 
functionalities.
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The third research process was performed with the objective of filling the gaps towards 
creating a working Information Security Management System, a management system 
which enables consultants as well as customers to get a continuous process and closed loop 
between risk, security, compliance and assurance. The secondary focus of this research was 
the business opportunity for selling the artefact as an ISMS system.
Besides these three examples of fairly conditioned evaluations, the consultants and users also 
provided feedback on the artefact. This feedback was collected in an integral overview. The 
artefact evaluation and feedback form is included in the appendix which can be accessed via 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc.
7.4.1    EVALUATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE ITEMS
Besides the functional requirements designed and presented in the previous chapters, 
various knowledge items were also raised during the many research projects. We elaborate 
Case 5 from Chapter 5 and 6. This concerned the use of Michael Porter’s model for strategy 
formulation by security officers. And, whether this management model helps the security 
manager by a) enabling this with a better understanding of external forces that he/she needs 
to reckon with, and b) gets his or her message across due to the use of existing management 
models (and not complex jargon). The evaluation of these knowledge items was performed on 
10 September 2015 at Erasmus University in Rotterdam. The session raised important and 
interesting results. The audience consisted of IT managers, CIOs and security professionals. 
Through the use of GSS facilitating software, 28 respondents participated in this small 
research project/lecture. The main conclusions from the session are:
- It became very obvious that security should be a boardroom topic. All respondents
disagreed with the proposition “it is totally irrelevant whether the board finds security 
important.”
- According to the respondents, current management models can be re-used. The 
undermentioned model from Harvard professor Michael Porter (Five Forces model) can be 
used by the Chief Information Security Officer to determine the strategic forces of influence
and advise board members.
-  Knowledge is not a limitation for a board member, but awareness is. This statement 
requires some additional explanation since knowledge is content specific and awareness is 
knowledge of existence. Awareness is about knowing what knowledge you have or don’t have. 
In this case having basic awareness on certain security and risk-related topics are addressed 
3 out of 12 times by the GSS participants. Knowledge was mentioned 2 times out of 12 by the 
participants when they were asked about the critical success factors of BIS adoption. One of 
the participants raised that Knowledge is not a limitation for BoD but awareness is. Therefore,
in-depth knowledge is not required, but a minimum level of security awareness by boards is, 
in order to take effect. Source: step 6 of the GSS session “voting of the propositions”. 
- All participants rank “Security on the board agenda” as the most critical success factor for
effectively adopting security as a boardroom topic. The participants raised the fact that it 
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Figure 77: Design Science Research framework for transferring knowledge through the DSR artefact.
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Figure 78: Michael Porter five forces model.
the force of 
bargaining power
of suppliers
rivalry among
existing
competitors
the force of 
new entrants
the force of
substitute
products
or services
the force of 
bargaining power
of buyers
2567 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
does not stop with putting it on the agenda. Board members should also act on it and behave 
accordingly.
Other critical success factors that were mentioned are: knowledge, innovation, awareness, 
knowledge through gaming and accountability. Most of these critical success factors were 
also raised by the experts in Chapter 3 and 4.
After a discussion between the participants it became clear that most of the effects can be 
found in the softer factors such as “tone at the top” and other non-instrumental elements.
The entire research report is included in the Appendix.
Some interesting feedback was received from numerous participants on the method used 
(meeting software) as well as the knowledge gained in relation to new insights and ideas.
AW from Oracle: “Through the used method we immediately had direct contact with each 
other and were able to work as we have had worked with each other years before. I really 
enjoyed participating and debating to establish concrete results.”
JL from Erasmus University: “I wish we had had more time to discuss underlying thoughts 
in-depth. The group discussion is always very valuable in these types of research methods 
and I wish you could challenge the participants to express their thoughts instead of using 
predefined lists.”
7.4.2   CONTRIBUTION TO THE ARTEFACT EVALUATION OBJECTIVES
In order to determine to what extent an artefact is effective for solving the explicated problem 
it is important to set objectives for the evaluation. This was done in the first section of Chapter 
7.3.2. We hereby elaborate, based on the evaluation method of Johannesson and Perjons 
[73], per objective how this was met:
Objective 1. Examine how the MBIS artefact can contribute to a better BIS maturing process 
within the stakeholder group (mid-market companies).
This objective was met by developing a working instrument that can measure BIS maturity 
on multiple levels (governance, management and operations) as well as from multiple 
perspectives such as those of technology, processes and people. The metrics provided can 
function as measurement variables which each organisation can preselect.
Objective 2: Re-align the experienced business problems with the problem-solving 
capabilities of the artefact.
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This objective was met due to the fact that I handed over a prioritised set of relevant 
functions that were required at that time from different perspectives: those of customers 
and consultants, thus directly contributing to solving the problem at hand. The rigorously 
validated functionality list also makes it possible to strip the artefact from non-relevant 
requirements that were built in along the way and did not undergo a rigorously development 
process prior to implementation.
Objective 3: Address the problem of organisations demanding an ISMS. And examine what 
else the SecuriMeter needs to function as an ISMS.
This objective was met due to the five suggestions I made. These suggestions cross the GAP 
between the current and desired situations, the current and situation being the SecuriMeter 
with its current functionalities and the desired situation being the SecuriMeter with full ISMS 
functionalities.
Figure 79: Michael Porter Five Forces model according to the research data from case 5.
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7.4.3   COMPARISON OF THE ARTEFACT 
INTRODUCTION
In this stage of the research project the SecuriMeter artefact is demonstrated and evaluated 
based on its own capabilities and requirements set via the previous chapters. An artefact 
comparison against an existing other artefact can bring additional insights on the working 
and the artefacts’ positioning compared to other tools. It can also support the future 
development process of the artefact. In agreement with the manuscript commission an 
objective comparison between SecuriMeter and a similar security measurement and 
reporting tool is proposed. The manuscript commission and then researcher agreed to 
compare the SecuriMeter Artefact with the tool of the Information Security Forum (ISF), 
“The ISF Accelerator”. By comparing both tools based on the ENISA criteria (1)47, these 
criteria were set based on an extensive examination by ENISA into Information Security 
and Risk management tooling. According to the manuscript commission these criteria 
are sufficient for the required comparison and will contribute the research project in its’ 
academic contribution. In agreement with the promotors and the manuscript commission 
it was decided that in addition to the ENISA criteria, both tools also needed to be compared 
based on the scientific claim (e.g. functionalities) that were derived from this research work 
and as presented in this thesis (2)48. Since this thesis is based on Design Science Research, 
and the control over progress and effects within DSR are typically at the hands of the 
person designing, i.e., the researcher, the comparison needs to be objective, thus without 
interference of the researcher, and repeatable. Important note is that during the comparison 
study no new release of the artefact was made, thus the entire study was executed on the same 
version. 
I have selected GSS as a method for this qualitative comparison of tooling since GSS is also 
proposed in the entire thesis as a research method to gain a deeper understanding of the 
topic and to record intermediate steps. GSS is a research method that can use multiple 
iterations, with or without group interactions [107] and all steps, scores and arguments are 
recorded in the GSS software to assure objectivity, controllability, repeatability. With this in 
mind the following research approach is proposed.
RESEARCH APPROACH FOR THE ARTEFACT COMPARISON
In chapter 2 potential research risks are addressed. The risks of objectivity, controllability, 
repeatability and generalisability are taken into consideration during this comparison study. 
Therefor the following objective criteria and controllable steps are embedded. The criteria 
that form a “Frame of Reference” are:
 − 1. ENISA Criteria, and 
 − 2. Additional criteria derived from the deliverables in this PhD research project:
47  European Network and Information Security Association predefined “security and risk tool” criteria. The criteria can be found on 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/threat-risk-management/risk-management/current-risk/risk-management-inventory/rm-ra-
tools/template
48  The thesis presents core functionalities within the SecuriMeter artefact which are derived from the Design Science Research work 
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The following controllable research steps and goals are proposed;
FIRST STEP: 
- The researcher submits the criteria proposed by the commission, being ENISA criteria, and
the presented functionalities of the SecuriMeter artefact to the promotors. The entire list of 
criteria is also attached in the appendices. The goal is to have clear predefined criteria which 
can be compared in the next steps. 
After this the 100+ criteria are delivered to co-promotor professor Mulder who processed 
the criteria in an online survey tool so a group of experts can prioritize the criteria on 
relevance for comparison. Before submitting it in final version to the experts Mulder 
requested a group of nine people to test the set-up, in this pre-test the criteria, the listing and 
the online tooling. This is called step 1a. According to Recker [77] Page 78, “a pre-test is a 
tryout, and its purpose is to help produce a survey form that is more usable and reliable. Pre-
testing helps refine the instrument and ensure executability of the survey”. Recker describes 
on page 80 of his book to perform an instrument pre-test three objectives to pursue when 
doing pre-tests of survey instruments:
 − Evaluate the authenticity of the questions,
 − Evaluate the survey interface and layout, and
 − Establish validity and reliability of the survey instrument.
PARTICIPANT ROLE INDUSTRY SUBMITTED
1 Project manager security Financial Services Y
2 Director HR Services Y
3 Director Educational Services N
4 Manager SOC Telecom Y
5 Manager Call Center Financial Services Y
6 Director Risk & Security company Y
7 Security Architect Government Y
8 Teacher Security Educational Services Y
9 Security Officer Government Y
10 Project manager security Airport / Aviation Y
After the test feedback is gained to improve the tool, listing and prepare the real sessions. 
Also potential ambiguous terms or vague items can be detected and anticipated on. After this 
a large heterogeneous group from multiple business domains can score the provided criteria 
based on relevance for comparison and on the validity for the risk and security field. In this 
initial step the participants are not able to influence each other [117] nor are they influenced 
Table 18: List of participant characteristics of the online survey test step 1a.
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by the session operator professor Mulder. This group is referred to as 1b in the appendix 
“Research approach tool comparison”.
PARTICIPANT ROLE INDUSTRY SUBMITTED ONLINE
PRESENT AT 6 JULY 
SESSION
1 CISO Media Y N
2 CISO Financial Services Y N
3 Software Security specialist Software testing Y Y
4 Manager Accountancy Y Y
5 Consultant Security Services Y Y
6 Consultant Security advisory Y N
7 Director / Professor Research Institute Y Y
8 Partner at consulting firm Security and Risk advisory Y Y
9 Director EMEA Security and Risk advisory Y N
10 Director Security Services Security and Risk advisory Y N
11 Consultant Security and Risk advisory Y Y
12 Auditor Financial Services Y N
13 Information Security Officer Government Y Y
14 Auditor Financial Services / 
Auditing
Y N
15 Consultant in Education Educational services Y N
With this step all scores are recorded per participant and analytical motivations are 
submitted in the system. This is to assure the objectivity, controllability and repeatability 
during and after the research project.
An additional GSS session is held based on the online pre-submitted data. This so called 
“Relay Group method” increases the productivity of the group and enables a double loop 
learning [148] which increase the quality of the outcome [297]. To address the large 
deviations between the individual scores and to discuss this in the group a better qualified 
core set of criteria is established which has been validated by experts from the field. Also a 
prioritisation of all the criteria is done based on the relevance for a comparison study. 
All steps, scores and arguments are submitted in the GSS system to assure the objectivity, 
controllability and repeatability. The sessions are moderated by an experienced session 
moderator, which is required according to the ground rules of group moderation published 
by Hengst [115] and addressed in multiple other publications [298], [112], [149].
The objective of this first step is to selectively narrow down the 100+ list of criteria to 
eventually establish a core set of criteria that can be considered relevant according to experts 
Table 19: Participant characteristics in the comparison study step 1b.
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opinion and to do a further thorough comparison analysis on in the next steps. 
SECOND STEP
The second step is to record the two tools in a video demonstration on their performance with 
regard to the selected criteria. 
1. SecuriMeter tool is presented in a demo to present the previous derived criteria (origin; 
1 (ENISA) and 2 (Additional)). This demonstration is recorded on film to assure objectivity,
controllability, repeatability. 
2. ISF “Accelerator” tool is presented in a demo to present the previous derived criteria 
(origin; 1 (ENISA) and 2 (Additional)). This demonstration is recorded on film to assure
objectivity, controllability and repeatability. 
The objective of this second step is to deliver two tool demonstrations on video about the core 
functionalities/criteria of both tools. 
THIRD STEP
In this third step eleven other participants from a heterogeneous group participate in a GSS 
session which will be moderated by co-promotor professor Mulder. A predefined agenda 
is set and shared prior to the meeting so the participants can individually prepare the GSS 
session. The GSS session is introduced by the two video demonstrations of the artefacts. 
According to Recker video films increase the credibility (e.g. internal validity) (page 94), 
this method was chosen to assure the objectivity and controllability of the comparison study 
[77]. All 11 participants are asked to compare the presented functionalities and score the 
functionalities. All steps, scores and arguments are recorded in the GSS system to assure the 
objectivity, controllability and repeatability of the research. The objective here is to deliver an 
in-depth analysis on the predefined selected criteria and an analysis on the deviations given 
by the expert respondents. 
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PARTICIPANT TITLE ROLE INDUSTRY INVITED PRESENT 
AT 10TH 
AUG
1 Dr. Security 
Consultant
Information 
Security Services
Y Y
2 Drs, MA Advisor Government Y Y
3 Dr. RE Auditor/lecturer Government Y Y
4 MSc CISA Consultant Information 
Security Services
Y Y
8 Drs, CISM, 
CISA
Auditor / ISACA 
Chair
Financial Services Y Y
6 MSc, RE Auditor Financial Services Y Y
7 Prof. Dr. ir. Professor Education Y Y
8 MSc Consultant Security Services Y Y
9 MSc MISM Information 
Security Officer
Transportation Y Y
10 BC, RE Auditor Financial Services Y Y
11 MSc Information 
Security Officer
Government Y Y
THE FINAL DELIVERABLES OF THESE 3 STEPS ARE:
- Clearly defined criteria for the tool comparison.
- Two demonstrations of both tools recorded on film.
- An in-depth comparison analysis of both tools based on predefined criteria.
ASSURING THE ACADEMIC RIGOUR DURING THE COMPARISON STUDY 
While constructing an artefact based on interpretive qualitative methods, such as the applied 
DSR, requires the researcher to demonstrate sufficient objectivity and academic rigour. To 
demonstrate this rigour, and the risks associated with interpretivist research as addressed 
in chapter 2, an additional comparison study was executed that caters the principles of 
Replicability, Independence, Precision and Falsification set by Recker [77]; 
Replicability refers to the term to which extent research procedures are repeatable and would 
lead to similar outcome. Independence (reliability) refers to the level if other individuals 
would reach the same conclusions as the researcher based on the same data. Recker states; 
“If dependability can be demonstrated, it is similar to reliability in that it is demonstrated that 
measures provide consistently similar results” [77]. 
In the case of this comparison study a predefined frame of reference for the comparison 
criteria, is used in the form, of the ENISA criteria, combined with the core functionalities 
derived from this research project. This frame of reference, together with the approach 
Table 20: List of participant’s characteristics of the GSS expert panel held on 10th August 2017 (step 3).
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of multiple iterations to distil core comparison criteria to eventually compare two tools is 
visualised in the figure below. This is outlined in a comparison research approach (enclosed 
in the appendix) were also the role of the researcher is reduced to a minimum. By making 
use of this approach potential bias is reduced since the ENISA criteria list is an externally 
provided reference. By judging the latter, in multiple iterations, by expert panel focus groups 
an additional regulative cycle complements the reliability of the entire process. When making 
the researcher less involved in the research process and an external professional moderator 
(Antwerp Management School Professor) facilitates the process increases the independence 
and limits the influence and input merely from the researcher and increases the possibility of 
similar outcomes if this process was repeated. As Recker states “independence is sometimes 
easier to achieve (when working with factual, objective, precise data) and sometimes harder 
(in interpretive research where we attempt to explain a phenomenon by interpreting available 
sentiments or statements about the phenomenon from participants)” [77]. By involving 
multiple and different groups of people from heterogeneous professions and industries, 
in multiple GSS sprints increases the total population of participants and thereby yield a 
positive influence on the reliability. By audio recording and capturing all steps into process 
reports and GSS reports the entire comparison study is replicable for any other researcher.  
Precision “refers to the fact that in all scientific research the concepts, constructs, and 
measurements should be as carefully and precisely defined as possible to allow others to 
use, apply, and challenge the definitions, concepts, and results in their own work” [145]. 
By involving multiple and different participants in multiple GSS sprints is referred to as 
“Relay Groups” [297]. De Vreede et al. [297] state in their paper “Athletics in Electronic 
Brainstorming” on differences between Relay Groups and Decathlon Groups, that by 
making use of multiple Relay Groups, which judge the latter of the previous group, instead 
of Decathlon Groups, where participants need to start from scratch, increases productivity 
Figure 80: Artefact demonstration and comparison study research approach.
Ar
te
fa
ct
 D
em
on
st
ra
tio
n 
&
 C
om
pa
ris
on
 
Ob
je
ct
iv
e
De
liv
er
ab
le
Start
Determine 
initial the 
comparison 
criteria for the 
two artefacts 
to compare 
Testing the 
set up, criteria 
listing and 
online scoring 
tool
Pre assess 86 
Criteria via 
blind scoring
Discuss and 
prioritize the 
86 criteria to 
etsblish a core 
list of criteria
Recoring the 
video 
demonstrating 
all 37  criteria 
in the two 
tools
End
End
Used methods
Showing the 
two artefact 
videos and 
compare 
based upon 
ISO15504 
NPLV rating
A list of 86 
criteria for the 
two artefacts 
comparison 
(being ISF and 
SecuriMeter)
An in-depth 
comparison 
analysis of both 
tools based 
upon 
predefined 
criteria.
[44] 
Number of 
participants
Feedback on 
the set up, 
questions and 
tool (1)
Pre assessed 
list of 86 
items (2)
Feedback on 
each criterion 
and a 
priorized list 
of 37 criteria 
relevant for 
the 
comparison 
(3)
Two video’s of 
the two artefacts 
demonstrating all 
37 criteria
Commissions’
ENISA criteria 
+ PhD 
deliverables
Online Survey 
test
[9]
Blind online 
scores by 
experts
[15]
GSS session 
(6th July)
[7]
Screenrecord
ding, 
predefined 
script. 
[2]
Final 
comparison 
report of two 
artefacts (4)
GSS session 
10th August 
[11]
2647 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
and group satisfaction. Both group satisfaction as well as the moderator of the GSS Session 
[297] increases an open atmosphere where people speak up when something is ambiguous
or vague. By making use of a predefined agenda which is shared before the GSS sessions, 
as well as sending the participants the data upfront to prepare enables pre-questioning for 
clarifications or the latter to be challenged to gain precision on the latter. In addition the 
ISO15504 measurement scale for software capability and maturity was used to assess the 
predefined criteria and contributes precision. 
Other academic principles Recker refer to are Credibility and Confirmability. Credibility 
(internal validity) refers to the fact if the researcher has substantiated his findings with 
sufficient evidence. Credibility in this comparison study is achieved through triangulation, 
maintaining a chain of evidence via; a research proposal, process reports, notes regarding 
decisions making throughout the process, audio and video footage and GSS Meeting 
reports. When implementing and maintaining a chain of evidence Confirmability (aka 
measurement validity) is realised. Recker states “Confirmability suggests that qualitative 
research findings can be independently verified by outsiders in a position to confirm the 
findings (typically participants)” for example via the appendices that encompass; the 
research approach, an overview of all comparison criteria, a list of participants and their 
characteristics, detailed process reports, meeting notes with decisions throughout the 
process, video presentations, GSS Meeting reports etc. 
TYPE OF TEST DATE STEP
Online survey test 20 June 2017 1a
Blind test 2 July 2017 1b
Criteria selection session 6 July 2017 1b
Video demonstration 2 Augustus 2017 2
Comparison session 10 August 2017 3
DELIVERABLES
The first an online pre-test to test the working of the meeting wizard tool was executed among 
9 participants. After that step an online survey (blind, different time different place) was 
executed to get the initial input on all the comparison criteria. The objective is to have the 
participants of this session get to know the items and prepare their own session. The answers 
that are submitted by the participants via the online tool are captured in the GSS database 
and presented to the group based on the largest variance (above 40% non-consensus). The 
objective in this stage is to get a better understanding on the items that have a large variety. 
All participants that scored high are asked to provide their feedback. The feedback on all 29 
discussed items is captured in the GSS Meeting tool and later on visible in the report. Below 
are the most relevant comments and learnings and the related decisions are highlighted. 
Table 21: Type of test during the comparison including dates.
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 − On the criteria “pricing” the remark was made about the fact it can be two folded; price 
of the product and the pricing model (e.g. user based, processor based, fixed fee, pay per 
use?)
 − It doesn’t matter how big the company is, that’s only relevant for the scaling. Not relevant 
for the importance. Small companies can process large amounts of money or sensitive 
data.
 − According to two participants a trail license is key. This is the only way, “seeing is believing”. 
You need to get your hands on the product. One participant scored this low in his first 
online submission but wants to revise his answer based on the discussion; he thinks it is 
really relevant.
 − The view point on how to look at items is determined by the role you fulfil in the 
organisation. For example a manager weighs his criteria different than for example the 
subject matter expert (auditor).
 − Initially language seems not relevant by the group but after the discussion that tools in 
other languages (e.g. Hebrew, Chinese) are limiting in use of acceptance. For example 
government in Netherlands demands tools in Dutch.
 − One participant mentioned: “Some criteria are scored completely different before the 
session than after the group discussion within the group”
 − Another participant raised: “Important is to determine the objective of the tool (doel van 
de tool) before selection”
 − Some of the criteria are not smart was a remark of most of the participants. The ENISA list 
seems outdated.
 − Setting the criteria and the relevance of criteria is also determined based on the level of 
maturity of the organisation. A less mature organisation requires more guidance. 
7.4.4  COMPARISON CRITERIA 
In the final round it is the objective to have the participants selects the core criteria which 
they think are relevant for the eventual tool comparison. With the knowledge they have 
gained from the previous rounds and discussions (double loop learning [148]). All criteria 
are presented via the Meeting Wizard iPad interface and all participants were asked to 
answer Yes = useful for the comparison, No = not useful for the comparison. A complete list 
of all comparison criteria arose, ranked based on the score of the group. Below is a list of all 
criteria with +85% consent, thus 6 out of 6 scored yes. 
2667 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
ITEM 
NUMBER
TOOL COMPARISON CRITERIA DESCRIPTION (DESTILLED BY THE 
EXPERT BASED ON ENISA AND PHD CRITERIA) USED FOR THE VIDEO 
SCRIPT. REFERRED TO AS ITEM
 # YES ANSWERED 
BY EXPERT PANEL 
(GSS 6TH JULY) 
1 The possibility of quantifying the current and desired 
situations and a presentation of the steps that are 
necessary to bring about improvements
7
2 Dashboards on governance-, management- and operational level 7
3 List the national or international standard this tool is 
compliant with.
7
4 Separation of duties between user and management/maintenance 7
5 Dashboarding into Security maturity 7
6 Planning and designing multiple organisational and technical 
assessments at the levels of governance, management and 
operations, 
7
7 Ability to document proof (evidence-based) 7
8 Trial before purchase, Details regarding the evaluation 
period of the tool (if it does exist).
7
9 Tool architecture, Specify the technologies used in this 
tool as well as how it is deployed (stand-alone application, 
web application, database used?)
7
10 Ability to identify and register relevant legislation 
and regulations, and the persons who are responsible and 
accountable. 
7
11 Tool foresees different roles of users: Specify and explain 
if the tool supports roles of users.
7
12 Identifying the risk owners, the measures that must be 
taken, and the owners of these measures. 
7
13 R.M. Method phases supported, Risk communication : 7
14 R.M. Method phases supported, Information processed 7
15 Specify whether the tool helps the company toward a 
certification according to a standard.
7
16 R.M. Method phases supported, Risk treatment : 7
17 R.M. Method processes supported: Does the tool provide Risk
Management functionality? If yes, specify the processes
included and how they are supported.
7
18 R.A. Method activities supported: Does the tool provide Risk 
assessment functionality? If yes, specify the activities 
included and how they are supported. 
7
19 Specify available interfaces or other ways of integration 
with other tools
7
20 Brief description of the product, a brief description of 
the product containing general information, overview of 
functions.
7
21 R.A. Method phases supported, Risk identification :  7
22 Information Processed: Specify what kind of results/output 
this tool generates in each phase.
7
Table 22: Final list of comparison criteria derived by the expert panel on 6 July 2017.
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ITEM 
NUMBER
TOOL COMPARISON CRITERIA DESCRIPTION (DESTILLED BY THE 
EXPERT BASED ON ENISA AND PHD CRITERIA) USED FOR THE VIDEO 
SCRIPT. REFERRED TO AS ITEM
 # YES ANSWERED 
BY EXPERT PANEL 
(GSS 6TH JULY) 
23 R.M. Method phases supported, Risk assessment: 7
24 R.A. Method phases supported, Risk analysis :  7
25 Standards and norms that are present in the tool 7
26 R.A. Method phases supported, Risk evaluation :  7
27 Integration in Organization activities 6
28 Tool helps towards a certification 6
29 Specify whether it is possible to customize the tool?s 
knowledge database to client requirements.
6
30 Flexibility of tool's database 6
31 Used in European countries: list of EU member states in 
which implementation is known by working group members. 
This includes organization as: ? European institutions 
(e.g. European Commission, European Union Council, European 
agencies). ? International organizations situated in Europe 
(e.g. NATO, UNO, OECD, UNESCO).
6
32 The targeted kind of users is: Operational level: guidelines 
for implementation planning, with a low level of detail.
6
33 The targeted kind of users is: Management level: generic 
guidelines.
6
34 Pricing and licensing models, Maintenance fee: the yearly 
fee for maintenance. 
6
35 Reporting functionalities (word, csv, pdf etc) 6
36 Ability to measure the maturity on governance, management 
and operational levels 
6
37 Trial before purchase, CD or download available :  6
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VIDEOS WITH ARTEFACT DEMONSTRATIONS
Based on these criteria two video demonstrations are recorded and delivered:
 − Securimeter video, accessible via: https://youtu.be/wBNg2oyK4c4 and enclosed in the 
appendix. Recorded on 1 August 2017 in Ede 
Figure 81: SecuriMeter video demonstration on YouTube used for the comparison study.
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COMPARISON OF TWO ARTEFACTS 
As a final deliverable the objective of the last research step 3 is to collectively compare the 
core functionalities of a Business Information Security (BIS) artefact. 
The prepared video clips of two consultants presenting the predefined criteria in the two 
artefacts, being the "ISF accelerator" and the "SecuriMeter" are required to be watched by 
the participants prior to the GSS session. The two movies are also shown during the session 
and will collectively - through group discussion – being used to assess the tools on the 
availability of the functionalities and thereby compare the two tools. 
Prior to the meeting the experts need to prepare this session by looking into the list of 
predefined functionalities (comparison criteria) and the video script that is used to record 
the presentations. By looking into this list prior to watching the video the experts will be 
better prepared for the group session. The session is moderated by Professor Hans Mulder of 
Antwerp University. The entire list of all 37 criteria items including the video demonstrations 
 
Figure 82: ISF video demonstration on YouTube used for the comparison study.
 − ISF Accelerator video, accessible via: https://youtu.be/EXLyGUFDwu0 and enclosed in the 
appendix. Recorded on 18 July 2017 in Nieuwegein 
2707 IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
of the two artefacts were shared one week prior to the session. In the table below the scores of 
both tools are presented. The variance represents the deviation of the scores of the experts. 
The deviations above 40% are discussed in the group and further detailed in the next 
analysis chapter. 
CRITERIA 
ITEM 
CRITERIA ITEM DESCRIPTION   
RATING  ABSTAIN VARIABILITY 
35 Reporting functionalities (word, csv, pdf etc)
4 1 0%
12 Identifying the risk owners, the measures that must 
be taken, and the owners of these measures. 
3,9 1 20%
29 Specify whether it is possible to customize the 
tool's knowledge database to client requirements.
3,9 3 22%
25 Standards and norms that are present in the tool
3,8 1 27%
7 Ability to document proof (evidence-based)
3,8 0 26%
37 Trial before purchase, CD or download available 
3,8 3 44%
4 Separation of duties between user and management/
maintenance
3,8 1 27%
3 List the national or international standard this 
tool is compliant with.
3,8 1 40%
5 Dashboarding into Security maturity
3,7 1 31%
8 Trial before purchase, Details regarding the 
evaluation period of the tool (if it does exist).
3,7 2 44%
36 Ability to measure the maturity on governance, 
management and operational levels 
3,7 1 43%
16 R.M. Method phases supported, Risk treatment
3,6 1 44%
11 Tool foresees different roles of users: Specify and 
explain if the tool supports roles of users.
3,6 2 46%
Table 23: Expert scores on SecuriMeter matching the criteria ranked on rating.
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CRITERIA 
ITEM 
CRITERIA ITEM DESCRIPTION   
RATING  ABSTAIN VARIABILITY 
20 Brief description of the product, a brief 
description of the product containing general 
information, overview of functions.
 3,6 1 61%
2 Dashboards on governance-, management- and 
operational level
 3,5 0 52%
1 The possibility of quantifying the current and 
desired situations and a presentation of the steps 
that are necessary to bring about improvements
 3,5 0 59%
28 Tool helps towards a certification
 3,5 3 47%
14 R.M. Method phases supported, Information processed
 3,5 3 67%
26 R.A. Method phases supported, Risk evaluation
 3,4 1 33%
13 R.M. Method phases supported, Risk communication
 3,4 2 46%
15 Specify whether the tool helps the company toward a 
certification according to a standard.
 3,4 2 46%
17 R.M. Method processes supported: Does the tool 
provide Risk Management functionality? If yes, 
specify the processes included and how they are 
supported.
 3,4 1 53%
6 Planning and designing multiple organisational and 
technical assessments at the levels of governance, 
management and operations
 3,4 0 59%
9 Tool architecture, Specify the technologies used in 
this tool as well as how it is deployed (standalone 
application, web application, database used?)
 3,4 3 57%
33 The targeted kind of users is: Management level: 
generic guidelines.
 3,3 2 44%
22 Information Processed: Specify what kind of results/
output this tool generates in each phase.
 3,3 1 43%
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CRITERIA 
ITEM 
CRITERIA ITEM DESCRIPTION   
RATING  ABSTAIN VARIABILITY 
19 Specify available interfaces or other ways of 
integration with other tools
3,1 3 62%
10 Ability to identify and register relevant 
legislation and regulations, and the persons who are 
responsible and accountable. 
3,1 1 70%
21 R.A. Method phases supported, Risk identification
3,1 1 55%
32 The targeted kind of users is: Operational level: 
guidelines for implementation planning, with a low 
level of detail.
3 1 42%
30 Flexibility of tool's database 
3 2 54%
24 R.A. Method phases supported, Risk analysis
2,9 2 73%
23 R.M. Method phases supported, Risk assessment
2,9 2 73%
18 R.A. Method activities supported: Does the tool 
provide Risk assessment functionality? If yes, 
specify the activities included and how they are 
supported. 
2,9 2 49%
27 Intergration in Organization activities
2,4 6 53%
34 Pricing and licensing models, Maintenance fee: the 
yearly fee for maintenance. 
2,2 6 98%
31 Used in European countries: list of EU member states 
in which implementation is known by working group 
members. This includes organization as: European 
institutions (e.g. European Commission, European 
Union Council, European agencies). International 
organizations situated in Europe (e.g. NATO, UNO, 
OECD, UNESCO).
2,2 5 90%
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CRITERIA 
ITEM #
CRITERIA ITEM DESCRIPTION 
RATING
ABSTAIN VARIABILITY 
34 Pricing and licensing models, Maintenance fee: the 
yearly fee for maintenance. 
 3,6 6 53%
20 Brief description of the product, a brief 
description of the product containing general 
information, overview of functions.
 3,5 5 33%
5 Dashboarding into Security maturity
 3,5 1 54%
9 Tool architecture, Specify the technologies used in 
this tool as well as how it is deployed (standalone 
application, web application, database used?)
 3,4 4 70%
35 Reporting functionalities (word, csv, pdf etc)
 3,3 1 67%
1 The possibility of quantifying the current and 
desired situations and a presentation of the steps 
that are necessary to bring about improvements
 2,8 1 50%
33 The targeted kind of users is: Management level: 
generic guidelines.
 2,8 1 40%
36 Ability to measure the maturity on governance, 
management and operational levels 
 2,7 1 52%
2 Dashboards on governance-, management- and 
operational level
 2,6 0 51%
22 Information Processed: Specify what kind of results/
output this tool generates in each phase.
 2,6 2 71%
29 Specify whether it is possible to customize the 
tool's knowledge database to client requirements.
 2,5 1 75%
27 Intergration in Organization activities
 2,3 7 29%
25 Standards and norms that are present in the tool
 2 2 63%
Table 24: Expert panel scores on ISF Accelerator matching the criteria ranked on rating. 
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CRITERIA 
ITEM #
CRITERIA ITEM DESCRIPTION 
RATING
ABSTAIN VARIABILITY 
31 Used in European countries: list of EU member states 
in which implementation is known by working group 
members. This includes organization as: ? European 
institutions (e.g. European Commission, European 
Union Council, European agencies). International 
organizations situated in Europe (e.g. NATO, UNO, 
OECD, UNESCO).
1,6 6 80%
7 Ability to document proof (evidence-based)
1,6 2 46%
19 Specify available interfaces or other ways of 
integration with other tools
1,5 1 68%
3 List the national or international standard this 
tool is compliant with.
1,4 3 66%
30 Flexibility of tool's database 
1,4 3 66%
15 Specify whether the tool helps the company toward a 
certification according to a standard.
1,4 2 46%
8 Trial before purchase, Details regarding the 
evaluation period of the tool (if it does exist).
1,3 7 29%
10 Ability to identify and register relevant 
legislation and regulations, and the persons who are 
responsible and accountable. 
1,3 2 63%
28 Tool helps towards a certification
1,3 4 30%
23 R.M. Method phases supported, Risk assessment
1,2 1 40%
24 R.A. Method phases supported, Risk analysis
1,1 1 20%
32 The targeted kind of users is: Operational level: 
guidelines for implementation planning, with a low 
level of detail.
1 3 0%
6 Planning and designing multiple organisational and 
technical assessments at the levels of governance, 
management and operations
1 1 0%
37 Trial before purchase, CD or download available 
1 1 6%
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CRITERIA 
ITEM #
CRITERIA ITEM DESCRIPTION 
RATING
ABSTAIN VARIABILITY 
4 Separation of duties between user and management/
maintenance
 1 0 0%
12 Identifying the risk owners, the measures that must 
be taken, and the owners of these measures. 
 1 2 0%
21 R.A. Method phases supported, Risk identification
 1 1 0%
16 R.M. Method phases supported, Risk treatment
 1 1 0%
18 R.A. Method activities supported: Does the tool 
provide Risk assessment functionality? If yes, 
specify the activities included and how they are 
supported. 
 1 1 0%
14 R.M. Method phases supported, Information processed
 1 1 0%
13 R.M. Method phases supported, Risk communication
 1 2 0%
17 R.M. Method processes supported: Does the tool 
provide Risk Management functionality? If yes, 
specify the processes included and how they are 
supported.
 1 1 0%
26 R.A. Method phases supported, Risk evaluation
 1 1 0%
11 Tool foresees different roles of users: Specify and 
explain if the tool supports roles of users.
 1 2 0%
The entire GSS meeting Wizard report can be found in the appendix, including the process 
report of the meeting. This can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
DATA ANALYSIS SECURIMETER
When doing the analysis on the scores from the experts judgment we round up the figures to 
one single digit. For example; 2.4 being 2, and 2.6 being 3. 
34 items of the predefined criteria items scored 3 (largely achieved) and 4 (fully achieved). 
This means 91,9% of all 37 criteria are “largely” or “fully present” in the SecuriMeter. The 
entire list of all criteria including the scores and variance between the participants is listed 
below. 
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From all comments made by the participants submitted in the system during the session I 
analysed them all and I will address the relevant remarks from the participants that require 
additional explanation or reflection.
ITEM 20. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TOOL.
-One of the participants raised; brief description is not a comparison criteria. It cannot be
found in the tool.
ITEM 30. FLEXIBILITY OF TOOLS DATABASE
-A comment was made that “never sharing customer data” was mentioned in the question. 
It was actually in the answer given (not in the question) by the presenter of the tool to make
explicit how SecuriMeter deals with confidential data in the database and the fact that it 
(customer data) is not shared.
ITEM 27. INTEGRATION IN ORGANISATION ACTIVITIES. 
Hard to present for both tools since this requires more time to make this explicit and the 
videos were limited in time. Comparing this criteria also depends on which functionality 
of the tool you want to present for this since most of the functionalities can integrate into 
numerous processes, e.g. risk management processes, reporting processes, testing processes 
etc.
ITEM 11. TOOL FORESEES DIFFERENT ROLES OF USERS: SPECIFY AND EXPLAIN 
IF THE TOOL SUPPORTS ROLES OF USERS.
This is a relevant comment since securely seperate users for example via Multi Factor 
Authentication (MFA) is not presented and present in both tools. This could well be a future 
requirement.
ITEM 15. SPECIFY WHETHER THE TOOL HELPS THE COMPANY TOWARD A 
CERTIFICATION ACCORDING TO A STANDARD.
Both presentations did not specifically present how this could be achieved. This requires 
additional information/demonstration via for example a product walkthrough.
Item 3: List the national or international standard this tool is compliant with.
Good remark from one of the participants that the tool does the listing (is the engine), it is 
not about having all the standards. But to support working with all the standards that were 
listed prior to implementation of the tool.
DATA ANALYSIS ISF ACCELERATOR
When analysing the results of the ISF tool scores based on the same digit roundup method 
we observe 11 items of the predefined criteria items scoring 4 (fully achieved) and 3 (largely 
achieved) based on the ISO15504 NPLV scoring. This means that 29,7% of the criteria 
are fully or largely present in the ISF Accelerator tool. If we take into consideration the 
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remark that the participants raised at item number 20; a brief description of the product 
is not a criteria rather than something that is handy to have so you immediately know the 
core capabilities of the tool. It is not "in the tool" as one of the experts mentioned. This 
criteria scored 3.5 in the ISF scoring. One could argue if this criterion should not have been 
withdrawn in the initial selections. 
Additional analysis was done on the 4 comments the experts made during the scoring. 
34. Pricing and licensing models, Maintenance fee: the yearly fee for maintenance.
ISF tooling is part of a larger whole. Namely, a community body with extensive materials such 
as tools. 
27. Integration in Organization activities 
As most Microsoft Excel users know spreadsheets offer multiple ways to interface or 
automate things (e.g. via macro's, scripts etc.). This was not explicitly mentioned during the 
presentation.
7.5         ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS AFTER DEMONSTRATING, EVALUATING AND COMPARING 
THE ARTEFACT
In 2000 de Vreede et al. [297] stated that discussion groups working on outcomes of others 
have better results than groups that start from scratch. De Vreede et al. refer to Decathlon 
Groups when Groups need to start from scratch and Relay Groups when they work on 
previous collected data. De Vreede stated: “Relay groups appeared to be more productive 
than Decathlon groups, in particular in terms of elaborations to previous contributions” 
Relay groups also produced slightly more unique ideas, but not significantly. Hence, we may 
conclude that overall a Relay method is preferable in terms of productivity than a Decathlon 
method. In this research project the last expert group used the data of the previous group 
in order to enable productivity of the group, since rating such an amount of criteria and 
compare the tools based on these criteria may take multiple hours and may be a mental 
stretch. This might have an impact on the participant’s satisfaction. As De Vreede et al. 
continue in their research “Relay groups were also found to be more satisfied”, in terms of 
interest accommodation. 
With this knowledge an additional step was added to the GSS meeting. In addition to the 
comparison of the two artefacts the experts were also asked, based on their prior gained 
and shared knowledge, to brainstorm on the research question “Which parameters that 
influence the Maturing Business Information Security (MBIS) process can be considered as 
requirements for an artefact designed to capture, measure and report the MBIS process?
The objective of this question was to gain a qualified insight through discussion and listing of 
parameters via experts’ opinions. This seems specifically interesting for me as a researcher 
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to see if the experts perceive the same artefact requirements compared to the ones I have 
gained via this research project. From all 98 answers given by the experts I will highlight 
the most relevant one that are "already part of the SecuriMeter" artefact, marked as AP, "not 
yet in the artefact" marked as NP, or are a "part of the analysis method", marked as PAM. 
PAM refers to the analysis method which enables knowledge sharing, consensus building on 
priorities, decision-making, stakeholder engagement, increasing the awareness and enables 
reflection. PAM encompasses two artefacts:
One being the collaborative analysis method that enables team collaboration to define the 
parameters for analysis of the BIS maturity and two the SecuriMeter tool that supports the 
administrative work (for measuring and reporting purposes), which can be used to report 
insights into the state of BIS maturity on multiple levels (strategic, tactical and operational). 
A subset of the list that was derived via experts is displayed in the table below. The relevant 
–new - items that gave new / or inspiring insights on the topic, are listed including my 
reflection (as a researcher). 
Interesting finding from the expert participants is that most of the submitted answers relate 
to either “preconditions” or “enablers” of the BIS improvement process such as; tone at 
the top, culture, enable lower in the organisation decision-making, knowledge, education 
etcetera. These items are most of the time collectively determined based on strategic 
objectives, regulatory requirements or the type of industry an organisation is in. Therefor the
majority, 55 of the total 98, of the items were marked as "part of the analysis method". This 
means that the majority of the parameters raised by the experts are subject to some form of 
–team- collaboration.
21 items of the total 98 are already functionalities present within the SecuriMeter aretfact. 
10 items are both subject to PAM as well as a future requirement since these are not present 
in SecuriMeter yet. These items are interesting and reflected below since they can serve as 
future artefact requirements. 18 items are not yet present but can well be considered as a 
requirement and are potential backlog items that the developers can take into consideration 
for the next sprints. Therefor this additional comparison was a meaningful exercise. 
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ORGAN-
ISA-
TIONAL 
LEVEL
 ARTEFACT REQUIRE-
MENT SUGGESTION 
SUBMITTED BY THE EX-
PERTS 
AP = AL-
READY 
PRESENT 
IN SE-
CURIME-
TER
NP = NOT 
PRESENT IN 
SECURIME-
TER
PAM = 
PART 
OF THE 
ANALYSIS 
METHOD
RESEARCHERS REFLECTION 
ON SUGGESTIONS
GOVERNANCE 
G  Needed: governance 
structure in which 
interconnectivity 
exits between stake-
holder on several 
layers 
PAM collectively fill in 
the questionnaires via 
GSS
G  Link to business ob-
jectives 
PAM Can be done via refer-
encing the domains of 
a standard towards a 
strategic objective
G  country of operation NP Very relevant func-
tionality for a multi-
national dealing with 
multiple foreign regu-
latory requirements
G Awareness of what 
the desired level of 
maturity is: com-
pliance-driven or 
self-imposed goals? 
AP PAM Defining the desired 
level can be done in 
SecuriMeter, and how 
the organisation is 
engineered in its pro-
cesses (control ori-
ented, self-imposed, 
or threat oriented) 
can also be defined. 
Stating this is always 
subject to debate on 
interpretation for ex-
ample via GSS. 
MANAGEMENT 
M  freedom for taking 
action 
PAM Needs to be set and 
mandated by manage-
ment, for example by 
working in small Agile 
teams (DevOps way of 
working). 
M  Support prioritiz-
ing specific risks and 
measures: best value 
for your money. 
AP PAM This is partly present 
but can be improved 
via the IRO. Making 
the IRO part of a col-
laborative process to 
prioritize risk treat-
ments tuned to the 
value for money
M  Translate known 
risks into costs of 
business discontinu-
ity or lost oportu-
nities 
 NP PAM This is partly present 
but can be improved 
via the IRO. Making 
the IRO part of a col-
laborative process to 
link risks to lost op-
portunities
Table 25: Abstract of the 98 requirement suggested by the experts on multiple levels.
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ORGAN-
ISA-
TIONAL 
LEVEL
 ARTEFACT REQUIRE-
MENT SUGGESTION 
SUBMITTED BY THE EX-
PERTS 
AP = AL-
READY 
PRESENT 
IN SE-
CURIME-
TER
NP = NOT 
PRESENT IN 
SECURIME-
TER
PAM = 
PART 
OF THE 
ANALYSIS 
METHOD
RESEARCHERS REFLECTION 
ON SUGGESTIONS
M  security as part of 
KPIs, yearplan of em-
ployees 
NP PAM Integrate with HR re-
warding mechanisms
M  tone at the bottom PAM
M  available budget NP
M  look outside the or-
ganisation and learn 
from others their 
mistakes 
NP
M  Trustworthyness or 
(un)certainty of 
data. Data regarding 
the maturity of a 
control deteriorates 
over time. 
NP
M  Different mitigation 
options incl pro's 
and con's 
NP PAM
M  reliability of man-
agement information 
NP Reliability can be 
improved via sign off 
process and retention 
policies on the infor-
mation submitted in 
SecuriMeter
M  management approach/
type 
NP PAM Increasingly important 
due to agile way of 
working were decsion 
making is delegated 
more down in the or-
ganisation and teams.
M  level of knowledge 
and expertise of man-
agement 
NP PAM Current knowledge and 
expertise of manage-
ment can be assessed 
via SecuriMeter (e.g. 
via number of cerifica-
tions or taken cours-
es), defining the gap 
can also be done by 
setting clear knowl-
edge requirements per 
maturity level per 
domain. Improvement is 
needed in explicating 
the expertise gap
OPERATIONS 
O  every 4 years : re-
view all operations 
for usefulness and 
lean 
NP
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O  all security op-
erations must have 
a purpose . if not, 
DELETE 
NP Enforce alignment of 
controls towards busi-
ness objectives. Man-
datory functionality 
to reference a control 
towards an objective
O  Security data must 
be an integral part 
of operational data 
NP PAM Therefor requires the 
same BIA process as 
regular data. 
O  make improvements 
visible to employees 
AP PAM
O  Include operations 
as active component 
in improvement of 
security, not just 
as only serving for 
excecution of what 
is decided at other 
levels 
NP PAM
O  skilled employee NP PAM Current skills level 
can be assessed via 
SecuriMeter (e.g. via 
number of cerifications 
or taken -online- 
courses), defining 
the gap can also be 
done by setting clear 
knowledge requirements 
per maturity level per 
domain. Improvement is 
needed in explicating 
the expertise gap
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7.6        CONCLUSIONS TO THE ARTEFACT DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION
The proposed method described in this thesis needs to enable a collective analysis through 
team collaboration and deliver an administrative tool that facilitates the process of capturing, 
measuring, storing and reporting the required BIS data in order to improve the Maturity of 
Business Information Security. According to the comparison study held among experts this 
“administrative tool” delivers the majority of the predefined criteria. Although there was 
much debate on the accuracy of the provided ENISA list (2006), as well as the comparability. 
One participant comments; “Comparing a tool based on Excel and a SaaS tool is comparing 
apples and oranges”. Despite the debate this comparison actually validated the delivery of 
the artefact and its requirements via a rigours process. The final result is a validated tool that 
supports the administrative work (for measuring and reporting purposes), which can be 
used to report insights into the state of BIS maturity on multiple levels (strategic, tactical and 
operational) to boards, owners and other stakeholders. The ability of addressing multiple 
layers such as Governance, Management and Operations was acknowledged by the entire 
expert panel via item 4, 5, 12 and report accordingly towards stakeholders, proven via item 
3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 presented in Table 26
Criteria derived 
from the 
deliverables in 
the PhD research:
Nr of 
experts
agree 
(total 7) 
Relevance for 
comparison according 
to the expert panel of 
6th July 2017 (in 
percentages)
Present in SecuriMeter 
artefact according to 
the 11 experts (on 
ISO15504 NPLF Scoring) 
of 0th August 2017
1. Ability to 
identify and 
register relevant 
legislation and 
regulations, and 
the persons who 
are responsible 
and accountable. 
7 100% 3 Largely Achieved
2. Identifying the 
risk owners, the 
measures that 
must be taken, 
and the owners of 
these measures. 
7 100% 4 Fully Achieved
3. Ability to document 
proof (evidence-
based)
7 100% 4 Fully Achieved
4. Planning and 
designing multiple 
organisational and 
technical 
assessments at the 
levels of 
governance, 
management and 
operations, 
7 100% 3 Largely Achieved
5. Dashboards on 
governance-, 
management- and 
operational level
7 100% 4 Fully Achieved
Table 26: List of artefact requirements that are present in the SecuriMeter.
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Criteria derived 
from the 
deliverables in 
the PhD research:
Nr of 
experts
agree 
(total 7) 
Relevance for 
comparison according 
to the expert panel 
of 6th July 2017 (in 
percentages)
Present in SecuriMeter 
artefact according to 
the 11 experts (on 
ISO15504 NPLF Scoring) 
of 0th August 2017
6. The possibility of 
quantifying the 
current and 
desired situations 
and a presentation 
of the steps that 
are necessary to 
bring about 
improvements
7 100% 4 Fully Achieved
7. Various benchmarking 
capabilities, 
specific to the 
sector concerned, *
5 71% NA NA
8. Separation of 
duties between 
user and 
management/
maintenance
7 100% 4 Fully Achieved
9. Reporting 
functionalities 
(word, csv, pdf etc)
6 86% 4 Fully Achieved
10. Dashboarding into 
Security maturity
7 100% 4 Fully Achieved
11. Standards and norms 
that are present in 
the tool
7 100% 4 Fully Achieved
12. Ability to measure 
the maturity on 
governance, 
management and 
operational levels 
6 86% 4 Fully Achieved
13. API (to extract 
data from various 
sources)*
4 57% NA NA
* these items are not measured since the had to little consensus (<86%) by the expert panel
This panel of eleven experts in the field validated the working of the artefact. According to 
this expert panel ten out of the thirteen artefact requirements that are described in this thesis 
are relevant for a BIS tool (artefact). All experts agreed that all requirements are fully or 
largely available in the established artefact.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS
In conclusion we can state that according to the guidelines for artefact demonstration 
and evaluation provided by Johannesson and Perjons [73] we summarise the problem, 
the treatment of the problem via requirement setting, the method used to evaluate the 
artefact and the level of stakeholder engagement. In the table below we summarise the most 
important evaluation methods and in the figure is displayed how these methods relate to the 
Framework [73].
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Case Requirement Evaluation method
Key BIS management 
information
Dashboard on policy 
status, risks and 
evidence
POC and stakeholder interviews 
Key BIS governance 
practices and KSF
Assessment questionnaire Real-life and stakeholder participation 
during assessments and sessions (with 
boards1)
Key BIS management 
interventions
BIS maturity Assessment 
questionnaire 
POC and stakeholder interviews (mid-
market organisations). Also real-
life application of +100 maturity 
assessments between 2011-2015)
Insight into BIS 
metrics
List of predefined 
metrics
Via the evaluation register (see the 
Appendix) that is filled by stakeholder 
feedback
Use of existing 
management models
Knowledge items / Scope 
and context items / 
Stakeholder analysis
GSS research session at Erasmus 
University with 28 participants that 
represent stakeholders
An important conclusion and future recommendation is proposed by Ge and Helfert [299]. The 
authors proposed a framework for guiding “experimental evaluation in design science, consisting 
of three components: artefact, experiment, and data analysis”. This enables a more iterative and 
creative process of development, with the limitation that the artefact is overloaded with irrelevant 
requirements. Tremblay [147] et al. “investigate the use of focus groups for artefact evaluation, 
making a distinction between exploratory focus groups that study an artefact in order to suggest 
improvements for further design (formative evaluation). This is similar to what was done in this 
research project in case 1 with the use of GSS for identifying key BIS management information. 
And the other method is a conﬁrmatory focus group. That aims to establish the utility of an artefact 
in ﬁeld use (summative evaluation), similar to what was done via the last two artefact evaluations in 
this research project. The scoping was very tight on summative evaluation and it set the direction for 
business development (i.e. valorisation).
Table 27: Summary of the evaluation methods used.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Ex
pe
rim
en
t 
Initial problem
Explicate the 
problem
Define 
requirements 
of the Artefact
Design and 
Develop 
Artefact
Demonstrate 
Artefact
Evaluate 
Artefact
Feedback loop
BIS parameters for 
Boards
Requirements 1st version of 
the Artefact
Demonstrated 
Artefact
Evaluated 
Artefact
-Literature
Research 
-Delphi Research
-GSS Research
Creative 
Methods
-Proof of
Concept
-GSS Research
-GSS Research
-Case Study
Research 
-Literature
review
-Mid market 
survey
-2 x GSS 
Research with
Experts
-GSS Research
with CI(S)O’s
-GSS Research
with experts
-2 x Delphi 
Research with 
CISO’s and 
security 
managers
-Brainstorm
-UML Design
-Building a 
prototype
-Proof of
Concept
-Live
environment
-Client 
surveys
-User surveys
-Comparison
-Student 
evaluations
Figure 83: Methods to demostrate and evaluate the artefact based on Johanneson and Perjons [73]
 8
FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS,
LIMITATIONS AND
CONTRIBUTIONS
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, 
LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS8 287
This chapter contains the overall findings, conclusions and limitations of this research 
project. It reveals the practical and academic contribution and how the process of 
valorisation is realised due to rigorous exploration and practical exploitation of the artefact. 
8.1        RESEARCH FINDINGS
This research project delivers a conceptual framework for BIS with parameters that influence 
the BIS maturity at management as well as governance level (Board of Directors) as well as 
insights into factors that influence the BIS maturity such as barriers. 
In chapter 2 a multi-method research approach is proposed and used throughout this 
project. This method, based upon GSS, utilises knowledge sharing, consensus building on 
priorities, make decisions, enable stakeholder engagement, e.g. through collaboration it 
contributes to the increase of awareness and enables reflection. This enables to break silo’s 
and reflect on learnings in order to improve. 
The delivered design artefact-tool supports the analytical and administrative work, of 
measuring and reporting, which can be used to report insights into the state of BIS maturity 
on multiple levels (strategic, tactical and operational). It thereby removes the current 
troubles of evidencing-documents that are currently scattered all over the company. The 
delivered artefact creates one single source of truth. The complete method is coined MBIS 
method and is visualised in Figure 84: The MBIS method and PDCA-based activities. 
More than 40 highly qualified, board-level professionals contributed to the artefact 
requirements study. The outcome revealed that the current BIS measurement monitoring 
and reporting tooling is lacking 79% in the necessary requirements to do proper security 
administration. In comparison of a financial accounting system this would imply a major 
compliance default that could lead to bankruptcy. 
According to the expert panel 91% of the required functionalities are present in the artefact 
that is established in this research project. 
ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The main research question set forward in chapter 1 in this thesis “How can we establish 
method, which utilises best practices and collaboration for improving BIS maturity?” is 
answered in multiple ways. Chapter 2 presents the method that was developed, to strengthen 
the collaboration and decision-making processes needed in order to address and solve BIS-
related problems. GSS was applied as a research technique to determine the requirements 
among stakeholders and to prepare or guide the stakeholder-user group when discussing 
the implementation (making the tool fit for purpose). The administrative tool used to 
support this PDCA-based approach and to capture, measure and report it is called the 
‘SecuriMeter’ artefact, which is presented through this research. The utilisation of best 
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practices such as ISO, using a DSR methodology that is based on the work of numerous 
DSR research scientists such as Winter, [300], Dietz and Hoogervorst [301], Albani et 
al. [302], Van Aken et al. [225], Wieringa [146], Hevner et al. [138], Johannesson and 
Perjons [73] and is collectively referred to as the ‘MBIS method’ as visualised in Figure 84. 
Throughout the research project multiple participants mentioned that determining the 
current and desired state is subject to collaboration with multiple stakeholders. One of the 
participants mentioned “Collective submitting the answers in the tool with the different roles/
responsibilities in the organisation raises awareness and defines individual responsibilities 
in a collective approach to reach a mature organisation”. An important finding is that the 
proposed MBIS method enables a collective analysis through team (BoD, MT) collaboration 
and process the required data in the administrative tool to measure, monitor and report. 
Chapters 4 and 5 elaborate how the numerous qualitative research methods, proposed in 
Chapter 2, such as GSS research and Delphi contribute to a qualitative view into enablers 
and disablers of MBIS and how GSS and Delphi utilise the establishment of parameters that 
can be considered by board of directors or executive management. Chapter 4 produces 
a qualitative view from the perspective of experts. The extra empirical validation on the 
research data was performed on the target group and revealed interesting findings on the 
four main barriers that limit the MBIS process. The target group raised the following issues: 
management and organisation, perception and attitudes, knowledge and skills and budgets 
as the main barriers to the MBIS process. These items were reframed in the conceptual 
model that was used for further investigation of MBIS parameters and helped define the 
research assumptions according to Whetten [150]. The reframing is as follows:
BARRIERS PARAMETERS OF INFLUENCE
Management and 
organisation
Management and organisation (1)
Perception and 
attitudes
Part of the Culture (3)
Knowledge and skills Part of the Resource capabilities (2) of the organisation and 
the people
Budget Not perceived as a direct barrier and not raised as an 
intervention for example “more money”. We assume therefore that 
budget is not seen as a barrier (only 12%) but as a dependent 
variable that can and will be influenced by all of the above
Chapter 4 also propose the seven preconditions organisations need to consider before 
attending the MBIS process. These are qualitative preconditions that were raised by experts 
and target groups of CISO’s CIO’s IT managers and security managers. The collective or 
individual application of the preconditions varies in influence on the effect of the individual 
intervention [218]. Along with these preconditions this research resulted in a qualified list of 
core interventions that are prioritised by mid-market organisations. These core interventions 
are established (source is ISO) due to expert panel assessment and prioritisation via GSS, 
based on “ease of implementation” and “effectiveness”. The proposed long list of ISO27002 
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controls, e.g. interventions answers research question two and the final list of derived 
interventions answers question five. This chapter 4 demonstrates the use of best practices 
from the existing communities to examine the potential artefact requirements. These are 
later on validated via survey research by 40 organisations representing the target group, 
mid-market organisations. Due the variety of the participating organisations it is fair to state 
that this core set is generalizable and valid for mid-market organisations. By this research, 
research questions 1 to 6 were answered and new insights for the next research phase were 
gathered. Research questions one to six were: 
1. What is BIS maturity, based on the definitions derived from best practices and literature?
Answer: Out of chapter 2 we have derived BIS Maturity as a state, process or period of being 
mature as an organisation when it comes to Business Information Security, expressed via a 
maturity model which constitutes of multiple levels with predefined criteria. With Business 
Information Security we address the entire End-to-End process of information processing 
including all relevant stakeholders.
2. Which best-practice interventions are currently used to improve BIS maturity?
Answer: In chapter 3 and 4 multiple Information Security frameworks and maturity models 
are described.  The selected long list of ISO27002 controls, e.g. interventions is used by the 
majority of the organisations and therefor used in this research to examine core interventions 
that can be promoted to artefact requirements in the next sections of the research. 
3. Which barriers do organisations experience when applying BIS interventions?
Answer: In section 4.4.7 of chapter 4 a list of Main barriers for MBIS according to the experts 
is derived and categorised.
Main barriers for MBIS according to the experts
4. Which barriers have been identified in mid-market organisations?
Answer Table 6: Top intervention suggestions according to mid-market organisations. 
display the main barriers derived from the research. Being Management and organisation, 
Perception and attitudes, Knowledge and skills, Budget
5. Which of the identified BIS interventions are practical in such organisations?
Answer: In Table 6 the top BIS intervention that are practical according to mid-market 
organisations is proposed.
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6. What are the general organisational preconditions for the application of the core set of BIS
interventions?
Answer: The organisational preconditions for the application of the core set of BIS 
interventions that were derived in section 4.7 of chapter 4 are:
 − Identify applicable (mid-market) laws and legislation.
 − Perform risk and impact analysis in order to justify the implementation of necessary 
interventions in order to achieve the desired security maturity level.
 − Apply relevant norms in order to comply with law, legislation or regulations or a framework 
that is derived from these norms, for example COBIT.
 − Involve management about the business impact of not having these essential interventions 
in place.
 − Increase the awareness of security throughout the organisations since human error is 
a predominately cause. Train and educate with focus on the correct perception about 
security on the technical as well as the business side of the organisation.
 − Measure and monitor all potential technical and organisational vulnerabilities (security 
assessments) as a continuous process in order to be in control and achieve the desired level 
of security maturity.
 − Continuous maintain knowledge and skills that are essential to keep being “in control”.
An important finding that was gained from the MBIS research journey described in Chapter 
4 was the emphasis most of the respondents gave to the fact that the engagement of senior 
management and board is essential for the successful attending the process of improving 
BIS. This organisational level can provide strategic direction into factors such as clear 
stakeholder expectations, regulations, business goals and risk appetite. All of these factors 
are of influence but were most of the time absent by the examined companies in Chapter 4. 
This was demonstrated by the 39% that scored 2 out of 5 and 21% scored 1 out of 5 on the 
COBIT maturity ladder.
Therefore the research in Chapter 5 was conducted with the objective to provide answer to 
research question:
7. What is a useful framework for Business Information Security Governance practices,
according to the academic literature on the subject and the views of experts? 
Answer: With the objective to develop a core set of practices that contemporary boards 
can use to direct, monitor and control Business Information Security, chapter 5 led to 
Governance practices suitable for Business Information Security, distilled by expert panel 
research. Table 9 proposes the top 10 of these Business Information Security Governance 
practices being; 1. Determine Roles, 2. Corporate internal communication, 3. Awareness 
at level of Boards of Directors, 4. Board and Senior Management Leadership, 5. Lessons 
learned, 6. Transparency, 7. Determine risk appetite, 8. Internal control, 9. Regular 
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reporting, 10. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation.
A prioritised set of practices and critical success factors was derived from 228 practices out 
of +100 literature sources varying from academia to practitioner-oriented. The direct result 
is a list of 22 practices that can function as a framework of BISG practices, e.g. parameters 
of controls for boards. Main conclusion from this research is that these governance practices 
need to be taken into account before an organisation starts any BIS improvement initiative. 
Ontological and epistemological challenges can be mastered by collaborative exchanging 
viewpoints, meanings and opinions on the topic, based on these 22 items, that traditional ad-
hoc and project based approaches absence. The qualitative research conducted in Chapter 
5, due to applying a collaborative analysis method such as GSS, also revealed the positive 
effect that GSS has via group interaction and group thinking, such as management teams 
and boards. Besides having a facilitating function, it also suits the objectives of generating, 
capturing and sharing the necessary knowledge in order to overcome the epistemological 
challenges of knowledge management, e.g. scoping knowledge raised in chapter 2. The 
research in Chapter 5 indirectly answers the main research question by showing that GSS 
provides a collaborative method that utilises best practices, the best practices in this research 
being the governance practices from the literature. 
The research projects described in chapters 4 and 5 about management and governance 
practices delivered a conceptual framework for BIS-related Design Science Research 
methodologies as proposed in chapter 2. It derived two sets of design requirements to 
establish into the artefact. Chapter 6 and 7 elaborate on five cases of practical business 
problems that were addressed by applying the DSR methods in designing the artefact 
requirements to be presented in Chapter 7. Important findings from chapter 6 are the 
additional insights into metrics Boards can measure and report on, the successful use of 
management models to address strategic forces and CI(S)O’s can use to bring their message 
across and the essence of creating a transparent and open culture (whistle blowing) in order 
to continuously learn. Main conclusion of chapter 6 is the value-add of the proposed DSR 
method to explicate problems and the impact for stakeholders. 
The requirements set forward in chapter 6 and presented in chapter 7 are not limited. 
Numerous other requirements are described in Chapter 7 and validated by experts. These 
requirements were set together in collaboration with a network of eco partners. An evaluation 
of the artefact requirements was made in Chapter 7 and is still being done as part of the 
continuous development process visualised in the PDCA (see Figure 84). Main conclusion 
from chapter 7 is that BIS improvement is not only about administrative tooling, but about 
collaborating, and mutually setting objectives and determine priorities. The proposed 
method foresees in the collaboration as well as the administration that is required during the 
maturing process. 
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8. Which parameters that influence the Maturing Business Information Security (MBIS) 
process can be considered as requirements for an artefact designed to capture, measure and 
report the MBIS process? 
Answer: This can be answered by the enumeration of the five cases of business problems that 
were translated into requirements in the artefact and can be considered as parameters to 
capture, measure and control the MBIS process;
CASE PROBLEM ARTEFACT REQUIREMENT FORM
1. Key BIS
management
information
The absence of a 
centralised fact-
based view on BIS 
(dashboard)
Dashboard on policy 
status, risks and 
evidence
Dashboard
2. Key BIS
Governance
practices and
KSF
The absence of 
Governance practices 
and Critical Success 
Factors for Business 
Information Security
Assessment questionnaire Functional
3. Key BIS
management
interventions
The absence of a core 
set of interventions 
that can be applied to 
enhance the maturity 
level of BIS
BIS maturity Assessment 
questionnaire 
Functional
4. Insight into
BIS metrics
Absence of effective 
metrics for 
Governance, management 
and operational level 
in order to measure 
the MBIS process
List of predefined 
metrics
Non-functional & 
functional
5. Use of existing
management
models
Absence of knowledge 
items into strategic 
external forces of 
influence that is 
relevant in the BIS 
strategy formulation
Knowledge items / Scope 
and context items / 
Stakeholder analysis
Functional & 
Environmental
For the articulation and validation of the requirements of the artefact, the GSS helped in 
shifting the interventions based on the average and variance of the group. And prioritise 
based on practical appliance of a total score on effectivity of the intervention of > 1.5 and 
variance of the group. GSS made it possible to assemble 22 BISG practices based on 
numerous criteria and delete low scoring items and discuss the high variances among 
experts.
Research question nine can be answered through the research conducted in Chapters 
6 and 7.
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9. How do these artefact requirements contribute to solving the business problems and 
meeting stakeholders’ needs?
Answer: The contribution of the artefact is that organisations and their stakeholders can 
increase the security maturity by applying the artefact and the predefined assessments, 
standards, reports etc. By periodically executing for example the predefined assessments all 
relevant items (people, process, technology) are addressed, monitored, proofed and 
reported continuously. Capturing and providing these important details on multiple levels 
of the organisation contributes the practical environment into factual insights on the 
current versus desired state. Figure 50 demonstrates the dashboards for all three 
organisational levels: Strategic, Tactical and Operational. Continuous compliance becomes 
increasingly relevant due to regulatory requirements. The artefact supports a continuous 
compliance PDCA approach. 
So the answer to this question is dual. As the table below presents the solution to the 
problem, as well as the importance to the stakeholder are articulated but they stay behind 
with the practical environment.
Figure 84: The MBIS method and PDCA-based activities.
DO/ACT:
Analysis and administration of
-Self Assessments
-Audits
-Measurements
-Monitor
-Report
-Submit Proof
-Register
-Submit best practice
-Extract logs
-Controlling
-Reflect
-Learn
-Share
-Improve
-Decide
-Prioritize
-Direct
PLAN
Collaboration enables to
-Sense Business opportunities
-Share knowledge
-Generate view points
-Set urgency and priority
-Built consensus
-Fit to purpose
-Make decisions
-Create engagement
-Increase awareness
-Set requirements
CHECK
Collaborate to;
-Evaluate
SecuriMeter
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CASE / ARTEFACT 
REQUIREMENT
ARTEFACT SOLUTION TO THE 
PROBLEM
WHY IMPORTANT FOR THE 
STAKEHOLDER?
1. Key BIS management
information
A prioritised key set of BIS 
management information to use 
in a dashboard 
Because it creates a mutual 
ground of knowledge, 
awareness and items to be 
managed
2. Key BIS Governance
practices and KSF
A rigorously prioritised set 
of BIS governance practices to 
use as a (self) assessment for 
BISG measurement
Because it creates a mutual 
ground of knowledge, 
awareness and items to 
be governed (evaluated, 
directed and monitored) 
3. Key BIS management
interventions
A rigorously prioritised 
set of BIS management 
interventions to use as a 
(self) assessment for BIS 
measurement
Because it creates a mutual 
ground of knowledge, 
awareness and items to be 
managed and frequently 
measured
4. Insight into BIS
metrics
A set of relevant metrics 
created by experts to measure 
and manage BIS 
Because it creates a mutual 
ground of knowledge, 
awareness on metrics to 
consider when managing BIS
5. Use of existing
management models
An alternative view on 
modelling, capturing and 
presenting strategic (cyber) 
forces 
Because, strategic models 
such as Porter can help 
contemporary CI(S)O overcome 
the knowledge / jargon gap 
between the CI(S)O and its 
stakeholders, BoD, Executive 
management
The construction of several parameters in the artefact contributes to solving part of the main 
problem stated in Chapter 1 and answers the main research question in numerous ways.
RESEARCH DELIVERABLES
This Design Science Research project has been conducted in close co-operation with 
companies and educational institutions. This has resulted in the construction of an artefact 
with numerous functionalities and variable parameters that can assist in the goal-setting, 
design and implementation of increasing BIS maturity. The active involvement of stakeholders 
in finding solutions is advocated in DSR, and it has actually occurred in this research. 
Managers, CIOs, CISOs, IT Directors and CFOs have actively contributed to the construction 
of the MBIS artefact. Chapter 6 elucidates five primary functionalities of the artefact, each 
relating to our central research question and the objectives set prior to this research project. 
These primary research deliverables are:
1 a) Parameters, insights and viewpoints that form a conceptual framework for BIS, and 
influences the BIS maturity at management as well as governance level (Board of Directors) 
as well as insights into factors that influence the BIS maturity.
1 b) A design artefact-tool that supports the administrative work (for measuring and 
reporting purposes), which can be used to report insights into the state of BIS maturity 
on multiple levels (strategic, tactical and operational) – using the parameters defined for 
reporting the BIS maturity of the organisation – to boards, owners and other stakeholders. 
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A defined analysis method which enables knowledge sharing, consensus building on 
priorities, make decisions enables stakeholder engagement, contributes to the increase of 
awareness and enables reflection.
The core artefact functionalities derived from this research that relate to the problems from 
chapter 1 are;
1. To identify and register relevant legislation and regulations, and the persons who are 
responsible and accountable. This is increasingly desirable in the Netherlands in view of 
laws and regulations such as the Data Breach Notification Act (2016) and the proposed 
Cybersecurity Incidents Affecting Vital Services Notification Act49. Assigning responsibilities 
and accountability is demonstrated in chapter 6.2.1 in Figure 53: Case 1: Demonstrating the 
policy setting and maintenance.
2. Identifying the risk owners, the measures that must be taken, and the owners of these 
measures. This functionality makes it possible to monitor and measure these factors 
continuously, and includes the corresponding burden of proof. This functionality offers users 
an integral management approach. Identifying and assigning the risk owners is demonstrated 
in chapter 6.2.1 in Figure 50: Case 1: Demonstrating the risk overview and risk indications.
3. Planning and designing numerous organisational and technical assessments at the 
levels of governance, management and operations, which are visualised in a dashboard. The 
dashboards are demonstrated in chapter 6.2.1 in figure “Demonstrate the dashboarding 
on Strategic level (Governance), Tactical level (management) and operational level”. The 
numerous assessments are presented in Figure 71: Evaluation of the artefact: List of all the BIS 
assessments in the artefact.
The administrative tool enables the capturing, storing, interpreting, measuring and reporting 
of the current and desired state and explicate the steps to bring about the improvement.The 
artefact has the ability to use best-practice assessments, audits and questionnaires such as 
ISO, OWASP, NIST etc. By making use of industry bodies the artefact has the ability to catch 
up with changing technology and regulatory requirements as well as sophisticated cyber 
threats. Maintaining this yourself in any artefact is a cumbersome task. Community bodies 
such as NIST or ISF maintain their frameworks and standards with the latest threats and 
propose mitigating activities which can be adopted in the artefact. Bodies such as UCF50 
provide “feeds” to maintain artefacts. 
By periodically collaborating with business, management, BoD and other relevant 
stakeholders, about captured facts, via GSS and by making use of the Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) capabilities within the artefact BIS can be practiced as a 
continuous management practice and not as an ad-hoc project. The collaborative approach 
49  Source: European Union regulation 910/2014 Directive 1999/93/EC, article 19 is effectuated via the guidelines provided by 
ENISA
50  Unified Compliance Framework (UCF). The UCF’s maintains a repository of all regulator and community frameworks and provides 
feeds towards tooling. The UCF site interfaces via Application Programming Interfaces and cover all topics from security and 
versioning through the various calls these tools will need to make to establish and maintain two way access to the UCF’s information.
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enables the awareness and continuous learning process and self-reflection of all stakeholders 
involved [9], [67]. 
 − The possibility of quantifying the current and desired situations and a presentation of the 
 − steps that are necessary to bring about improvements. These steps can in turn be used as 
guidelines for BIS. Demonstrated in chapter 6.2.2 in Figure 62: Case 4 Demonstrating BIS 
improvements and periodically changes via the IRO.
 − Various benchmarking capabilities, specific to the sector concerned, which offer the manager 
a factually-based frame of reference. Demonstrating fact-based evidencing is done in 
chapter 6.2.2 in Figure 61: Case 4: Demonstrating evidencing-functionality. 
By doing this Business Information Security surpass the tactical IT management level and 
enables to involve the strategic level and reflect the latter with peers. Also regulators or 
supervisory bodies can benefit from this since there is little –actuarial- data on certain 
industries and their performance with regard to BIS. The collaborative process via GSS 
maximises knowledge sharing and awareness between any group about the necessary 
insights into the required tactical and operational facts. This also contributes the sense of 
urgency and insights into “actionable items”. 
The research, construction, demonstration and evaluation have resulted in a set of 
instruments that offer evident practical added value for organisations, and which also have 
wider social and economic relevance. This set of instruments is an example of the value that 
can be created by applying the DSR method. The outcomes will assist company boards and 
managers to get a better grip on major security threats in the future.
8.2         RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions of the research can be divided into two major parts. The conclusions 
we draw from the first two exploration phases (1) and the conclusions we draw based on the 
establishment of the artefact (2). The two of them constitute the major conclusions described 
in the last section of this section (3).
8.2.1  CONCLUSIONS ON THE EXPLORATION INTO THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
             FOR BIS (1).
Although the research data doesn't show that board room involvement actually increases 
BIS maturity, this is also revealed by the feedback from practitioners during sessions and 
workshops. They observe acceleration in maturity once boardroom members show active 
engagement. This urges the empirical validation of the Governance index in Chapter 5. This 
more empirical testing is also emphasised by Workman [6] and Flores [9].
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In the initial explorative research project from Chapter 4 experts and target group 
respondents compiled a list of interventions. When validating the implementation of these 
interventions it was surprising that most of these interventions are not in place within mid-
market organisations. They blame this to the absence of board and management involvement 
and clear guidance into laws and regulations. They raised the engagement of the board as 
top priority to increase the BIS maturity. The research also showed that 22% of the mid-
market suggest that ‘training and educate personnel on awareness’ contributes most to 
security; this equals the opinion of experts according to the expert panel research. This urge 
of knowledge sharing in order to increase awareness is also mentioned by other researchers 
[1], [303], [68].
Also the filling in of the survey questionnaire has raised the awareness of mid-market 
participants. Responses to open questions such as “that’s a good idea”, “needs to be 
developed”, “good idea to apply this” proved this and proofed the relevance of this research. 
One participant rose;
“Invest time to understand the language of the Board and identify where the IT risk may 
impact strategic business goals. While every company is different they are also very much 
alike. Sharing knowledge prevents re-invention 'of the wheel', will drive innovation and will it 
brings companies faster to a higher maturity level”
Figure 85: Direct Monitor and Control Cycle including reflection internally and externally.
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Board of Directors / Executive management
Tactical level:
Senior and Midle management
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Lower management and administration
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The ultimately presented list of interventions form a frame of reference for mid-market 
organisations in order to practically increase business information security maturity. A 
carefully selected list of interventions present those interventions that are most effective 
and easy to implement for a market that, according to the performed survey, struggles 
with the enforcement of essential interventions. By making use of a combination of the ISO 
best practices and for example the COBIT maturity model organisations can have better 
insights into the interventions they have applied as well as those they need to apply in order to 
achieve a certain maturity level. In order to prepare organisations for attaining the maturing 
process the researcher proposes seven preconditions that organisations need to take into 
consideration. The established core set of interventions was set as requirements candidates 
into the artefact. The objective of this artefact requirement is to measure (take a photo) the 
current state on BIS (as is) and the desired state (to be), and map out the steps to take.
The research project described in Chapter 5 was a multidisciplinary, multi-layered approach 
to GSS security research. As a result a highly significant core set of Business Information 
Security Governance and Executive Management practices could be established. A set 
of BIS-related Governance practices that was not compiled and published in the Body of 
Knowledge ever before.
The BISG top 22 practices to attain and maintain a certain level of Business Information 
Security Governance maturity is later on widely adopted by organisations. This practice-
oriented research immediately contributed to organisations since the list can be adopted, 
communicated and reported on. The researcher proposes larger-scale, longitudinal 
research via this GSS SecuriMeter method to measure evolvement of certain organisations 
or industries on how they deal with Governance practices. This is why the BISG top 22 was 
integrated as a requirement into the MBIS artefact (detailed explanation in Chapters 6 and 
7) and is subject to the collaborative process. In this way a socially justified method, due to 
team collaboration on a large set of predefined data (i.e. top 20) will “encompass social and 
adaptable security methods that are rigorously developed along with practice” [151]. The
result of this research phase is the design of a governance framework to monitor, evaluate 
and direct business information security.
A conclusion of the explorations in Chapters 4 and 5 revealed little attention at the level of 
board of directors and executive management. Although practitioner’s literature suggests 
that board attention is growing [9], [304], the factual data taken from the artefact reveal 
the opposite. The organisations under review are unable to identify essential interventions, 
such as executing business impact assessments, and struggle with insufficient knowledge and 
skills. On the other hand it could be argued that the artefact provided a more critical and 
realistic perspective on the state of their BIS maturity. However, in both cases the feedback 
and feedforward loop have been supportive in maturing BIS. On the basis of these findings, 
it can be argued that communication and reflection as visualised above between multiple 
business layers and their security has to be aligned. The raised set of core BISG practices was 
set as requirements into the artefact with the objective to measure the current state on BISG 
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(as is) and the desired state (to be), and map out the steps to undergo. I.e. solve the problem 
of low maturity in a straightforward and effective manner.
An important side effect of these two research phases was the new and fresh insights into 
BIS. The two established lists of practices and interventions called for numerous discussions, 
presentations, lectures and consultancy assignments. Over 100 organisations are being 
measured based on these methods. Important feedback that proof the relevance of this 
research;“Organizations need to look at the higher scope of information security. They have 
to look for frameworks and approaches to assess measure and increase the effectiveness of 
information security in the organisation. Bobbert helps organisations measure and increase 
an organisation's maturity level relative to information security” and “The necessity of good 
information management is increasing to ensure business continuity. With that also the 
security of that information and the awareness of that IT is just one of the elementary parts. 
Yuri Bobbert shows with his research that good information security management is about 
people, starting at the top. Bobbert presents conclusions that are a must read for all business 
owners, managers and directors of mid-market organisations that do not address business 
information -security- management consequently on their agenda”.
Figure 86: Spider diagram on the current status based on ISO27K (n=27).
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8.2.2   CONCLUSIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DSR ARTEFACT (2)
According to the guidelines of DSR artefact establishment we thoroughly elaborated on the 
construction of the artefact. Both the technical and functional requirements are presented 
via numerous examples. The numerous methods used to establish the requirements resulted 
in interesting views. First of all the GSS sessions with the stakeholder group of CI(S)Os gave 
a good impression of core management information which the artefact needs to display in 
order to contribute to solving the problem i.e. the absence of core management information. 
The participants also raised that they have gained new insight and knowledge and appreciate 
the discussion and interaction with their peers. A predefined set of requirements was taken 
into development and evaluation via Chapters 6 and 7. The items that were raised and 
prioritised by the group can also function as parameters of control.
The Delphi research performed in order to gain metric data from experts delivered a huge 
amount of qualitative data. This data was categorised and formed a set of core metrics at the 
level of Governance, management and operations that contemporary boards can directly 
apply. By implementing these requirements in the artefact as measurement criteria (per 
level of maturity) enables organisations to have direct insight in factual data. The metric 
items that were raised and prioritised by the Delphi group can function as parameters of 
control.
Important feedback that proof the relevance of this research;
“I’m seeking for good security metrics because currently we only report on our known risks” 
and “If I could had an answer to all these three questions. This is what I’m looking for.” 
These last two remarks also show the necessity of this research and the exchange of these 
insights. It also shows the high level of engagement of security professionals to participate in 
scientific research.
Case 5 revealed two astonishing facts. First of all the fact that security professionals are not 
fully aware of the external influence that have influence in their security strategy. And second 
of all the respondents acknowledge that 58 percent consider it important addressing these 
external forces in their strategy formulation in the future. Since they did not do this up until 
the survey.
Therefore the result of this survey showed that new knowledge items gained via other 
models can help the security practitioner. The survey showed how the Five Forces can be 
subdivided into dynamic and static forces and how inadequate security strategy is, with its 
inordinate focus on static forces. The second important result from the survey showed that 
new knowledge item such as the five forces and the value chain model can be borrowed from 
Porter to enrich the current strategy formulation with in the BIS domain. According to the 
survey findings, security misses the mark, typically focusing on individual activities of the 
organisation rather than considering the role each activity plays in the wider picture. For 
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instance, security specialists see that their business has relationships with third parties, but 
seldom recognises these parties as potentially influential forces.
Understanding the value chain and the five forces is a prerequisite for business success. Yet, 
surprisingly, Porter’s frameworks have yet to take hold in the BIS field, also proven by the 
outcome of the GSS session at the Erasmus University were all participants raised the use of 
Porters model as a potential successful parameter of strategising.
Integrating the knowledge items (such as Porters’ Five Forces or Value Chain) into the 
DSR process enables the debate with in boardrooms on the scope and context of BIS. 
Integrating requirements such as the “Stakeholder analysis” into the artefact can also serve 
as parameters of control.
The validation process revealed a critical analysis on the artefact functionalities. This showed 
that the artefact embodied too much functionality that was used very little. This validation 
urged the researcher and the development team to prioritise and select functionalities 
that actually contribute to BIS maturity. As a critical reflection towards the environment 
(organisations) is that the attention is paid by doing too much instead of doing the right 
things.  
8.2.3   SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 5 also reveals the “business requirements” of macro and meso-oriented knowledge 
(such as regulations, industry norms) gaining, capturing, sharing, and reporting (knowledge 
management items) within groups. This Chapter 5 also reveals the efficiency of GSS within 
boardrooms and management teams (relevance) and proposes GSS as an instrument to 
effectively process knowledge items and gain consensus on BIS strategy and maturity.  
The findings from Chapter 6 (Porter research) are typically knowledge items. These novel new 
insights into new models were shared in sessions and workshops [305] and contributed to 
new knowledge for the audience (rigour as well as relevance).
By the continuous measuring based on the rigour frameworks and norms, empirical data is 
collected. This data is used in contributing the rigour due to publications on new insights, 
preconditions, lessons learned, critical success factors and barriers.
The research facts show that best practices from several bodies (NEN, ISACA, NIST) are 
applied but do not have sufficient effect. Numerous reasons have been mentioned throughout 
this research. These bodies are not yet part of the design cycle but need to be part of it. They 
can learn lessons from the empirical data why these frameworks fail [3], [151], [5].
Due to regulations, evidence-based working [306] and integral management DSR appears 
to be an effective method to; articulate the business problem via the literature, discuss topics 
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and increase knowledge due to GSS and collect, measure, report data on BIS via the artefact. 
Conclusion is that DSR embodies all those perspectives.
Most of the participants from the environment acknowledged that the data from the design 
science cycle (e.g. artefact establishment) contributes to knowledge gaining and sharing, 
strategic forces, metrics, e.g. research data from Chapter 5. These knowledge items were not 
gained from the literature rigour but from the empiric.
8.3         RESEARCH RISKS AND LIMITATIONS 
In this section I will address the multiple risks and limitations this research faced as well as 
the mitigating controls that were put into place to ensure replicability, independence and 
precision [77]. In the multiple individual studies a predefined frame of reference was used in 
the form of; ISO27000 in chapter 2, Governance practices based upon SPRM in chapter 5, 
artefact construction based upon the approach of Johannesson and Perjons [73] in chapter 
6 and 7 and the ENISA criteria in the comparison study. These frames of references, together 
with the approach of multiple participants from multiple sectors to ensure validity, and the 
use of GSS to capture and record data complements the reliability of the entire research 
process. All sessions where; predefined with a clear agenda, moderated by an external and 
professional moderator, recorded on video or audio and structurally reported. By following 
the GSS sanity requirements for reliable expert panel research set by Hengst [115] this 
contributes independence and limits the influence from the researcher and increases the 
possibility of similar outcomes if this process was repeated. 
Other academic principles Recker refer to are Credibility and Confirmability. Credibility 
(internal validity) refers to the fact if the researcher has substantiated his findings with 
sufficient evidence. Credibility in this comparison study is achieved through triangulation, 
maintaining a chain of evidence via; a research proposal, process reports, notes regarding 
decisions making throughout the process, audio and video footage and GSS Meeting 
reports. When implementing and maintaining a chain of evidence Confirmability (aka 
measurement validity) is realised. Recker states “Confirmability suggests that qualitative 
research findings can be independently verified by outsiders in a position to confirm the 
findings (typically participants)” for example via the appendices that encompass all the data, 
a list of participants and their characteristics, detailed process reports, meeting notes with 
decisions throughout the process, video presentations and GSS Meeting reports etc. 
By publishing the majority of the research and the intermediate results in academic 
papers and conferences a scientific regulative cycle judged the latter on most of the above-
mentioned items. 
The main focus of this research was to examine and validate qualitative factors of influence 
and other practices that form parameters of control for boards and management. The 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, 
LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS8 303
methods used were mainly qualitative methods. A limitation of this study is therefore the 
absence of statistical data and analysis. The objective of this research was to examine causes 
and explicate problems mainly via qualitative methods, and apply these qualitative methods 
to parameters of control such as questionnaires and survey lists that express answers e.g. 
observations as quantitative scores. Drawing generalizable conclusions from these scores 
is only possible when the sample size is large enough, and the sampling contains some 
form of independent observations, which means that the score of an individual case, e.g. 
a measurement of BISG maturity, is influenced by the score of others. If BISG maturity 
measurements are made in groups, for example in boards or management teams, the 
presence of other members of the group influences the outcome and the results might 
therefore not be independent. The independence assumption is important when applying 
statistical techniques. Kline [248] warns statistical researchers that “scores from repeated 
measurements of the same case are probably not independent.” Kline continues: “… if scores 
are really not independent, results of analysis that assume independence could be biased.” 
Drawing generalizable conclusions from the data gathered via the measurements taken, 
with the SecuriMeter, is thus not feasible. A key objective of this research project was to 
establish the first iteration of an artefact that has the most relevant parameters that boards 
can take into consideration. These parameters change due to time, technology and business 
requirements and require constant assessment and alteration, preferably via a regulative 
design cycle. Again, the aim here is not, in this initial phase, to be mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive but to initiate debate among stakeholders to examine and determine 
resolutions to the BIS problem (for example, the checklist-based assessments in Chapters 
5 and 6). When this qualitative approach is further evolved via the rigour and relevance 
cycles and the data from the environment such as BISG scores are entered into the artefact, 
it becomes a knowledge base in itself. This thus allows quantitative analysis on the data 
gathered in later stages. When this data set becomes extensive enough, and represents a 
reasonable sample size, statistical analysis can be performed. Statistical inference could be 
subject to future research.
Since the field of BIS is complex, as explained by Abraham [80], little work has been done on 
transferring an empirical field of research into knowledge items such as practices and critical 
success factors [7], so such attempts are clearly necessary. As put forward in the previous 
section, quantitative methods can be used when larger data sets are available and data 
generalisability is possible, for example in the phase when macro level data from generic BIS 
interventions is gathered. This data can be replicated if the data analytics is performed with 
due care, especially since drawing generalizable conclusions from small samples influences 
the valid representation of the group and thus the external validity. As Kline argues about the 
characteristics of the observations in a certain sample: “there is a limited guarantee that the 
characteristics of any particular random sample will match those in the population” [248]. 
There is very few academic research performed among true board members [30], [7]. 
This research project is also limited into examining board room members. Although 
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the SecuriMeter artefact has been used in assessing organisations, and also board 
room members were involved, they did not agree to use the data for research purposes. 
UWV Chairman of the board Bruno Bruins agreed to use his name related to the BISG 
measurement I have performed with him, but did not allow to publicly disclose the outcome 
of the measurement.
Another limitation is time. This research is performed during the period 2010 to 2017. 
Even though, in the IS research field this is a long time it is still limited to 7 years. Since the 
emergence of the field and the swift dynamics one can also state that 7 years is a long time.
Besides the limited number of academic publications on security failures this last decade 
(compared to other disciplines such as healthcare, aviation, automotive) the confidentiality 
and shame of incident sharing is still present. In all surveys, all participants, are very limited 
in sharing incident information or failures. Also in the GSS sessions I observed reservation 
to share to much detail that can reveal the weak points of the organisation. As mentioned 
in the above sections, the introduction of ISACS51, public reports such as Ponemon, [307], 
CSI [308] ENISA [309], NCSC, integrated reporting standards [92], Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) [310] might bring more disclosure to this domain. This information 
sharing restraint is considered as a research limitation.
The artefact as presented in this thesis captures two forms of knowledge base items. First, 
new theoretical concepts such as the BISG maturity assessment established in Chapter 5, the 
MBIS maturity assessment established in Chapter 4 and the examples rose from numerous 
research methods in Chapter 6. These are scientific driven concepts scrutinised in the design 
cycle of the DS framework and incorporated in the artefact as working methods to solve 
practical problems. The other knowledge base items are items that rose from the practitioner 
community. Most of the times fairly well documented in the knowledge base, for example in 
ISO standards, NIST standards, or other forms of security community driven frameworks and 
practices. In Chapter 7, thirteen examples of practitioner-oriented alterations were raised 
and represent a fraction of all other working methods that were incorporated into the artefact 
during the years of construction. Due to the combination of academic and non-academic 
oriented working methods both scrutinised in the design cycle process, a rigorously 
developed artefact was established. One could argue that although the artefact is not purely 
derived from academia-related items, research institutions, universities are encouraged to 
contribute to the further development of the MBIS artefact. In this research project the pure 
scientific driven items into the artefact are from the researcher himself, this is a limitation 
in the sense that the artefact is not tested with other researchers/authors theoretical 
concepts. Although I as a researcher incorporated mechanisms to secure the objectivity and 
transparency of my research, I am aware of my own role and influence on my research. The 
way I have secured the objectivity of this research is by:
51  Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC's) are public-private partnerships which have been organised per sector. The 
participants exchange information and experiences about cyber security. 
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 − Making use of the DSR framework of Johannesson and Perjons which prescribes clear steps 
and criteria throughout the process and enables transparency.
 − Making use of numerous participants from heterogeneous organisations / professions.
 − Recording the GSS sessions on video or audio (with permission of the participants).
 − Publishing the research approach, findings and conclusion in peer-reviewed-journals during 
the entire research. 
 − Documenting the sessions (GSS Meeting reports) and documenting the artefact 
development process (e.g. via change logs, version documentation, backlogs, etc.)
 − Making use of an external professional moderator during the performed sessions.
All of these measures, which are applied to ensure objective and reproducible research, are 
listed in the appendices. This can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-
hfdc
Another limitation of this research is the direct link between the research method 
outputs as direct input for the artefact. For example, the used method of Group Support 
System technology can generate items such as ontological knowledge on parameters 
(i.e. stakeholders, compliance, policy criteria, and business drivers) but remain in the 
GSS software. After the GSS session the data needs to be manually implemented in the 
SecuriMeter artefact. A limitation in this research but certainly a step forward in DS research 
would be that GSS is the initial interface for the SecuriMeter. Therefore ontological and 
epistemological challenges can be prioritised during the session and directly imported into 
the artefact. This direct link enables the researcher to directly import relevant parameters 
into the SecuriMeter and further fine-tune the artefact based on the situational requirements 
at the customer end. This option is examined and can be implemented via the XML 
connection between the two software tools52.
The entire research into MBIS was performed with mainly Dutch customers. All participants 
are located in the Netherlands. Due to the absence of a fair number of foreign organisations 
limits the generalisability of the findings.
In several IT Alignment studies the success or failure factor lies sometimes in centralisation 
or decentralisation function of the IT department [311], [312], [313]. This aspect is not 
examined in this study even though it plays a role in the level of security effectiveness. 
There is a limited amount of research performed in the difference between centralised and 
decentralised environments. This dimension is not taken into consideration during this 
research project but could be subject to further research into meso-level research.
In line with the centralised and decentralised discussion, outsourcing the organisations 
security capabilities is also out of scope in this research project. Compared to the Business 
and IT alignment phenomena were sourcing is a fairly examined topic [314], within the 
52  This was examined based upon the SecuriMeter version 3 and Meeting Wizard GSS software. Not for other GSS software tooling.
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information technology (IT) security domain this is also examined but mainly for the 
technology and services perspective [312]. Paans, Schinagel and Schoon put great effort in 
outsourcing or insourcing the Security Operation Centre (SOC) function of the organisation. 
The authors conclude that SOC capabilities can be outsourced or for effectivity objectives 
integrated with other organisations in the form of specific collaboration such as forensics 
and pen testing (RijkSOCs) [315]. This “SOC sourcing” is limited to the IT part of the much 
broader domain of Business Information Security. Because of the broadness of this domain 
it seems obvious from a strategic perspective to outsource certain parts of the BIS function, 
an organisation will always be accountable for their own BIS maturity level and the level of 
control over this process. Due to the limited number of academic publications on sourcing 
this broader BIS concept and the fact that organisations hold an obligation of organising 
the BIS function and the how question is subordinate, it is left out of scope in this research 
project. Organising and contracting questions are obviously part of the strategy formulation 
and hold a direct relation to the organisation –resource- capabilities.
8.4        RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
INFORMATION SECURITY AS A STRATEGIC UNIQUE SELLING POINT (USP)
During the research some participating organisations were inspired to view Information 
security as an element that creates value. For example, GGN Mastering Credit applied, 
together with the researcher, the COBIT framework to reach a maturity level of 3 out of 5. 
This enabled them to reach a BIS maturity level which was prescribed for financial institutions 
that are regulated by the Dutch Central Bank. According to Security and privacy Officer FV 
this achievement is in line with the overall GGN Mastering Credit business objectives, to 
be perceived as an integer and engaged business partners towards their customers. This 
maturity level in relation to an ISO27001 certification enabled GGN Mastering Credit 
to acquire new customers [316]. According to FV this gives GGN Mastering Credit a 
competitive advantage towards the competition, “especially since customers increasingly 
demand a certain level of BIS from suppliers, this higher level of BIS maturity becomes 
a Unique Selling Point” [316]. FV participated in a publication in the Finance and ICT 
magazine [317].
Linking business objectives towards Business Information security initiatives was also 
performed by Timeos, a Dutch mid-sized pension fund. The Security Officer RvE, and the 
researcher engaged into a small coaching project with the objective to help the security 
officer align the business objectives to the security goals. This exercise gave the Security 
Officer of Timeos the ammunition to present his security plan to the board and master the 
knowledge and jargon gap.
Linking business objectives towards security objectives also helped medical Institute 
Verbeeten to increase the overall value perception. The objective was to improve the 
Maturity of Business Information Security, specifically on the awareness of the employees. TT 
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(facility manager) managed to measure and monitor the employee awareness over a certain 
timeframe due to smart formulated indicators. By doing this the Institute was able to comply 
with the NEN7510 as well as the CBRN regulations which require employees to be aware of 
handling confidential medical data and certain toxic substances. According to TvdD; “Our 
initial objective of improving the overall security awareness is achieved”, she proceeds; “by 
adopting awareness campaigns into the HRM cycle we enforce our employees to take notice of 
what taking care of confidential data is all about” [318].
PGGM, a large pension fund, also acknowledges that BIS has an indirect influence on 
customer value perceptions. As WP stated in a mutual case description about the use of 
COBIT and ISO in order to improve the BIS maturity [319]; “Customers require certification 
and expect a working Information Security Management system. Besides our customers, also 
our regulator DNB requires this”. “If we fail in information security and PGGM hits the news, 
that has a direct influence on our image and customer value perception”.
These cases are published in the book “How save is my “share”? [320], that highlight the 
perspective value creating of Business Information Security. These cases are based on 
interviews with organisations that collaborated in this action research and have directly or 
indirectly applied the SecuriMeter artefact. We can conclude that customers never have 
a direct requirement for adequate information security but most of the time it is indirect. 
Customers expect a proper handling of their privacy or other confidential information. 
Organisations that do not take this into consideration might suffer the consequences of a 
withdrawal of trust and thus less business.
THE PROCESS OF VALORISATION
After five years of doing Design Science research into the process of Maturing Business 
Information Security, and five thousand research and development hours spend with a 
research team, the artefact was acquired by DPA Group, a publically listed company which 
could find added value in applying SecuriMeter in their consulting practice and sell licences 
to customers. To me this is a classic example of the valorisation process. Numerous business 
problems led to well-articulated questions that were adopted in scientific research at the 
University of Utrecht, Den Haag and Antwerp. The problems were articulated in research 
objectives that encouraged academic researchers to address the problem and solve it with 
the use of an artefact. The following academic publications contributed to the rigour [249], 
[321], [322], [185]. By mutually, science and business, developing artefacts and apply 
this into business consultancy is the classic example of valorisation and the spin-off process. 
Nlemvo examined and published “The four stages of the global spin-off process”. From 
his in-depth analyses of the research data he distilled four stages in the global process of 
valorisation by spin-off.
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Stage 1: to generate business ideas from research. In this research five cases of business 
problems led to the creation of new consulting offerings, mainly assessments that were 
adopted in the artefact. And sometimes knowledge items that can be considered during the 
consulting process of data gathering, analysing, scenario-planning, presentation, reporting 
and advisory. A knowledge items that was raised was the use of existing management models 
(i.e. Porter’s Five Forces model).
Stage 2: to finalise new venture projects out of ideas. After the initial proof-of-concept 
phase described in Chapter 6 the MBIS artefact intellectual property was described and 
claimed via legal documentation. Due to partially Government funding for Research and 
Development within the BIS area a part of the artefact development was financially secured. 
The additional funding was gained from customers paying for the consulting services that 
were carried out with the artefact. An additional business plan was developed on how to 
exploit the artefact (Selling, licensing, convert into services) [323] and additional growth 
money was attracted from the bank to overbridge the financing gaps that traditionally occur 
with start-up projects and inventions [324]
Stage 3: to launch spin-off firms from projects. According to Nlemvo, “At the end of the 
second stage of the process, a new venture project should be ready. The third stage deals 
with the creation of a new firm to exploit an opportunity managed by a professional team 
and supported by available resources. These are the three key pillars of any entrepreneurial 
success”. In this stage a dedicated internal team was appointed with the development, 
marketing and sales of the MBIS artefact. An advisory board was installed to function as 
feedback forum for the research and development planning. External expertise such as 
lawyers, telesales and marketeers were contracted to bring the MBIS artefact to the market. 
The initial launch of the public version was done on the MBIS event in Lent in June 2013 in 
the presence of Dutch Cybercrime coordinator Dick Schoof, Antwerp University professor 
dr. Steven de Haes and many network partners and customers. This active engagement of a 
network ecosystem contributes to a higher spin-off performance [325].
Stage 4: to strengthen the creation of economic value by spin-off firms. After five years of 
research and development of the MBIS artefact and two years of commercial exploitation 
with customers the MBIS artefact has limitations. The main limitation is scale. Scale in the 
number of potential customers but also the size of customers. Since 2013 the SecuriMeter 
was mostly applied into mid-market organisations throughout the Netherlands. Although 
the underlying technology is scalable towards enterprise environments the environment of 
further incubation was limited in resources, time and money. Due to the size of the company, 
therefore the acquisition by DPA was tactically well timed, especially to create this desired 
up-scale. DPA serves with 1200 employees numerous enterprise customers within several 
industries throughout Europe. This new soil provide three opportunities for future growth of 
the artefact, in revenue (selling more licences and thus further establishing the valorisation 
process) but also extract more research data that is collected during consultancy 
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assignments. Data on maturity levels, critical success factors and best practices. This data can 
be processed anonymous for benchmark purposes and enables the design cycle to examine 
companies on a meso-level (over many industries) and macro level (over jurisdictions, 
countries and continents) to enable data generalisability.
8.5        FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARTEFACT 
In the figure below the maturity development of organisations is displayed. This Nolan and 
Norton model represents the evolution organisations go through. The curve represents 
a learning evolution through stages that depend on criteria that evolve over time. The 
assumption is that organisations and industries mature over time.
MICRO LEVEL (ONE ORGANISATION / SINGLE CASE)
At the micro level the rigour is contributed with one-dimensional details. Namely single 
case data taken for one organisation (relevance) with limited measurement methods (e.g. 
ISO27XXX, NEN). At the micro level lesson learned are drawn for the single organisation, 
however when in the design of the artefact industry statistics are included learned lessons 
can be evaluated. Relevance for one organisation is in practice measured on only a single 
case-based approach, and without an artefact which offers a longitudinal measurement, 
there is no support for a fact-based governance of the maturity of BIS. At the micro level the 
individual case finds its origin in a practical problem that’s being dealt with due to literature 
research on a mainly operational level. There is no comparative material on a higher level of 
abstraction (industries, countries, etc.). This micro level remains isolated per organisation 
and thus limited in generalisability. Relevance is determined by the case study, for instance 
ISO27001, and 'compared' by the literature (rigour), however without 'a' securimeter, the 
measurements and governance of security (design), this remains a case-based approach 
which cannot be compared (benchmarked) on the level of industry (meso) or jurisdiction 
(macro).
Figure 87: The spin-off process according to Nlemvo.
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MESO LEVEL (NUMEROUS ORGANISATIONS/BRANCHES)
The index gained in Chapter 5 is typically a macro level set of practices. The ISO based set of 
interventions from Chapter 4 can be applied on macro level within industries (NEN (health 
care) is based on ISO, BIR (Government) is based on ISO, BIWA (Water companies) is based 
on ISO, BIG (Local Government) is based on ISO etc. The other cases presented in Chapter 
7 can typically be applied on macro level since they are generic (for example Cloud, BYOD, 
virtualisation etc.).
Chapter 4 reveals core interventions that can function as a cost-benefit analysis and 
prioritisation (business case management). Chapter 4 shows the cost-benefit of interventions. 
Once gathered, large longitudinal data with the ability to benchmark (at the intervention 
level and cost level) becomes relevant. Cost-benefit analysis is done by comparing numerous 
business case studies. The Integrated Risk Overview within the artefact makes it possible to 
address the cost per risk item and the benefit per control and therefore the ability to forecast 
trends or anomalies based on a set of comparable and longitudinal industry figures/data.
Within a chain of actors the artefact can measure and govern the security of the entire chain 
(stakeholder analysis). The artefact can contribute to the establishment of a stronger rigour 
regarding the facts. An industry norm can be evaluated by the artefact in the design cycle, 
which enables the early engagement of the stakeholder and positively influences the effect 
of the intervention [218]. An example of an industry norm is the NCSC web application 
security guidelines [326]. These new guidelines are based on the work of Tewarie [176] who 
also participated in the future development of the artefact to enable the IT Objective Maturity 
Model (ITOMM) measurement method in order to comply with the NCSC guidelines. 
Screenshots of this NCSC guideline within the artefact are enclosed in the appendix.
Meso-level deals, with numerous organisations in certain industries. The rigour feeds the 
branch with best practices or generic branch interventions (such as PCI DSS for payment 
cards, HIPAA53 and NEN for Healthcare etc.) in order to master a practical problem. The 
design cycle utilises the establishment of certain requirements such as NEN (via the use of a 
GSS method) within the artefact that measures MBIS within this industry. The current status 
within SecuriMeter is that industry measurement data is limited
MACRO LEVEL(ENTIRE SECURIMETER DATABASE/CROSS-INDUSTRY)
At the macro level organisations learn from previous gathered data, this contributes to 
solving knowledge problems. More data fuels the self-learning process of the organisation 
(relevance), the design science and the rigour.  
Macro level deals with the highest abstraction level. This level is represented by micro data 
on individual organisations, data on industries and data of organisation across boundaries 
53  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA was enacted by the United States Congress) requires the 
establishment of national standards for electronic health care transactions and national identifiers for providers, health insurance 
plans, and employers.(source Wikipedia)
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and jurisdiction. In order to achieve this, the relevance cycle needs to provide the design 
cycle with problems that require solutions that were validated in the rigour and deal with 
globalisation and other broader problems (cybercrime, espionage, state-sponsored 
attacks etc.). This information gained from the rigour can feed the design cycle with new 
requirements
The future development of the industry as well as the artefact is typically subject to enhanced 
insights and requires an active, long-term commitment and engagement of Governing 
bodies (e.g. ISACA, NIST, ISO) academia and businesses to maintain the DSR cycle going 
and contribute to the overall maturing process of the BIS topic. Governing bodies should 
be part of the DSR cycle. The proposed fact-based DSR method can be part of the further 
development of international standards. These bodies (rigour) can learn from the empirical 
cycle. Further research on the application of DSR and the artefact into the proposed 
methodology is required. And as part of the DSR a continuous development of the artefact is 
also required. GSS can utilise the future functional and non-functional requirement setting, 
as well as the validation process.
Beyond monitoring and reporting towards the BoD and the organisations according to the 
selected requirements continuous further research need to be performed into bottlenecks, 
barriers and other influencing factors that limit the implementation. The artefact can be of 
assistance for the future research.
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Figure 88: The artefact maturing process based on Nolan Maturity Model of Organisations.
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Backlog of the artefact
The future requirements derived from the expert panel research in chapter 7 can function as 
a backlog of user stories for future development of the artefact. 16 items are not yet present 
but can be considered as a requirement and are potential backlog items that the developers 
can take into consideration for the next sprints. The top 5 is listed below.
NR.  ARTEFACT REQUIREMENT SUGGESTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXPERTS 
1. country of operation 
2. Translate known risks into costs of business discontinuity or lost opportunities 
3. security as part of KPIs, yearplan of employees 
4. available budgets 
5. look outside the organisation and learn from others their mistakes 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MATURITY CRITERIA WITHIN THE ARTEFACT
Tewarie [176] developed an Information security object repository. This repository 
encompass a comprehensive set of information security objects such as network, protocol, 
process, database, platform, mobile devices, connections, policies, storage, task and 
roles etc. This repository is theme based and therefore forms a structured method for 
measurement ad evidence collection. Audits and measurements can be performed based 
on these objects. Besides this self-assessments can be performed by organisations, due to 
NPLF classification of the objects. The sum of the individual object score, per theme, indicates 
the overall maturity level of the organisation. The pilot of this Information Security Object 
Repository (ISOR) within Information Security Object Maturity Model (ISOMM) is applied 
in the SecuriMeter as a pilot and seems promising for further research and action-based 
development.
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IT Security is becoming more complex and is changing more rapidly, and it has implications 
beyond the IT field, touching all the essential aspects of company operations. Since businesses 
increasingly rely on information and their supporting processes Information Security is more 
and more seen as part of Business Administration in close collaboration with key stakeholders 
that subsequently benefit the well-being of the firm. For this reason, we use the comprehensive 
term Business Information Security (BIS), which succinctly expresses the complexity and 
dynamic character of the field. The causes of the many security incidents that take place are very 
diverse, as are the strategies that have been chosen to keep them manageable. 
The survey of the academic literature that was conducted for this thesis has shown that raising 
BIS maturity is not a technical matter that can be solved with systems and techniques; rather 
it requires a more sociological approach. The right attitudes, a certain kind of behaviour and 
the corresponding culture appear to be essential, and the tone set by senior management is 
also important in ensuring that BIS becomes part of integral management with an appropriate 
administration to support dialogues. In practice I observe companies struggling with excel 
and word documents scattered throughout the organisation with no single source of truth. This 
becomes even more challenging since we are entering an era where compliance and in “control 
statements” are a license to operate for firms. The main problem we aim to tackle in this research 
project on the one hand, to contribute to the required knowledge sharing, build the necessary 
consensus on priorities (where to start), make informed decisions and create the necessary 
engagement among stakeholders. In this thesis we refer to the collective term “Collaboration”. 
And on the other hand determine the key concepts and practices that support the required 
analytical work and administration without reinventing the wheel. The main question we want to 
answer in this thesis is “How can we establish a collaborative analysis method which utilises best 
practices for improving the maturity of BIS (MBIS)?”
The first three chapters of the thesis outline the context for this study by providing an overview 
of the concepts that are most important for improving BIS. One important concept that makes 
it easier to recognise the diverse causes of problems is Design Science Research (DSR). DSR 
research focuses on developing and applying knowledge to support effective action in practice. 
This scientific knowledge does not supply ready-made solutions for specific problems; it is 
rather generic knowledge that professionals can use to design and develop specific solutions for 
specific problems (i.e. it is design-oriented). Beginning with this methodology, this study focuses 
on three essential areas and associated deliverables:
 − Examining the key concepts and parameters that influence BIS maturity. The collective 
term parameter is used to capture terms such as interventions, barriers, practices, critical 
success factors, knowledge items and working methods that are part of the MBIS process. It is 
not intended to examine or scrutinise the current frameworks or models and the efficiency of 
these models.
 − Designing and building an experimental artefact with relevant parameters. To contribute to 
capturing the above-mentioned items by constructing an artefact which has the initial relevant 
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requirements (parameters of control) needed to test these requirements and to demonstrate 
that it contributes to solving MBIS-related problems. I refer in this thesis to an artefact 
experiment. 
 − Examining and defining a method that addresses collaboration 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on the development of this conceptual framework of parameters 
that influence BIS maturity. They give a qualitative picture of the most important concepts and 
interventions that managers can initiate to improve and maintain their BIS maturity. These 
interventions were first categorised and prioritised by experts on the basis of criteria such as 
ease of implementation and degree of effectiveness, and then validated by forty managers with 
experience in the field. This study has also identified seven critical constraints for efficient MBIS. 
These ‘core interventions’ and constraints are immediately applicable for organisations. One 
of the most important findings from the responses of these forty managers was the need for 
senior management to be engaged in the process of setting the BIS strategy (i.e. in setting the 
organisation’s goals).
To analyse the failure of management to pay constant attention to improvement at all levels of 
the organisation (governance, management and operation), Chapter 4 describes an extensive 
literature study into diverse kinds of usable governance practices. Hundreds of sources in 
diverse locations across the world were consulted. The findings have been categorised, by means 
of a Group Support System (GSS) expert panel study, in the form of 22 essential governance 
practices and critical success factors. These essential practices and critical success factors can 
function as a conceptual BIS Framework of parameters for boards and senior managers.
In parallel with this academic research, hundreds of organisations have been helped to 
improve their BIS maturity on the basis of the core interventions from Chapter 3 and the 
core practices from Chapter 4. The practical experience gained in applying the scientifically 
generated knowledge of core interventions made us aware of the need for a set of instruments, 
an artefact that supports the analytical and administrative work to continuously monitor and 
measure the level of BIS maturity and to record the evidence. It would be a sort of book-
keeping application for the head of the BIS Department, based on existing framework and 
practices.
Chapters 6 and 7 describe the design and construction of an artefact with the necessary 
parameters that were derived from chapter 3 and 4. These parameters had first to be 
translated into system requirements, both functional and technical. The particular 
contribution of DSR research is that it links the existing body of knowledge to actual 
practice and vice versa, in order to make the problems faced in practice more manageable. 
In the case of BIS, this involves a continuous interchange of knowledge so that the artefact 
itself is also constantly being improved.
To design the artefact on the basis of problems encountered in BIS practice, Chapter 
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6 describes five common problems found in practice. These five ‘sore points’ are very 
diverse – both in their causes and in their effects – and they manifest themselves at different 
levels in an organisation. These problems have been subject to a structured qualitative 
study and translated into functional requirements for the artefact, in such a way that the 
artefact can contribute to solving or more effectively managing a BIS problem. Chapter 6 
then describes the design and construction of the artefact on the basis of Design Science 
Research. 
Chapter 7 takes the same five problems as a starting point to demonstrate how the 
artefact works and how the requirements affect the span of control of the parties involved. 
This chapter also includes an evaluation of the performance of the artefact from various 
perspectives. Finally a comparison study among 38 experts was executed to demonstrated 
the working compared to a similar tool. 
Finally, chapter 8 reveals the deliverables of this research being;
1 a) Parameters, insights and viewpoints that form a conceptual framework for BIS, 
and influences the BIS maturity at management as well as governance level (Board of 
Directors) as well as insights into factors that influence the BIS maturity.
1 b) A design artefact-tool that supports the administrative work (for measuring and 
reporting purposes), which can be used to report insights into the state of BIS maturity 
on multiple levels (strategic, tactical and operational) – using the parameters defined for 
reporting the BIS maturity of the organisation – to boards, owners and other stakeholders. 
Resulting in a defined analysis method which enables knowledge sharing, consensus 
building on priorities, make decisions enables stakeholder engagement, contributes to the 
increase of awareness and enables reflection.
The five primary functionalities of the artefact, each relating to our central research 
question. These primary functionalities are:
 − To identify and register relevant legislation and regulations, and the persons who are 
responsible and accountable. This is increasingly desirable in the Netherlands in view 
of laws and regulations such as the Data Breach Notification Act  and the proposed 
Cybersecurity Incidents Affecting Vital Services Notification Act.
 − Identifying the risk owners, the measures that must be taken, and the owners of these 
measures. This functionality makes it possible to monitor and measure these factors 
continuously, and includes the corresponding burden of proof. This functionality offers 
users an integral management approach.
 − Planning and designing numerous organisational and technical assessments at the 
levels of governance, management and operations, which are visualised in a dashboard.
 − The possibility of quantifying the current and desired situations and a presentation of 
352IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF 
BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
the steps that is necessary to bring about improvements. These steps can in turn be used 
as guidelines for BIS.
 − Various benchmarking capabilities, specific to the sector concerned, which offer the 
manager a factually-based frame of reference.
These functionalities were validated by multiple expert panels and acknowledged the 
presence of these functionalities in the artefact. The outcome of the expert validation 
reveals that 91% of the relevant functionalities are designed and built in the SecuriMeter 
artefact. Thereby the artefact supports the collaboration to do the necessary analytical and 
administrative work to create one source of truth.
The main contributions and conclusions of this research are:
 − A method that enables collaboration and administration to improve the Maturity of 
Business Information Security.  
 − A method that aligns business with information security and tested in practical 
environments 
 − An artefact that utilizes industry best practices and the required functionalities that 
contributes in the improvement of BIS 
 − An artefact that is proven by executing hundreds of measurements at 150+ midmarket 
and large organisations 
 − New insights in practices, enablers and critical success factors that maximise BIS and 
other academics to do further research on
 − The gained research data enables future research in the MBIS field
 − An improvement of the professional field of practitioner by providing research insights, 
data, findings
The artefact-tool that supports the administrative work has been applied in practice with 
more than a hundred organisations, using various methods from the existing body of 
knowledge plus the methods we have developed. In all more than 300 managers and 
IS professionals participated in the study. The outcome from more than 5,000 hours of 
work in research and development is a mature technology that has already been applied 
by diverse organisations. Just as there are levels of IS maturity within organisations – and 
the IS field is still maturing as a discipline – the artefact-tool will certainly mature further 
and pass through further necessary phases. One essential element will be the utilization 
of other methods found in the existing body of knowledge, such as international standards 
and frameworks. An important way to improve the artefact-tool is to further automate it 
so that the operational control effectiveness (BIS status) can be monitored and measured 
in real time. A built-in XML connector is a potential solution, and the first tests have been 
promising. Further automation and reducing the tolerances for error should contribute 
to higher reliability, so that management can approach their responsibilities – and legal 
liability – armed with good information. The continuous ‘feedback learning loop’ embodied 
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in Design Science Research offers a path of constant learning and improvement for the IS 
system, the organisation, and the communities that contribute to the developing body of 
knowledge.
This study has benefited from enthusiastic co-operation from many parties, who have 
demonstrated 100% willingness to participate in this and future research. The research 
has already led to several academic and practically-oriented publications. This Design 
Science Research has been conducted in close co-operation with companies and 
educational institutions. This has resulted in the construction of an artefact-tool with 
numerous functionalities and variable parameters that can assist organisations and can be 
used in further research.
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APPENDICES THAT ACCOMPANY CHAPTER 1
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) letter on security breaches (Meldplicht en 
interventiemogelijkheden), European Security Breach Notification. This letter describes the 
directives for vital sector companies to adhere to the data breach notification act. Published 
in July 2012 in the Netherlands.
The appendices are accessible via the Radboud University digital archive, structured per 
chapter. Accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
APPENDICES THAT ACCOMPANY CHAPTER 2
IN DIGITAL ARCHIVE:
Publication: This publication is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a 
collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security 
(MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was established to measure, 
monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business Information Security 
levels. This paper focusses on the several research methods used and prescribes a Design 
Science Research approach for the development and implementation of the Artefact. Title: 
On Exploring Research Methods for Business Information Security Alignment and Artefact 
Engineering in International Journal of IT/Business Alignment and Governance Volume 8 • 
Issue 2 • July-December 2017 (14 pages)
DOI: 10.4018/IJITBAG.2017070102
Publication: This publication is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a 
collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security 
(MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was established to measure, 
monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business Information Security levels. 
This publication describes a literature review and comparison between research methods for 
designing and engineering a Business Information Security (BIS) artefact. Defining research 
methods to establish artefact functions (e.g. dash boarding, risk register) that reflect the 
parameters of control for Board of Directors, is the main goal. Finally a research method 
is proposed that was used in the thesis which can be used to establish an experimental 
dashboard with initial parameters of control. This research approach is based on a Design 
Science Research (DSR) approach. 
DOI: 10.4018/IJITBAG.2017070102
Poster Publication: This publication is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On 
a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security 
(MBIS)”. In this research a Design Science research Artefact was established to measure, 
monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business Information Security 
358IMPROVING THE MATURITY OF 
BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY
levels. This poster publication was used to present the research methods and approach of 
the thesis at the Enterprise Engineering Working Conference (EEWC) Forum in 2017 in 
Antwerp, Belgium on 9 - 11 May 2017. It visualises the DSR approach used in this thesis and 
the deliverables of the thesis in terms of papers and artefact functions. 
url; http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1838/
The appendices are accessible via the Radboud University digital archive, structured per 
chapter. And can be accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
APPENDICES THAT ACCOMPANY CHAPTER 4
IN APPENDIX DOCUMENT 
List of preselected interventions e.g. first selection for setting the GSS agenda. These 
interventions were preselected by the expert based upon the relevance and applicability as 
an intervention for mid-market organisations. 
Objectives of Expert Group Discussion, send by mail prior to the session. This document sets 
the objectives and expectations for the participants of the GSS session and is send by mail 
upfront to the participants of the GSS session.
Expert panel introduction presentation (PDF). This presentation provides an introduction for 
the GSS session. It provides context for the participants and sets the expectations on what is 
expected from the expert participants. 
List of Expert Supplementation of security interventions. These interventions were raised by 
the experts during the GSS session.
Market definitions according to Gartner and CBS. These are mid-market definitions 
according the Centraal Bureau Statistiek (CBS) in The Netherlands and Gartner Research 
institute. 
Maturity models. An overview of maturity models used in Information Security 
Simplified COBIT information security maturity levels, source ISACA.
Ease of implementation BIS Interventions according to experts displayed in the graph
Effective Interventions Graph. A visualisation on the core MBIS interventions scored by the 
expert panel and ranked on the effectiveness. 
E-mail invitation to the participants and web survey screenshots. These screenshot represent 
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the invitation for participants of mid-market organisations to join in the survey and displays 
the survey portal. The survey was held in Q2 2010.
List of the Participating mid-market organisations. This list displays the names of the 
companies who have participated in the survey. They agreed in disclosing their company 
name and keep their participants name confidential. 
IN DIGITAL ARCHIVE 
GSS Expert panel introduction Presentation. This presentation document is a contribution 
to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the 
Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS)”. In this research a Design Science 
research Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations 
can improve their Business Information Security levels. This presentation was given as 
an introduction to the GSS expert panel participants who were asked to pre-select and 
prioritise the core interventions for mid-market organisations that can potentially function as 
parameters of control in this experimental artefact. This GSS Expert panel session was held 
as the first of several other GSS sessions to establish the artefact requirements. This session 
was held at 15 February 2010 in Fort Vechten Utrecht and was recorded and documented in 
a separate Meeting report.
GSS Expert panel data in Meeting report in separate PDF. This dataset is a contribution 
to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the 
Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS)”. In this research a Design Science 
research an artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations 
can improve their Business Information Security (BIS) levels. This report reflects the entire 
Group Support System (GSS) research results that was collected during the session among 6 
security experts. Objective of this expert panel research is to prioritize security interventions 
that contribute in the improvement of BIS maturity. The experts ranked the interventions on: 
a. Ease of Implementation and b. Effectiveness of the intervention. The report reflects the 
numeric scores as well as the graphs per intervention. Multiple disciplines participated in 
this panel session: Security manager, Auditor, Security Officer, consultant, accountant and 
lector. To support the expert panel research process we used a Group Support System (GSS). 
After this expert session surveys (questionnaire) with limited questions is composed and 
send out for feedback to mid-market organizations. In the form of a questionnaire the core 
interventions are presented and mid-market security/it managers needed to rank the most 
practical ones in order to increase their own BIS maturity levels. This will lead eventually to a 
framework with requirements, based upon a maturity model, of core interventions which can 
function as artefact requirements. This session was held on 15th February 2010 from 14.00-
18.00 in Fort Vechten in Utrecht (Netherlands). During this 4 hour sessions the participants 
were asked to provide input to establish a core set of interventions which can be used for the 
improvement of BIS. This session was moderated by a professional moderator. 
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Video footage of the GSS Expert panel session held at 15 February 2010 in Fort Vechten 
Utrecht in separate MPEG available by the researcher and not in the archive. During 
this 4 hour sessions the participants were asked to provide input to establish a core set of 
interventions which can be used for the improvement of BIS. This session was recorded with 
permission of the participants and moderated by a professional moderator.
The survey data in the Excel file is displaying all the survey data that was collected in Q2 
2010 by Dutch mid-market organisations. It consist of survey data on all core interventions 
according to the mid-market participants, percentages on interventions according to 
the survey results, scores of BIS barriers etc. The fields marked in red are the high scores 
compared to the rest. Table G to V reflect the core interventions the participant can score 
with Yes or No (if implemented), tables W to AL reflect the argumentation on the No if certain 
participants answered that a certain intervention was NOT implemented. The empty fields 
from tables W to AL therefor reflect a YES on the question. The latest column (AP) is the 
intervention suggestion mid-market participants rank as top interventions for mid-market 
organisations. The second excel tab reflect the scores in graphs. 
Publication in International Journal of IT/Business Alignment and Governance (IJITBAG) 
1(4), Page 18-39, in December 2010 under the title A research journey into Maturing the 
Business Information Security of Mid-market organisations in separate PDF. This publication 
is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for 
Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design 
Science research Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations 
can improve their Business Information Security levels. This publication describes the 
literature review, expert judgement via GSS and mid-market validation of a core set of 
interventions that mid-market organisations can take into account for improving their BIS. 
The final core set of interventions are set as artefact requirement candidates in a later stage of 
the research. 
DOI: 10.4018/jitbag.2010100102
The appendices are accessible via the Radboud University digital archive, structured per 
chapter. Accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
APPENDICES THAT ACCOMPANY CHAPTER 5
IN APPENDIX DOCUMENT
Agenda for the Expert Panel session held at 25 February 2012 in Veenendaal
Governance practices literature list. This list contains a consolidated view into the top ranked 
practices and with their variance. The items are enumerated via: First the Discipline, the 
SPRM mapping, the main description of the practices, a detailed description of the practice, 
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the source of the practice and the extraction date. 
Presenting the research paper on chapter 4 at the Hawaii International Conference of System 
Science (HICSS)
Presenting the research paper on chapter 4 at the ISACA conference (picture)
IN DIGITAL ARCHIVE 
Literature Overview of all Governance practices sources before the GSS session. This 
dataset is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method 
for Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design 
Science research Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations 
can improve their Business Information Security levels. This data set was collected over a 2 
year timeframe 2010-2012. This Excel file displays all the collected and examined sources 
on Governance practices in general that can form a reference for the GSS session. In this 
document you will see per tab the discipline (Corporate Governance (CG), IT Governance 
(ITG), Risk Governance (RG) and Information Security Governance (ISG). Row A represents 
the discipline of the practices, row B represents the mapping on SPRM to later on derive a 
clear list based upon Structures, Processes and Relational Mechanisms (SPRM), row C the 
description of the practice, row D a more detailed description and row E reflects the source 
of the practice in the literature. The tab cumulating represents the entire list of Governance 
practices that can function as input for the following GSS session with expert judgement. 
Scores on BIS Governance practices after the expert session with GSS. This dataset is 
a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for 
Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design 
Science research Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations 
can improve their Business Information Security levels. This data file called ”MBIS literature 
& GSS Expert research” excel file displays all scores derived from the GSS session held on 
25 February 2012 in Veenendaal. It contains: the combined scores of all 4 experts (cross 
impact), the individual score from the auditor, security consultant, security officer, security 
architect. The experts scored based upon the Ease of Design, Ease of maintenance and Ease of 
Implementation of the practices. The final result is a top 20 which can function as parameter 
requirements in the artefact. All ranked practices (including their literature sources) are 
marked based upon Structure practices, Process practices and Relational Mechanism 
practices (SPRM). The tab BIS framework reflects the end-product, a combined score of the 
top 26 BISG practices categorised in Governance and executive management practices. 
Group Support Session report from 25 February 2012 in PDF (167 pages). This report 
dataset is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method 
for Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design 
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Science research Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations 
can improve their Business Information Security levels. This detailed report displays all the 
collected data during the expert panel session held on 25 February 2012 in Veenendaal. 
During this session a group of experts assessed Governance practices suitable for BIS that 
later on could function as artefact requirements. 
Video footage of the expert panel (video), available on request. Not publicly available due to 
privacy restrictions. Available on request.
Publication on the 46th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) 2013 
in Hawaii United States. This publication is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort 
“On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business Information 
Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was established to 
measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business Information 
Security levels. In this publication is elaborated how the research among 4 experts was 
done to validate the literature on Governance practices via a collaborative process and 
documented in GSS. The title of this publication is: Group Support Systems Research in 
the Field of Business Information Security; a Practitioner’s View (pages 1-10) in PDF. It was 
presented in Hawaii in 2013 and the outcome was taken into account to further establish and 
demonstrate the artefact. 
DOI 10.1109/HICSS.2013.244 
The appendices are accessible via the Radboud University digital archive, structured per 
chapter. Accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
APPENDICES THAT ACCOMPANY CHAPTER 6
IN APPENDIX DOCUMENT
Invite letter for Delphi Research participation in PDF
Functional Design of the MBIS artefact, core MBIS interventions
Example of the Artefact Roadmap of requirements
Artefact functional design in UML Use cases
Screenshots of youtrack artefact maintenance and backlog tool 
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Excel file with Delphi research data. This data set is a contribution to the PhD thesis 
research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business 
Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was 
established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business 
Information Security levels. The data in this file reflects a Delphi research that was executed 
via a survey questionnaire in multiple rounds. The first tab represent the demographics of 
the participants (names and e-mails are left out). The second tab represents the answers 
the participants gave on Strategic forces questions and the tab “all questions” reflect all the 
answers the participants made. The last tab represents the summary of the strategic forces 
the participants are coping with during the establishment of their security plans. 
Delphi research data in PDF. This data set is a contribution to the PhD thesis research 
effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business 
Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was 
established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business 
Information Security levels. In these three PDF documents the data of the above-mentioned 
Delphi research is collected. It displays; demographics of the participants (42), background, 
role and education, The industry they are in, the BIS forces they experience (recognition of 
forces expressed in %), their impact, specific knowledge items the participants find vital for 
their industry, SMART security metrics on management and Operations.
 − Report on Delphi Research part 1in PDF (1-26 pages) reports the important strategic 
forces the participants experience during their strategic planning
 − Report on Delphi Research part 2 in PDF (1-8 pages) reports the important arguments 
how organisations think they can continuous improve on BIS.
 − Report on Delphi Research part 3 in PDF (1-9 pages) reports important metrics on how 
organisations can measure and monitor their BIS improvement efforts on a Governance, 
Management and Operational level. It also reports on new insights the participants 
gained during the filling in of the questionnaire. 
Publication on Governance Practices and Critical Success factors suitable for Business 
Information Security at the International Conference on Computational Intelligence and 
Communication Networks in 2015 in PDF (1-8 pages). This paper is a contribution to the 
PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity 
of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact 
was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their 
Business Information Security levels. This paper describes the research process of collecting 
literature data on BISG and validates this via the GSS expert panel to establish a core set of 
BIS practices and Critical Success Factors. This research was conducted in 2011 and 2012. 
The derived BISG practices are used in the further establishment of the BIS artefact. 
DOI 10.1109/CICN.2015.216.
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Publication on Porters’ Elements for a Business Information Security Strategy in Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) Journal volume 1 2015. This publication 
reflects the research effort into strategic forces organisations cope with while drafting their 
strategic BIS plans. 
GSS session report in PDF. This report is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort 
“On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business Information 
Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was established to 
measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business Information 
Security levels. This report displays the GSS session held on 12 April 2012 in Veenendaal 
among CIO’s and CISO’s of mid-market organisations. During this session the participants 
were asked to raise important management information and BIS dashboard items that can 
function as artefact requirements
The appendices are accessible via the Radboud University digital archive, structured per 
chapter. Accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
APPENDICES THAT ACCOMPANY CHAPTER 7
IN THE APPENDIX DOCUMENT
Visual of the research program for establishing the artefact. This visual display the entire 
research program for establishing the artefact based upon several research projects. 
Online tracking tool for the backlog and development of artefact requirements. Screenshot 
of the software development tracking tool used by the researcher and the developer
Screenshot to demonstrate the portal for online access to the artefact 
ISO15504 in detail and some examples (screenshots) on how this is implemented in the 
artefact 
Demonstration via screenshots of the BIS maturity assessment in the artefact
Screenshots to demonstrate the Software development tracker “YouTrack”. This software 
development tracking software was used to raise new functionalities to the developer and 
track the development, implementation and documentation of the functionality requests.
Examples of Evidence of the taken assessments with the artefact, for benchmark purposes
Screenshots of the evaluations on the artefact
Evaluation and feedback register in Excel. This list was maintained to collect all the feedback 
raised during the development of the artefact.
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Evaluation and Advisory report on artefact functions. This thesis report is a contribution 
to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the 
Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research 
Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve 
their Business Information Security levels. This thesis is a contribution to evaluate and 
assess the core functionalities of the artefact and do a deeper analysis on the efficiency and 
effectivity of these functionalities in solving stakeholder problems and customer satisfaction. 
This research part was done in collaboration with The Hague University of Applied Sciences 
(Haagse Hogeschool) department Security Management, executed in 2014 and is in Dutch, 
page 1-95, in PDF by ST.
Thesis on the establishment and evaluation of the prototype artefact. This thesis report 
is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for 
Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design 
Science research Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations 
can improve their Business Information Security levels. This report reflects the establishment 
of the artefact prototype and an evaluation at four organisations on multiple topics such 
as completeness, applicability, understandability, reliability, the goal and suggested 
improvements. This research part was done in collaboration with Utrecht University of 
Applied Sciences (Hogeschool Utrecht) department Informatics, executed in 2011 and is in 
Dutch, page 1-39, in PDF by SP
Adviesrapport IRO versus ISMS. This thesis report is a contribution to the PhD thesis 
research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of 
Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact 
was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their 
Business Information Security levels. This thesis is a contribution to compare the artefact 
function; Information Risk Overview (IRO) to the functionalities of an Information Security 
Management System (ISMS). This research part was done in collaboration with The Hague 
University of Applied Sciences (Haagse Hogeschool) department Security Management, 
executed in 2015 and is in Dutch, page 1-14, in PDF format by TA.
Group Support System on Porter and BISG research report. This summary report is 
a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for 
Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design 
Science research Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations 
can improve their Business Information Security levels. This report reflects a GSS session 
among 28 CIO’s, CISO’s, It managers on the topic “Cyber Security in the Boardroom” and 
provides insight into knowledge questions. It was held at Erasmus University in Rotterdam at 
10 September 2015 (page 1-15).
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Overview of the comparison criteria and video scripts. This excel report is a contribution 
to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the 
Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research 
Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve 
their Business Information Security levels. In this excel sheet you can find all the comparison 
criteria that were distilled via the ENISA based criteria, plus criteria that were distilled from 
this research, via an expert panel analysis and prioritisation. In this overview the top 31 
criteria items with 6 votes or more in favour out of an expert panel group of 7 experts. These 
final 31 items were given to a two persons who demonstrated the presence of the criteria in 
the two MBIS artefacts (tools) via a predefined script (drafted by the person presenting the 
tool), and where videotaped for later validation by another expert panel group. Columns: A 
represents the number of the criteria, B the description of the criteria, C the score from the 
experts, D the script of the MBIS artefact SecuriMeter and F the script for the ISF accelerator. 
The videos where later on used to compare the two artefacts and do a detailed validation per 
criteria. 
Report on the online test (step 1a). This report is a contribution to the PhD thesis 
research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business 
Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was 
established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business 
Information Security levels. This report reflects the results of the test participants in round 
1a of the comparison study. This comparison was executed on both tools (artefacts). In this 
round the test panel tested the interface, questioning, usability etc. before the next step (1b) 
can be executed. This test was executed online in June 2017. 14 pages in PDF named “First 
GSS comparison criteria”.
GSS Meeting report on (step 1b blind) internet submissions on scoring the criteria 
on their relevance. This report is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a 
collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security 
(MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was established to measure, 
monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business Information Security 
levels. This report reflects the first round of the GSS session (1b). The data in this report was 
collected due to pre submission of the scoring prior to the GSS sessions of 6 July 2017. Since 
this was submitted prior to the session the participants were not able to discuss or influence 
each other (blind submission). This was used as input for the physical meeting session held on 
the 6th July 2017 with the same participants. Page 1-16 in PDF named “Internet Session”
Meeting report on GSS session 6th July 2017 (step 1b in group). This report is a 
contribution to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for 
Improving the Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design 
Science research Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations 
can improve their Business Information Security levels. This report reflects the final step in 
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step 1 and captures the data of the GSS meeting held on 6th July 2017 with the objective to 
derive the core comparison criteria to in a later stage compare two artefacts on. Page 1-24 in 
PDF named “GSS The Hague”.
SecuriMeter videopresentation (step 2). This video presentation is a contribution to the 
PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity 
of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact 
was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their 
Business Information Security levels. This video reflects a presentation of all the predefined 
37 comparison criteria (step 2) in the SecuriMeter artefact. This video is available with 
consent of the presenter. 
ISF Accelerator videopresentation (step 2). This video presentation is a contribution to the 
PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity 
of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact 
was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their 
Business Information Security levels. This video reflects a presentation of all the predefined 
37 comparison criteria (step 2) in the ISF Accelerator artefact. This video is available with 
consent of the presenter.
Meeting report on GSS Session 10th August 2017 (step 3). This report is a contribution 
to the PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the 
Maturity of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research 
Artefact was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve 
their Business Information Security levels. This report contains the data capturing of the 
expert panel judgements during the session on 10th August 2017. This record contains 
the data of: Names of participants, the agenda of the session, the scores of the experts’ 
judgment on the ISF Accelerator security tool including some comments. The scores of the 
experts’ judgement on the SecuriMeter security tool including some comments. The opinions 
of experts on the question “which artefact requirements can be considered on the level of 
Governance, management and operations” and the opinions of experts on the process of this 
comparison study. It is presented in text and graphs in PDF format (page 1-22) and named 
“Expert Panel session of 10th August 2017”
GSS report on Session 3 in Excel. This record is a contribution to the PhD thesis research 
effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business 
Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was 
established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business 
Information Security levels. This record contains the data capturing of the expert panel 
judgements during the session on 10th August 2017. This record contains the data of:
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1 st tab: A brief explanation on the several rounds during this comparison study. The 
required way of scoring via the ISO15504 methodology. 
2nd and 2rd tab: The scores of the experts’ judgment on the ISF Accelerator security tool 
including some comments. The variability between the experts judgements.
4th and 5th tab: The scores of the experts’ judgement on the SecuriMeter security tool 
including some comments. The variability between the experts judgements
6th tab: The opinions of experts on the question “which artefact requirements can be 
considered on the level of Governance, management and operations”
7th tab: The opinions of experts on the process of this comparison study 
8th tab: Names of participants (blanked out in the public version)
9th tab: Final mapping of the criterias and the comparison between the two artefacts 
The appendices are accessible via the Radboud University digital archive, structured per 
chapter. Accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
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Screenshot of the BIWA. This screenshot is a contribution to the PhD thesis research effort 
“On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity of Business Information 
Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact was established to 
measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their Business Information 
Security levels. These screenshots reflect the various assessments variants that are built in the 
artefact for measuring the security levels within; water companies that need to comply to the 
BIWA (Baseline Informatiebeveiliging Waterschappen). It also includes a screenshot of the 
BIWA dashboard and the BIWA benchmark in the water company industry. 
Screenshot of the implementation of the ITOMM. This screenshot is a contribution to the 
PhD thesis research effort “On a collaborative analysis method for Improving the Maturity 
of Business Information Security (MBIS). In this research a Design Science research Artefact 
was established to measure, monitor and report how organisations can improve their 
Business Information Security levels. These screenshots reflect the IT Objective Maturity 
Model (ITOMM) build in the artefact for measuring the security levels based upon the 
ITOMM model. Screenshot on the implementation of the ITOMM measurement scales, 
questions, graphs, dashboard etc. Mainly used for future development of the ITOMM model. 
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Notification letter of the European Security Breach / incident notification act July 2012 in 
PDF. In this act specific vital industry companies are subject to a new notification act to notify 
if they are victim of a significant data breach or incident.
The appendices are accessible via the Radboud University digital archive, structured per 
chapter. Accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-zbu-hfdc
THE ENTERPRISE
ENGINEERING
NETWORK
371THE ENTERPRISE ENGINEERING 
NETWORK
BACKGROUND 
The Enterprise Engineering Network (EE Network, www.ee-network.eu) is a research and 
training network targeting PhD candidates and research fellows. Next to the supervision of 
PhD candidates and research fellows, the main activities of the network involve:
 − Research seminars;
 − Events targeting interaction with practitioners;
 − Events targeting interaction with M.Sc. students;
 − Development of a joint curriculum for EE Network researchers and associated courses;
 − Co-organisation of scientic events.
The hosts of the network are also concerned with formulating and conducting joint research 
projects. Yet, the EE Network itself focuses on the actual training activities. The history of the 
EE Network, and its direct predecessors, can be traced back to 2001. It is currently hosted at 
six locations:
1. Headquarters: IT for Innovation Services department of the Luxembourg Institute of 
Science and Technology, Belval, Luxembourg;
2. Université de Lorraine, Nancy, France;
3. University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg;
4. Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands;
5. HAN University of Applied Science, Arnhem, the  Netherlands;
6. Utrecht University of Applied Science, Utrecht, the Netherlands.
To enable a practical operation of the training activities, in particular for the research 
seminars, the EE Network has a traditional geographical focus on the Rhine-Scheldt-Meuse-
Moselle basin, which includes the Low Countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), 
the Rhineland in Germany, as well as Lorraine in France.
372IMPROVING THE MATURITY 
OF BUSINESS INFORMATION 
SECURITY
FINISHED DISSERTATIONS
Dissertations produced in the EE Network, and its 
direct predecessors, include:
2018-1 M. Bjeković, Pragmatics of Enterprise 
Modelling Languages: A Framework for 
Understanding and Explaining, Radboud University, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands, January 12, 2017
2017-2 M. van Zee, A recommender system to 
support high-level decision making in large 
companies Rational architecture: Reasoning about 
enterprise dynamics, University of Luxembourg, 
Luxembourg, April 6, 2017
2017-1 G. Plataniotis, EA Anamnesis A Conceptual 
Framework for Enterprise Architecture 
Rationalization, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands, April 4, 2017
2016-2 R. Ettema, Using triangulation in Lean Six 
Sigma to explain quality problems - An enterprise 
engineering perspective, Radboud University, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands, December 14, 2016
2016-1 H. Faller, Organizational Subcultures and 
Enterprise Architecture Effectiveness: an Ex-planatory 
Theory, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands, March 4, 2016
2015-2 L.J. Pruijt, Instruments to Evaluate and 
Improve IT Architecture Work, University of Utrecht, 
Utrecht, the Netherlands, November 25, 2015.
2015-1 D.J.T. van der Linden, Personal semantics of 
meta/concepts in conceptual modeling languages, 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands, February 13, 2015.
2014-2 C. Feltus, Aligning Access Rights to 
Governance Needs with the Responsibility 
MetaModel (ReMMo) in the Frame of Enterprise 
Architecture,University of Namur, Namur, Belgium, 
March 11, 2014.
2014-1 F. Tulinayo, Combining System Dynamics 
with a Domain Modeling Method, Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, January 27, 
2014.
2013-2 C. Brandt, An Enterprise Modeling 
Framework for Banks using Algebraic Graph 
Transformation, Technische Universität at Berlin, 
Berlin Germany, December 20, 2013.
2013-1 R. Wagter, Enterprise Coherence, Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 
November 19, 2013.
2012-2 A. Nakakawa, A Collaborative Process for 
Enterprise Architecture Creation, Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, November 21, 
2012.
2012-1 D. Ssebuggwawo, Analysis and Evaluation of 
Modelling Processes, Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands, November 21, 2012. 
2009-2 S. Overbeek, Bridging Supply and Demand 
for Knowledge-Intensive Tasks, Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, April 24, 
2009.
2009-1 J. Nabukenya, Improving the Quality of 
Organizational Policy Making using Collaboration 
Engineering, Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands, March 3, 2009.
2006-1 B. van Gils, Aptness on the Web, Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 
March 3, 2006.
2004-1 S.J.B.A. Hoppenbrouwers, Freezing 
Language { Conceptualisation Processes across ICT 
Supported Organizations, Radboud University 
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, December 
10, 2004.
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